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We are determined to tackle the unfairness that holds people back and give everyone the 
opportunity to succeed – make sure everyone has a fair chance.
We know that disadvantage can come from your gender or ethnicity; your sexual orientation 
or your disability; your age or your religion or belief or any combination of these. But 
overarching and interwoven with this is the persistent inequality of social class – your family 
background and where you were born.
Action to tackle inequality must be based on the most robust and sophisticated analysis of its 
roots and how it affects people’s lives. In order to provide that detailed and profound analysis, 
in 2008, the Government set up the National Equality Panel, chaired by Professor John Hills. 
This report of the National Equality Panel shows clearly how inequality is cumulative over an 
individual’s lifetime and is carried from one generation to the next. 
But the report also shows that public policy intervention works. It has played a major role 
in halting the rise in inequality which was gaining ground in the 1980s. Public policy has 
narrowed gaps in educational attainment, narrowed the gap between men and women’s pay 
and tackled poverty in retirement. 
The National Equality Panel Report shows the key stages in people’s lives where public  
policy intervention is most important and most effective – during the pre-school years,  
at the transition from education to the workplace and re-entering the labour market after 
having children. 
This National Equality Panel Report sets out undoubted challenges. The important thing 
now is to acknowledge the importance of those challenges and to use the National Equality 










For individuals, who deserve to be treated fairly and have the 
opportunity to fulfil their potential and achieve their aspirations;
For the economy, because the economy that will succeed in the 
future is one that draws on the talents of all, not one which is 
blinkered by prejudice and marred by discrimination; 
For society, because an equal society is more cohesive and at ease 
with itself. vi
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In response to the challenge set out in this report, the Government, building on substantial 
progress to date, will continue to make the choices that prioritise fairness and aspiration. This 
challenge will need to be addressed by Government, but also by working in partnership with 
others including with local government and the voluntary sector. The scale of the challenge 
set out in the National Equality Panel Report cannot be addressed overnight. It will demand 
sustained public policy commitment.
I want to warmly thank Professor Hills and his panel for their comprehensive report. This is 
important work done to the highest standard of professionalism. It is the responsibility of 
we in Government to match the scale of the challenges with the commensurate focus of 
Government action. 
The work of the National Equality Panel will underpin the response by all strategic public 
authorities to Clause One of the Equality Bill which places a new legal duty on key public 
bodies to consider, in all the important decisions they make and all important actions they 
take, how they can tackle socio-economic inequality. 
This is a big challenge which requires sustained and focused action. But for the sake of the 
right of every individual to reach their full potential, for the sake of a strong and meritocratic 
economy and to achieve a peaceful and cohesive society, that is the challenge which must  
be met.
Harriet Harman 




As will be evident from the amount of material we are able to present in this volume, we have 
been greatly supported in our work by a very wide range of organisations and individuals, to 
all of whom we are most grateful. However, the views and opinions in the Report are those of 
the Panel and are not necessarily shared by those who have supported us or whose analysis or 
research we draw upon.
First, we would like to thank the Government Equalities Office for the funding, personnel and 
other support it has given to us since we started work in October 2008, at the same time as it 
has rigorously respected our independence.
Second, we are very grateful to all those who submitted evidence to us or came to the 
consultative events which we organised (see Appendices 5 and 6). These gave us the benefit 
of their expertise and perspectives and raised many important issues on which we hope the 
information we present here sheds some more light.
Early in our work we were very generously hosted by a series of universities, research 
organisations, government departments and the devolved administrations, whose members 
took great trouble to present relevant research and material focussed on the questions we 
were asked to investigate (see Appendix 4). As will be seen, we draw on much of this research, 
and on follow-up work kindly carried out for us. In particular, we are grateful to James Banks 
and Gemma Tetlow of the Institute for Fiscal Studies for analysis of the distribution of wealth 
within the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing.
We also commissioned researchers to carry out specific pieces of detailed research which have 
pushed forward understanding in this area (see Appendix 7). Thanks to the quality and speed 
of these exercises, we have been able to draw extensively on their results throughout our 
Report. The resulting research reports are available on our website.
Throughout our work, our requests for analysis, data and information have been generously 
and patiently met by officials in a number of government departments and agencies. In 
particular, we are grateful for analysis carried out for us by the Households Below Average 
Income team in the Department for Wealth and Pensions, by the Wealth and Assets Survey 
team at the Office for National Statistics, officials in the Department for Children, Schools 
and Families and in the devolved administrations concerned with pupil outcomes at school, 
and those in what is now the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills concerned with 
entry into higher education.
We are very grateful for permission from their editors to reproduce figures from the most 
recent report of the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (Figure 11.24) and from Top 
Incomes over the Twentieth Century edited by A.B. Atkinson and T. Piketty (Figures 2A and 2B) 
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In preparing the report for publication, the designers and staff of CDS have carried out an 
exceptional job in helping us to make the material as accessible as possible, and have done so 
to a very tight timetable.
As a Panel, however, our greatest debt is to our Secretariat and the staff of the Centre for 
Analysis of Social Exclusion at the London School of Economics who have so ably supported us 
throughout: Antonino Barbera Mazzola, Jack Cunliffe, Jane Dickson, Zoë Palmer, Cindy Smith 
and Anna Tamas, led by Giovanni Razzu. Without them it would have been impossible to have 
embarked on this exercise, let alone to have completed it.
John Hills 




After Housing Costs (AHC) Income
The income after deducting housing costs, such as rent, water rates and charges, mortgage 
payments etc, have been deducted.
Age cohort 
A group of people born in the same year or other period.
Before Housing Costs (BHC) Income
The income before deducting housing costs (e.g. rents, mortgage payments etc). 
Disposable income
The income left over after income tax and National Insurance are deducted, but including 
social security benefits and tax credits.
Earnings
The remuneration (wages and salaries) provided directly by employers to employees in return 
for their supplied labour. In this report, we generally use ‘earnings’ to refer to weekly amounts 
and ‘wages’ to refer to hourly pay.
Equality strands
Social groups covered by equalities legislation including gender, age, ethnicity, religion or 
belief, disability status, sexual orientation and transgender.
Equivalent net income
Comprises total income from all sources of all household members including dependants, 
after deducting direct taxes. Income is adjusted for household size and composition, using 
equivalence scales, which reflect the extent to which households of different size and 
composition require a different level of income to achieve the same standard of living (see 
Box 2.1).
Gini coefficient
A international summary indicator of inequalities. It can take values from zero to 100 (in 
percentage terms) or from zero to one. Zero indicates perfect equality, with every household 
or individual having the same amount; a value of 100 or one would imply that one household 
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Household reference person (HRP)
The person responsible for the accommodation. In the case of joint householders, it is the 
person with the highest income. If there are two or more members with the same income, 
the HRP is the eldest. In households with a sole householder that person is the household 
reference person. 
Individual income
Income received by each adult in her or his own right from all sources, both before (total) and 
after (net) deducting direct taxes.
Key Stages
The National Curriculum is divided into four Key Stages according to pupils’ ages:  
Key Stage 1 – Infant School (6-7 years); Key Stage 2 – Junior School (7-11 years);  
Key Stage 3 – Lower Secondary School (12-13 years); Key Stage 4 – Upper Secondary School 
(14-16 years).
Median, Income
Median household income divides the population of individuals, when ranked by equivalent 
net income, into two equal sized groups. The median of the whole population is the same 
as the 50th percentile. The term is also used for the midpoint of the subsets of the income 
distribution. 
National Minimum Wage
A minimum rate of pay that employers are legally obliged to pay their workers. In the UK, the 
National Minimum Wage from October 2009 for workers over 21 is £5.80 an hour. 
Pay gap
The raw gap in pay between two groups, for instance between men and women (gender pay 
gap) or disabled and non-disabled people (disability pay gap)
Pay penalty
Unexplained component/factor of pay gaps. The pay gap could be accounted for by factors 
such as different educational qualifications, occupation, etc: what cannot be accounted for by 
those factors has been defined as representing the pay penalty. 
Percentiles
The values which divide a distribution, when ranked by an outcome, such as income, into 100 
equal-sized groups. Ten per cent of the population have incomes below the 10th percentile, 20 
per cent have incomes below the 20th percentile and so on.xi
Glossary of terms
Wealth
The stock of assets of households. Depending on the definition, these can include financial 
assets, material, property or housing assets (net of liabilities owed), and private pension rights.
90:10 ratio
A summary measure of inequality. This is the ratio between the values of an outcome for 
people 10 per cent from the top and the 10 per cent from the bottom of a distribution. The 




















inequalities in the UK
Chapter 1 Introduction
Britain is an unequal country, more so than many other industrial countries and more 
so than a generation ago. This is manifest in many ways – most obviously in the gap 
between those who are well off and those who are less well off. But inequalities in 
people’s economic positions are also related to their characteristics – whether they are 
men or women, their ages, ethnic backgrounds, and so on. The independent National 
Equality Panel, was established at the invitation of the Rt. Hon. Harriet Harman, Minister 
for Equality to report on the relationships between inequalities in economic outcomes 
and differences related to people’s characteristics.1
Inequality matters
Readers from different philosophical and political perspectives will come to the material in 
this report with both varied expectations for what they will see and varied views of what kinds 
of inequality are justified or unjustified.
Some might argue that inequalities of the kind we describe are inevitable in a modern 
economy, or are functional in creating incentives that promote overall economic growth. 
However, comparisons of the kind we make in Chapter 2 with other equally or more 
economically successful countries, but with lower inequality, undermine arguments about the 
inevitability or functionality of the extent of the inequalities in the UK that we document. 
Moreover, the view that greater equality would stifle diversity has to be set against the 
counter view that it is inequality that suppresses the ability of individuals to develop their 
talents.2 Where only certain achievements are valued, and where large disparities in material 
rewards are used as the yardstick of success and failure, it is hard for those who fall behind to 
flourish.
1  Appendix 1 and 2 list the membership of the Panel and present our terms of reference.
2  As R.H. Tawney wrote, “individual differences, which are a source of social energy, are more likely to ripen and 
ﬁ  nd expression if social inequalities are, as far as is practicable, diminished” (1964, p.57).
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For many readers, the sheer scale of the inequalities in outcomes which we present will be 
shocking. Whether or not people’s positions reflect some form of ‘merit’ or ‘desert’, the 
sheer degree of difference in wealth, for instance, may imply that it is impossible to create 
as cohesive a society as they would like. Wide inequalities erode the bonds of common 
citizenship and recognition of human dignity across economic divides. A number of analysts 
have pointed to the ways in which large inequalities in the kinds of economic outcome we 
look at are associated with societies having lower levels of happiness or well-being in other 
respects, and to the social problems and economic costs resulting from these.3
When considering whether the degree of inequality is ‘justified’ or not, an important 
distinction lies in how people judge inequalities between groups such as those between 
women and men or between ethnic groups, and inequalities within those groups. Where 
differentials in, say earnings, reflect differences in work experience, creating differences 
by age, this might be seen as reasonable. But systematic differences between groups – for 
instance, by gender, ethnicity or religion – unrelated to experience or qualifications, constitute 
what would be seen by some as being the most central issue, violating fundamental principles 
of social justice, rooted in recognition of equal worth and respect. At the same time, even if 
such differences were eliminated completely so that, for instance, men and women enjoyed 
equal incomes, but there remained large gaps between low and high income men and low 
and high income women respectively, many would still not regard the resulting distribution as 
fair, as society as a whole would remain more unequal than they thought was just.
This is, in part, because a crucial test of whether inequalities in outcomes are seen as fair or 
unfair will depend on whether they reflect choices made against a background where the 
opportunities open to people were equal to start with, or whether they stem from aspects 
of their lives over which they have manifestly little control. Most people and all the main 
political parties in Britain subscribe to the ideal of ‘equality of opportunity’. The systematic 
nature of many of the differentials we present, and the ways in which advantages and 
disadvantages are reinforced across the life cycle (as we describe in Chapter 11), make it hard, 
however, to sustain an argument that what we show is the result of personal choices against 
a background of equality of opportunity, however defined.  Inequality in turn then acts as a 
barrier to social mobility.
Aims of this report
This report documents the relationships between the distributions of various kinds of 
economic outcome on the one hand and people’s characteristics and circumstances on 
the other. In addition to documenting the extent of inequalities overall, it also addresses 
questions such as: how far up or down do people with different characteristics typically come 
in the distributions of, say, earnings or of wealth? Specifically, the outcomes we examine are:
  ❍ educational outcomes, including the range of achievement of young people at 16 
(GCSE points scores or their equivalent) and the highest educational qualiﬁ  cations of 
adults;
3  See the extensive evidence in Layard (2005) or Pickett and Wilkinson (2009).3
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  ❍ employment status of the adult population;
  ❍ earnings of those in paid employment, both hourly wages and weekly earnings;
  ❍ individual incomes, received by each adult in their own right from all sources in total, 
both before and after deducting direct taxes;
  ❍ equivalent net income – income calculated as the total receipts of the household of 
which someone is a member, adjusted for the size of the household and after allowing 
for beneﬁ  ts and direct taxes (the measure of income that is used in the UK’s ofﬁ  cial 
income distribution statistics); and 
  ❍ wealth – the stock of assets of households taking the form of ﬁ  nancial, property or 
housing assets (net of liabilities), including private pension rights.
We present information on the distributions of these outcomes for the population as a whole, 
with indications, where possible, of how they have changed in the last decade or more, and 
of how the UK compares with other industrialised countries. But our main focus is on the 
position of different social groups within the distributions of each outcome. We present the 
information that we have been able to assemble showing breakdowns not only relating to 
six of the ‘strands’ covered by equalities legislation – gender, age, ethnicity, religion or belief, 
disability status, and sexual orientation – but also by socio-economic class, housing tenure, 
nation or region, and area (by level of deprivation in the neighbourhood).4
Structure of the report
The structure of the main body of the report is as follows. In Chapter 2, we describe the 
overall inequalities which we then break down in later chapters. What do the distributions 
look like of educational outcomes, employment, earnings, individual incomes, household 
incomes, and wealth? As a reference point for the later analysis, we highlight people who are 
at different positions along the range from the lowest to the highest. For instance, how much 
larger are the earnings of people a tenth of the way from the top than the earnings of people 
a tenth of the way from the bottom? Similarly, how much greater is the wealth of someone 
a tenth of the way from the top of the distribution than that of a person in the middle? We 
summarise how these distributions and levels of inequality within them have changed over 
time, and how the UK compares internationally.
In Part 2, Chapters 3 to 8, we break these distributions down to look at the positions of 
different social groups within the overall distribution. First, we compare differences by gender 
and then, for men and women separately, by other characteristics, such as age or ethnicity. 
In each case, we present information not just on the position of someone in the middle of 
the range for that group (the ‘median’ for the group) in terms of the overall distribution for 
the population as a whole, but also for the spread of outcomes within the group.5 One of the 
4   See Box 9.1 for discussion of the position of the trans population.
5  A separate Statistical Appendix, available on our website, contains more detailed tables of the material we 
analyse here. The Statistical Appendix also contains downloadable data in spreadsheet form. Spreadsheet 
versions of the ﬁ  gures and tables we have produced for the report will be available on our website.
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things immediately apparent from this analysis is the large extent of inequalities between 
members of the same group, even by comparison with the systematic differences we find 
between those in the middle of different groups.
In Chapter 9, we present a cross-cutting analysis of the considerable amount of information 
contained in Chapters 3 to 8, looking at the patterns of all the outcomes for each group 
when the population is divided in different ways. We summarise here, for instance, gender 
differences across educational achievement, employment, earnings, and incomes. Parts of 
the chapter look at the extent to which gaps in outcomes, particularly earnings, between 
particular groups can be explained by factors such as qualifications or age, or whether 
they represent unexplained ‘penalties’ related to other characteristics. An important issue 
which the summaries here shed light on is whether each group is equally advantaged or 
disadvantaged within the range for each of the different outcomes. Are particular ethnic 
groups found in the same positions within the separate rankings defined by educational 
qualifications, earnings and incomes, for instance?
In Part 3, we look at different aspects of time. In Chapter 10, we present analysis of changes 
over time in inequalities in outcomes between particular groups and, where possible, how 
inequalities have changed within each group. We examine how the positions of different 
types of people in the overall distributions of earnings and income have changed over time. 
Has the relative position of women improved over time, for instance? Because many of the 
data of the kind we need have only recently become available, these comparisons generally 
cover only the last decade or so (and for many breakdowns, not even this is possible). We also 
present findings from analysis about the extent to which changes (mostly increases) in the 
inequality of incomes and of earnings over the last four decades have been more associated 
with changes in inequalities between groups or those within groups. We also discuss how the 
recession may affect some of the groups in which we are interested. 
In Chapter 11, we look at how differences in outcomes evolve across the life cycle. We start by 
presenting information about intergenerational links between the socio-economic positions 
of parents and their children. We then trace how differences across individuals narrow or 
widen in the pre-school years, at school, over people’s working lives, and into retirement and 
later life. We examine the extent to which differences in, say, earnings can be accounted 
for by differences in educational qualifications. This approach allows us to isolate some of 
the life stages and transitions at which inequalities emerge or widen. This helps suggest 
what mechanisms are at work, and so the points at which policy intervention may be most 
appropriate.
Finally, in Chapter 12, we summarise our key findings and draw out what we see as being the 
key challenges which the material presented suggests for policy development. A separate 
Summary also contains this material, together with some of the figures and tables that are 
central to the analysis.5
1
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Limitations
We present a large amount of information, most of it never analysed in this way before. 
But we should acknowledge that the data have some limitations. In order to present the 
level of detail that we do, we primarily depend on analysis of large scale national sample 
surveys, such as the Labour Force Survey (LFS) or the Family Resources Survey (FRS), or of 
administrative sources (such as the National Pupil Database (NPD), based on the Pupil Level 
Annual School Census). This has three implications. First, the data collected are usually for 
those living in private households: the non-household population – around 2 per cent of all 
residents or over one million people – is usually excluded from such surveys. This means that 
important groups are not covered in our main comparisons – such as those living in residential 
care homes, those sleeping rough, or members of the armed forces living in barracks. 
Appendix 3 discusses the implications of this, concluding that the data on the household 
population, while incomplete, can still present a fair picture of the population as a whole.
Second, the social groups and the terms used to describe particular groups are those used 
in the original surveys. Such categories are often contested and come with particular 
connotations or cultural loadings.6 However, it is up to us to report what the data show, 
giving the responses chosen when people have been presented with particular categories, 
even if those are not ideal or are incomplete. At the same time, the survey questions do not 
necessarily allow all the social groups in which we are interested to be distinguished. The very 
rich data now available on assessments of pupils throughout their school careers include 
gender and ethnicity, for instance, and whether they receive Free School Meals or have Special 
Educational Needs, but do not include information on, say, broader measures of parental 
background or religious affiliation. While the LFS has asked for a number of years whether 
people live in a same sex couple, this is only a very limited measure of sexual orientation, 
and other surveys do not include even this question. While the often highly disadvantaged 
position of members of the Gypsy and Traveller communities is revealed by some surveys, it is 
not in others (see Box 3.2 in Chapter 3). Similarly, the surveys we use do not identify whether 
respondents are asylum-seekers or refugees, so we cannot distinguish the position of this 
group, although qualitative evidence suggests some may be highly disadvantaged (Box 9.4). 
Appendix 13 at the end of the report describes the social groups that can be identified in the 
surveys used and gaps in them, as well as plans by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) to 
improve information routinely collected in future. Box 12.1 in the final chapter contains some 
suggestions for future data collection and analysis.
6  This particularly applies to the ways in which surveys ask people about their race, ethnicity or religion. For 
example, it was put to us that some people should be described as ‘British African Caribbean’, rather than 
using racialised categories such as ‘Black British’ or ‘Black Caribbean’, the use of which could be considered 
to perpetuate discrimination and inequalities. However, that was not a category offered to respondents 
in the original surveys on which we report. Other differences in labels might be taken to imply that some 
citizens were British and others were not. Similarly, there is ambiguity in survey questions about religion and 
belief (or non-belief), which we discuss below. For the most part, the questions relate to religious afﬁ  liation in 
general or cultural terms, rather than necessarily implying that people subscribe to a particular set of beliefs 
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Third, by their very nature, sample surveys, even large ones of the kind we use, can only 
produce reliable information on groups containing sufficiently large numbers of respondents. 
This is a particular constraint where we summarise not only the position of an ‘average’ 
member of a group or sub-group, but also the often very important differences within a 
group.7 This means that groups that are relatively small in number (or whose numbers are 
simply unknown) cannot be covered in this way. An example of this problem is the position of 
the trans population, on which other kinds of information can shed some light (see Box 9.1 in 
Chapter 9), but not in a form that we can compare with the other groups covered here. Where 
we can, we draw on qualitative information where it helps to fill gaps of this kind or sheds 
light on the picture presented by the quantitative data.
It should also be noted that, although we do look at the position of children in their early 
years and educational outcomes while at school, our focus on economic outcomes often 
implies that we are looking at the position of adults rather than of children, except in respect 
of their membership of a household with particular income levels. Other kinds of information 
on, for instance, their health or social relationships would be necessary to give a more rounded 
picture of the well-being of children, enabling better understanding of childhood inequality 
alongside the well established focus on child poverty.8
Where possible, our coverage is of the whole of the UK, although we also present comparisons 
between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as the English regions. 
However, some data are only available for Great Britain (excluding Northern Ireland), or only 
for England. In some cases policies vary across the devolved administrations so that, while 
similar information can be presented for each nation, it is not directly comparable and so 
cannot be aggregated to UK level. This is most relevant for educational achievement at age 
16, where examination systems differ, but also affects measures based on neighbourhood 
deprivation, since the indices used have a different basis. On the other hand, there may be 
cases where differences in outcome may reflect differences in policy, which then potentially 
suggest useful lessons from what are, in effect, national experiments.
Where we present information on the ‘latest’ position we are generally able to use data 
collected up to 2008 or until the financial year 2007-08 (that is, up to March 2008). This, 
therefore, generally represents the position immediately before the full extent of the financial 
crisis became clear or the economic recession started. Because the changes may have what 
turn out to be temporary effects (at least in distributional terms), it is in some ways better 
that we use data that were collected before the recent turmoil. This timing issue should be 
borne in mind in interpreting our findings. In Section 10.5 of Chapter 10, we discuss some 
early evidence on the effects of the recession on the inequalities we examine and any lessons 
from previous recessions on which groups may be worst affected. This issue also affects the 
interpretation of time trends: those available over a ten-year period, for instance, show what 
happened during a continuing upturn, rather than over a complete economic cycle.
7  For reasons of reliability, we only present the median and mean values from sample surveys where they 
reﬂ  ect the position of at least 30 respondents. To show the position of the 30th and 70th percentiles we 
require there to be at least 100 respondents in the relevant group, and to show data on the 10th and 90th 
percentiles we require at least 200 respondents.
8  See, for instance, Burchardt, Tsang and Vizard (2009) or Bradshaw (2005).7
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Relationship with other inquiries and reports
While compiling this report has been a challenging exercise, our remit is, in many respects, a 
narrow one. We focus on economic inequalities. These are not necessarily the most important 
aspects of people’s lives, well-being or happiness. There are others that may be far more 
so – health, life expectancy or freedom from fear of violence, for instance. For marginalised 
groups, lack of equality of recognition and respect will often be of fundamental importance. 
Nevertheless, economic inequalities shape, and are intertwined with, these other aspects of 
people’s lives. Therefore, our work has implications for parallel inquiries. Our work follows on 
from the Equalities Review, chaired by Trevor Phillips, which reported in 2007. That review 
recommended that government and other bodies examine progress in reducing inequalities 
within an ‘equalities measurement framework’ covering important freedoms or capabilities 
across ten dimensions or domains. That framework has since been developed further by, and 
for, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and the Government Equalities Office 
(GEO) (see Box 1.1 at the end of this chapter). It will be applied by the EHRC when it presents 
its Triennial Review, expected in late 2010. Our report draws on the Equalities Review and 
on research of different kinds that has been commissioned by EHRC in the last two years. In 
turn, we hope that the information presented here will help EHRC in its broader remit. For, 
while economic outcomes are directly measured in only three of the ten domains within the 
framework, within our society economic resources and educational qualifications are often 
crucial to people’s capabilities in other respects, and the lack of them to constraining those 
capabilities.
The association between economic and other outcomes is most obvious so far as health and 
life expectancy are concerned. We present, at the end of Chapter 11, what will be for many 
startling evidence from the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing on the relationship between 
mortality rates after age 50 and levels of wealth. Health inequalities – and policies that might 
help reduce them – are the focus of the parallel Strategic Review of Health Inequalities in 
England post 2010, led by Sir Michael Marmot, which will be published shortly, so we do not 
focus on them directly in this report, but we have been grateful for the opportunity to share 
related parts of our analyses during the writing of this report.
We have also been able to draw on two other recent exercises that relate in particular to the 
links between generations: the Cabinet Office’s review of social mobility and the subsequent 
White Paper,9 and the Panel on Fair Access to the Professions, chaired by Rt. Hon. Alan 
Milburn, MP, whose final report, Unleashing Aspiration, was published in July 2009.
As we write (November 2009), the Equality Bill is proceeding through Parliament. Although 
our report is not about the specific actions that public bodies and others might take, we hope 
that the baseline information we present and the highlighting of areas of particular concern 
could be useful in implementing the ‘socio-economic duty’, if the Bill is enacted.10
9 Cabinet  Ofﬁ  ce (2008, 2009a).
10  The Equality Bill will introduce a new duty on certain public bodies to have regard to the desirability of 
reducing socio-economic inequalities. The duty will apply to: ministers; central government departments; 
regional development agencies; local authorities; police authorities; strategic health authorities; and primary 
care trusts. The duty will apply when those organisations are making decisions of a strategic nature, such as 
when deciding priorities, setting targets, allocating resources, and commissioning services. It is intended both 
to support work to tackle differential outcomes associated with the various ‘equalities strands’ and to close a 
gap in existing equalities legislation, by addressing the needs of those who are not currently protected. An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
8
Ways of working and sources of information
As will be clear from the Acknowledgements, we have been helped by a very large number of 
organisations and individuals, taking in particular the following forms:
  ❍ Members of the Panel and its Secretariat visited universities, other research 
organisations, government departments, and the devolved administrations in 
Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, which provided invaluable presentations on and material 
from relevant existing research (see Appendix 4).
  ❍ We issued a Call for Evidence and received very helpful responses from a wide range 
of representative organisations and individuals (listed in Appendix 5). Twenty-four of 
these submissions are available on the panel’s website (http://www.equalities.gov.uk/
national_equality_panel/call_for_evidence.aspx).
  ❍ Following the response to the Call for Evidence, we held a ﬁ  rst seminar at which 
representatives of interested organisations presented what they saw as the most 
important evidence and issues from their perspectives, with other participants adding 
their views and debating the issues involved. At a second event, members of the 
Panel presented some of what we saw as key recent evidence on the ways in which 
inequalities develop across the life cycle (see Chapter 11), again with participants 
adding their views and perspectives. Appendix 6 gives more information on these 
events, and summaries of the points made at each of these events are also available on 
our website.
  ❍ Following our initial review of evidence, we commissioned ten research projects to 
examine particular issues in detail (see Appendix 7). The ﬁ  nal reports from these 
projects are available on our website and from the research institutions involved. We 
refer extensively to their ﬁ  ndings below.
  ❍ We were also greatly assisted by statistical analysis carried out for us by the 
Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) and the devolved administrations 
(on educational outcomes), the former Department for Innovation, Universities 
and Skills, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) (particularly on household 
incomes) and the ONS (on very recently available data on wealth and assets). Our 
secretariat carried out extensive analysis of data from these sources and from the LFS.
  ❍ We met as a full Panel nine times between October 2008 and November 2009 to 
consider this evidence, to discuss the research carried out for us, and to agree this 
report.
Conclusion
In this report, we bring together in one place for the first time a consistent analysis 
of the relationships between economic inequalities and people’s characteristics and 
circumstances, how these interact, and how they develop across the life cycle. We hope 
that this material will contribute to understanding of the economic and social structure of 
the country, inform debates over the fairness or otherwise of the outcomes for different 
population groups, and assist the formulation and design of relevant policies.9
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Box 1.1: The EHRC/GEO Equalities Measurement Framework
The EHRC and Government Equalities Office (GEO) are developing a new framework for 
the measurement of inequality in England, Scotland and Wales.11
The core building blocks of the Equalities Measurement Framework (EMF) consist 
of three aspects of equality, covering ten areas of peoples lives (‘domains’), and the 
characteristics by which differences will be analysed.
The EMF aims to measure inequality of ‘substantive freedoms’ in outcomes 
(achievements), processes (unequal treatment, discrimination, lack of dignity and 
respect) and autonomy (empowerment or choice and control). In this way, it covers 
much wider aspects of inequality than the economic outcomes covered in this report.
It covers ten dimensions: life; health; physical security; legal security; education and 
learning; standard of living; productive and valued activities; participation, influence 
and voice; individual, family and social life; identity, expression and self respect. These 
have been based on international human rights covenants and derived through 
extensive consultation with groups at risk of disadvantage.
The framework covers all seven of the equality groups set out in the Equality Act 2006 
(gender, age, ethnicity, disability, religion or belief, sexual orientation, transgender), with 
the addition of social class. 
The first part of the Framework contains 48 indicators to measure outcomes and 
processes. Questions for the collection of data on autonomy are being developed and 
tested.
Once fully developed, the EMF will be a monitoring tool that allows measurement, 
evaluation and comparison of inequality between individuals and groups. For example, 
the EMF could be used to evaluate the health of older people in terms of:
•  outcomes, such as health status; 
•  autonomy, such as questioning whether they experience choice and control in relation 
to their medical treatment, including issues of information and consent; and
•  process, such as exploring whether older people experience explicit discrimination or 
other forms of unequal treatment, such as a lack of dignity and respect.
The EMF is intended to be used as a tool to measure inequality, but the overall 
framework can also be used to assess policy interventions and underlying causes of 
inequality. The freedoms that individuals or groups have can be widened or constrained 
by, for example, their access to resources, and by how well they are able to use those 
resources (which can vary between people as a result of personal, legal and institutional 
reasons).
11 See  Alkire  et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion.11
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Chapter 2 Economic inequalities in the UK
In later chapters, we look at the distributions of economic outcomes amongst members 
of different population groups. To set this in context, this chapter looks at the population 
as a whole.12 We look at the distributions of educational outcomes (attainment at age 
16, and highest qualifications of adults), employment status, hourly wages and weekly 
earnings, individual incomes, incomes on a household basis, and household wealth. 
Where information is available, we look at trends over time and compare the position in 
the UK with that in other countries. We also summarise what has happened to incomes 
right at the top and at the bottom of the income distribution and look at the impact of 
the tax and benefit systems on income distribution.
We present this information in two ways. The first kind of diagram (such as Figure 2.1(a)) 
shows what percentage of the population can be found within a particular range. Generally 
speaking there are more people to be found round the middle of the distribution, but fewer 
a long way above or below the middle. This means that the figures show a characteristically 
‘humped’ shaped picture, with ‘tails’ extending on either side. If most people have much 
the same outcome, the hump is tall but narrow, with only small tails on either side. But if 
outcomes are unequal, the hump in the middle is less pronounced, and the tails extend further 
from it.
Within each of these diagrams we highlight the outcome for someone who comes exactly half 
way up the distribution – the so-called median outcome, where 50 per cent of the population 
do worse and 50 per cent do better (also known as the 50th percentile). We also highlight 
the outcomes for those where only 10 per cent or 30 per cent do worse (the 10th and 30th 
percentiles) and, at the other end, those values which exceed the outcome for 70 per cent or 
90 per cent of the population (the 70th and 90th percentiles). Comparison of the 90th and 10th 
percentiles gives one summary measure of the inequality of a distribution: the greater this 
‘90:10 ratio’, the more unequal a distribution across most of its range.13
We focus on these measures because we need to summarise information about the 
distribution of outcomes within each of a number of groups, between those groups, and 
across the population as a whole. Using measures such as percentiles, medians, and the 90:10 
ratio allows us to do this in a robust way, even for relatively small population groups. 
12  Subject to the limitations noted in Chapter 1, in particular that coverage usually relates to the private 
household population.
13  This is just one summary measure of inequality. Others, such as the well-known ‘Gini coefﬁ  cient’, are 
affected by all outcome values, throughout the range from bottom to top. By construction the 90:10 
ratio depends on the two values of the 10th and 90th percentiles. For further discussion of issues involved 
in measuring inequality and distribution, see Atkinson (1983), Cowell (1995 and 2000), Jenkins and 
Micklewright (2008), and Jenkins and Van Kerm (2009). Recent trends in the UK are discussed in Brewer, 
Muriel, Phillips and Sibieta (2009).
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The second kind of diagram (such as Figure 2.1(b)) shows what proportion of the population 
has an outcome below a particular value.14 This is helpful in allowing one to read off how high 
up the overall distribution a particular value comes – are someone’s earnings half-way up the 
distribution, for instance, or two-thirds of the way up? Where possible, we show the outcome 
for each percentile (cut-off for each hundredth) of the distribution but, in the case of wealth 
distribution, the values for the top few per cent of households are so high that they cannot 
be fitted into a figure that shows the variation within the rest of the population. Again, we 
highlight the 10th, 30th, 50th (median), 70th, and 90th percentiles.
Where data are available we summarise some of the trends in inequality measures over 
time, and show how the UK compares with other industrialised countries. In general the data 
presented are for the UK (broken down between its constituent nations in Chapters 3 to 8) 
but, for school outcomes in Section 2.1(a), we show separate pictures for England, Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, as educational systems differ between them.
The order in which we discuss the outcomes in this chapter (and elsewhere in the report) 
follows the logic of some of the main relationships between them:
  ➢ We start with education because, although it is not in itself an economic outcome, it 
plays such an important role in determining people’s position in the labour market. To 
maximise the proportion of the population covered, we concentrate on results at age 16 
(Key Stage 4 or GCSEs in England and Wales and Secondary 4 in Scotland) and on the 
highest qualiﬁ  cations of the adult population. In Chapter 11, we look at development in 
achievements at other ages.
  ➢ We then look at employment status – whether or not people have paid work; if so, is 
this full-time or part-time and is it as an employee or self-employed; and if not, what 
is the main reason for non-employment, such as full-time education, retirement, or 
unemployment looking for work?
  ➢ For employees (but not the self-employed), we show the distribution of hourly wages 
and weekly earnings. In this chapter, we show results for a variety of groups of workers, 
but in our main analysis we concentrate on the hourly wages of all employees, giving 
direct comparison between part-time and full-time workers (particularly important 
in comparisons between men and women), and on weekly earnings for full-time 
employees.
  ➢ Combining income from weekly earnings with that which individuals receive from other 
sources (such as from beneﬁ  ts, pensions or investments) gives total individual income. 
Deducting direct taxes (income tax and employee National Insurance contributions) 
gives net individual income.
14  In the case of incomes, this kind of diagram is sometimes known as ‘Pen’s parade’, after the Dutch 
economist, Jan Pen (1971), who imagined the income distribution in the form of a parade, where the heights 
of those marching past had been adjusted in proportion to their incomes, making the point that in such a 
parade, the majority has incomes below the average (mean), but a few giants have incomes that are many 
times the average.13
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  ➢ While individual incomes are important in showing the potential control that individuals 
may have over economic resources, in many circumstances it will be the total income 
of the family or household that has most effect on people’s standard of living. But this 
will also be affected by household size – £2,000 per month provides a higher standard 
of living for a single person living alone than it does for a family of four. We, therefore, 
next show income in terms of total net income of a person’s household, adjusted for 
household size, known technically as equivalent net income.15
  ➢ Finally, the accumulation over people’s lifetimes, either from savings out of income or 
from inheritance (or other transfers), or from the return on investments, creates people’s 
stock of wealth or other assets. Because it is so hard to judge how ownership of wealth 
is divided within a household or how to compare between households of different sizes, 
we look at household wealth, deﬁ  ned in different ways.
While the main relationships do follow the sequence indicated by the arrows above for 
many, some go, of course, in the opposite direction. For instance, wealth levels directly affect 
people’s incomes through the interest or dividends they may receive from that wealth. Less 
directly, higher incomes may make it easier for people to invest longer periods of time in 
education. In Chapter 11, we look at the way some of these relationships evolve across the 
life cycle. There is also, of course, a close – but by no means exact – relationship between 
someone’s position in the distribution of one outcome and their position in the distribution of 
another. Appendix 8 shows what some of these relationships look like, where we have data on 
more than one outcome in the same survey.
2.1 Educational  outcomes
(a)  Results at Key Stage 4
Discussion of achievement at age 16 is often (in English terms) dominated by whether pupils 
achieve five or more ‘good’ GCSEs (graded C or above) or not. This provides a rather crude 
measure of the range of achievement – a simple yes or no, dividing the population into two 
groups. Figures 2.1(a) and (b) give a more sensitive measure of achievement for 16 year-olds 
in state (‘maintained’) schools in England in 2008, showing the range of total scores in up to 
eight GCSEs (or the equivalent in other qualifications) according to a calculation used by the 
Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF).16 The minimum number of points for 
15  As we discuss below, this measure is based on an assumption that income is equally shared within the 
household. Often it is not. Individual income and equivalent household income give measures of command 
over economic resources that are in some ways opposite ends of the assumptions one could make about 
sharing – equally shared in the latter case, or not pooled at all in the former. In some cases, though, one 
person may have control over income coming in regardless of who receives it, in which case even looking at 
individual incomes would understate the degree of inequality.
16  This system awards 16 points for a pass at G, 22 for an F up to 52 for an A and 58 for an A*. The capping is 
based on the ‘best’ 8 GCSEs or equivalent standardised points from other qualiﬁ  cations. DCSF argues that 
capping the scores at up to 8 GCSEs (or equivalent) gives the best measure of overall achievement. Allowing 
scores for more subjects to count – as is done in the results for Scotland and Wales – would mean that there 
was more spread at the top of the distribution.
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5 passes at C or above is 200, while 8 A*s would give a total of 464. Including the nearly 2 per 
cent of pupils who have no points at all,17 the median points score was 329, corresponding, 
to 7 passes at grade B. Around this there was, however, quite a range, with a long tail of low 
achievement. A tenth of pupils had fewer than 160 points, which is half of the median score, 
and 30 per cent had less than 284 points.18 At the other end, a tenth of state school pupils 
achieved 416 points and just over 1 per cent achieved 462 or more points – unlike incomes or 
wealth, the distribution of test results like this has an upper limit (no-one can get more points 
than the 464 for 8 A*s).
We present results for state schools, because it is only these results that we can break down 
by the characteristics of pupils in Chapter 3. However, this represents only 93 per cent of the 
age group. As Figure 2.1(c) shows, the results for those in English independent (private) schools 
are rather different. Half of all such pupils achieve 386 points or more at age 16 (equivalent 
to the top 20 per cent in state schools) and 30 per cent of them achieve 417 points or more 
(equivalent to the top 10 per cent in state schools). Nearly 7 per cent of the private pupils 
achieve 462 or more points, the maximum shown in the figures. If the independent school 
population had the same spread of characteristics as the whole population, their omission 
would not affect our later analysis. However, the private school population comes not just 
from more affluent households, but also disproportionately from particular ethnic groups. It 
should be borne in mind therefore that the breakdowns in Chapter 3 omit, for instance, up to 
a fifth of the highest-achieving 10 per cent of pupils as a whole. 
17  This includes both those who fail any exams they take and those who are in the school system but take no 
exams at all. It does not include those who have dropped out of the school system by 16 because they have 
moved abroad or are educated at home or are in the country but not in education. We do not have any 
information on how many children are in these situations. 
18  Although 70 per cent of pupils had tariff scores above 284, only 65 per cent had more than 5 GCSEs at 
grades of C or above, even though this could theoretically be achieved with a smaller aggregate score. This is 
because some pupils will have scores from up to 8 GCSEs contributing to their aggregate score, but with 4 or 
fewer at Grade C or above.15
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Figure 2.1(a): Key Stage 4 results, England, 2008:
Maintained schools, percentage with results in each band
Figure 2.1(b): Key Stage 4 results, England, 2008:
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Figure 2.1(c): Key Stage 4 results, England, 2008:
Independent schools, percentage with results in each band
These patterns have changed over time. Figure 2.1(d) shows the corresponding distribution 
for state school pupils in 2004. Comparing this with the 2008 results, measured achievement 
improved at all levels over those four years, notably at the lower levels. The proportion with 
no graded results at all halved; while the cut-off for the bottom tenth rose from 104 to 160 
points and the median score rose from 305 to 329. This is part of a longer-term trend in 
GCSE attainment: whereas 46 per cent of pupils achieved 5 or more passes at C or above in 
1998, this had risen to 54 per cent in 2004 and 65 per cent in 2008 (see Chapter 10). There is 
controversy over the extent to which these increases represent ‘genuine’ improvement or are 
the result of changes to curriculum and assessment. The development and inclusion in the 
data of a wider range of vocational and functional qualifications and their inclusion in the 
GCSE equivalent data is likely to account for some of the improvement at the bottom end of 
the distribution. However, our main concern here is with the position of different groups within 
the distribution. The ranking of different groups – such as those receiving or not receiving Free 
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Source: DCSF, based on NPD.17
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Figure 2.1(d): Key Stage 4 results, England, 2004:
Percentage with results in each band
The system in Scotland is different, as is the scoring system used by the Scottish 
Government.19 The distribution of results shown in Figure 2.1(e) shows cumulative points from 
qualifications obtained by the end of ‘Secondary 4’ in Scottish state schools in 2008 (with no 
capping of number of subjects included). The distribution on this basis is more widely spread 
than that in England (partly because scores are uncapped at the top, and because there is 
less weight given to relatively low-level passes at the bottom). The median score of 176 points 
corresponds to 8 Standard Grade passes at grade 3, but 10 per cent of pupils achieved fewer 
than 61 points, while 10 per cent achieved 284 or more points. As in England, these scores 
have improved over time: the median result in Scotland in 2003 on this basis was 170 points, 
with nearly 5 per cent achieving no graded results, compared to the 3.5 per cent in 2008 
shown in the figure. 
19  In Scotland, the tariff score of a pupil is calculated by simply adding together all the tariff points 
accumulated from all the different course levels and awards the pupil attains. Therefore, all exams taken 
in previous years are included and any level of exams may be included (e.g. Access 3, Standard Grades, 
Intermediate 1 and 2, Highers and Advanced Highers). A pupil getting 5 Standard Grades would collect 
between 40 and 190 points, based on lowest to highest possible results. 
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Figure 2.1(e): Secondary 4 results, Scotland, 2008:
Percentage with results in each band
Wales uses GCSEs like England, but the Welsh Assembly Government uses a different scoring 
system for the grades.20 Figure 2.1(f) shows the distribution of results for Welsh state schools 
in 2008. The median result was 44 points (equivalent to, for instance, seven passes at grade B, 
as with the English median result). Again, there appear to be somewhat more pupils with low 
levels of achievement compared to the median than in England, a tenth having fewer than 6 
points, including nearly 6 per cent with no graded results at all, but a tenth scored more than 
69 points.21 The most significant change from corresponding results for 2005 was that, in the 
earlier year, nearly 8 per cent of pupils had achieved no graded results.
20  In Wales, the system does not cap the number of qualiﬁ  cations that contribute to point scores. It awards 1 
point for a pass at G, 2 for an F up to 7 for an A and 8 for an A*. 
21  In Wales, the National Pupil Database from which the results have been drawn includes only some approved 
qualiﬁ  cations, mainly GCSEs, GNVQs and some NVQs. Therefore, some of the 6 per cent reported as having 
no results may actually have achieved entry level qualiﬁ  cations in some other vocational qualiﬁ  cations not 
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Figure 2.1(f): Key Stage 4 results, Wales, 2008:
Percentage with results in each band
Finally, Figure 2.1(g) shows achievement of pupils in state schools in Northern Ireland in 2008. 
In this case the system is directly comparable with that in England and achievement levels 
are very similar, with the exception that fewer Northern Irish pupils received no graded results, 
and twice as many (3 per cent) received the maximum shown of 462 or more points. It is this 
last statistic that represents the main difference from corresponding figures in 2005, when 
only half as many Northern Irish pupils had received the maximum score shown.
Figure 2.1(g): Key Stage 4 results, Northern Ireland, 2008:
Percentage with results in each band
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Given the differences in examination systems between countries, it is not possible to say 
directly whether these kinds of variations between high and low achievers in parts of the 
UK are similar or more marked than in those other countries. However, there are regularly 
undertaken international comparisons which involve standardised tests taken by samples of 
children in many countries. Appendix 9 summarises some of their recent findings for 13-16 
year-olds in England and Scotland, showing both comparative levels of average achievement 
for reading, maths and science, and the spread around those averages. While the two studies 
quoted tell somewhat different stories about average performance in international terms 
(most flattering to England in the case of the Trends in International  Mathematics and 
Science Study (TIMSS) of 15-16 year-olds in 2006), they both suggest that the spread of 
performance in Britain is not dramatically larger or smaller than other countries.22 One of the 
studies suggests that the average level of achievement (in mathematics) is higher in England 
than Scotland, but with a narrower spread in Scotland. 
(b)  Highest qualiﬁ  cations of the adult population
The discussion above is about the achievement levels at the minimum school leaving age of 
today’s young people, who were 16 in 2008. But we are interested in the whole population, 
many of whom finished their formal education a long time ago. While we have less detailed 
information about precise grades, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) includes information on the 
highest level of qualification of the UK adult population, which we can compare with a wide 
range of individual characteristics. We divide qualifications into the eight categories shown 
in Figure 2.2. Within the working age population (16 to State Pension age),23 by the three 
calendar years 2006-2008 half had at least A levels as their highest qualification, with 19 per 
cent having a first or higher degree. However, a quarter had either no qualifications or only 
those up to ‘Level 1’.24 As we shall see in Chapter 3, qualification levels vary substantially by 
age, ethnicity, religious affiliation, disability status and housing tenure.
As more highly qualified generations have entered the labour market, and older ones have 
retired, the distribution of qualifications among the working age population has changed. 
The figure shows that just eleven years earlier, only 12 per cent had a first or higher degree as 
their highest qualification, but 31 per cent had no qualifications above Level 1. Comparisons 
across countries in qualification levels are harder, but Appendix 9 suggests that the UK is 
similar to the OECD average in terms of tertiary education, but has lagged behind in terms of 
the numbers achieving at least upper secondary education (that is, from 5 GCSE grades A*-C 
or equivalent to A levels), especially for those now aged 25-34. 
 
22  Stewart (2009), looking at data from the international PIRLS 2006 study of literacy for a younger, 9-10 year-
old age group, ﬁ  nds by contrast that England and Scotland had higher dispersion in results than almost all of 
the 13 participating OECD countries. 
23  In Chapter 3, we also show the qualiﬁ  cations for adults above State Pension age by age group.
24  Level 1 corresponds to GCSEs grades D-G and corresponding vocational qualiﬁ  cations that give basic 
knowledge and skills and an ability to apply learning with guidance and supervision. Below Level 1 are entry 
level certiﬁ  cates, such as English for Speakers of Other Languages, Skills for Life, etc. 21
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Figure 2.2: Highest qualification of working age population, UK, 1995-1997 and 2006-2008:
Working age population (Men 16-64, Women 16-59), percentages
2.2 Employment  status
The LFS also allows us to look at the employment status of the working age population. 
Because employment patterns for men and women are so different, Figure 2.3(a) shows the 
pattern in 2006-2008 for all adults and for men and women of working age separately, while 
Figure 2.3(b) shows the same information for eleven years earlier. Overall, three-quarters of 
all working age adults were in paid work in 2006-2008, with nearly half employed full-time, 
a sixth part-time, and 9 per cent self-employed. A further 9 per cent were either unemployed 
looking for work or were students, and 17 per cent were economically inactive. But these 
patterns were highly gendered: 59 per cent of men, but only 39 per cent of women were 
employed full-time; 26 per cent of women but only 6 per cent of men were employed part-
time; 14 per cent of men were self-employed, but only 5 per cent of women; and 12 per 
cent of women were ‘inactive, looking after family or home’, but only 1 per cent of men. 
Comparing this pattern with that eleven years earlier (1995-1997), the main changes over this 
period of continuous economic growth were an increase of 4 percentage points in the number 
of women employed full-time and a decrease in the number of men unemployed looking for 
work from nearly 8 to 5 per cent. The proportion of women not in paid work looking after 
home or family fell by 3 percentage points.




GCE A Level or equiv.
GCSE grades A*-C or equiv.(1)
Level 1 or below
No qualification
Don't know
1995-1997            2006-2008  
Source: National Equality Panel (NEP), based on LFS 1995-1997 and 2006-2008. 
Note: (1) 5 GCSEs or more, (2) Non-degree higher educational qualifications.
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Figure 2.3(a): Employment status, UK, 2006-2008:
Working age population (Men 16-64, Women 16-59)
Figure 2.3(b): Employment status, UK, 1995-1997:
Working age population (Men 16-64, Women 16-59)
Appendix 10 shows a breakdown by main category of employment status for other European 
Union countries. Compared to the other countries, the UK had (before the recession) relatively 
high employment rates, low formal unemployment, and particularly high rates of female part-
time employment.
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Self-employed ILO unemployed
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Inactive, disabled/long-term sick Inactive, retired
Inactive, other reason, no reason given
Source: NEP, based on LFS 1995-1997 and 2006-2008.23
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2.3  Wages and earnings
(a) Hourly  wages
The LFS allows us to look at both the hourly wages and weekly earnings of the two-thirds of 
the working age population (both men and women) who are in paid employment but not 
those who are self-employed. We use data from the LFS in preference to the Annual Survey 
of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) because, although ASHE has more accurate data on those who 
earn more than the threshold for paying National Insurance contributions, unlike the LFS 
it contains very little information on the characteristics of employees beyond their gender 
and age. Appendix 12 compares the wage and earnings distributions revealed by the two 
surveys. The LFS tends to show somewhat lower wage and earnings levels at each part of the 
distribution than ASHE, but the inequality shown by the two series is very similar.
Figure 2.4(a) shows the distribution of gross (that is, before tax) hourly wages for all 
employees in 2006-2008, adjusted to 2008 levels by an index constructed from the pooled 
LFS dataset to account for variations in earnings. The greatest concentration of wages was in 
the range from £6-6.99, but median wages were £9.90 per hour, and the mean was £12.20. As 
before, we highlight the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles. The top tenth of wages were 
£21.30 or more, just under four times those at the cut-off for the poorest tenth (£5.50, very 
close to the adult National Minimum Wage at the time).25 The 90:10 ratio was therefore 3.9. 
Figure 2.4(b) shows the wages for each percentile of the distribution up to the top 1 per cent, 
who had wages more than £43 per hour. Figure 2.4(c) shows the very different shapes of the 
distributions for those employed full-time and part-time, the latter being very tightly grouped 
at, and just above, the National Minimum Wage, and few with wages more than £10 per hour, 
while the distribution of full-time wages is more widely spread.
25  The adult minimum wage up to September 2008 was £5.73 per hour. Younger workers (aged 16-17) had 
a lower minimum of £3.40. Some of the small number of results shown for wages below these levels will 
represent errors in reporting of hours to the survey, rather than evasion – those actually employed by 
evading employers are unlikely to respond to surveys of this kind. 
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Figure 2.4(a): Hourly wages at 2008 prices, UK, 2006-2008:
All employees, percentage with earnings in each range
Figure 2.4(b): Hourly wages at 2008 prices, UK, 2006-2008:
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Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008.25
Chapter 2   Economic inequalities in the UK
Figure 2.4(c): Hourly wages at 2008 prices, UK, 2006-2008:
Full-time/part-time employees, percentage with earnings in each range
(b) Weekly  earnings
Given variations in hours, particularly between part-time and full-time earners, weekly 
earnings are even more dispersed than hourly wages. Figures 2.5(a)-(d) present information 
on weekly earnings similar to that given above for hourly wages, again based on LFS data. 
First, Figure 2.5(a) shows the distribution of weekly earnings across all employees in 2006-
2008. Median earnings (including part-timers) were £364 per week, but with a tenth earning 
less than £106 and a tenth earning more than £815 (and therefore implying a 90:10 ratio of 
7.7). As the spike on the right of the diagram shows, about one in twenty earned over £1,000 
per week. The distribution for part-timers is shown separately in Figure 2.5(b) and for full-
timers in Figure 2.5(c). The difference between the two series is of course even greater than 
that for hourly earnings. Median weekly earnings were only £141 for part-timers, compared 
to £448 for full-timers. The top tenth of part-timers earned at least £346, a figure exceeded 
by almost 70 per cent of full-timers. Meanwhile, a tenth of full-timers earned more than £893 
per week. The 90:10 ratio for weekly earnings of full-timers, 3.7, was slightly less than that of 
wages for all employees. In Chapter 5, we look at the positions of different population groups 
in terms of hourly wages for all employees, and of weekly earnings for those working full-time. 
Figure 2.5(d) shows earnings at each percentile of full-time earnings, with the top 1 per cent 
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Figure 2.5(a): Weekly earnings at 2008 prices, UK, 2006-2008:
All employees, percentage with earnings in each range
Figure 2.5(b): Weekly earnings at 2008 prices, UK, 2006-2008:
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Figure 2.5(c): Weekly earnings at 2008 prices, UK, 2006-2008:
Full-time employees, percentage with earnings in each range
Figure 2.5(d): Weekly earnings at 2008 prices, UK, 2006-2008:
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Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008.
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Over time, the distribution of earnings has changed, becoming much more dispersed 
between the mid-1970s and the late 1990s. Figure 2.6(a) and (b) use data from ASHE and its 
predecessors to show trends in the real value of weekly earnings for male and female full-time 
employees since 1968 at three points in the distribution: the 10th percentile, the median and 
the 90th percentile.26 For men, earnings at the 90th percentile doubled from £531 per week in 
1977 to £1,045 in 2002, while median earnings grew by 56 per cent, but earnings grew only by 
27 per cent at the 10th percentile (a significant part of which occurred after 1997). As a result, 
the 90:10 ratio grew from 2.3 in 1977 to 3.6 in 2002. For women, the gap in wages between 
the best and worst paid also widened, but there was faster growth at all pay levels. Over the 
same 25 years from 1977, the 10th percentile for women rose by 56 per cent, the median by 
84 per cent, and the 90th percentile by 114 per cent. As a result, the 90:10 ratio for women 
working full-time rose somewhat less rapidly, from 2.4 to 3.2. The figures also show how there 
was very little change at all in real earnings across the distribution for men or women between 
2002 and 2008, even before the recession started.
Figure 2.6(a): Full-time weekly earnings at 2008 prices, 1968 to 2008, men
26  As explained in Appendix 12, these data show slightly higher levels of earnings across the distribution than 




















10th percentile Median 90th percentile
Source: NEP, based on 1968-1996 New Earnings Survey (NES) (GB), 1997-2008 ASHE (UK).29
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Figure 2.6(b): Full-time weekly earnings at 2008 prices, 1968 to 2008, women
While our main concentration in this report is on the bulk of the distribution where the 
numbers in any population subgroup are large enough for us to make reliable comparisons, 
Figure 2.7 shows the extent to which weekly earnings vary within the top tenth of the 
distribution.27 The top 5 per cent of full-timers earned more than £1,100 per week, and the 
top 1 per cent more than £1,900 per week. It is right at the top of the distribution that there 
have been the fastest increases in earnings in the last 30 years. The figure shows Atkinson 
and Voitchovsky’s (2004) analysis of earnings at the top of the distribution expressed as a 
percentage of the median between 1968 (when the NES, now ASHE, series starts) and 2001. 
The 90th percentile for weekly earnings for men and women together grew from 1.7 times the 
median in 1977 to 2.2 times it in 2001. But the 99th percentile grew from 2.9 to 4.8 times the 
median, and the cut-off for the top 0.5 per cent from 3.4 to nearly 6 times the median.28
27  This uses data from the NES, the predecessor to ASHE, rather than the LFS used in previous ﬁ  gures, such as 
Figure 2.5(d). For the highest earners, ASHE is likely to be more accurate.
28  Figures of the kind quoted in this chapter generally represent the position at the time of a survey, with 
respondents generally asked about their ‘usual’ or ‘normal’ earnings or incomes at the time. Over a longer 
period, such as a year, these will vary, sometimes considerably (Hills et al., 2005). One result of this is that the 
distribution of earnings across a whole year is less unequal than in a single week. McKnight (2009) discusses 
the trends in the distribution of annual earnings, showing that it became less unequal between 1997 and 
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Source: NEP, based on 1968-1996 NES (GB), 1997-2008 ASHE (UK).
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Figure 2.7: All employees weekly earnings at the top of the distribution as a percentage of the 
median, UK, 1968 to 2001
The UK is not the only country where wage differentials have increased over the last 
thirty years although, as Figure 2.8 shows, the increase was both faster here than in many 
comparable countries, and has taken the ratio between the 90th and 10th percentiles to a level 
only exceeded by the USA amongst the countries illustrated. The figures, for full-time workers, 
are calculated on a slightly different basis from the LFS figures shown in Figure 2.6(c), but the 
90:10 ratio of 3.6 shown here for the UK in 2008 compares with lower ratios, of 3.0 in France 
and 3.3 in Germany, but a much higher one, 4.9, in the USA. 
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2.4 Individual  incomes
For employees, the weekly earnings shown in Figure 2.5 generally represent the bulk of their 
incomes, but a third of those of working age are not employees, and most of those over State 
Pension Age are retired. Some of these may have no income in their own right (but live in a 
household where other members have income, as discussed in the next section), while others 
may have income from benefits, pensions, self-employment, or investments. Employees also 
have income from other sources as well as earnings. Figure 2.9(a) shows the distribution 
across all adults of the total income they receive directly.29 Over the three financial years 
2005-06 to 2007-08 (adjusted to 2007-08 prices), median total individual income was £251 
per week, significantly less, as one would expect, than median earnings for all employees at 
around the same time (£364 in Figure 2.6(a)). The range was also even wider – with a tenth 
of adults having a weekly income on an individual basis of £57 or less, and a tenth having an 
individual income of £704 or more, generating a 90:10 ratio of 12.4. Four per cent of adults 
had total income exceeding £1,000 per week, but nearly 5 per cent had little or no income 
in their own right (less than £20). Figure 2.9(b) shows the corresponding distribution for the 
three years 1996-97 to 1998-99.30 At that time there was a somewhat more pronounced peak 
corresponding to some of the main pension and benefit levels (£80-100 per week in 2007-08 
prices). The fastest growth in individual incomes (28 per cent) was around the median, with 
both the 10th and 90th percentiles growing by rather less, around 20 per cent. Both the 10th 
and 90th percentiles therefore fell in relation to the median over the nine years, but the 90:10 
ratio changed little.
In our breakdown of the position of members of different groups in Chapter 6, we concentrate 
on net individual income, after allowing for direct taxes. The overall shape of this distribution 
is shown for 2005-06 to 2007-08 in Figures 2.10(a) and (b). Figure 2.10(c) shows the shape of 
the net income distribution nine years earlier. As one might expect, comparing with Figure 2.9 
direct taxes have little effect on those with the lowest individual incomes, and a larger effect 
on those with the highest incomes than on the median.31 The 90:10 ratio is thus reduced 
compared to that of pre-tax incomes to 9.6 in 2005-06 to 2007-08 (and had been 9.8 nine 
years earlier). Just under 2 per cent of the adult population had net individual incomes of 
£1,000 per week or more (up from 1.2 per cent in the earlier period). The top 1 per cent had 
individual incomes above £1,300 in 2006-2008. Again, growth at the median (25 per cent) 
had been somewhat greater than at the 10th and 90th percentiles (18-19 per cent).
29  This includes beneﬁ  ts such as Income Support or income-related Jobseeker’s Allowance which are attributed 
here to the individual who receives them, even where they are paid in respect of a couple. Housing Beneﬁ  t 
and Council Tax Beneﬁ  t are excluded from these ﬁ  gures. The data cover only individuals living in private 
households. An adult is someone who is: a married or cohabiting person; or an individual aged 19 or over; or 
a 16 to 18 year-old not in full-time education; or a 16 to 18 year-old on a course above ‘A’ level standard (or 
above ‘Highers’ in Scotland).
30  Data for 1996-97 to 1998-99 cover Great Britain, data for 2005-06 to 2007-08 cover the United Kingdom.
31  See Box 2.4 below for discussion of the effect of the tax system as a whole.
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Figure 2.9(a): Total individual income at 2007-08 prices, UK, 2005-06 to 2007-08:
Percentage with income in each range
Figure 2.9(b): Total individual income at 2007-08 prices, Great Britain, 1996-97 to 1998-99:
Percentage with income in each range
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Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series 2005-06 to 2007-08.33
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Figure 2.10(a): Net individual income at 2007-08 prices, UK, 2005-06 to 2007-08:
Percentage with income in each range
Figure 2.10(b): Net individual income at 2007-08 prices, UK, 2005-06 to 2007-08:
















0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000+
£ per week (£20 bands)


























Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series 2005-06 to 2007-08.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
34
Figure 2.10(c): Net individual income at 2007-08 prices, GB, 1996-97 to 1998-99:
Percentage with income in each range
2.5  Incomes on a household basis
Looking at income on the basis of which individual receives it, as in the previous section, gives 
valuable insights into the positions of different groups and, as we shall see in Chapter 10, 
changes over time in the economic positions of men and women and of different age groups. 
However, most people do not live alone and, for many purposes, what will be most important 
for their standard of living is the total income of the family or household to which they belong. 
In this section, and in the breakdowns we examine in Chapter 7, we use a household-based 
definition. In this section, we look at ‘equivalent net income’ as defined for the main official 
income distribution statistics in the UK, published each year by the Department for Work and 
Pensions in its Households Below Average Income (HBAI) publication. A brief description of 
how those statistics are derived and the definitions used is given in Box 2.1, but key points to 
note are:
  ❍ The statistics allocate all individuals in the population (including children) a level of 
income based on the total income of the household in which they live. Each tenth of the 
distribution shown therefore contains the same number of people, even if they live in 
households of different sizes.
  ❍ Each individual in a household is allocated the same income, in effect assuming equal 
sharing of resources within a household. This may be a reasonable assumption in many 
cases, and assuming no sharing at all would clearly be wrong for those situations, but 
there is evidence that sharing is incomplete in other cases. There is no evidence that 
would allow robust estimates that allowed for variations in sharing within households. 
We discuss implications of this for measurement of gender inequality, in particular, in 
Box 7.1. 
P70 = £271
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  ❍ The level of income is adjusted to allow for the fact that a smaller household needs 
fewer resources than a larger household to achieve the same standard of living. The 
result is a calculation of equivalent net income. This is the amount that would put 
a household consisting of a couple with no children in the same position.32 The box 
explains how this adjustment is made. The factors used are, to some extent, arbitrary 
but are the ones used most commonly for international comparisons, for instance by 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or EU. 
  ❍ Incomes include beneﬁ  ts and pensions, but income tax and National Insurance 
contributions are deducted. The ofﬁ  cial statistics present information on two bases 
– before and after deducting housing costs. For the main comparisons in this report 
we look at incomes on a before housing costs (BHC) basis, although we present some 
breakdowns on the after housing costs (AHC) basis where this gives a markedly 
different picture for the position of particular groups (notably those deﬁ  ned by region 
and housing tenure). Incomes are shown on a weekly basis (averaging out items that 
are received monthly or annually).
Although each of the many assumptions made in compiling these statistics could be 
challenged, the series gives, for many purposes, the most useful description of the differences 
in economic resources between people, including what has happened to inequality over time 
and how inequality in the UK compares with other countries. Figures 2.11(a) and (b) show 
the shape of the income distribution on this basis in the financial year 2007-08. Median 
equivalent net income was £393 per week. In other words, half the population lived in 
households where income adjusted for household size put them in a position that was less 
favourable than a childless couple with a net annual income of £20,500, and half were in a 
more favourable position. A tenth had weekly incomes below £191 and a tenth had incomes 
of more than £806 (including more than 5 per cent above £1,000 per week). The top 1 per 
cent had equivalent net incomes above £2,000 per week. Thus, the 10th percentile was just 
under half the median, and the 90th percentile was just over twice the median, and so the 
90:10 ratio was more than four (4.2). As we shall see, this is a high level of income inequality 
in both historic and international terms. Sharing within the household (assuming that it 
occurs) means that it is, however, considerably less than the inequality described for individual 
income in the previous section. The shape of the distribution is one that is often observed: 
many people have incomes around and just below the median, but there is a long tail of a 
smaller number of people who had incomes well above the median. One result of this is that 
‘average’ (mean) income (£487) in 2007-08 was well above the middle person’s income given 
by the median (£393). A small number of high incomes pull up the average. 
32  Note that this is simply the reference category used – all household types are included in the statistics, 
regardless of how many members they contain.
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Box 2.1: The Households Below Average Income (HBAI) income definition
The Department for Work and Pensions’ HBAI series presents information on potential 
living standards in the UK. Despite the series’ name, it provides information about the 
whole of the income distribution, not only on low incomes.
The measure of income used to produce the HBAI is ‘weekly net disposable equivalent 
household income’, which we refer to as ‘equivalent net income’. This includes total 
income from all sources of all household members including dependants, net of direct 
taxes.
Income is measured on two bases, Before Housing Costs (BHC) and After Housing Costs 
(AHC) have been deducted. Housing costs include rent, water rates, mortgage interest 
payments, insurance premiums and ground rent and service charges.
An important assumption in the HBAI analysis is that all individuals in the household 
benefit equally from the total income of the household. However, a household of three 
persons needs a larger income than an individual living alone in order to enjoy the same 
living standard, but not three times as much because of economies of scale (e.g. sharing 
space, utilities, etc.). To reflect this, income is adjusted using an ‘equivalence scale’, 
to reflect the extent to which households of different size and composition require a 
different level of income to achieve the same living standard. Incomes are adjusted to 
be equivalent to those for a couple without children.
For example, suppose that three households – a single person, a couple with no 
children, and a couple with two children aged fourteen and ten – all have unadjusted 
weekly household incomes of £200 BHC.
The equivalent net income of the couple with no children would be £200, as that family 
type is the reference case. The equivalent income of the single person would be £299, 
in effect showing a potential living standard nearly 50 per cent higher than for the 
couple. For the couple with two children, equivalent income would be £131, reflecting a 
potential living standard only two-thirds of that of the childless couple.
The main data source used in the survey is the FRS, but results for around the top 1 
per cent of the income distribution are adjusted to be consistent with HM Revenue & 
Customs (HMRC) data based on tax returns.
Fuller details can be found in Appendix 2 of DWP’s annual HBAI publication.37
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Figure 2.11(a): Equivalent net income before housing costs, UK, 2007-08:
Number of individuals (millions) with income in each range
Figure 2.11(b): Equivalent net income before housing costs, UK, 2007-08:
Income level at each percentile (£/week)
Figure 2.11(c) shows what the distribution looked like (at 2007-08 prices) ten years earlier, in 
1997-98 (but for Great Britain). Comparing the two, incomes at all levels rose in real terms 
over the ten years by between 17 per cent (at the 10th and 70th percentile) and 21 per cent (at 
the 30th percentile). The median grew by 18 per cent. At the same time, there was a reduction 
in the numbers of individuals with incomes below the conventional poverty line marked on 
the diagrams (measured as 60 per cent of the median), but a faster increase in the incomes of 
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Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.  Incomes are adjusted to be equivalent to those for a couple with no children. For a 
single person, divide actual net income by 0.67; for a couple with child under 14 by 1.2; for a couple with 2 children under 
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Figure 2.11(c): Equivalent net income before housing costs at 2007-08 prices, GB, 1997-98:
Number of individuals (millions) with income in each range
Figure 2.12 shows in more detail the ways in which real incomes have grown at different 
points of the distribution since 1994-95 (when the survey used by DWP for this analysis 
started). Particularly rapid periods of growth include that for the 90th percentile between 
1995-96 and 2001-02 and for the 10th percentile between 1997-98 and 2001-02. Growth 
for all groups slowed considerably after 2001-02. In the last two years for which figures are 
available, up to 2007-08, real incomes fell at the 10th percentile, but rose for those in the top 
half of the distribution.
Figure 2.12: Incomes over time at 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 90th percentiles, 1994-95 to 2007-08 















0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000+ 





























60% of the 
median = £200
Mean income = £402
 1.7 million individuals  with 
income above £1,000 per week






















10th percentile 30th percentile 50th percentile 70th percentile 90th percentile
Source: DWP.
Note: figures are for the UK from 2002-03, earlier years are for GB only.39
Chapter 2   Economic inequalities in the UK
These kinds of differential income growth mean that different ways of summarising the 
overall inequality of the income distribution can show somewhat different pictures. Longer-
term trends in income inequality since 1961 according to two kinds of summary measure are 
shown in Figure 2.13. The first measure is the 90:10 ratio which we have been using above, 
which is one way of summarising inequality across the bulk of the population. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, incomes at the 90th percentile were generally just over three times those at the 
10th percentile. Ever since the very steep growth in inequality in the mid-1980s, the ratio has 
been somewhat above four. It declined in the mid-1990s and again at the start of the 2000s, 
but grew between 2004-05 and 2007-08, so that the latest figure available exceeds its value 
of ten years before. The figure also shows trends in the ratios for the parts of this relating to 
below-median incomes (the 50:10 ratio) and to above-median incomes (the 90:50 ratio). Since 
the mid-1990s these have had very similar values and have moved together, although back in 
the 1960s the 50:10 ratio was greater than the 90:50 ratio.
The second summary index for inequality is the Gini coefficient. This (expressed as a 
percentage) takes a value from zero, if everyone has the same income, to 100 if one person 
has all the income and everyone else none. It is affected by income differences at every point 
in the distribution, including at the very top and bottom as well as in the middle. Given the 
increasing incomes of those at the very top in particular, this index fell less rapidly than the 
90:10 ratio in the mid-1990s and first part of this decade, and the increasing inequality after 
2004-05 meant that by 2007-08 it had reached its highest level in the years covered. We 
do not have figures before 1961 on this basis, but comparison with measures based on tax 
records suggests that this is the highest level of income inequality since soon after the Second 
World War.33
Figure 2.13: Changes in overall income inequality measures (HBAI definition), 1961 to 2007-08
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Source: IFS, http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn19figs.zip
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While our focus in this report is on the population as a whole rather than on the extremes, for 
many people it is the contrasts between those right at the top and those right at the bottom 
that are of most interest or concern. Box 2.2 summarises analysis of the increasing shares of 
those at the very top of the distribution in the last twenty years, comparing both with earlier 
periods and with other countries. Box 2.3 summarises recent changes in poverty rates using the 
main current official measures, and discusses evidence on the reliability or otherwise of the very 
lowest reported incomes (which implies that data for incomes in the bottom few percentiles – 
below the fifth percentile of the overall distribution – should be treated with caution).
Box 2.2: Trends in the highest incomes
The main evidence we present in this report is concerned with inequalities across 
the bulk of the population. Because our focus is on differences between and within 
groups when the population is classified in various ways, and because of small sample 
numbers for many of those groups, we concentrate in the chapters that follow on 
inequality measures that exclude the very top and very bottom of the distributions in 
which we are interested. However, for many people the first thing that would come to 
mind when discussing ‘inequality’ would be differences between those right at the top 
and either the middle or those right at the bottom. This box presents evidence, mainly 
from different sources to those used in the rest of the report, on long-term and more 
recent trends in the highest incomes, with some evidence on what kinds of people 
have the highest incomes and earnings.
Table 2A and Figure 2A show results from analysis by Tony Atkinson and Thomas 
Piketty of the shares of total income which various groups right at the top of the 
income distribution received (after income tax) between 1937 and 2000. The results 
are drawn from tax records. They are somewhat different to other analysis of incomes 
in this section in that they relate to the shares of ‘tax units’ – essentially single people 
or couples up to 1989, but individual adults since then. There is, thus, a break in the 
series between 1989 and 1990. The figures are not adjusted for household size.
The table and figure show that between 1937 and 1949 the shares of each of the 
groups declined. The share of the top tenth of taxpayers fell from 36 per cent to 
29 per cent. For the very highest group – the top 0.05 per cent (one in every two 
thousand) – the fall was from 2.4 per cent of total after tax income to 0.7 per cent. 
This tendency towards reduced inequality continued until 1969, but by the late 1970s 
it had reversed and then gathered pace. By 2000, the share of the top 0.05 per cent 
had risen to above 2.5 per cent of the total again – higher than it had been in 1937 
(although a small part of the difference may reflect the definitional change in 1990). 
The share of the top 1 per cent had reached 10 per cent, again its highest since before 
the Second World War. 
The table shows an important contrast, however, between the 1979 to 1989 and 
1990 to 2000 periods. In the earlier period – essentially the 1980s – the top tenth of 
taxpayers increased their share of total income by 5 percentage points, with half of 
this accounted for by the top 1 per cent, and within this the top 0.1 per cent increasing 
their share by 1 percentage point. Inequality was growing within those with the 
highest incomes, but they were all increasing their shares. By contrast, in the 1990s, 
the increase in the share of the top tenth was all accounted for by the top 0.1 per cent. 
The ‘next 0.9 per cent’ gained too, so the top 1 per cent as a whole increased their41
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share from 8 to 10 per cent of the total. But the share of the ‘next 9 per cent’ actually 
fell. The increase in the shares of top incomes in the 1990s was about those right at the 
top, not those quite near to it.34


















1937 2.37 1.28 5.4 9.0 3.6 12.6 23.1 35.6
1949 0.68 0.55 1.2 4.2 2.6 6.8 22.0 28.8
1959 0.54 0.41 2.4 3.3 2.2 5.5 20.4 25.9
1969 0.44 0.37 2.2 3.0 2.0 5.0 20.0 25.1
1979 0.53 0.33 2.0 2.8 1.9 4.7 21.5 26.2
1989 1.81 2.9 4.7 2.5 7.1 24.2 31.3
1990 2.21 3.2 5.4 2.6 8.0 25.9 33.9
2000 2.53 0.97 3.7 7.2 2.8 10.0 24.3 34.3
Source: Atkinson and Piketty (2007), table 4.2.
Notes: Figures are based on the shares of different groups of ‘tax units’ (as proportion of total potential 
tax units). There are two discontinuities resulting in slight changes after 1974 and more signiﬁ  cant ones 
after 1989, with the introduction of independent taxation, so husbands and wives are now separate units.
Figure 2A: Share of total personal after tax income of the top 0.05%, 0.1%, and 0.5%, 
UK, 1937-2000 (percentage of total after tax income)
34  In 2004-05, the highest tenth of adults had annual incomes before tax of above £35,000; the top 
1 per cent had incomes above £100,000; and the top 0.1 per cent – about 47,000 people – had incomes 
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Source: Atkinson and Piketty (2007), ﬁ  gure 4.6.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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This kind of (favourable) reversal of (literal) fortunes for those at the very top of the 
income distribution since the late 1970s happened in certain other countries as well. As 
the first panel of Figure 2B shows, comparable data show similar trends for the shares 
of the top 1 per cent in other English-speaking countries (in this case for before tax 
incomes and going back over the whole of the twentieth century). Indeed, in the USA, 
the gain of the top 1 per cent was even greater than in the UK, to more than 15 per 
cent by 2000. However, as the lower panel shows, while the pattern of falling shares 
for the very top was similar in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland up to 
1980, in these countries there has been little change since then. The rise in the incomes 
of the very top has not, therefore, been a global phenomenon.
Mike Brewer, Luke Sibieta and Liam Wren-Lewis look at recent tax-based data in more 
detail, contrasting the four-year periods from 1996-97 and from 2000-01. In the first 
period, real income growth (after income tax) within the top 10 per cent was faster, the 
nearer the top one looked: an annual rate of nearly 4 per cent at the 90th percentile, but 
more than 5 per cent at the 99th percentile, and 8 per cent at the cut-off for the top 0.1 
per cent. However, between 2000-01 and 2004-05, annualised income growth fell to 
around 1 per cent at most points within the top tenth, and to zero at the cut-off for the 
top 0.1 per cent.35 
Part of the reason for this is connected with fluctuations in the stock market, and in 
levels of dividend payments, which will have increased and then fallen again in the 
period since 2004. Part of it also relates to trends in pay for those with the highest 
incomes. One indication of what has been happening here is provided by the Income 
Data Services analysis of the earnings (and other remuneration) of the chief executive 
officers (CEOs) of Britain’s largest companies shown in Figure 2C. This shows indices of 
real earnings since 1999 for all full-time employees, and for the CEOs of the top 100 
and next 250 companies. For all employees, real earnings were roughly static between 
2003 and 2008 (at about 106 per cent of 1999 levels). But between 1999 and 2007 the 
real earnings of the CEOs of the top 100 companies more than doubled (reaching £2.4 
million per year), and those of the next 250 companies almost doubled (reaching £1.1 
million). The CEOs did have a sharp fall in pay in 2008, as one might expect given the 
financial crash, but it remained higher than in 2004, and substantially higher than in 
1999. It is striking that the rapid rise in CEO remuneration came after 2003, just as full-
time earnings in general flattened out.
35  Brewer, Sibieta and Wren-Lewis (2008), ﬁ  gure 11. Atkinson and Piketty (forthcoming) suggest, however, 
that by 2005, shares at the very top of the UK distribution were higher again in 2005 than they had been in 
2000.43
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Figure 2B(a): Share of top 1% in total income before tax in English-speaking countries 
(percentages)
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Source: Atkinson and Piketty (2007), ﬁ  gures 13.2A and 13.2B.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
44
Figure 2C: Index of real median earnings of FTSE 350 CEOs, 1999-2008 (1999=100)
Who are those with the highest incomes?
We know much less about what kinds of people have the highest incomes and 
earnings than we do about larger groups of the population, where sample data give 
reliable information. As far as incomes for tax purposes are concerned, we have a little 
information about their gender, age and the region where they live:36 
•  Men were just over half of all taxpayers in 2004-05, but five-sixths of the top 1 per 
cent and more than nine-tenths of the top 0.1 per cent.
•  Those aged 45-54 were just under a fifth of all taxpayers were, but they were a third 
of the top 1 per cent and half of the top 0.1 per cent.
•  Those living in London were an eighth of all taxpayers, but a quarter of the top 1 per 
cent and more than a third of the top 0.1 per cent.
The tax data on which this is based do not indicate people’s other characteristics. 
The LFS gives more information of the composition of those with the highest 
weekly earnings, some features of which are summarised in Table 2B, showing what 
proportions of earners of different kinds are found in various parts of the weekly 
earnings distribution. In Chapter 5, we investigate the earnings of different groups in 
more detail, but this summary shows that patterns applying when looking up to the top 
tenth of earners intensify within the top tenth. For instance:
36  Brewer, Sibieta and Wren-Lewis (2008), ﬁ  gures 5 and 6. The data also contain information on the kinds of 








1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
FTSE 100 CEOs Mid-250 CEOs All full-time employees
Source: Income Data Services (for CEO pay) and ASHE (for all full-time employees).
Note: CEO earnings include salary, beneﬁ  ts, annual bonus, share options and Long-Term Investment Plans. Adjusted by RPI.45
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•  Men are more than three times as likely to be in the top tenth of earners as women, 
but six times as likely to be in the top 1 per cent.
•  With the exception of Indian employees, non-white ethnic groups are less likely to be 
amongst the highest earners than White British employees.
•  Nearly 40 per cent of higher managerial and professional employees are in the top 
tenth of earners, and 5 per cent of them in the top 1 per cent.
•  12 per cent of employees with mortgages are in the top tenth of earners, but less 
than 1 per cent of social tenant employees are in the top tenth.
Table 2B: Proportions of different groups within various parts of the weekly earnings 












Top 1% of 
earners
Men 9 15 21 25 29 15.9 1.8
Women 30 25 19 15 12 4.6 0.3
White British 20 20 20 20 20 10.0 1.0
Indian 16 21 21 20 23 13.3 1.3
Pakistani 29 27 18 14 13 7.0 na
Bangladeshi 40 24 15 13 na na na
Black
Caribbean
17 18 24 25 16 6.1 na








6 13 22 30 29 12.4 0.8
Intermediate 22 33 27 14 5 1.3 na
Lower 
supervisory
13 23 27 26 11 2.6 na
Semi-routine 41 34 17 7 2 0.4 na
Routine 36 26 22 13 3 0.6 na
Outright 
owners
27 21 19 16 17 8.8 1.2
Mortgagors 16 17 19 23 25 12.4 1.1
Social 
tenants
34 31 21 11 3 0.7 na
Private 
tenants
18 26 23 19 13 7.0 0.8
Source: NEP, based on LFS (UK).
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Box 2.3: Trends in income at the bottom of the income distribution
In this box we present information on poverty rates for the whole population as well as 
for selected groups: working age adults, children and pensioners.37 We then discuss two 
issues: that the extent of poverty depends on the measure adopted, and that reported 
income is not always the best measure of living standards.
We start with figures for relative poverty on official definitions, that is, the number of 
individuals whose equivalent net income38 is below 60 per cent of the national median. 
In 2007-08 in the UK there were 11 million individuals in relative poverty using this 
definition. As a percentage of the population, poverty had fallen from 19.4 to 18.3 per 
cent since 1994-95. The reduction in the poverty rate was most pronounced between 
1997-98 and 2004-05, falling from 19.4 to 17 per cent. 
As Figure 2D shows, the reduction in the rate of child poverty was particularly 
pronounced over the same period from 1997-98 to 2004-05, falling from 26.7 to 
21.3 per cent. However, it had risen again to 22.5 per cent in 2007-08. Similarly, the 
pensioner poverty rate fell from 24.6 to 21.3 per cent between 1997-98 and 2004-05, 
but had risen to 22.7 by 2007-08.
Figure 2D: Relative poverty rates, 1994-95 to 2007-08, UK
The numbers presented above are based on a relative measure of poverty, that is, 
relative to the median income of the whole population. The threshold therefore 
changes over time as general living standards rise. 
37  We draw heavily from the DWP Households Below Average Income and the IFS Poverty and Inequality 
annual publications. We report ﬁ  gures on a Before Housing Cost basis.
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Source: HBAI (2007-08), DWP.47
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Alternatively, a line can be fixed at 60 per cent of the median income in a particular 
year, for instance, 1998-99 in Figure 2E. This gives us a measure of numbers below 
a fixed real (absolute) line. Against an absolute line, 12 per cent of individuals were 
classified as poor, compared to this, by 2007-08. By contrast, this figure was 23 per cent 
in 1994-95. 
Figure 2E: Poverty in relative terms and against an absolute line
Income is the basis for the measures of poverty presented above and in the official 
statistics. However, the Government announced in 2003 that it would also adopt an 
additional third indicator of poverty to monitor progress towards its target to halve 
child poverty by 2010 compared to the 1998 level. This is a combined indicator of low 
income (below 70 per cent of the median) and material deprivation, according to which 
children are classified as living in material deprivation if their parents say they cannot 
afford certain items, such as a family holiday for at least a week a year, having friends 
or family around for a drink or meal at least once a month, two pairs of all-weather 
shoes for each adult.39 According to this measure, there were 2.2 million children living 
in households with low income and high material deprivation in the UK in 2004-05, or 
17 per cent of all children. The figures were the same in 2007-08, (up from a low point 
in 2006-07).40
39  Rates of material deprivation are only collected for families with children.
40 DWP  (2009a).
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Research for DWP by Brewer, O’Dea et al. (2009), using data for 2004-05 to 2006-07, 
suggested that children from households with the very lowest reported incomes did not 
appear to have the lowest average living standards measured in other ways. Children 
living in households with reported incomes below £50 a week had average living 
standards comparable to those with incomes of £250 to £500 a week. Living standards 
were also higher for children living in self-employed families compared to those living in 
employed families and workless families with similar reported incomes.
The lowest apparent living standards were for children living in households with 
incomes in the range of £100 to £200 a week. From Figure 2.11(b) this corresponds 
to the 4th to the 11th percentile of the overall income distribution. By implication, care 
should therefore be taken when using statistics relating to incomes in the bottom 4-5 
per cent of the distribution, as they may be affected by reporting errors.
It should be noted that the figures for income that we analyse here and in later chapters are 
usually taken from surveys that cover a ‘snap shot’ of a sample of the population at any one 
time. First, this means that when we make comparisons over time, as in Figures 2.12 or 2.13 or 
in Chapter 10, they are a comparison between the populations at each date, not the result of 
following the same people over time (although Chapter 11 contains some analysis that does 
this). Second, people’s circumstances vary over time – those who are, for instance, poor in one 
year are not necessarily poor the next year. While the prevalence of income change between 
one year and the next is relatively high, the growing literature on ‘income mobility’ shows that 
most income changes are short-distance rather than long-distance moves – few people move 
from the top to the bottom or vice versa over a period of several years.41
The relationship between different kinds of income
In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we looked at the distributions of gross earnings (for employees) 
and of total individual incomes (across all adults, and including other kinds of income). The 
shapes of these are major factors in creating the overall distribution of income on the net 
household income basis described in this section, but there are three intervening mechanisms 
that mean that household income inequality may not be the same as – or even change 
in the same direction as – inequality in earnings or individual incomes. First, the social 
security system means that the gross incomes of pensioners and others with no earnings are 
substantially higher than their incomes from the market (even including private pensions). 
Second, the direct tax system tends to narrow income inequalities, as we saw in Section 2.4. 
Third, household composition can either narrow or widen income inequality. If those without 
income in their own right are in the same households as those with high individual income, 
inequalities will be narrowed, but if those with high individual incomes are in the same 
households as others with high incomes, inequalities may be widened. In Box 2.4, we look at 
41  See Hills (2004), chapter 5, for a summary of the evidence. See Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) and Jenkins and 
Rigg (2001) for a more detailed discussion of the position in the UK in the 1990s. International comparisons 
can be found in Goodin, Heady, Muffels and Dirven (1999) and Bradbury, Jenkins and Miklewright (2001). 49
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the impact of the tax and benefit system on overall income inequality, while in Box 2.5 (at the 
end of the chapter) we look at the relationship between household composition and income 
levels. One reason for the differences between groups in incomes on a household basis that 
we show in Chapter 7 is that household composition varies between them.
Box 2.4: The effects of taxes and benefits on household income 
Taxes and benefits change the income of households and therefore affect the level of 
income inequality, usually reducing it. The Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) annual 
Redistribution of Income (ROI) analysis assesses the impact of the tax and benefit 
system on the distribution of household income and therefore on income inequality. In 
the first part of this Box we report findings from their 2009 analysis and from a review 
they published in 2008 looking back over the last 30 years.
The ROI analysis starts from the ‘original income’ received by households from 
employment, occupational and private pensions, and investments, before government 
intervention (effectively, market income). It then looks at how taxes and benefits at 
different stages affect households’ final disposable income. The unit is the household, 
unlike DWP’s HBAI analysis, where the unit of analysis is the individual. However, in 
presenting results, households are ranked by their net equivalent disposable income, 
adjusted in a similar measure to HBAI, taking account of their size and composition. 
Income levels are shown without adjustment.
The latest available analysis is based on the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) for 
2007-08. It shows that, before tax and benefits, the top fifth of households had an 
average original income of £72,600 per year. This was sixteen times the average for the 
bottom fifth of households, £4,700 per year. After taking account of all taxes (including 
indirect taxes) and benefits, the ‘post tax’ incomes of the top fifth became £52,400, 
whilst that of the bottom fifth increased to £14,300. Households with the highest 
income pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits, while the opposite occurs 
for those with the lowest incomes. Taxes and benefits therefore reduce the extent of 
income inequality.
Figure 2F shows the Gini coefficients for inequality in the different types of household 
income considered in the analysis:
•  The top line shows the Gini coefficient for original income. This was 52 per cent in 
2007-08, up from 43 per cent in 1977.
•  The Gini coefficient for gross income (original income plus cash benefits such as 
state pensions) was much lower: 38 per cent in 2007-08, up from 30 per cent in 1977.
•  The Gini coefficient for disposable income (gross income less direct taxes and local 
taxes, and so similar to the HBAI equivalent net income measure) was even lower: 34 
per cent in 2007-08, compared to 27 per cent in 1977.
•  However, once indirect taxes were taken into account, the Gini coefficient for post-
tax income (disposable income less indirect taxes) was 38 per cent in 2007-08, the 
same level as the index for gross income. In 1977 the coefficient for post-tax income 
had been 29 per cent.
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Thus, while cash benefits reduce inequality in the distribution of household income, the 
overall effect of the tax system as a whole – the difference between gross incomes and 
‘post-tax’ incomes – is small (apart, of course, from financing the benefits). In the ONS 
analysis, the equalising redistributive effect of direct taxes was offset by the effect of 
indirect taxes.42 Figure 2F shows that this has been the case for the last 30 years. Figure 
2G shows that this has also been true when one looks at the different parts of the 
income distribution. In some ways this is a quite startling diagram. It shows that across 
the entire period, the tax system as a whole (including indirect taxes) has had virtually 
no effect on the shares of each fifth of the income distribution – direct and indirect 
taxes (as measured by ONS) have taken the same proportion of income from each 
fifth of households throughout the period. The effect of the tax system has remained 
resolutely proportional, with very little variation over time despite the policy shifts over 
the period. This is especially striking over the 1980s. Given that the share of original 
(market) income of the top fifth grew over this period, one might have expected, other 
things being equal, the progressivity of the income tax system to have restrained the 
growth of post-tax inequality. That it did not do so was a result of other changes over 
the same period that changed the structure of the tax system, acting in the opposite 
direction.43
Figure 2F: Inequality for the distribution of income at each stage of the tax and benefit 
system, Gini coefficients (percentages)
42  Measuring the distributional effects of indirect taxes can be done in different ways. Where households 
smooth their consumption while income ﬂ  uctuates, analysis of the kind used by ONS can exaggerate the 
regressivity of indirect taxes. If their impact is measured in relation to spending, rather than income (of 
which higher income households tend to save more), they also emerge as less regressive, or even progressive, 
in the case of VAT (Crossley, Phillips and Wakeﬁ  eld, 2009).
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Source: Jones, Annan and Shah (2009), ﬁ  gure 12.51
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Figure 2G: Share of total gross and post-tax income by quintile group
Figure 2F highlights that it is the combination of taxes and benefits that has a 
redistributive effect. Taxes in the UK may be largely proportional overall, but they 
finance, amongst other things, cash benefits and state pensions that are more 
important to the incomes of those with low incomes, so the combined effect is to 
reduce inequality. In understanding trends over time, it is important to look at the 
combination of the two together – as can be done by comparing the lines for original 
and disposable or post-tax incomes in Figure 2F.
The discussion of the effects of the tax system also reminds us that there are two 
things that can affect the distribution of income after taxes and benefits: changes 
in the distribution of market income and policy changes. To isolate the impact of the 
latter, one has to model what would have happened in the absence of policy change – 
technically, comparing the results of actual policies with a ‘counterfactual’. Figure 2H 
shows analysis of the impact of changes to the direct tax and benefit systems over the 
twelve years from 1996-97 to 2008-09, modelled on a population with fixed market 
incomes and other characteristics. The impact is shown against two comparisons: 
with what the system would have become if all aspects of the tax and benefit system 
had been adjusted in line with price inflation over the period; and against what it 
would have become if they had been adjusted in line with earnings growth. The first 
of these gives a broad measure of the distributional impact of policy change against 
policies if there had been no reforms such as the introduction of tax credits and if price 
indexation of benefits and tax thresholds had continued. However, at a time of real 
income growth, one would expect price indexation to lead to a less redistributive impact 
of taxes and benefits (as, for instance, benefits and pensions fall behind the incomes 
of those in paid work).44 The second comparison is therefore against an earnings-linked 
base that would be expected to be more neutral in distributional terms. 
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The first set of bars suggests that compared to unchanged policies that involved price 
indexation, those who would have been in the poorest half of the income distribution 
were better off under the actual structures of 2008-09 – by up to 25 per cent for those 
who would have been in the poorest tenth.45 The second set of bars suggests that 
against an earnings-linked base, those who would have been in the poorest three tenths 
were still better off on average, but to a smaller extent – by up to 8 per cent for the 
bottom tenth. Those in the top half of the income distribution were slightly worse off 
than they would have been under the 1996-97 adjusted for earnings indexation.
Figure 2H: Overall distributional effect of tax-benefit policies, 1996-97 to 2007-08, 
compared to price and earnings indexation (percentage change in disposable income)
A recent analysis carried out by Stuart Adam and James Browne came to a very similar 
conclusion about the changes to taxes and benefits affecting households since 1996-
97.46 It also carried out the same analysis on reforms under the previous government, 
concluding that, “Labour’s reforms since 1997 have had a similar effect on overall 
inequality as increasing benefit rates in line with GDP, while the Conservatives’ reforms 
(between 1979 and 1997) were roughly equivalent to increasing them in line with 
inflation”. The effect of this was that, “Labour’s tax and benefit reforms since 1997 
have tended to reduce inequality, while those of the previous Conservative government 
tended to increase it”.
However, the reforms to personal taxes and benefits since 1996-97 have involved 
selective redistribution. The family types which have benefited the most from these 
changes on average have been pensioners, and workless families with children, even 
when one looks within each income group.47
45  Unlike the ONS analysis, which looks at households, this analysis is for the position of individuals, in terms of 
equivalent net income.
46  Adam and Browne (2009). See also Jenkins and Van Kerm (2009).
47  Adam and Browne (2009), ﬁ  gure 4.9; Sefton, Hills and Sutherland (2009), ﬁ  gure 2.6; Phillips (2008), 
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Gini coefficient (percentages) Source: OECD (2008).
Note: UK figures based on FRS.
International comparisons 
The OECD recently published a major comparison of income inequality across its member 
countries. Figure 2.14(a) compares the Gini coefficients measured in much the same way as 
described above (and using the same data source for the UK) in 30 industrialised countries in 
the mid-2000s. At this point the UK had income inequality that was above the OECD average 
and which put it in the top quarter of all the countries shown, although significantly below the 
USA, Turkey and Mexico. Italy had higher inequality than the UK,48 but other large European 
countries such as Germany and France had inequality that was below the OECD average, 
while Scandinavian countries, particularly Denmark and Sweden, had the least inequality.
Figure 2.14(a): Gini coefficients of income inequality in OECD countries, mid-2000s 
The growth in income inequality in the UK in the 1980s was unusually rapid from a cross-
national perspective. Part of this can be seen from Figure 2.14(b), showing changes in the Gini 
coefficient for 24 countries where data are available over two periods, from the mid-1980s to 
the mid-1990s and from then until the mid-2000s. In the first period, the UK was one of the 
six countries with the most rapid growth in inequality; in the second, it was one of the four 
countries with the largest fall. Taking the two decades as a whole, UK inequality grew, but 
by less than the average for these countries. The years chosen to mark off the most recent 
period are, however, rather favourable for the UK, 2004-05 preceding the most recent period 
of inequality growth.49
48  The UK ﬁ  gure used by OECD was for 2004-05; the growth in inequality in the UK by 2007-08 would put the 
UK above the level that Italy had been at in the mid-2000s.
49  Brewer, Muriel, Phillips and Sibieta (2009, p.24). The OECD comparisons over time also use a different data 
source, the EFS, which gives a somewhat more favourable picture of income inequality trends than the larger 
FRS used for the comparison shown in Figure 2.14(a) and for the main DWP analysis.
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Figure 2.14(b): Percentage point changes in the Gini coefficient over different time periods 
The UK’s high level of income inequality in international terms is partly a product of its 
very high inequality at the top of the income range,50 while it is less unusual at the bottom. 
In terms of relative poverty, its performance is bad compared to other EU member states, 
particularly for children and pensioners, according to Eurostat’s main data source.51 This 
suggests that in 2006 the UK had an overall poverty rate (against a line of 60 per cent of 
each country’s median income) of 19 per cent, compared to an average for the fifteen longer-
standing EU members of 16 per cent. Only Italy, Spain and Greece had higher overall poverty 
rates. This is, however, a slightly gloomier assessment of the UK’s poverty rate than the DWP’s 
HBAI data show (a poverty rate of 18 per cent in 2006-07) and a less favourable picture than 
the OECD’s comparison across 30 countries illustrated in Figure 2.15, which suggests a rate 
of 16 per cent in the UK a couple of years earlier, putting it below the average for the larger 
group of countries shown at the time.
50  OECD (2008), p.32.



























Source: OECD (2008). Note: UK figures based on Expenditure and Food Survey.
                              Mid-1980s to mid-1990s Mid-1990s to mid-2000s
Cumulative change
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Figure 2.15: Relative poverty rates (percentages) at 60% of median income thresholds, 
mid-2000s
One of the reasons for the UK’s comparatively high levels of inequality in disposable incomes 
within Europe is that the combined impact of benefits and taxes in some other countries 
does more to reduce inequality compared with that in incomes from the market than the UK 
system does (see Box 2.8). Figure 2.16 is based on analysis by Alari Paulus, Francesco Figari 
and Holly Sutherland of income inequality in the early 2000s, both before and after allowing 
for the impact of state pensions and other benefits and direct taxation. Looking across the 
countries there is less variation in inequalities in ‘original’ (market) income than there is in 
gross income (after public pensions and other benefits) or disposable income (after taxes). 
Inequality in original income is not very much higher in the UK than in France and Germany, 
for instance, but benefits and taxes result in inequality in disposable income that is four 
percentage points lower in Germany and five points lower in France. Scandinavian countries, 
such as Denmark start with market income inequality that is not much lower than that in the 
UK, but achieve much greater reductions.52
52  Calculations of the redistributive effect of taxes and transfers can be done in different ways. The recent 
OECD report, Growing Unequal?, presents a number of comparisons across industrialised countries (OECD, 
2008, ﬁ  gure 4.4). These conﬁ  rm the picture that the UK achieves less reduction in inequality than countries 
such as Denmark, Sweden and Germany, but more than others outside Europe, such as Japan or the USA. 
The comparison with countries such as France depends on the precise measure used.
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Figure 2.16: Income inequality (Gini coefficient) before and after taxes and benefits, 
2001-2005
2.6 Household  wealth
The final kind of comparison that we make is between the wealth levels of different kinds of 
household (that is, their stock of assets, as opposed to their flows of income). This has not 
previously been possible, but can now be done thanks to the new ONS Wealth and Assets 
Survey (WAS), based on a sample survey carried out in the two years from July 2006 to June 
2008. As with the other data we present, this relates to the period immediately before the 
financial crisis and associated falls in both house prices and share values, and hence, relates to 
the point when wealth values were at their, arguably artificial, peaks. As explained above, it is 
very difficult to attribute wealth on an individual basis, so we look here at wealth distribution 
between households.
Measures of wealth can be constructed in different ways, depending on what kinds of 
assets or liabilities are included. We show the distributions of wealth below on three bases, 
concentrating in Chapter 8 on the third:
  ❍ Figure 2.17 shows the distribution of net ﬁ  nancial and physical wealth, giving 
the values at each percentile of the distribution. This includes household goods 
and possessions such as cars, but excludes owner-occupied houses. It also excludes 
mortgages, but allows for other ﬁ  nancial liabilities.
  ❍ The distribution of net non-pension wealth, including houses and deducting 
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Source: Paulas, Figari and Sutherland (2009).57
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  ❍ Figure 2.19(a) shows the proportion of households with total net wealth, including 
private pension rights, in each range, while Figure 2.19(b) shows the values at each 
percentile of the distribution.53
Some households had little or no wealth or even negative wealth (that is, those whose 
liabilities exceed their assets, even when household goods and property such as cars are 
included).54 For instance, on the narrowest wealth definition shown in Figure 2.17, the bottom 
2.4 per cent of households had no or negative wealth in 2006-2008. Wealth at the 90th 
percentile, £177,000, was over four times the median, £42,000. One per cent of households 
had net financial and physical wealth of more than £666,000. 
Figure 2.17: Net financial and physical wealth, 2006-08, GB (£)
53  In analysis of the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing carried out for us by James Banks and Gemma 
Tetlow (2009) looking at the wealth of people aged over 50, they also show the distribution of wealth 
including estimated State Pension rights.
54  The data we are using relate to the period before house prices fell, so ‘negative equity’ (which could create 
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Allowing for houses and mortgages, to show net non-pension wealth as in Figure 2.18, 
2.2 per cent still had zero or negative wealth, but the median rose to £145,000, and the 90th 
percentile to £491,000. More than 2 per cent of households had net non-pension wealth 
exceeding £1 million; for the top 1 per cent it exceeded £1.5 million (off the scale of the 
figure).
Figure 2.18: Net non-pension wealth, 2006-08, GB (£)
Allowing for private pension rights widens the gaps again, particularly at the top. Figure 
2.19(a) shows what proportion of households had wealth in various ranges (up to £800,000), 
already showing how wide the spread is compared with the other outcomes we have 
looked at. Figure 2.19(b) shows the levels of total wealth at each percentile. 1.6 per cent of 
households had zero or negative total net wealth, and the 10th percentile for total net wealth 
only rose to £8,800 and the median to £205,000. However, a tenth of households had total 
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Figure 2.19(a): Total net wealth, 2006-08, GB, (£)
Percentage with wealth in each range
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These distributions are far more unequal than any of those we have discussed so far, and the 
wealth of the richest households is far greater in relation to median household wealth than 
are high earnings or incomes relative to typical earnings or incomes.55 Measures such as the 
90:10 ratio – almost 100 for total net wealth – have limited meaning when the poorest tenth 
have little or no wealth. Within the top half of the distribution, the 90:50 ratio (comparing the 
90th percentile and the median) for total net wealth was 4.2, twice the equivalent ratio for 
equivalised net income or full-time weekly earnings (see Table 2.2 below). While the top 1 per 
cent by equivalent net income had 5 times the median (Figure 2.11(b)), the wealthiest 1 per 
cent of households had almost 13 times median total net wealth. Measures such as the Gini 
coefficient also have much higher values than they do for income distribution – for instance, 
61 per cent for total net wealth as measured in this survey, compared with 
36 per cent for equivalent net income.
As the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) has just been carried out for the first time, it is not 
possible to look at trends in wealth distribution on a comparable basis.56 Figure 2.20 gives 
some indication of recent trends in wealth distribution from a different kinds of source, HMRC 
analysis of data on the estates of those dying each year. The series is available on this basis 
since 1976. Until the mid-1980s, there was an uneven trend towards less inequality of wealth 
measured on this basis, but after the early 1990s it tended to become more unequal again, 
although fluctuating with stock market cycles. By 2003, after a fall in the stock market, the 
shares of the wealthiest groups and the overall level of the Gini coefficient had fallen back 
in that year, but were still as high, or higher, than they had been in 1976. This series does not 
extend beyond 2003.
Figure 2.20: Distribution of personal marketable wealth, 1976 to 2003, UK:
Share of most wealthy percentages of population and Gini coefficient, (percentages)
55  In Chapters 8 and 11, we look at the extent to which this inequality is explained by life-cycle factors.
56  Comparison of changes in wealth distribution calculated in a similar way to that shown here for the period 
1995 to 2000 based on data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) by Banks, Smith and Wakeﬁ  eld 
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Source: HMRC, based on Distribution of Personal Wealth series.61
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International comparisons
Making comparisons of wealth inequality between countries is more difficult than comparing 
earnings or income distributions. However, an exercise known as the Luxembourg Wealth Study 
(LWS) has begun to do this. Table 2.1, drawn from OECD’s review of LWS data, suggests that 
levels of household wealth inequality in the UK57 are not exceptional in international terms, and 
indeed much less not only than in the USA (for which two alternative series are shown), but also 
than in Germany and Sweden. The latter may come as a surprise, but it should be remembered 
that the meaning and importance of wealth differs between countries. In nations where the 
state is responsible for the bulk of pension provision funded from taxation, individuals have less 
need to save for retirement, which affects some of the numbers.




























Shares of individuals (%)
Positive net 
worth
77 83 63 89 68 82 77 77
Nil net 
worth
3 2 29 7 5 6 8 4
Negative 
net worth
20 15 9 3 27 11 16 19
Shares of total wealth (%)
Top 10% 53 45 55 42 58 45 64 71
Top 5% 37 31 38 29 41 30 49 58




75 68 80 61 89 66 81 84
Source: OECD (2008), table 10.3, based on the LWS database. Tabulations based on a deﬁ  nition of 
household wealth that excludes business equity. Data based on household weights. Pension assets 
excluded for UK, Italy and Sweden.
Notes: 1. Most ﬁ  nancial assets and non-housing debt are recorded only for values exceeding €2,500.
57  The UK ﬁ  gures are drawn from the BHPS. They show more inequality in 2000 than the comparable HAS 
ﬁ  gures for 2006-2008 shown in Figure 2.18 which also omit private pension rights. The HAS ﬁ  gures for non-
pension wealth have a Gini coefﬁ  cient of 59 per cent, for instance, compared to the 66 per cent for the BHPS 
series used by OECD in Table 2.1.
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Summary
For those familiar with the kinds of information we are using in this report, none of 
what we have presented above (apart from the only recently released data on wealth 
distribution) may be a surprise but, for others, the sheer scale of inequalities in most of 
the areas that we cover may be striking. Table 2.2 summarises some of the information 
we have shown. For the five distributions of wages, earnings, incomes and wealth we look 
at in detail, generally using data for the three years 2006-2008:
•	 The	median	hourly wage was £9.90. The 90:10 ratio was 3.9, with 10 per cent having 
wages below £5.50 and 10 per cent above £21.30 per hour. The top 1 per cent had 
wages above £43 per hour.
•	 The	median	for	weekly earnings for those employed full-time was £448. The 90:10 
ratio was 3.7, with 10 per cent having earnings below £240 and 10 per cent above 
£893 per week (equivalent to annual earnings of £46,600). The top 1 per cent had 
earnings above £1,910 per week.
•	 Median	net individual income received by adults in their own right, including those 
not employed, was £223 per week. The 90:10 ratio was 9.6, with 10 per cent of adults 
having individual incomes below £56 and 10 per cent above £542 per week. 1 per 
cent had individual incomes about £1,300 per week.
•	 For	the	whole	population,	median	equivalent net income on a household basis was 
£393 per week. The 90:10 ratio was 4.2, with 10 per cent of people having equivalent 
net incomes below £190 and 10 per cent above £805 per week. 1 per cent had 
equivalent net incomes above £2,000.
•	 Median	total wealth (including personal possessions, net financial assets, housing 
and private pension rights) was £205,000. The 90:10 ratio was just less than 100, with 
the top tenth of households having wealth above £853,000, and the bottom tenth 
having less than £8,800. Even looking more narrowly at the top half of the wealth 
distribution, those in the top tenth had more than 4.2 times as much wealth as those 
in the middle, around twice the equivalent ratios for weekly earnings or equivalent net 
income. 1 per cent of households had total net wealth above £2.6 million.
For earnings and equivalent net income, all of these ratios represent high levels of 
inequality by comparison with those in the UK a generation ago, and by comparison with 
other industrialised countries. Over the last decade, trends have been complex. On some 
measures, including the 90:10 ratio described above, earnings inequality has narrowed, 
and income inequality flattened out. On other measures, particularly those for income 
inequality which look across the whole distribution, inequality has widened.
A recent assessment of the overall impact of tax and benefit reforms since 1979 finds 
that policy over the 1979 to 1997 period was equivalent to increasing benefits in line with 
price inflation, while policy since then has been equivalent to increasing benefits in line 
with the growth of national income. Reforms since 1997 have tended to reduce income 
inequality, while those in the earlier period tended to increase it.63
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191 393 806 4.2 2.1 2.1
Total wealth  8,820 204,500 853,100 97 4.2 23.2
Note: All ﬁ  gures are given in 2008 prices, except the ﬁ  gures for net individual incomes (which are at 2007-
08 prices). Figures for net individual incomes taken from data for 2005-06 to 2007-08 (at 2007-08 prices), 
those for equivalent net income are from 2007-08 data, and for wealth from data for July 2006 to June 
2008 in cash terms.
At the very top of the income distribution, using data from tax records, the share of the 
top 1 per cent in after tax income fell from 12.6 per cent of the total in 1937 to 4.7 per 
cent by 1979, but rose again to 8 per cent in 1990 and 10 per cent in 2000. The share of 
the top 0.05 per cent (one in two thousand) fell from 2.4 per cent of the total in 1937 to 
under 0.5 per cent in 1969. By 2000, their share had risen back to 2.5 per cent. A similar 
gain in the shares of those with the highest incomes occurred in other English-speaking 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s, but this did not occur in continental Europe.
Although household wealth inequality is far more unequally distributed than household 
income, recent trends have been for only a small increase in inequality in the UK, and its 
level does not appear to be unusual by comparison with other countries.
It is harder to compare the spread of educational outcomes over time or internationally, 
particularly using the measure we favour for looking at the spread of overall achievement 
at age 16, rather than the numbers reaching a particular standard. However, recent 
international surveys suggest that school pupils in the UK have relatively good levels of 
literacy and mathematics achievement on average, and that the spread of attainment 
in comparable tests at age 14-16 is not exceptional. Looking at the qualifications of 
the working age population, while these have improved over time, what stands out is 
the relatively slow improvement in the proportion of the population with low (or no) 
qualifications, particularly for those in their twenties and thirties by comparison with 
other countries.
In the next part of the report, we examine the most recent data available to us to 
look at where members of particular population groups are to be found within these 
distributions, and how the spread of outcomes within each group compares with those in 
the population as a whole.
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Box 2.5: Household composition and income levels
There is a strong relationship between the type of family that individuals belong to 
and their likelihood of being located in a specific part of the equivalent net income 
distribution. 
Table 2C below shows that individuals in lone parent families are disproportionately 
represented at the bottom of the income distribution: almost 40 per cent of them 
are in the bottom fifth of the distribution, which corresponds to an equivalent net 
income below £244 per week, and 31 per cent into the second fifth. Only 3 per cent of 
individuals in lone parent families are in the top fifth of the income distribution. 
Single pensioners are also mostly represented at the bottom of the income distribution: 
29 per cent of them fall into the bottom fifth, and only 6 per cent of them fall into the 
top fifth. 
On the other hand, couples with no dependent children are to be found mostly at the 
top of the distribution: 38 per cent are in the top fifth and 27 per cent in the next 
highest fifth. 
Non-pensioner couples with children and single people without dependent children 
are more evenly distributed across the distribution. There are few differences in the 
distribution between single men and women without children.
Table 2C: Distribution of equivalent net income for individuals, by family type, UK (% of 














Pensioner couple 22 23 22 18 15 7.7
Single pensioner 29 31 21 12 6 4.6
 Male 22 33 23 13 8 1.2
 Female 32 31 21 11 6 3.4
Couple with 
children




10 9 15 27 38 11.4
Single with 




20 18 21 21 21 10.6
 Male 19 17 21 22 21 6.4
 Female 20 19 20 21 20 4.1
Source: DWP (2009a). Figures are Before Housing Costs65
Part 2
What is the position of different groups in 
the distributions of economic outcomes?
In this part of the report, we present our core findings on where members of different 
groups are to be found within the overall distributions of economic outcomes shown in 
the previous chapter, using the most recent data58 (Chapter 10 looks at changes in some 
of these over time). Chapters 3 to 8 present a very detailed view of differences across a 
range of educational and economic outcomes both between groups and within groups. 
Rather than summarising these at the end of each chapter, the most striking features of 
these are summarised in Chapter 9 under each way of dividing the population between 
social groups. At times, the results may seem repetitive: there are pervasive inequalities 
between social groups that manifest themselves again and again across different 
outcomes. That is important in itself. At the same time, there are some variations not 
just in the scale of the differences between groups, but also in their direction, depending 
on which outcome we have examined, which we draw out further in that chapter and its 
summary tables. However, what the statistics in these chapters also make clear is that 
inequality in economic outcomes is not only, or even predominantly, about differences 
between groups, but manifests itself within each social group, however we classify the 
population.
We show results in Chapter 3 to 8 for eight main distributions (two for each of education and 
earnings). We start by showing results broken down by gender (except for wealth). As the 
circumstances of men and women usually differ so much, we look at the positions within the 
overall distributions of men and women separately, where possible, when examining the other 
nine dimensions in which we are interested.59 
The dimensions we examine are:
  ❍ age;
  ❍ ethnicity;
  ❍ religious afﬁ  liation or ethno-religious group;
  ❍ disability status;
  ❍ sexual orientation;
  ❍ occupational social class;
  ❍ housing tenure;
  ❍ nation or region within England;
  ❍ area deprivation.
58  We use the present tense to describe these results as they are as contemporary as currently available data 
allow. As we explained in Chapter 2, the data mostly relate to periods ending in 2008.
59  The Statistical Appendix available online contains breakdowns for the whole population by each dimension 
as well as detailed results for men and women separately. For incomes on a household basis in Section 3.5, 
we present only limited information by gender, with most breakdowns shown for the population as a whole. 
For wealth in Chapter 8, breakdowns are on a household basis only.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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In Chapters 3 to 8, we present detailed results from this exercise – in many ways the core of 
what we were asked to do – taking each outcome one at a time. In Chapter 9, we summarise 
these findings, taking a cross-cutting approach, looking across each dimension in turn. That 
chapter also contains evidence from studies which have examined the extent to which 
variations in some of the outcomes – such as pay differentials between groups can be 
explained by differences between them in other factors, such as qualifications.
The Statistical Appendix contains full tables giving the values of each outcome for each sub-
group of the population in two ways. First, it shows outcomes for the 10th, 30th, 50th (median), 
70th and 90th percentiles within that group, for instance in pounds per hour or pounds per 
week where we are discussing earnings, as well as the mean outcome for the group. This 
shows both what outcomes are for those in the middle of that group, and the scale of 
differences between members of the group. A second table then shows what these amounts 
correspond to in terms of the ranking within the overall distribution for the whole population. 
Thus, to take the first set of results we look at in Chapter 3, the median GCSE point score 
for girls in England 2008 in state schools is 338. This result is at the 56th percentile of the 
distribution of point scores for all students in state schools – half of girls are in the top 44 per 
cent of achievement overall. When we look later at attainment by whether a pupil is receiving 
Free School Meals or not (as an indicator of low income or disadvantage), the median (middle) 
result for those receiving Free School Meals is 275 points, corresponding to the 27th percentile 
of the overall distribution – half of children receiving Free School Meals have results putting 
them in the bottom 27 per cent of achievement overall.
In Chapters 5 to 8, we summarise this information for earnings and income outcomes in 
two ways. First, we show the outcomes for each group diagrammatically, showing the range 
from the 10th to the 90th percentiles within each group, also indicating the median and the 
central range between 30th and 70th percentiles. Second, at the end of each chapter, we give 
a summary table containing the median outcome for the group, the 90:10 ratio for the group 
(as an indicator of inequality within it),60 and the rank in the overall distribution reached by 
the 10th percentile, median, and 90th percentile of the group. The diagrams and tables also 
indicate what proportion of the total population falls within each category. The rows of 
the tables are ordered by the median outcome for each group. Box 3.1 gives an annotated 
example of this kind of presentation to help readers follow the diagrams that follow. In the 
case of Key Stage 4 outcomes we use diagrams to show the ranking within each nation’s state 
school results rather than the raw results to allow some comparison across the nations, and 
do not present summary tables. As highest educational qualifications and employment are 
categorical outcomes we simply present these diagrammatically rather than as a ranking. 
The Statistical Appendix contains the detailed statistics underlying each of these. Most of 
the information we present is drawn from sample surveys (apart from that for children’s 
attainment at 16, which is from records for all children). It is therefore subject to sampling 
error, particularly where small population groups are concerned. To avoid this distorting the 
60   This is not always possible or meaningful as far as household wealth is concerned, because of the prevalence 
of very low or negative wealth holdings within some groups.67
results, we use large surveys, pool data from several years of the surveys, and avoid presenting 
results based on small sample numbers.61
Box 3.1: Reading and interpreting the report’s diagrams and tables
In this part of the report, we present results of the descriptive analysis in two ways: ‘box 
and whisker’ figures and summary tables. In this box, we explain how to interpret them. 
Example 1: Figures
To show the extent of inequality both between groups and within each group, we use 
diagrams of the kind shown above, in this case for men’s hourly wages by age band.
For each age group, the black short vertical line represents median earnings for men of 
that age. For instance, the median is £10 per hour for men aged 25-29 (circled). Half of 
men of this age earn more than this, and half earn less. For each group, the thin line 
61  The estimates that we present of percentiles, proportions and other statistics derived from sample survey 
data are subject to sampling error. The uncertainty associated with estimates, and with calculations 
based on them (e.g. differences across groups, or changes over time), can be assessed using summaries of 
statistical signiﬁ  cance such as standard errors and conﬁ  dence intervals. The uncertainty associated with 
estimates decreases in magnitude, the larger the sample size. We present information about sampling 
variability in this report only rarely. Instead, to reduce potential problems, in the statistics derived from 
our own research, we try to ensure that the samples used are sufﬁ  ciently large to minimise sampling error, 
typically by pooling data from different years of the survey. To address the separate issues of bias and 
possible unrepresentativeness, we have used the relevant survey weights where possible. For discussions of 
issues of statistical signiﬁ  cance and bias associated with the estimates derived by others, please see the 
original source. It should be noted that estimates of differences based on comparisons between surveys, for 
instance over time as in Chapter 10, are likely to have greater standard errors than estimates for a single 
point of time.
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extends as far to the right as the 90th percentile of earnings for this age group – a tenth 
of men aged 25-29 earned more than £18 per hour. At the other end, the 10th percentile 
is shown – a tenth of men aged 25-29 earned less than £6 per hour. The thicker parts 
of each bar show the central range of earnings for each group, from the 30th to the 70th 
percentiles.62
The greater the distance between the 10th and 90th percentiles, the larger is the ratio of 
the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile, and the greater the 90:10 ratio, the greater the 
inequality in hourly earnings. 
The three broken black vertical lines running from the top of the chart to the bottom 
show the 10th percentile, median (50th percentile) and 90th percentile for the whole 
population. With these reference points, we are able to compare the distribution within 
each age group with the distribution for the population as a whole. 
Example 2: Summary tables
We also use tables such as the example below to summarise key statistics at the end of 
Chapters 5-8. The example is again for hourly earnings, by gender as well as age band.
There are four types of information in the table. The first is the outcome for the person 
in the middle of each group, in this case the value in £ of median earnings: such as £10 
per hour for a man aged 25-29.63 This information is in the first column of the table. 
The second type of information, shown in the second column, is the 90:10 ratio, which 
is a summary measure of inequality. For instance, inequality in hourly earnings for men 
aged 65-69, 4.2 according to the 90:10 ratio, was greater than the inequality among 
both men aged 30-34 (a 90:10 ratio of 3.5), and among women aged between 65 and 
69 (3.3). A ratio of 4.2 means that the best paid tenth of men aged 65-69 earned more 
than four times as much as the worst paid tenth of men of the same age.
The table also shows where members of each group come within the ranking (from zero 
to 100) of outcomes for the whole population. It shows where people in a group with 
outcomes corresponding to the 10th percentile, median and 90th percentile of that group 
are to be found within the population as a whole. For instance, among women aged 20–
24, a woman with the middle value of hourly earnings (median) for that age group had 
hourly earnings that put her only 26 places up from the bottom of the distribution or, 
put another way, 24 places below the middle of the overall distribution. The worst paid 
tenth of women aged 20-24 came below the 5th percentile of the whole distribution. By 
contrast, among men aged 40-44, the middle value (median) corresponds to the 69th 
percentile of the overall distribution, that is, within the top third.
Finally, the fourth column of the table, shows the proportion of the population within 
each group – the ‘population share’ of that group. 
In summary tables, as here, we order groups by the median outcome for each group.
62  Sometimes we do not have enough data to give reliable information on the full spread within a group.  In 
some cases we are not able to show the levels of P10 and P90, and so the group only has the thicker central 
box, without the thinner lines extending to its right and left sides. In other cases, we are able to show only 
the median, so the group just has a cross showing the position of its median.
63  The outcome would be £ per week in the case of weekly earnings, or points score in the case of educational 








Rank in the overall 
distribution
Population 
proportion (%) 10th Median 90th
Men
40-44 13.42 4.0 25 69 95 6.6
45-49 13.21 4.0 24 68 95 5.9
35-39 12.96 3.8 24 67 94 6.3
50-54 12.78 4.1 22 66 95 4.9
30-34 12.14 3.5 20 63 92 5.4
55-59 11.42 3.9 19 59 93 4.5
25-29 10.04 2.9 15 51 83 4.7
60-64 9.94 3.6 14 50 90 3.0
65-69 8.28 4.2 6 37 89 0.7
20-24 7.36 2.4 6 28 63 3.4
70+ 6.76 4.5 3 23 85 0.3
16-19 5.31 2.5 1 8 34 2.0
Women
30-34 10.37 3.5 11 53 87 5.6
35-39 10.01 3.7 10 50 88 6.8
40-44 9.56 3.6 10 47 88 7.6
25-29 9.53 3.0 11 47 80 5.2
50-54 9.31 3.6 11 45 87 6.0
45-49 9.24 3.5 11 45 86 6.9
55-59 8.61 3.4 9 40 85 5.0
60-64 7.96 3.3 7 34 82 2.3
20-24 7.08 2.4 5 26 60 3.8
65-69 6.83 3.3 5 23 77 0.6
70+ 6.17 3.3 3 17 69 0.2
16-19 5.31 2.5 1 8 34 2.371
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In this chapter, we look at two measures of educational outcomes: attainment by 
children at the age of 16; and the highest qualifications of adults. For the first of these, 
as examination systems differ between them, we show results separately for England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. We look at the range of achievement by gender for 
all four nations. We also examine outcomes in England, Scotland and Wales by ethnicity, 
Special Educational Needs (Additional Support Needs in Scotland), Free School Meals 
receipt as an indicator of low income (in England and Wales), region (in England), and 
area deprivation. We show highest qualifications of adults in the UK across all ten of the 
dimensions in which we are interested.
3.1  Results at Key Stage 4
Information from the National Pupil Database (from the Pupil Level Annual School Census) on 
Key Stage 4 results in England (the GCSE examinations taken at 16 in England and equivalents 
in the other nations) allows us to examine how the distribution of points scores that children 
obtain at age 16 relates to some of the characteristics that we are interested in. These include 
gender, ethnicity, and the deprivation level of the neighbourhood where they live. Box 3.3 
reports analysis of the relationship between GCSE performance in England and religious 
affiliation. Information on whether children are assessed as having Special Educational Needs 
(Additional Support Needs in Scotland) gives indirect information on the relationship with 
disability status (considered in more detail in Box 11.2 in Chapter 11).64 Whether children are 
receiving Free School Meals gives some indirect information on relationships with parental 
income or social class. In Chapter 11, we consider analysis of evidence from a variety of sources 
on the relationship between test assessments through childhood and other indicators of 
background, including ethnicity, parental income and social class.
Gender
Figure 3.165 shows the results of boys and girls in each of the four nations of the UK in terms 
of their ranking within the overall results in 2008 at age 16 (Key Stage 4) for state schools in 
each nation. Girls do better than boys throughout the distribution in each nation.66 Median 
results for girls correspond to the 54th percentile of all results in Scotland, and the 56th in Wales 
and Northern Ireland and England. The gender gap in terms of typical ranking ranges from 8 
places (out of 100) in Scotland to 12 places in Northern Ireland and Wales. There are similar 
gender differences in ranking at the 30th and 70th percentiles, but the differences at the 
extremes are rather smaller67 – the top 10 per cent performing girls in England are in the top 8 
per cent of the overall distribution, just 5 points ahead of the best performing boys while the 
bottom 10 per cent of boys in England are in the bottom 8 per cent of the overall distribution, 
for instance, 5 places behind the worst performing girls.
64  Children who would be considered disabled under the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) (around 4 per cent 
of the child population) make up a sub-set of all children with Special Educational Needs/Additional Support 
Needs (Scottish Government, 2009).
65  The numbers in brackets after the description of each group in the figures in Chapters 3 and 4 show the 
proportion of the total population in that group.
66  These are the only breakdowns we are able to present for Northern Ireland.
67  There is a limit on how big the differences can be at these points in the distribution, given the sizes of the 
groups.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 3.1: Key Stage 4 (Secondary 4) results, by gender, 2008
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Ethnicity
Figure 3.2(a) shows results at Key Stage 4 in England in 2008 by gender and ethnicity in terms 
of ranking within overall state school results in England. Figures 3.2(b) and (c) show equivalent 
breakdowns for Scotland and Wales (but with a less detailed breakdown, and with population 
numbers too small to give meaningful presentation on the spread of results for some ethnic 
groups). In England, the median White British boy ranks at the 46th percentile, with median 
results for several other ethnic groups near to or just below the overall median. However, the 
median Indian boy is ranked at the 64th percentile overall, and the median Chinese boy at 
the 75th percentile. Median results for Pakistani, Black African, Black Caribbean, and boys with 
other Black backgrounds are ranked at the 40th percentile or below. More than half of boys of 
Irish Traveller or Gypsy/Romany heritage have results placing them in the lowest 10 per cent 
overall. Box 3.2 looks at other evidence on the exceptionally high levels of educational and 
other forms of disadvantage of the Gypsy and Traveller communities.
For girls, there are some similar differences in terms of high performing ethnic groups, but 
with a higher overall level of achievement, and with few groups with a very low overall ranking. 
Thus half of Chinese girls are ranked above the 83rd percentile, and half of Indian girls above 
the 73rd percentile. But half of Pakistani girls perform above the overall median (above the 
53rd percentile) and the medians for girls from the three Black categories recorded are around 
the overall median. Thus gaps between ethnic groups are smaller on the whole for girls than 
for boys. Again, however, the median for girls of Gypsy/Romany and Irish Traveller heritage is 
in the bottom 11-12 per cent overall.
Results vary considerably within each ethnic group, indeed, much more so than between 
most groups. As the figure shows, the differences between ethnic groups are similar across 
most of the performance range within them (looking at the thicker bars showing the 30th to 
70th percentiles of each group). At the extremes – the ends of the thinner lines – there is less 
variation (partly because there is less scope for it). Nonetheless there are some features that 
stand out. For instance, a tenth of Chinese boys are ranked in the top 3 per cent overall, and a 
tenth of Chinese girls are ranked in the top 1 per cent.
These differences in ranking appear to be greater in England than in Scotland and Wales. 
Figure 3.2(b) shows, for instance, that the median for Black boys (from different backgrounds 
taken together) is at the 48th percentile overall in Scotland, and the median for Asian-
Pakistani boys is at the 43rd percentile. Asian-Indian girls have median results ranked at the 
73rd percentile and Asian-Chinese girls at the 76th percentile. In Wales, Figure 3.2(c) shows 
only median rankings for most groups, as the numbers of non-white pupils are rather small. 
Chinese boys and Indian girls achieve high rankings, but the median rankings for small 
number of Black African boys and girls (only 127 in total in the dataset covering the whole of 
Wales) are at the 29th and 34th percentiles respectively.75
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Comparing the figures, what is most striking is the way in which particularly large proportions 
of low achievers are found for boys from certain ethnic groups. In Chapter 11, we look at how 
differences in performance in school tests between ethnic groups develop over the school 
years, drawing on analysis of English test results. The administrative data from schools do 
not include religious affiliation, but the Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England 
(LSYPE) sheds some light on this, and on the interaction between religious affiliation and 
other characteristics. This is discussed in Box 3.3. It suggests that there are some differences 
within ethnic groups when also classified by religious affiliation. For instance, White Christian 
children achieve more GCSE passes at A*-C than White children who have no religious 
affiliation, and Indian Hindu and Sikh children achieve more good GCSEs than Indian Muslim 
children.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 3.2(a): Key Stage 4 results, by ethnicity, England, 2008
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Figure 3.2(b): Secondary 4 results, by ethnicity, Scotland, 2008
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Source: Scottish Government, based on Pupil Census.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Source: Welsh Assembly Government, based on NPD-PLASC.
Figure 3.2(c): Key Stage 4 results, by ethnicity, Wales, 200879
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Box 3.2: The Gypsy and Traveller population
There is no official count of the Gypsy and Traveller population, as the relevant question 
will be introduced for the first time only in the 2011 Census. The exact figure is hard 
to estimate, but the Council of Europe has suggested there were around 300,000 
Gypsies and Travellers in the UK in 2002 (200,000 housed, and 100,000 in caravans).68 
According to Communities and Local Government, in 2009, there were around 18,000 
caravans.69
In Scotland in 2008, the Gypsy and Traveller population was estimated at 2,455 people 
or 744 households. This represents 0.05 per cent of the overall Scottish population.70
Although we are able to report on the educational achievement of Irish Travellers and 
Gypsies/Romany children, the other surveys we use to assess economic inequality do 
not allow us to identify Irish Travellers and Gypsies/Romany groups in general. Because 
of this, we need to rely on other evidence from other sources. This is very little limited, 
but a recent report by Sarah Cemlyn and colleagues (2009) for the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (EHRC) presents evidence of high levels of disadvantage, including:
•  very low rates of participation in secondary education and reported discrimination 
and abusive behaviour by school staff and other students;
•  lack of access to pre-school, out-of-school and leisure services for children and young 
people;
•  low employment rates and high poverty rates;
•  reported repeated brutal evictions and extreme hostility from the wider population; 
and
•  worse health and higher mortality rates than the rest of the population.
Education 
Gypsy and Traveller children remain highly disadvantaged in terms of access, inclusion 
and achievement in schools. Since 2003, Department for Children, Schools and 
Families DCSF has been able to obtain and publish figures about the participation and 
achievement of Gypsy and Traveller children.71
Gypsy/Roma and Irish Traveller pupils, who make up a significant proportion of children 
in primary schools (2.5 per cent in 2007)72, experience high levels of inequality in 
relation to attainment. In 2008, Gypsy/Roma and Irish Traveller children had the lowest 
educational performances with only 17 per cent of Traveller of Irish Heritage and 16 per 
cent of Roma Gypsy pupils obtaining five or more GCSE A*-C passes, compared to 55-65 
68  The Council of Europe http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/documentation/strategies/statistiques_
en.asp
69  Communities and Local Government (2009).
70  Scottish Government (2008).
71  It should be noted that these national ﬁ  gures apply to two groups, Travellers of Irish Heritage and Gypsy/
Roma pupils.
72 DCSF  (2008a).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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per cent for the rest of children.73 We will see in Chapter 6 that, unlike that for any other 
ethnic group, educational attainment among Gypsy/Romany and Irish Travellers 
pupils has fallen over time. Irish Traveller pupils are 2.7 times more likely than White 
British pupils to be categorised as having Special Educational Needs, even once socio-
economic disadvantage is controlled for.74
Data from 2005-06 show that Irish Traveller, Gypsy/Roma along with Black Caribbean 
and Mixed White/Black Caribbean pupils are more than three times as likely to 
be permanently excluded from school as White pupils.75 This has been explained 
by accommodation difficulties leading to interrupted attendance and learning, 
experiences of racist harassment and bullying, from both other pupils and the school 
staff, lack of validation of their culture, limited relevance of the curriculum for some 
children, difficulties in negotiating home and school, and teachers’ low expectations.76
The disadvantage in education is also reflected in the considerable barriers to training 
and economic inclusion that the Gypsy and Traveller population experience. The 
employment statistics do not differentiate Travellers and Gypsies from other minority 
ethnic groups. In the absence of systematic data, the review carried out for the EHRC 
by Sarah Cemlyn and colleagues draws on small-scale studies and anecdotal evidence. 
The picture reported in that review, which we summarise below, is one of high levels of 
unemployment and economic inactivity (often the result of employment-related injuries).
Employment and financial exclusion
•  Employment patterns are highly gendered. Self-employment among men is common 
and a small number of waged Gypsies and Travellers are employed in low or semi-
skilled jobs. A high percentage of women do not work outside the home, or work only 
until they are married and children are born. There is some evidence that a small, but 
growing, number of mothers are entering (usually low or unskilled) employment when 
their children reach school age. In some areas, it is not seen as the cultural norm for 
women to have paid work.
•  There is evidence from across the UK that those who are known to be Gypsies or 
Travellers encounter discrimination when applying for paid work. Although the review 
found hard evidence (unsurprisingly) hard to come by, examples abound of people not 
being called for interviews or of jobs being ‘mysteriously filled’.77 Other barriers faced 
by unemployed Gypsies and Travellers include literacy and numeracy problems, lack of 
qualifications or references and the inability to provide evidence of former addresses.
•  Discrimination can also affect the work opportunities of those who are self-employed. 
Their opportunities are also frequently restricted by regulations, which limit 
economic activities on official sites. The authors conclude, “the discussion of access 
to employment and economic inclusion for Gypsies and Travellers demonstrates 
inequalities resulting from racism and discrimination” (p.45).
73 DCSF  (2008b).
74 Cemlyn  et al. (2009).
75 DCSF  (2007).
76 Cemlyn  et al. (2009).
77 Cemlyn  et al. (2009), p. 41.81
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•  Gypsies and Travellers are often excluded from accessing bank accounts and 
reasonably priced credit, frequently leading people in poverty to incur debt to 
unregulated loan companies. This makes it harder to secure receipt of benefits.
Accommodation 
•  The lack of suitable and secure accommodation underpins many of the inequalities 
that Gypsy and Traveller communities experience. Currently around one in four 
Gypsies and Travellers living in caravans do not have a legal place on which to park 
their home. Being on unauthorised sites presents a situation of constant threat of 
eviction. Eviction itself causes further stress and threat of violence.
•  An additional issue is the relatively higher costs that Travellers and Gypsy/Roma 
people have to incur for accommodation. This is due to the high levels of rent for 
residents on sites, and the resale of electricity or other utilities, which is determined 
by the fact that site residents have to pay an additional premium for the use of 
electricity. 
Health
•  Mortality rates and life expectancy are worse for the Gypsy and Traveller population 
than for the rest of the population. It is reported that Gypsy and Traveller women live 
12 years less than women in the general population and Gypsy and Traveller men 10 
years less than men in the general population.
•  Gypsies and Travellers have been found to be nearly three times more likely to be 
anxious than others, and just over twice as likely to be depressed. Gypsies and Travellers 
in housing experience hostility from neighbours, and it is likely that the constant 
exposure to racism and discrimination has a negative impact on mental health.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Box 3.3: Religious affiliation and educational attainment
To better understand the way in which religious affiliation is associated with 
educational outcomes, the Panel commissioned the Centre for Market and Public 
Organisation (CMPO) at the University of Bristol to analyse the relationship between 
pupils’ religion, ethnicity and attainment at school in England, using the Longitudinal 
Survey of Young People (LSYPE) (who were in Year 9 in 2003-04).78 In this box, we 
summarise some of the results of this research.
In explaining economic and educational inequalities, it is often difficult to disentangle 
religion from ethnicity. This is even more so when gender is added as an additional 
characteristic and sample sizes become small. For instance, in the LSYPE, there are 
only 51 cases who report themselves to be Jewish, 44 of these being White and 2 
Indian, which is too few to ensure robust results. Moreover, some ethnic groups are 
concentrated in just one religious group, which makes impossible to compare the 
attainment of religious groups within them. More than 99 per cent of Pakistani female 
students and 97 per cent of Bangladeshi female students report themselves to be 
Muslim.79
The research shows that, in all measures of GCSE attainment, Hindu boys and girls 
perform most highly on average: Hindu girls achieve almost 2 GSCE grades A*-C 
more than Christian girls, and over 2 GSCE grades A*-C more than Muslim girls. For all 
religious groups, girls tend to do better than boys, and the gender gap is similar across 
religious groups. 
Looking at one measure of ethno-religious differences, Table 3A shows that Indian 
Hindu and Indian Sikh girls have one more GCSE pass at A-C* than Indian Muslim girls, 
and two more than Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim girls. This difference is slightly 
more pronounced in the case of boys. Within Christians, it is Black African girls that 
have the highest numbers of GCSE passes at A-C* while, for boys, it is White Christians 
who outperform others.
The researchers also look at the (capped) points scores of the kind used elsewhere in 
this chapter attained by children from different ethno-religious groups.80 These show 
a similar pattern to the number of passes shown in Figure 3A. For instance, White 
Christian girls and boys obtain more GCSE points than those without religion, and 
Indian Hindu girls and boys more points than Muslim or Sikh girls and boys.
They also investigate whether these differences between groups are statistically 
significant, using multiple regression analysis. They find that for White students, there 
is a positive association between being Christian – as opposed to not religious – and 
the number of Key Stage 4 passes (as in Table 3A). This association does not necessarily 
imply, however, that religious observance, per se, has an effect on educational 
attainment: other factors, such as the quality of schools attended, or family resources, 
may be the factors that make a difference. For Black African and Indian students, 
however, the difference between religious groups in number of passes is not statistically 
significant.
78  Burgess, Greaves and Wilson (2009).
79  ‘Religion’ is self-reported. The relevant LSYPE question is ‘What, if any, is your religion?’
80  Burgess, Greaves and Wilson (2009), tables 9a and 9b. They also look at outcomes at Key Stages 2 and 3 
(age 11 and 14) and at changes (‘value added progress’) between Key Stages 2 and 4.83
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Table 3A: GSCE outcomes – number of GCSE/GNVQ at grades A*-C by ethnicity, religious 
affiliation and gender (England, 2003-04)
Religion
None Christian Hindu Muslim Sikh Other
Girls
Ethnicity
White 5.97 6.88 13 7.19 0 6.01
Black 
Caribbean
3.12 5.81 4 -- 0 8.93
Black 
African
9.77 7.12 -- 4.39 9 7
Indian 10.51 7.18 8.63 7.2 8.02 10.67
Pakistani 6.65 -- 2 6.14 -- --





5.64 5.78 9 3.52 6 5.07
Boys
Ethnicity
White 5.13 6.17 5.5 6.68 6.69 5.19
Black 
Caribbean
3.49 4.06 -- 7.5 -- 5.61
Black 
African
6.57 5.68 0 4.83 -- --
Indian 5.93 8.11 7.66 6.05 6.44 8.21
Pakistani 0 8.74 -- 4.51 2.07 6.5





5.86 3.99 0 6.13 -- 2.01
Source: Burgess, Greaves and Wilson (2009), Tables 9C and 9D. 
Note: Cells with numbers in bold font contain at least 50 observations, the others less than 50 
observations.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Special Educational Needs
The data from English schools can be broken down by the level of Special Educational 
Needs assessed for each child. The categories that can lead to this are described in Box 11.2 
in Chapter 11. There are three levels of Special Educational Needs that can be assessed – 
‘school action’, ‘school action plus’, or Special Educational Needs with a ‘statement’ – the 
third implying the greatest level of special needs. The results in England in 2008 are shown in 
Figure 3.3(a). Just over a fifth, 22 per cent, of the 16 year-olds covered here had some form of 
Special Educational Needs assessment. Most of these are on some form of school action; only 
a small proportion have statements of Special Educational Needs. Any of the levels of Special 
Educational Needs was associated with a much lower range of performance at GCSE than by 
those without Special Educational Needs, but particularly when there was a formal statement. 
For those with some form of Special Educational Needs there is less of a gender difference 
than for others. In Wales, a smaller proportion (17 per cent) is assessed as having Special 
Educational Needs, but the pattern of differences shown in Figure 3.3(c) is almost identical.81 
The Scottish system is different, with only 5 per cent of pupils assessed as having Additional 
Support Needs. As Figure 3.3(b) shows, the performance of this group at Standard Grade is 
comparable to that of the similarly sized group of statemented children at GCSE in England 
and Wales.
Whilst it might be expected that children with certain types of cognitive difficulty would 
achieve less well, there is no necessary reason why children who have, say, visual or hearing 
impairments should not perform as well as their peers, unless they have additional difficulties. 
It should be noted that in England and Scotland there is a strong association between living in 
a deprived area and having particular types of Special Educational Needs/Additional Support 
Needs identified. The association between living in a deprived area and being identified as 
having social, emotional and behavioural difficulties or a learning disability is particularly 
strong. By way of contrast, the association between the identification of sensory impairments 
or specific learning difficulties (dyslexia) with area deprivation is less strong. Box 11.2 in 
Chapter 11 presents evidence from a study carried out for us that looked at performance 
through the school years of children with different kinds of special needs.
81 The  ﬁ  gure omits the small additional category in Wales of ‘statutory assessment’.85
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Figure 3.3(a): Key Stage 4 results, by Special Educational Needs, England, 2008
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Figure 3.3(b): Secondary 4 results, by Additional Support Needs, Scotland, 2008
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Source: Scottish Government, based on Pupil Census.87
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Figure 3.3(c): Key Stage 4 results, by Special Educational Needs, Wales, 2008
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Source: Welsh Assembly Government, based on NPD-PLASC.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
88
Free School Meals status
Figure 3.4 shows the difference in the range of rankings between those receiving Free School 
Meals and those not receiving them. This is an imperfect measure of parental income or 
social class. Entitlement to Free School Meals depends on parental receipt of out-of-work 
benefits or the maximum rate of Child Tax Credit, but those in work receiving other benefits 
or tax credits are not currently entitled, even if they also have low income. About one in eight 
of those covered by the English statistics receive Free School Meals. Detailed comparison of 
family income levels suggests that while those children receiving free meals generally come 
from low-income families, other children from low-income families do not receive them for one 
reason or another.82 Nonetheless, it reveals one of the starkest differences in any of the results 
at age 16. In the English results in Figure 3.4(a), it can be seen that the spread of results for 
boys not receiving Free School Meals is almost identical to that for all children. But half of 
boys receiving free meals come in the bottom quarter of the overall distribution; two-thirds 
of them in the bottom two-fifths. A tenth of boys receiving Free School Meals have no more 
than 44 tariff points, corresponding to nothing more than two passes at grade F. Overall, 
there is a gap of 26 places (out of 100) in the typical ranking of boys receiving or not receiving 
free meals, and 28 places for girls. The Welsh results show a virtually identical pattern. Results 
on this basis are not available for Scotland. Chapter 11 looks in more detail at differences in 
assessments between ages 7 and 16 by gender, ethnicity and Free School Meals status.
82  Hobbs and Vignoles (2009), ﬁ  gure 1. Some children eligible for Free School Meals do not take them up; 
others are from low-income families, but are ineligible because a parent is in low-paid work, receiving tax 
credits, rather than Income Support. Technically, the measure refers to children ‘known to be eligible’ for 
Free School Meals; for simplicity, we refer to those receiving or not receiving them.89
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Figure 3.4(a): Key Stage 4 results, by Free School Meals status, England, 2008
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Figure 3.4(b): Key Stage 4 results, by Free School Meals status, Wales, 2008
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Source: Welsh Assembly Government, based on NPD-PLASC.91
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Region
For the reasons given in Chapter 2, we cannot compare Key Stage 4 results between the 
constituent nations of the UK. However, Figure 3.5 shows the differences in spread of results 
across the English regions. The main conclusion from this is that there is little difference 
between regions. The biggest difference in median rankings is only 7 places for boys and 5 
places for girls, between Yorkshire and the Humber and the South East.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 3.5: Key Stage 4 results, by region, England, 2008
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Source: DCSF, based on NPD-PLASC.
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Area deprivation
By contrast with regional differences, there is a considerable gradient between the children 
living in different kinds of neighbourhood. The English results in Figure 3.6(a) are based 
on an index of area deprivation linked to the circumstances of children in particular.83 The 
differences between areas are similar for boys and girls and at all points within the spread of 
results. Within the least deprived areas, nearly 70 per cent of boys achieve results in the top 
half of the overall range. In the most deprived areas, only 30 per cent of boys achieve results 
in the top half. Half of girls in the least deprived areas achieve results in the top quarter 
overall, but only about a fifth of those in the most deprived areas. The difference in typical 
ranking between most and least deprived areas is 35 places (out of 100). Very few of the 
highest achievers come from the most deprived areas, and very few of the lowest achievers 
come from the least deprived areas.
Scotland and Wales have different indices of area deprivation.84 Using these also shows very 
pronounced differences in results between areas. Indeed, in Scotland, the pattern in Figure 
3.6(b) shows an even more dramatic gradient between areas than in England: median results 
for boys in the least deprived Scottish areas are at the 73rd percentile and for girls at the 76th 
percentile; those in the most deprived areas are at the 23rd and 29th percentiles respectively. 
In other words, simply knowing what kind of neighbourhood a child comes from makes a 
difference equivalent to traversing half of the overall range of performance at 16. The Welsh 
results in Figure 3.6(c) show results in the most deprived areas between the English and 
Scottish results. 
83  This is the Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI): it shows the percentage of children in a 
deﬁ  ned geographical area (Super Output Area) that live in families that are income deprived (as measured 
by numbers receiving Income Support, income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance or Pension Credit, plus those 
receiving Working Tax Credit or Child Tax Credit who also have an equivalent net income below 60 per cent 
of the national median before housing costs).
84  The Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation 2006 (SIMD) combines 37 indicators across seven domains 
(current income, employment, health, education, skills and training, housing, geographic access and crime). 
The overall index is a weighted sum of the seven domains. It is used to rank areas from most deprived (rank 
1) to least deprived (rank 6,505). The Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation (WIMD) 2008 provides a rank for 
the 1,896 Lower Super Output Area (LSOAs) in Wales. The deprivation domains are: income, employment, 
health, education, skills and training, geographical access to services, housing, physical environment and 
community safety.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
94
Figure 3.6(a): Key Stage 4 results, by Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index, 
England, 2008
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Source: DCSF, based on NPD-PLASC.95
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Figure 3.6(b): Secondary 4 results, by Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation, Scotland, 2008
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Source: Scottish Government, based on Pupil Census.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 3.6(c): Key Stage 4 results, by Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation, Wales, 2008
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Source: Welsh Assembly Government, based on NPD-PLASC.97
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3.2 Highest  qualiﬁ  cations of the adult population
For some individuals, of course, educational achievement at age 16 determines the 
qualifications with which they enter the labour market. For others, it is a prelude to staying on 
at school or college and further qualifications. Box 11.3 in Chapter 11 looks at the relationship 
between recent results at age 16 in England and whether young people enter higher 
education, depending on gender, ethnicity and Free School Meals status (with significant 
differences by ethnicity in particular). Other research discussed in Chapter 11 also examines 
the relationships between young people’s social background, the kind of university they go 
to, their eventual degree result, and what happens to them when they then enter the labour 
market. The qualifications of today’s adult population reflect the accumulation of past 
relationships of that kind. This section presents breakdowns of the highest qualification levels 
of the adult population in the UK, as shown in Figure 2.2 in the last chapter.
Gender
Figure 3.7 shows that across the adult working age population more than a quarter of both 
men and women have degrees or other qualifications from higher education, but fewer 
women (19 per cent) than men (28 per cent) have A levels or their equivalent as their highest 
qualification. A quarter of each has no more than a Level 1 qualification.85
Figure 3.7: Highest qualification, by gender, UK, 2006-2008, (percentages): 
Working age population
85  Level 1 corresponds to GCSEs grades D-G and corresponding vocational qualiﬁ  cations that give basic 
knowledge and skills and an ability to apply learning with guidance and supervision. Below Level 1 are entry 
level certiﬁ  cates, such as English for Speakers of Other Languages, Skills for Life, etc.
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GCE A Level or equivalent GCSE grades A-C or equivalent Level 1 or below
No qualification Don't know
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Age
These gender differences are mainly the result of differences for older cohorts, as can be seen 
from Figure 3.8. For the youngest cohorts gender differences are very small, with for instance, 
the main difference for those aged 25-29 between 2006-2008 being that 30 per cent of 
women, but only 27 per cent of men, have a degree or higher degree, while only 17 per cent of 
women, but 20 per cent of men have no qualifications above Level 1. However, for each age 
group over 30, not only does the overall level of qualifications tend to reduce, but so the gap 
between men and women increases in size for older age groups. 59 per cent of men, but only 
36 per cent of women in their late fifties have A level qualifications or higher. 26 per cent of 
men in their later fifties have no qualifications above Level 1, but 39 per cent of women. The 
way in which this gender gap in qualifications has closed – even reversed – is very important 
in understanding trends in the gender wage gap (see Box 10.1 in Chapter 10 below).99
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Figure 3.8(a): Highest qualification, by age, men, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Figure 3.8(b): Highest qualification, by age, women, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
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Ethnicity
Bearing in mind that a part of the difference may be due to age structure differences 
between ethnic groups and to younger cohorts being better qualified,86 Figure 3.9 shows 
considerable ethnic differences in qualification levels for both men and women in the working 
age population. More than 40 per cent of Bangladeshi and Pakistani men and of Pakistani 
women, and more than half of Bangladeshi women have no qualifications above Level 1, 
although nearly as many Bangladeshi and Pakistani men have a degree or higher degree as 
the population as a whole. 19 per cent of White British men and 18 per cent of White British 
women have first or higher degrees, but around 30 per cent of Indian and Black African men, 
and around 40 per cent of Chinese women and men. The White British population thus has 
smaller proportions than most other ethnic groups of both those with degrees and of those 
with low or no qualifications. These very large differences in qualification levels should be 
borne in mind when looking at the pattern of wage differentials in Chapter 5 below.
Figure 3.9(a): Highest qualification, by ethnicity, men, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
86   See Boxes 9.2 and 9.3 in Chapter 9 for discussion of differences between ﬁ  rst generation migrants and those 
in the ‘second generation’.
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Figure 3.9(b): Highest qualification, by ethnicity, women, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
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Religious afﬁ  liation
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) also allows us to break the results down by the religious 
affiliation that people express,87 as in Figure 3.10. This shows major differences between 
groups, some of course closely linked to the ethnic differences described above. More than a 
third of Buddhist and Hindu men and of Jewish women have first or higher degrees, and 43 
per cent of Jewish men. Christian and Muslim men have the smallest proportion with degrees, 
at 18 per cent. At the same time, more than 40 per cent of Muslim men and women have 
no qualification above Level 1. In contrast to the somewhat poorer performance at GCSE in 
England of those with no religious affiliation shown in Box 3.3, the fifth of working age adults 
telling the LFS that they have no religious affiliation are slightly better qualified than the 
population as a whole.
Figure 3.10: Highest qualification, by religious affiliation, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
87   The analysis is based on the response to the LFS question, ‘What is your religion even if you are not 
currently practising?’ The ONS’ advice is to classify this as ‘religious afﬁ  liation’ (see http://www.ons.gov.
uk/about-statistics/measuring-equality/ethnic-group-statistics/addendum--guidance-on-presenting-and-
discussing-religion-data.pdf).
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Disability status
We are able to look at disability status in two different ways – whether people are disabled in 
terms of the Disability Discrimination Act (‘DDA-disabled’), and whether they say that they 
have a long-term problem which affects the kind or amount of work which they might do 
(‘work-limiting disabled’). As Figure 3.11 shows, the better qualified groups are those classed 
as not disabled, or as DDA-disabled only. Nearly a third of both men and women who are 
both work-limiting and DDA-disabled have no qualifications (although note that this will be, 
in part, an age effect, as older people are both more likely to be disabled, and to have no 
qualifications).
Figure 3.11: Highest qualification, by disability status, UK, 2006-2008, (percentages)
Working age population
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Living in a same sex couple
The LFS does not ask respondents directly about their sexuality. However, for a number of 
years it has asked respondents whether they live as part of a same sex couple. The responses 
shown in Figure 3.12 show substantial differences between the qualification levels of the 0.5 
per cent or so of both male and female respondents who say they do and others who do 
not do so. For instance, a third of men and 43 per cent of women who report they are living 
in a same sex couple have a first or higher degree, compared to 19 per cent of others. We 
suggest that these data are unlikely to reflect differences in sexual orientation by educational 
level and are more likely to reflect differences in people’s propensity to report their status 
to a survey of this kind, or indeed their confidence to live openly in same sex couples. These 
differences are, however, very important for the interpretation of differences in wages 
between those who report they are in same sex couples and others (see Box 9.8 in Chapter 9).
Figure 3.12: Highest qualification, by whether living in a same sex couple, UK, 2006-2008 
(percentages)
Working age population
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Occupational social class
Figure 3.13 reports the differences one would expect by household occupational social class,88 
although the scale of differences is very striking. More than half of men and women in higher 
managerial and professional households have degrees, and more than a third of those in 
lower managerial and professional households. Few in these groups have qualifications below 
5 or more GCSE grades A-C or equivalent. By contrast, fewer than 10 per cent of men or 
women in the bottom three categories have degrees, and a third or more have qualifications 
no more than Level 1, including nearly half of women in households with routine occupations.
Figure 3.13: Highest qualification, by occupational social class, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
88  The measure we use in Chapters 3-6 is the ONS NS-SEC, which is an occupational based classiﬁ  cation that 
can cover the whole adult population. It replaced Social Class based on occupation (SC) and Socio-Economic 
Group (SEG) classiﬁ  cations. NS-SEC is deﬁ  ned at a household level by the position of the Household 
Reference Person (HRP). The HRP is the person responsible for the accommodation; in the case of joint 
householders, the person with the highest income; and where incomes are equal, the oldest person. More 
information can be found at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/methods_quality/ns_sec/downloads/NS-SEC_
User_2005.pdf
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Housing tenure
Figure 3.14 shows that only 4 per cent of social tenants have degrees, compared to 20 per 
cent or more for the other groups, and that 45 per cent of women and 47 per cent of men 
living in social housing do not have qualifications above Level 1, compared to less than a 
quarter for owner-occupiers. These differences are again closely linked to the employment 
and wage differentials we examine in Chapters 4 and 5.
Figure 3.14: Highest qualification, by housing tenure, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
Nation or region
Figure 3.15 shows rather small differences in qualification levels between England and the 
devolved nations, the largest being that 25 per cent of men and 21 per cent of women in 
Northern Ireland have no qualifications at all. In Scotland, 11 per cent of men and 16 per cent 
of women have non-degree higher education qualifications (vocational qualifications, such as 
in nursing or teaching), more than in the other countries. At regional level within England, the 
most striking feature is the high proportion of those in London with degrees (30 per cent of 
men and 29 per cent of women), although the proportion in London with low qualifications is 
similar to the English average.
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Figure 3.15(a): Highest qualification, by nation and region, men, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
Figure 3.15(b): Highest qualification, by nation and region, women, UK, 2006-2008 
(percentages)
Working age population
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Area deprivation
Figures 3.16(a)-(c) show for England, Scotland and Wales qualification levels for all adults of 
working age89 by area deprivation level within each nation.90 As with results at age 16, there is 
a strong gradient between areas with low and high levels of deprivation, and the gradients are 
very similar in each of them (although this partly reflects the way in which qualifications are 
one of seven factors used to construct the deprivation index).91 In all three nations nearly 30 
per cent of those living in the most deprived areas have no qualifications at all, and 8 per cent 
or fewer have degrees. Conversely, 29 per cent of those in the least deprived English areas, 
and 38 and 32 per cent of their equivalents in Scotland and Wales, respectively, have degrees, 
and 7 per cent or fewer have no qualifications at all.
Figure 3.16(a): Highest qualification, by Index of Multiple Deprivation, England, 2006-2008 
(percentages)
Working age population
89  The Statistical Appendix contains separate tables for men and women.
90  In this case, and in Chapters 4 to 8, the index used for England is the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). 
The IMD 2007 combines a number of indicators, chosen to cover a range of economic, social and housing 
issues, into a single deprivation score for each small area in England. This allows each area to be ranked 
relative to one another according to their level of deprivation. The seven domains are: income, employment, 
health deprivation and disability, education skills and training, barriers to housing and services, crime, living 
environment. IMD is similar to the WIMD and the SIMD, although based on a slightly different methodology.
91  The IMD includes one indicator on adults aged between 25 and 54 with no or low qualiﬁ  cations and another 
on the percentage of people not entering higher education.
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Figure 3.16(b): Highest qualification, by Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation, Scotland, 
2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
Figure 3.16(c): Highest qualification, by Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation, Wales, 
2006-2008 (percentages)
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We showed overall gender differences in employment status in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.3). In 
this chapter, we examine how these differences are related to other characteristics that 
are available from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). We look separately at the positions of 
men and women by age, ethnicity, religious affiliation, disability status, whether they 
report living in a same sex couple, occupational social class, housing tenure, the nation or 
region (for England) in which they live, and area deprivation.
Age
Figures 4.1 (a) and (b) show employment patterns for men and women by age (including 
those over State Pension Age). Among men, full-time employment is over 70 per cent for 
those in their late twenties. Including significant amounts of self-employment, and rather less 
part-time employment, more than 85 per cent of men are in paid work for ages up to their 
early fifties. For older groups, the fraction is smaller: under 60 per cent for those in their early 
sixties, and 21 per cent for those in their late sixties. For women, the pattern is very different: 
73 per cent of women in their late twenties are in paid work, including 17 per cent employed 
part-time. While the proportion of women in paid work is around 70 per cent at all ages up to 
the early fifties, more than 25 per cent are in part-time employment. For women in their early 
thirties, nearly 20 per cent are counted as being ‘economically inactive, looking after family, 
home’. Half of women in their early sixties are classed as inactive due to retirement and a 
further 9 per cent as inactive due to disability or long-term sickness.
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Figure 4.1(b): Employment status, by age, women, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Ethnicity
Differences between ethnic groups in employment patterns (Figure 4.2) are larger for women 
than for men of working age. Around 80 per cent of White and Indian men are in paid work in 
total; for the other groups, the fraction is between 60 and 70 per cent (59 per cent for those 
with mixed White and Black Caribbean background). Notably, 17 per cent of Bangladeshi 
men are employed part-time and 21 per cent of Pakistani men are self-employed. 23 per 
cent of Chinese men are students, but only 4 per cent of White British men. Unemployment 
is particularly high for Black African, Black Caribbean and Other Black men (between 10 and 
16 per cent). For women, there are even more striking differences. In particular, 44 per cent 
of Pakistani and 49 per cent of Bangladeshi women are economically inactive, looking after 
family or home, compared to 20 per cent or fewer for most of the other groups. Only around 
a quarter of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are in paid work, but more than half of the 
other groups. Part-time employment is most common for White British women (28 per cent). 
Economic inactivity as result of being a student is greatest for Chinese women (18 per cent), 
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Figure 4.2(a): Employment status, by ethnicity, men, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
Figure 4.2(b): Employment status, by ethnicity, women, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 1 0 0
Bangladeshi (0.2)
Pakistani (0.7)
White and Black Caribbean (0.1)
Chinese (0.2)
White and Asian (0.1)



















White and Black Caribbean (0.1)
White and Black African (0.1)
Black African (0.6)












Employed, full-time Employed, part-time Self-employed
ILO, unemployed Inactive, student Inactive, looking after family, home
Inactive, disabled/long-term sick Inactive, retired Inactive, other reason, no reason given
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
114
Religious afﬁ  liation
Figure 4.3 shows that the highest full-time employment rates for both men and women are 
for Christians, Hindus, and those saying they had no religious affiliation. A quarter of Jewish 
men are self-employed. The lowest employment rates are for Muslim men (47 per cent) and 
women (24 per cent), with 42 per cent of Muslim women classed as inactive looking after 
family or home. Formal unemployment, 5 per cent for all men (in 2006-2008), is 9 per cent for 
Muslim men, while 13 per cent of both Muslim men and women are counted as economically 
inactive because they are students (compared to 5 per cent of all those of working age).
Figure 4.3(a): Employment status, by religious affiliation, men, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
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Disability status, particularly for those reporting a work-limiting disability, makes a very 
large difference to employment status. There is little difference between those reporting no 
disability, and those who are classed as ‘Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) disabled’ but did 
not report a work-limiting disability. There is some potential circularity here, as employment 
status may affect whether people describe themselves as having a ‘work-limiting condition’. 
It is those who report work-limiting disability as well as disability in DDA terms who are 
most affected, with nearly half of such men (49 per cent) and 42 per cent of women being 
economically inactive because of disability or long-term sickness. Only 21 per cent of men 
with DDA and work-limiting disability are employed full-time, contrasting with two-thirds of 
men who were not disabled. For women, the corresponding figures are 14 per cent and 42 per 
cent. These broad categories disguise, however, considerable variation within the population 
of disabled people depending on severity and type of impairment. This is discussed further in 
Box 4.1.
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Figure 4.4(a): Employment status, by disability status, men, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
Figure 4.4(b): Employment status, by disability status, women, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
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Box 4.1: Employment and disability
Disabled people face some of the greatest employment disadvantages of any group we 
examine. However, the extent of this disadvantage depends on the type of impairment, 
and on its severity and duration.
Analysis of the labour market prospects of disabled people, and the differences by type 
and severity of impairment, shows that:
•  certain conditions (especially mental health problems) are more associated with poor 
employment prospects than others (such as skin conditions);
•  certain types of impairment (such as locomotor or intellectual impairments) are more 
disadvantaging than others (such as hearing problems);
•  more severe overall impairments are associated with poorer job prospects.92
Figure 4A shows Office for Disability Issues estimates of employment rates by type of 
impairment drawn from the Labour Force Survey. Some of these estimates have wide 
confidence intervals (shown by the bars around the central estimate) due to small 
sample sizes. There is a considerable range, from under 20 per cent for people with 
mental illness, phobia or panic, or people with learning difficulties, to over 60 per cent 
for people with skin conditions and allergies, diabetes, or chest or breathing problems.
Figure 4A: Employment rates (percentages) with 95% confidence intervals, by type of 
impairment, 2008, working age adults
92 Berthoud  (2006).
Source: Office for Disability Issues (2009), based on Quarter 2 of the LFS. For each type of impairment, the short 
vertical line shows the estimate of the group’s employment rate. The length of the horizontal line shows the 95% 
confidence interval for the estimated employment rate. 
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Living in a same sex couple
Figure 4.5 shows that men who reported themselves as living in a same sex couple have 
full-time employment rates 10 percentage points higher than other men of working age. 
The difference for women is even larger, with 67 per cent of those reporting themselves as 
in a same sex couple working full-time, compared to 39 per cent of other women, and with 
considerably fewer (2 per cent compared to 12 per cent) economically inactive because they 
are looking after family or home. Box 9.8 in Chapter 9 looks at the extent to which these 
differences are explained by characteristics such as the variations in qualifications described 
in the previous section. It shows, for instance, that men reporting themselves to be members 
of a same sex couple are a little less likely to be in employment than other men in couples, 
after controlling for demographic and other characteristics, such as age, education and region 
(but, by 2006-2008, the difference is not statistically significant).
Figure 4.5: Employment status, by whether living in a same sex couple, UK, 2006-2008 
(percentages) Working age population
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Occupational social class
The most striking difference in employment status by household occupational social class 
shown in Figure 4.6 is in whether women are employed full- or part-time. Around two-thirds of 
women in higher or lower managerial or professional households are employed full-time, and 
only about a fifth part-time. However, more women from routine or semi-routine households 
are employed part-time than full-time. Women from households in routine employment 
are much more likely than those in higher occupational classes to be economically inactive 
as a result of looking after family or home. Unsurprisingly, men and women in households 
classed as small employers and own account workers are also overwhelmingly classified as 
self-employed. Equally, few of those classed as never having worked or who are not otherwise 
classified are in paid work.
Figure 4.6(a): Employment status, by occupational social class, men, UK, 2006-2008 
(percentages) Working age population
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Figure 4.6(b): Employment status, by occupational social class, women, UK, 2006-2008 
(percentages) Working age population
Housing tenure
Figure 4.7 shows substantial differences in employment patterns by housing tenure, 
particularly for social tenants. Only half of men and 42 per cent of women of working age 
living in social housing are in paid work, compared to 89 per cent of men and 81 per cent of 
women in an owner-occupied household with a mortgage. More than a fifth of male social 
tenants are inactive due to disability or long-term sickness and two-fifths of women in social 
housing are inactive either due to disability or sickness or looking after family or home.
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Figure 4.7(a): Employment status, by housing tenure, men, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
Figure 4.7(b): Employment status, by housing tenure, women, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
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Nation or region
In contrast to the lack of substantial regional differences in educational results described 
in the last section, there are differences in employment patterns between the nations and 
between English regions. Figures 4.8(a) and (b) show higher employment in Scotland than 
for the other nations, and higher levels of inactivity in Northern Ireland due to disability or 
sickness (for men) or looking after family or home (for women). Within the English regions, 
London has the lowest full-time employment and highest unemployment rates for men. For 
women, London has a somewhat higher full-time employment rate than other regions, but a 
much lower rate of part-time employment. The North East has the highest rate of inactivity 
for men due to disability or sickness.
Figure 4.8(a): Employment status, by nation or region, men, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
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Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008.123
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Figure 4.8(b): Employment status, by nation or region, women, UK, 2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
Area deprivation
Finally, Figures 4.9 (a)-(c) show the links between employment rates and area deprivation 
across England, Scotland and Wales (again for all adults, rather than separately for men and 
women). One has to be careful again with circularity in these classifications, as employment 
is one factor (amongst seven) in determining the area deprivation measures. In England, the 
major difference is between the most deprived fifth of areas and others. In the most deprived 
tenth of areas, only 55 per cent of adults are employed and a quarter economically inactive 
because of disability, sickness or caring for family or home. This contrasts with more than 80 
per cent and less than 10 per cent in these categories, respectively, in the least deprived half 
of areas. The patterns in Scotland and in Wales are similar, with the partial exception that 
levels of economic inactivity due to disability or sickness are at 10 per cent or above in the 
most deprived four-tenths of areas in Scotland and Wales.




East of England (4.5)
West Midlands (4.2)
East Midlands (3.7)
Yorkshire and the Humber (4.5)












Employed, full-time Employed, part-time
Self-employed ILO unemployed
Inactive, student Inactive, looking after family, home
Inactive, disabled/long-term sick Inactive, retired
Inactive, other reason, no reason given
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
124
Figure 4.9(a): Employment status, by Index of Multiple Deprivation, England, 2006-2008 
(percentages)
Working age population
Figure 4.9(b): Employment status, by Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation, Scotland, 
2006-2008 (percentages)
Working age population
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Figure 4.9(c): Employment status, by Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation, Wales, 2006-2008 
(percentages)
Working age population
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008.
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Chapter 5 Wages and earnings
The first section of this chapter uses data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) to explore 
the position of different groups within the distribution of hourly wages, including both 
full-time and part-time employees. We look first at the position of all men and all women, 
and then at men and women separately within each of the other dimensions we can 
examine. The second section looks at the weekly earnings of those employed full-time. 
Rather than repeat all of the breakdowns given for hourly wages,93 this section highlights 
some of the main features of the distribution of full-time weekly earnings, paying 
particular attention to gender, as it is here that the largest differences can arise by 
comparison with the picture already given for hourly wages.
5.1 Hourly  wages
Gender
In Chapter 2, we showed the overall distribution of hourly wages for all employees.94 Figure 
5.1 and Table 5.1 summarise for 2006-2008 the differences both between men and women 
and within each gender in wage levels and in the corresponding rankings within the overall 
distribution (combining both full- and part-time employment) that these imply. The tables in 
this section show the proportions of the population in each group. Looking at Figure 5.1, the 
median female hourly wage, at £8.90, is 21 per cent below those of men (at £11.15). However, 
there is a very large spread within each gender, and hence, a considerable overlap between 
them. The best paid 10 per cent of men are paid more than £24 per hour, 4.1 times the cut-
off for the worst paid 10 per cent of men. The best paid tenth of women are paid more than 
£18.80 per hour, 3.5 times the cut-off for the worst paid women. From Table 5.1, it can be 
seen that the median male employee is at the 58th percentile of the overall ranking, 16 places 
higher than the median female employee. To put it another way, nearly three-fifths of men 
are in the top half of the hourly wage distribution, while nearly three-fifths of women are in 
the bottom half. The best paid tenth of women are within the top 15 per cent of the overall 
distribution, but the best paid tenth of men within the top 7 per cent overall. Box 10.1 in 
Chapter 10 discusses trends in the gender wage gap measured in different ways.
93  Corresponding information for the level and spread of weekly earnings for those working full-time can be 
found in the Statistical Appendix.
94  Self-employed workers are not covered in this section, but their incomes are taken into account in looking at 
the distribution of individual incomes in Chapter 6. Note that the calculation of hourly wages will, for some 
survey respondents, depend on dividing weekly or monthly earnings by reported hours of work, which may be 
approximate.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 5.1: Hourly wages, by gender, UK, 2006-2008 (£)
Age
A more detailed view of the gender wage gap can be seen by comparing the panels in Figure 
5.2. Among those in their twenties, the difference in the median wage between women and 
men is smaller than for all ages, at 5 per cent, but still in favour of men. This is even though 
we have seen that women in this cohort have slightly higher levels of qualification than men. 
The best paid tenth of women in their late twenties are paid more than £16.70, 6 per cent 
less than the cut-off for the best paid men . While the median wage is highest for men in 
their early forties (at £13.40 per hour), the median is highest for women in their early thirties 
(£10.40). The best paid tenth of men in each age group from their late thirties to their early 
fifties are paid more than £26 per hour, while the cut-off for the best paid tenth of women is 
around £20 per hour. For most age groups, the worst paid tenth of women are paid no more 
than £5.60 per hour (showing the effect of the National Minimum Wage in setting a floor to 
earnings), but the worst paid tenth of men are paid up to between £6 and £7 per hour. For 
both men and women in age groups well before the State Pension Age hourly wages are lower 
than those for younger ones at all levels within the distributions. Both panels of the figure 
show the way in which wages at all corresponding ranks in each group distribution are much 
lower for younger and older workers than for those in their thirties, forties and fifties.





Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.129
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Figure 5.2(a): Hourly wages, by gender and age, men, UK, 2006-2008 (£)
Figure 5.2(b): Hourly wages, by gender and age, women, UK, 2006-2008 (£)

















Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.
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Table 5.2 shows what this implies for rankings within the overall distribution. The median 
wage of the youngest, teenage, employees, is in the bottom 8 per cent of the overall 
distribution and the median wage for those in their early twenties, is still in the bottom 
26-28 per cent. The medians for men in their thirties, forties and early fifties are high enough 
to put them in the top third of the overall distribution, but only for women in their thirties 
is the median wage high enough to put them half way up the distribution. For employees 
in their early fifties, the median wage for women is 19 places lower down the distribution 
than the median for men. The best paid tenth of middle-aged men are ranked at the 94th 
percentile or above, but the cut-off for the best paid tenth of women is below the 90th 
percentile for all age groups. For both men and women over working age median hourly 
wages are well down the distribution.
Ethnicity
Figure 5.3 shows the range of hourly wages for men and women from different ethnic 
groups.95 Apart from the small mixed White and Asian group, the median wage is highest 
for Chinese men, at £12.70, followed by the medians for White British men at £11.40, the 
Other Mixed group at £11.30 and Indian men at £11.20. The median hourly wage is only 
£6.90 for Bangladeshi men, and only £7.70 for Pakistani men. Looking at the highest paid in 
each group, the best paid Indian men have wages greater than £26.30, the best paid White 
British men greater than £24.20, and the best paid Other White men greater than £25.70. 
At the bottom, however, there is less difference, with the cut off for the worst paid 10 per 
cent in each group (where available) being between £5 and £6 per hour, again suggesting 
that the National Minimum Wage provides a floor. The 90:10 ratio is 4.1 for men taken as 
a whole (Table 5.1). What is very striking in Table 5.3 is that the ratio is around the same 
or even higher for nearly all of the ethnic groups where we can compute it (apart from 
Black Caribbean and Black African men, where it is slightly lower). That is, wage inequality 
within most ethnic groups is as much as, or greater than, overall wage inequality. The table 
shows that members of most groups are spread through the overall distribution of hourly 
wages. However, the median-waged Pakistani man is only a third of the way up the overall 
distribution. The median wage for Bangladeshi men is only at the 24th percentile, and so half 
of this group is in the bottom quarter of the overall distribution.
For women, Figure 5.3 shows some similar patterns of difference both between and 
within groups, but usually at lower levels than for men. For only a few ethnic groups (Black 
Caribbean, Chinese and Other Mixed) does the median female wage reach the overall 
median. For several groups, including the largest group, White British women, the median 
wage is below £9 per hour. For Pakistani and Bangladeshi women the median wage is only 
£8.30 and £7.80, respectively. However, this implies that if women from these groups are 
employed, they are paid more than the median-waged man from the same groups. The 
gender wage gap is also reversed for Black Caribbean and Black African women. Overall wage 
95  For some groups, sample numbers are too small to show reliable information on the spread of wages within 
the group.131
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inequality within ethnic groups is somewhat lower for women than for men – reflecting, in 
particular, lower wages for the best paid women than the best paid men – but again is as 
great within each group as between women as a whole (a 90:10 ratio of 3.5), apart from Black 
Caribbean and Black African women.
Figure 5.3(a): Hourly wages, by gender and ethnicity, men, UK, 2006-2008 (£)
Figure 5.3(b): Hourly wages, by gender and ethnicity, women, UK, 2006-2008 (£)
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Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.
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One of the factors affecting pay differentials is people’s migration status, and for how long 
they have been resident in the country. Box 5.2 in the next section looks at some recent 
evidence on the way in which the relative weekly earnings of recent migrants rise as they stay 
longer in the country.
Religious afﬁ  liation
Differences between groups based on their expressed religious affiliation are greatest 
between Muslim men (median earnings of £8 per hour) and Jewish men, whose median 
wages of £17.50 are within the top fifth of all hourly wages. The best paid tenth of Jewish 
men have wages over £36.90, putting them in the top 2 per cent of the overall distribution. 
The best paid tenth of Hindu men have wages above £27.80, within the top 5 per cent of the 
overall distribution. It is also worth noting that the 10th percentile for Jewish men, at £8.50, 
is substantially above the minimum wage. The median wage for Jewish women is also well 
above the female median, putting them in the top third overall. There is much less difference 
between the other groups of men and women by religious affiliation. In Chapter 9 (Box 9.3), 
we look at evidence on differences in wages between ethno-religious groups, controlling for 
other factors such as differences in qualifications.
Figure 5.4: Hourly wages, by gender and religious affiliation, UK, 2006-2008 (£)


























Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.133
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Disability status
Figure 5.5 and Table 5.5 show that disabled people have lower wages than others, in 
addition to the much lower employment rates described in the last section. Again, for both 
men and women it is those who report a work-limiting disability as well as being Disability 
Discrimination Act (DDA) disabled who are most affected, with the median for men 20 per 
cent lower than the median for non-disabled men, and 12 per cent lower for women. There is 
very little difference between the level and spread of wages of those who report conditions 
that class them as DDA-disabled, but not a work-limiting condition, and those who are not 
disabled. 
Figure 5.5: Hourly wages, by gender and disability status, UK, 2006-2008 (£)






















Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
134
Living in a same sex couple 
Hourly wages for both men and women who report that they live in a same sex couple are 
higher at all points in the distributions for both men and women. Figure 5.6 shows that the 
median wage for men is 19 per cent and for women 40 per cent higher if they report living in 
a same sex couple. Indeed, the median wage for women reporting that they are in a same 
sex couple is higher than the median wage for men. The best paid tenth of men who report 
living in same sex couples are paid more than £27 per hour, putting them in the top 5 per cent 
overall; the best paid tenth of women in same sex couples are in the top 8 per cent overall.
Figure 5.6: Hourly wages, by gender and whether living in a same sex couple, UK, 
2006-2008 (£)
However, this kind of difference is not entirely surprising, given the higher level of 
qualifications for people who report they live in same sex couples (see Chapter 3). Box 9.8 in 
Chapter 9 summarises the results of a study carried out for us which concludes that by 
2006-2008, wages are not significantly different for men who report living in same sex 
couples from those that would be expected on the basis of other characteristics. There is 
evidence that there was a penalty in the wages of men in same sex couples after allowing for 
qualifications in earlier periods, but this is no longer statistically significant. Women in same 
sex couples continue to have higher wages than other women with similar characteristics, 
although the difference is smaller than it previously was. In other words, the pay gap in favour 
of those in same sex couples is wholly explained, for men, and mostly explained, for women, 
by factors such as the qualification levels of those reporting this status.
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Occupational social class
Figure 5.7 and Table 5.7 show the largest spreads in wage levels between any of the 
breakdowns in this chapter, those by household occupational social class. There is a very clear 
hierarchy, not just according to the median wage in each group, but also for the other points 
in the ranges for each group. The median hourly wage for men in the higher professional 
and managerial category, at £19.80, is 78 per cent higher than the median for all men. For 
women in this group the median is 153 per cent higher than the median for all women. The 
highest paid tenth of men in the higher professional and managerial group are paid £37 
per hour or more, 3.7 times the overall median wage, and putting them in the top 2 per cent 
overall. Indeed, the cut-off for the lowest paid tenth of this group of men, £11 per hour, is 
equal to the overall median for men. By contrast, among men in routine or semi-routine 
occupation households the median wage is £7.60-7.80 per hour, and for women it is £6-6.60, 
placing them in the bottom third of the overall distribution for men and in the bottom fifth 
for women. These differences between occupational groups are an important part of the 
explanation of overall earnings inequality: the 90:10 ratios within each group are in the range 
2.3-3.5 for men and 1.9-3.4 for women, in each case well below this inequality measure for 
men and women as a whole (4.1 and 3.5, respectively).
Figure 5.7: Hourly wages, by gender and occupational social class, UK, 2006-2008 (£)
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Housing tenure
Figure 5.8 and Table 5.8 show the differences in hourly wages by housing tenure. Not 
surprisingly, the median wages of those who own their property (whether bought outright or 
with a loan or mortgage) are higher than the earnings of people who rent. This is the case for 
both men and women. The median wage for women living in social housing, £6.58, corresponds 
to the 21st percentile of the overall distribution. At the other end, the median hourly wage for 
men with a mortgage (£12.64) cuts the overall distribution at the 65th percentile, 34 places (out 
of 100) higher up the distribution than the median for men in social housing.
Figure 5.8: Hourly wages, by gender and housing tenure, UK, 2006-2008 (£)
Nation or region
The median wage for both men and women in each of the three devolved nations is below 
that for the UK as a whole. Among men, the median is lowest in Northern Ireland but, among 
women, it is lowest in Wales. Within the English regions, the median wage for both men and 
women is lowest in the North East (also in Yorkshire and the Humber for women) and highest 
in London. For men, the gap between the median wage in Northern Ireland and in London is 
equivalent to 25 places (out of 100) in the overall distribution; for women, the median wage 
in London is 27 places above the median in Wales. As Table 5.8 shows, the spread of wages 
is also widest in London, with 90:10 ratios for men of 4.7 and for women of 4.3, much higher 
than the national ratio in each case. Wages are also more widely spread in the South East 
than in other region, for both men and women.




















Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.137
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Figure 5.9(a): Hourly wages, by gender and nation or region, men, UK, 2006-2008 (£)
Figure 5.9(b): Hourly wages, by gender and nation or region, women, UK, 2006-2008 (£)
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Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.
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These differences should be seen within the context of cost of living differences across the 
country. Box 5.1 contains some evidence on these and on their scale. Allowing for cost of living 
differences would reduce, but not eliminate, the differences between regions. For instance, the 
median hourly wage is 48 per cent higher in London than in Northern Ireland, but the cost of 
living only 15 per cent higher.
Box 5.1: Cost of living differences between regions
In February 2005, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) published estimates of the 
relative regional consumer price levels in 2004. This gives an indication of the differing 
cost of living in each region. The analysis has not been updated since 2005.
Table 5A shows the average price level in each region, relative to the national average. 
The analysis is based on data collected for the compilation of the Retail Prices Index 
supplemented by a purpose-designed survey of regional prices.














These figures show that the price of a fixed basket of goods and services, based on 
national consumption patterns, is highest in London, followed by the South East. 
Average prices in London are 9.7 per cent higher than the UK average. In the South 
East, they are 5.3 per cent higher than the national average. Prices are lowest in Wales, 
the North East and Yorkshire and the Humber. 
Using this fixed national basket of goods and services means that variations in the 
purchasing patterns between regions are not allowed for. However, the index allows 
comparisons to be made between the relative purchasing power of incomes between 
one region and another. Housing costs, which are included in the calculation, show the 
greatest variation between regions, with London being nearly twice as expensive as 
Northern Ireland. By contrast, food and tobacco prices vary little across regions. 139
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Area deprivation 
The relationship between hourly wages and area deprivation is shown in Figure 5.10 and 
Table 5.10, for England, Scotland and Wales. As with the employment analyses presented 
earlier, income (of which earnings are an important component) is part of the deprivation 
indices, and therefore the classifications have some degree of circularity that needs to be 
remembered when interpreting the results. The median hourly wage in the most deprived 
tenth of areas is much lower than the median in the least deprived tenth of areas – 
by nearly 40 per cent in England and Wales, and by 45 per cent in Scotland. The gap in 
median wages between most and least deprived areas is equivalent to 34 places out of 100 in 
the distribution in England and 35 places in Wales. In Scotland, the difference is even larger – 
39 places.
There is relatively little difference across kinds of area in wages at the bottom end (again 
reflecting the floor provided by the National Minimum Wage), but larger differences between 
them for the best paid. As a result there is much more inequality within the least deprived 
areas than within most deprived ones. The 90:10 ratio is 4.6 compared to 2.8 for least and 
most deprived areas in England, and 4.7 compared to 2.6 in Scotland. 
Figure 5.10(a): Hourly wages, by Index of Multiple Deprivation, England, 2006-2008, all 
employees (£)
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Figure 5.10(b): Hourly wages, by Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation, Scotland, 2006-2008, 
all employees (£)
Figure 5.10(c): Hourly wages, by Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation, Wales, 2006-2008, 
all employees (£)




















Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.
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5.2  Weekly full-time earnings
Gender and age
Figure 5.11 shows the spread of weekly earnings for all full-time employees and for men and 
women employed full-time in 2006-2008 (at 2008 prices), with, for comparison, the spread 
of weekly earnings for those working part-time. Among men working full-time, the median 
is £494 per week (equivalent to £25,800 per year). The median for women working full-time 
is £386 (equivalent to £20,100 per year). Table 5.11 (which includes information for all those 
of working age as well as the age breakdown) shows that this means that median earnings 
for women working full-time are at the 39th percentile of the overall distribution of full-time 
earnings, somewhat further down, even, than women’s hourly wages discussed in the previous 
section. Again, the gender gap in pay (22 per cent at the median) is alongside inequality 
within the distributions (as measured by the 90:10 ratio) that is just as great for men, and 
nearly as great for women looked at separately, as it is for all full-time workers together.96 
For those working part-time there is much less difference between men and women – indeed 
women earn slightly more than men but, for both men and women, median part-time 
earnings are less than a third of median full-time earnings. 
Figure 5.11: All employees weekly earnings, by gender, UK, 2006-2008 (£)
96  See Box 10.1 in Chapter 10 for discussion of trends in the gender pay gap.
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Figure 5.12 shows how the spread of full-time earnings varies between men and women in 
different age groups. Median earnings are highest for men in their early forties, £575 per 
week, while those for women are highest in their early thirties, £457 per week. The full-time 
gender pay gap in median earnings is 6-7 per cent for women in their twenties, but much 
greater for the older groups – 28 per cent for those in their early forties, for instance. The 
gender gap for the highest earners is similar: the highest paid tenth of men have weekly 
earnings in their forties of over £1,100, while the cut-off for the best paid tenth of women of 
the same age is around £800.
Figure 5.12: Full-time employees weekly earnings, by gender and age, UK, 2006-2008 (£)
Looking at the positions within the overall distribution of full-time weekly earnings shown in 
Table 5.11 that these levels imply, at any given age and point in the distribution, women are 
slightly further down this distribution than they were in that of hourly wages (shown in Table 
5.2). For those in their late forties, for instance, the median full-time earnings for women is 
26 places (out of 100) lower down the overall earnings distribution than the median for men 
(compared to a gap of 23 places in hourly wages).
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Occupational social class
Figure 5.13 shows the spread of earnings for men and women within each household 
occupational social class grouping. As with hourly wages broken down this way, there are 
large differences between groups, as well as within them. For men, the gradient between 
the groups is slightly less than that in hourly wages, however. For instance, men in higher 
professional or managerial households have median earnings 2.3 times as much per week 
as men in routine jobs, but the hourly wage difference was 2.5 times (Figure 5.7). However, 
the median earnings for women working full-time from higher professional or managerial 
households is 2.8 times greater than the median for women in routine occupation households, 
which is a greater difference than between the same groups in hourly wages (2.5 times). The 
highest paid tenth of men in the higher managerial and professional occupational group earn 
more than £1,500 per week (equivalent to just under £80,000 per year), 3.4 times the overall 
median for men. Again, this is a slightly smaller margin than the corresponding ratio for hourly 
wages (3.7), implying that men in this occupation report shorter working hours than do men 
in other occupations.
Figure 5.13: Full-time employees weekly earnings, by gender and occupational social class, UK, 
2006-2008 (£)
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Other characteristics
For completeness, Table 5.12 summarises features of breakdowns of the distribution of full-
time weekly earnings by other characteristics (full details are in the Statistical Appendix). 
It shows where median earnings for men and women in each category come within the 
overall ranking of full-time earnings, looking in turn at selected aspects of disability status, 
nation and region, whether people report living in a same sex couple, ethnicity and religion. 
By comparison with the corresponding tables (shown separately for each characteristic) in 
Section 5.1, the main difference is that women are generally several places further down this 
distribution than that of hourly wages. For some groups the difference is larger. As a result, 
it is only for three groups (Pakistani, Bangladeshi and mixed White-Black Caribbean women) 
that median full-time weekly earnings for women are greater than for men. For instance, 
among Black Caribbean women, the median hourly wage is at the 54th percentile of the 
overall distribution, but those working full-time have median weekly earnings only at the 
46th percentile.
Some groups of men are higher up the full-time distribution than they are in the distribution 
of hourly wages. Median full-time earnings for Bangladeshi men correspond to the 
29th percentile of the overall distribution, which is very low, but slightly better than the 
position suggested by the median of their hourly wages which is at the 24th percentile. 
Box 5.2 discusses the way in which the weekly earnings of recent migrants rise relative to 
UK-born workers in the years after arrival in the UK, and how this varies depending on 
continent of origin.
While the median among men reporting themselves as living in a same-sex couple lies at the 
68th percentile of the hourly wage distribution, it is only at the 60th percentile of the weekly 
full-time earnings distribution. Similarly, the median-waged woman in same-sex couples is 
at the 64th percentile of the hourly wage distribution, but only the 56th percentile of full-time 
weekly earnings.
Box 5.2: Earnings, migration and assimilation
One factor associated with differences between some ethnic groups in labour market 
outcomes is the disadvantage recent migrants experience in the labour market, both 
in terms of finding work and wages. However, over time, the pay gap closes (and even 
reverses as experience is gained). Recent research by Abigail McKnight and Richard 
Dickens,97 using longitudinal data from the Lifetime Labour Market Database, explores 
how earnings of migrants have changed in the last thirty years. 
Looking at groups as a whole, real weekly earnings of migrants (arriving in Britain since 
1975) lagged behind those of native workers in the 1980s and early 1990s. They are 
typically lower than those of native workers, but these wage differences narrow as 
length of residence in Great Britain increases. Since the early 1980s, migrant wages 
have risen in relation to those born in the UK.
97  McKnight and Dickens (2008). The model used by the researchers controls for a number of factors, including 
age, so the differences shown, relative to native-born employees, do not result from migrants’ wages rising 
with age and experience once they have arrived.145
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This ratio has tended to increase over time as migrant wages have caught up with 
those of non-migrants, partly reflecting differences in the balance of qualifications 
and experience between the groups. By the early 2000s, migrant men had similar pay 
to men born in the UK, but migrant women had pay more than 15 per cent higher 
than women born in the UK.
Figure 5A: Gap between earnings of migrants and UK-born workers by years since 
arrival
Figure 5A shows for men and women separately, how long it takes, since arrival in the 
country, for their wages to catch up with those of native workers of the same age. On 
arrival, both male and female migrants are paid less than a native worker of the same 
age. This gap is larger for men at more than 30 per cent, while for women the gap 
is around 15 per cent. This wage gap closes as migrants build up increasing years of 
experience in the British labour market. After two to three years, the penalty falls to 
20 per cent for men and about 5 per cent for women. For migrant women, the wage 
gap has disappeared after four to six years, whereas for men it takes up to twenty 
years to completely eradicate the wage difference.
As can be seen from Figures 5B and 5C, there is a considerable variation in the 
time it takes to ‘catch up’ depending on migrants’ countries of origin. For example, 
assimilation rates are fastest for those coming from European countries, while Asian 
men have slow rates of assimilation and have the largest initial gap, at 70 per cent.
The research also shows that migrants who have arrived since 1985 have fared 
better than those who arrived between 1975 and 1980. This is because they have a 
higher relative pay on arrival than twenty years ago, rather than because they then 
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Figure 5B: Gap between earnings of migrants and UK-born workers by continent of 
origin: Men arriving between 1985 and 1990
Figure 5C: Gap between earnings of migrants and UK-born workers by continent of 
















































Source: McKnight and Dickens (2008), figures 17, 18 and 19.147
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Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.







Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
40-44 13.42 4.0 25 69 95 6.6
45-49 13.21 4.0 24 68 95 5.9
35-39 12.96 3.8 24 67 94 6.3
50-54 12.78 4.1 22 66 95 4.9
30-34 12.14 3.5 20 63 92 5.4
55-59 11.42 3.9 19 59 93 4.5
25-29 10.04 2.9 15 51 83 4.7
60-64 9.94 3.6 14 50 90 3.0
65-69 8.28 4.2 6 37 89 0.7
20-24 7.36 2.4 6 28 63 3.4
70+ 6.76 4.5 3 23 85 0.3
16-19 5.31 2.5 1 8 34 2.0
Women
30-34 10.37 3.5 11 53 87 5.6
35-39 10.01 3.7 10 50 88 6.8
40-44 9.56 3.6 10 47 88 7.6
25-29 9.53 3.0 11 47 80 5.2
50-54 9.31 3.6 11 45 87 6.0
45-49 9.24 3.5 11 45 86 6.9
55-59 8.61 3.4 9 40 85 5.0
60-64 7.96 3.3 7 34 82 2.3
20-24 7.08 2.4 5 26 60 3.8
65-69 6.83 3.3 5 23 77 0.6
70+ 6.17 3.3 3 17 69 0.2
16-19 5.31 2.5 1 8 34 2.3
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
White and Asian 13.90 * * 71 * 0.1
Chinese 12.67 4.8 7 65 93 0.1
White British 11.35 4.1 14 59 93 41
Other Mixed 11.25 * * 58 * 0.1
Indian 11.15 4.5 13 58 94 0.9
Other White 10.44 4.6 10 53 94 2.8
Black Caribbean 10.34 3.7 13 53 90 0.3
Other Black 9.77 * * 49 * 0.0
Other Asian 9.75 4.2 8 49 91 0.3
Black African 9.60 3.5 10 48 86 0.5
White and Black Caribbean 9.10 * * 44 * 0.1
Other 8.92 4.0 7 42 90 0.6
White and Black African 8.48 * * 39 * 0.0
Pakistani 7.74 3.9 5 32 86 0.4
Bangladeshi 6.90 * * 24 * 0.1
Women
Other Mixed 10.51 * * 54 * 0.1
Black Caribbean 10.51 3.2 12 54 84 0.0
Chinese 10.21 4.5 7 52 92 0.0
White and Asian 9.86 * * 49 * 0.1
Black African 9.73 3.2 8 48 81 0.0
Indian 9.58 3.5 10 47 87 0.8
Other Black 9.50 * * 47 * 0.0
Other 9.23 3.5 8 45 85 0.0
White and Black African 9.09 * * 44 * 0.1
Other White 8.94 4.0 7 43 88 2.8
White British 8.83 3.5 8 42 85 46
Other Asian 8.57 3.5 5 39 82 0.0
White and Black Caribbean 8.39 * * 38 * 0.1
Pakistani 8.33 3.6 6 37 85 0.2
Bangladeshi 7.81 * * 33 * 0.1
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices. 149
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Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
Jewish 17.50 4.4 38 82 98 0.1
Hindu 12.02 4.8 12 62 95 0.6
Buddhist 11.44 4.2 13 59 93 0.2
No religion at all 11.25 4.1 14 58 93 10
Christian 11.24 4.1 14 58 93 35
Any other religion 11.14 3.9 12 58 91 0.4
Sikh 10.11 3.7 12 51 90 0.2
Muslim 8.05 4.0 6 35 88 1.0
Women
Jewish 13.37 4.5 13 68 94 0.2
Buddhist 9.67 4.0 5 48 87 0.2
Hindu 9.56 3.8 9 47 89 0.5
Any other religion 9.43 3.7 9 46 88 0.4
No religion at all 9.04 3.7 7 43 86 9.0
Christian 8.82 3.5 8 42 85 41
Sikh 8.59 3.3 8 40 82 0.2
Muslim 8.32 3.6 6 37 84 0.6
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
DDA-disabled 11.41 3.9 17 59 93 2.4
Not disabled 11.33 4.1 14 59 93 41
Work-limiting disabled only 9.61 3.6 10 48 88 1.5
DDA-disabled and work-
limiting disabled
9.04 3.5 9 43 85 2.4
Women
Not disabled 8.96 3.6 8 43 85 45
DDA-disabled 8.82 3.4 9 42 84 3.0
Work-limiting disabled only 8.43 3.5 7 38 84 1.5
DDA-disabled and work-
limiting disabled
7.90 3.2 6 33 79 3.0
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.








Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
Living as a same sex couple 13.26 4.0 22 68 95 0.3
Not living as a same sex 
couple
11.14 4.1 13 58 93 47
Women
Living as a same sex couple 12.39 3.7 20 64 92 0.3
Not living as a same sex 
couple
8.84 3.5 8 42 85 52
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.151
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Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
Higher managerial and 
professional
19.75 3.4 57 87 98 9.4
Lower managerial and 
professional
14.29 3.2 34 72 94 13
Intermediate occupations 10.00 2.6 19 50 80 3.4
Lower supervisory and 
technical
9.85 2.6 14 49 77 7.6
Semi-routine occupations 7.65 2.4 7 31 63 5.8
Routine occupations 7.80 2.3 7 33 62 6.8
Never worked, unemployed, 
and not classiﬁ  ed
5.83 3.5 2 13 65 1.5
Women
Higher managerial and 
professional
17.46 3.2 50 82 97 4.9
Lower managerial and 
professional
12.59 2.9 28 65 89 17
Intermediate occupations 8.60 2.3 14 40 70 10
Lower supervisory and 
technical
7.11 2.2 6 26 59 3.4
Semi-routine occupations 6.50 2.0 5 20 49 10
Routine occupations 6.00 1.9 4 15 38 4.1
Never worked, unemployed, 
and not classiﬁ  ed
5.80 3.4 2 13 63 2.3
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices. An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
Being bought with 
mortgage or loan
12.64 4.0 19 65 94 29
Owned outright 10.51 4.3 12 54 93 5.0
Other 9.45 3.5 9 46 86 1.3
Individual private landlord 9.22 3.7 9 45 88 8.3
Social Housing 7.65 2.5 6 31 66 4.1
Women
Being bought with 
mortgage or loan
9.75 3.6 9 49 87 32
Owned outright 8.50 3.6 8 39 86 4.6
Other 8.18 3.2 6 36 78 1.2
Individual private landlord 7.96 3.1 6 34 77 9.5
Social Housing 6.58 2.3 5 21 57 5.2
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices. 153
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Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
England 11.29 4.2 14 58 93 40
London 13.94 4.7 21 71 96 4.9
South East 12.85 4.7 16 66 95 9.1
Eastern 12.10 4.3 15 63 94 5.1
South West 11.03 3.9 13 57 91 4.9
West Midlands 10.58 3.8 13 54 90 4.7
East Midlands 10.48 3.8 12 54 90 4.8
North West (inc. 
Merseyside)
10.42 3.9 11 53 90 6.0
Yorkshire and the Humber 10.22 3.7 12 52 89 5.6
North East 10.14 3.5 12 51 88 2.7
Scotland 10.84 3.9 12 56 91 4.4
Wales 10.15 3.6 11 51 88 2.2
Northern Ireland 9.40 3.4 11 46 86 1.1
Women
England 8.91 3.6 8 42 85 44
London 12.32 4.3 14 64 94 5.1
South East 9.49 3.7 8 47 87 5.6
Eastern 9.07 3.6 8 44 86 5.4
West Midlands 8.60 3.4 7 40 83 3.0
North West (inc. 
Merseyside)
8.50 3.3 7 39 82 6.8
South West 8.45 3.3 7 38 82 9.6
East Midlands 8.24 3.4 6 37 82 5.5
North East 8.13 3.2 7 36 80 5.1
Yorkshire and the Humber 8.08 3.3 7 35 81 6.0
Scotland 8.78 3.4 8 41 84 4.9
Northern Ireland 8.50 3.3 8 39 82 1.3
Wales 8.30 3.3 8 37 82 2.5
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices. An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
England
Highest tenth 12.69 4.6 14 65 95 12
2nd tenth 11.58 4.4 12 60 93 11
3rd tenth 11.01 4.1 12 57 92 11
4th tenth 10.56 4.0 11 54 91 11
5th tenth 10.32 3.8 10 53 90 10
6th tenth 9.80 3.6 10 49 87 10
7th tenth 9.34 3.5 9 46 85 10
8th tenth 8.98 3.3 9 43 83 9.0
9th tenth 8.26 3.1 7 37 79 8.1
Lowest tenth 7.68 2.8 6 31 72 6.8
Wales
Highest tenth 11.89 3.7 16 62 91 12
2nd tenth 10.74 4.0 11 55 91 11
3rd tenth 9.76 3.6 11 49 88 10
4th tenth 9.70 3.5 10 48 86 11
5th tenth 9.07 3.6 7 43 84 10
6th tenth 8.77 3.1 8 41 79 9.5
8th tenth 8.30 2.9 8 37 77 11
7th tenth 8.27 3.0 9 37 79 10
9th tenth 7.93 2.7 7 34 72 8.4
Lowest tenth 7.21 2.6 6 27 68 7.6
Scotland
Highest tenth 13.81 4.7 15 70 95 11
2nd tenth 12.28 4.1 14 63 93 12
3rd tenth 11.18 3.9 12 58 91 13
5th tenth 9.89 3.6 9 50 87 10
4th tenth 9.82 3.7 10 49 88 11
6th tenth 9.24 3.3 9 45 84 10
7th tenth 8.55 3.0 9 39 80 10
8th tenth 8.31 3.0 8 37 77 8.9
9th tenth 7.89 2.6 8 33 72 7.8
Lowest tenth 7.69 2.6 7 31 69 6.4
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.155
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Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
All 447.9 3.7 10 50 90 100
All men 494.0 3.7 14 56 92 59
All women 386.0 3.5 6 39 83 41
Men
40-44 574.7 3.7 22 67 95 8.7
45-49 562.4 3.6 22 66 94 7.8
35-39 554.4 3.5 21 65 94 8.3
50-54 543.6 3.7 20 63 94 6.4
30-34 512.8 3.2 18 59 91 7.1
55-59 494.9 3.5 16 57 92 5.6
60-64 431.4 3.4 13 47 88 3.3
25-29 429.7 2.8 13 47 81 6.1
65-69 383.8 3.7 8 39 88 0.3
20-24 312.1 2.4 6 24 59 3.9
70+ 310.8 * * 24 * 0.1
16-19 216.5 2.7 1 6 25 1.3
Women
30-34 457.3 3.3 10 51 85 4.8
35-39 440.6 3.7 8 48 88 5.0
40-44 415.4 3.7 7 44 87 5.7
50-54 402.5 3.5 8 42 86 5.0
25-29 400.7 2.7 9 42 75 5.3
45-49 390.7 3.5 7 40 85 5.7
55-59 371.7 3.5 7 36 84 3.8
60-64 355.8 3.4 5 33 79 1.1
65-69 300.9 * * 21 * 0.1
20-24 294.2 2.3 4 20 51 3.7
16-19 214.1 2.8 1 6 22 0.9
70+ * * * * * 0.0
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 5.12: Full-time employees weekly earnings, by gender and other characteristics, UK, 
2006-2008 (£)




Not disabled 58 40
Work-limiting disabled only 47 36
DDA-disabled and work-limiting disabled 43 30
b) Nation and Region
England 58 40
London 70 61
South East 67 44
Eastern 62 42
South West 56 37
East Midlands 54 33
West Midlands 52 36
North West (inc. Merseyside) 50 34
Yorkshire and the Humber 50 32
North East 47 33
Scotland 54 36
Wales 50 32
Northern Ireland 43 33
c) Whether living in same sex couple
Living in a same sex couple 60 56
Not living in a same sex couple 56 39157
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Table 5.12: (Continued)
Median rank in the distribution
Men Women
d) Ethnicity
White and Asian 70 44
Chinese 65 51
White British 58 39
Other Mixed 57 52
Indian 56 43
Other White 53 39
Other Asian 50 42
Black Caribbean 50 46
Black African 50 45
Other Black 50 47
White and Black Caribbean 43 37
Other 43 40
White and Black African 41 47
Pakistani 31 34
Bangladeshi 29 30




No religion at all 57 41
Buddhist 56 43
Any other religion 56 43
Sikh 50 35
Muslim 36 35
Source: NEP, based on LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.159
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Chapter 6 Net individual incomes
In the next chapter we look at people’s incomes based on the total received by the 
household in which they live, on the assumption that all members share an equal 
standard of living. But for some purposes, we are also interested in the incomes which 
people receive in their own right, something which gains importance when resources are 
not equally shared within a couple, for instance. We looked at the distribution of weekly 
incomes directly received by each individual adult in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4), first in terms 
of the gross total incomes, then at net individual incomes, after deduction of direct taxes. 
In this chapter we look at the position of all adults from different population groups 
within the distribution of weekly net individual incomes pooled across the three financial 
years 2005-06 to 2007-08 (at 2007-08 prices). We can do this for eight of the dimensions 
in which we are interested, again starting with differences between men and women, and 
then looking at other groups for men and women separately. The data source (the Family 
Resources Survey (FRS)) does not ask questions linked to religious affiliation or sexual 
orientation.
Gender
As we noted in Chapter 2, individual incomes are distributed across all adults much more 
unequally than earnings are across those in employment. Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1 show 
considerable differences both between men and women and within the distribution for each 
gender. The median female individual income, £180 per week, is less than two-thirds of the 
median for men, £281 per week.98 A tenth of women have individual incomes above £435, in 
the top fifth of the overall distribution, but a tenth have incomes below £49 per week. A tenth 
of men receive more than £649 per week, but a tenth less than £84 per week. The spread 
measured by the 90:10 ratio is therefore nearly 8 for men and nearly 9 for women, which is 
not much lower than the ratio of 9.6 for the overall distribution. More than half of women are 
in the bottom 40 per cent of the distribution and more than half of men are in the top 40 per 
cent.
98  As shown in Chapter 10, however, this is a substantial increase on the position eleven years earlier.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 6.1: Net individual incomes, by gender, UK, 2005-06 to 2007-08 (£)
Age
Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2 break these differences down by age. For both genders there is a 
pronounced age pattern but, at all ages, women have much lower individual incomes than 
men. At all ages before State Pension Age there are very wide spreads in income, particularly 
for women.99 A tenth of men in their forties have net incomes above £812, and half above 
£369. Incomes for women in their thirties and forties are also higher than at other ages, but 
with a less pronounced peak. The cut-off for the highest tenth of women’s incomes in each 
age group never reaches the cut-off for the top tenth of incomes overall (£542 per week). 
Apart from the very youngest, few men have individual incomes below £90 per week and, 
after State Pension Age, the cut-off for the poorest tenth rises to over £120. The pattern 
for women is different, with the cut-off for the poorest tenth coming between £40 and £60 
in most age groups. For the oldest women, this cut-off rises, however, to £90 per week (as 
a larger proportion of older widows receive pensions directly, rather than their husbands 
receiving a married pension). One consequence of this strongly age-related pattern is that 
70 per cent of all those aged 65 or over have incomes in the bottom half of the overall 
distribution, and so too do nearly two-thirds of those in their early twenties.
99  At the youngest ages, where more than a tenth have little or no individual income, the 90:10 ratio ceases to 
be a useful measure.




Net weekly income (£)
Source: National Equality Panel (NEP), based on Individual Income Series 2005-06 to 2007-08.161
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Figure 6.2: Net individual incomes, by gender and age, UK, 2005-06 to 2007-08 (£)
Ethnicity
Sample numbers, even pooling three years of data in the way we do here, are not large 
enough to show the full spread of individual incomes for all the groups in which we are 
interested, but Figure 6.3 and Table 6.3 show different patterns between the groups where 
full information is available. There are significant differences both in median incomes and 
those at the top. For White British men, the median income is £288, 30 per cent greater than 
the medians for Black or Black British Caribbean men, for instance, while the 90th percentile 
for White British men is 22 per cent higher than the 90th percentiles for Black or Black British 
Caribbean men. Strikingly, more than half of Asian or Asian British Pakistani women have 
individual incomes below £100 per week (and nearly half of Asian or Asian British Bangladeshi 
women), and so are in the bottom fifth overall. More than a tenth of Pakistani women and 
of Bangladeshi men have no reported income in their own right at all. Looking across ethnic 
groups, White men (British and other) are typically 30 places (out of 100) higher up the overall 
distribution than Asian or Asian British Bangladeshi men. Comparing men and women, only 
for Black or Black British Caribbean men and women are individual incomes at similar levels 
across the range. For other groups, women are typically 10-20 places (out of 100) below 
men of the same ethnicity. The median income for White British women is 24 places below 
the median for White British men in the overall distribution; for Asian or Asian British Indian 
women, the gap is 27 places.







































Net weekly income (£)
Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series 2005-06 to 2007-08.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 6.3(a): Net individual incomes, by gender and ethnicity, men, UK, 2005-06 to 
2007-08 (£)
Figure 6.3(b): Net individual incomes, by gender and ethnicity, women, UK, 2005-06 to 
2007-08 (£)
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Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series 2005-06 to 2007-08.
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Disability status
Figure 6.4 and Table 6.4 show the spread of individual incomes for men and women by 
disability status. As with the earlier analysis of earnings, the available data allow us to 
distinguish those who are disabled on the two definitions, one linked to the Disability 
Discrimination Act (DDA), the other to whether they report a condition that limits the work 
they can do.100 As with the findings for earnings of employees, it is those who are disabled on 
both definitions who are most disadvantaged. The median individual income for men who 
are disabled on both definitions is £157, half the £316 for non-disabled men. For women the 
corresponding estimates are £131 and £198. A tenth of men disabled on both definitions 
have individual incomes below £59 per week, and a tenth of women in this situation have 
incomes below £31 per week. Unlike the position for earnings, however, those who are 
disabled according to the DDA definition, but do not report a work-limiting condition, also 
have much lower incomes than non-disabled people: the median income is £220 for men 
and £155 for women. A reason for the difference is that the population covered here includes 
not just employees, but others who are of working age, but not in paid work, and those over 
State Pension Age.101 The effect of this is that 70 per cent of men and about 75 per cent 
of women disabled on both definitions are in the bottom half of this income distribution. 
The much lower levels of income for disabled people shown here are despite the inclusion 
within their incomes of ‘extra costs benefits’, which are intended to compensate for some 
of the additional costs disabled people face. In Box 7.1 in Chapter 7, we argue that a fairer 
comparison between the incomes of disabled and non-disabled people would exclude such 
benefits, and we show the effects of doing so.
100  The individual income data are derived from the FRS, which contains two disability-related questions. The 
ﬁ  rst asks whether the respondent thinks he/she experiences life problems due to illness, injury or disability. 
The second asks whether, again in the opinion of the respondent, injury, illness or disability affect their 
ability to work. We have used a combination of these two answers to derive a disability variable for individual 
income analysis. We constructed this measure speciﬁ  cally for this exercise; it is not a standard FRS output.
101  The difference between incomes of women over 60 and men over 70 between those who are not disabled 
and those who are DDA-disabled only is much smaller than the overall difference, suggesting that this is a 
composition effect.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 6.4: Net individual incomes, by gender and disability status, UK, 2005-06 to 2007-08 (£)
Occupational social class
Given what we saw of weekly earnings variations for those in paid employment in Chapter 5, 
the degree of difference between different household occupational social class groups 
shown in Figure 6.5 may not come as a surprise.102 It is also the case that income inequality 
within most of these groups is less than that for the population as a whole, unlike the other 
breakdowns we have examined so far in this section, although it is still substantial. The 
median individual income for men from higher managerial or professional households is £578 
per week, more than twice the median for men from routine occupation households, £268 per 
week. For women, the corresponding differential is even larger: £471 compared with £157. The 
median individual income is below £100 per week for both men and women from households 
who have never worked or are long-term unemployed. A tenth of men in higher professional 
or managerial households have net incomes above £1,200 per week (compared to a 
corresponding figure of £1,500 for the gross earnings for full-time employees). The greatest 
within-group inequality is for small employers and ‘own account’ worker households, where 
for both men and women, incomes for those in the top tenth are more than ten times those 
for the poorest tenth. This illustrates the extent to which significant numbers of self-employed 
workers have very low incomes (affecting some ethnic groups more than others, with, for 
instance, 21 per cent of Pakistani men self-employed).
102  Non-employed people (retired; looking after a home; on government employment or training schemes; and 
sick or disabled) are classiﬁ  ed according to their last main job. Full-time students, the long-term unemployed 
and people who have never worked are assigned to a residual category: ‘never worked, unemployed, not 
elsewhere classiﬁ  ed’.
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In terms of the positions these imply within the overall distribution of individual incomes, 
Table 6.5 shows the considerable differences between groups. 90 per cent of men and about 
75 per cent of women in the top occupational group have individual incomes in the top third 
of the overall distribution. Half of men and nearly half of women from this group are in the 
top tenth of the overall distribution. Conversely, two-thirds of women from routine and semi-
routine occupations have incomes in the bottom half overall. However, more than half of men 
even in these occupations still have individual incomes in the top half overall. Nearly all of 
both men and women classed as ‘never worked or long-term unemployed’ have incomes in 
the bottom half of the overall distribution, most of them in the bottom fifth or lower.
Figure 6.5: Net individual incomes, by gender and occupational social class, UK, 2005-06 to 
2007-08 (£)
Housing tenure
Differences by housing tenure are linked to those by occupational class. Among owners 
buying with a mortgage, the median income is £368 per week for men, and £239 per week for 
women (Figure 6.6). These medians are greater than even the 90th percentile for male social 
tenants or the 75th percentile for female social tenants. The median income for social tenants 
is less than half the median for mortgagors for men and 60 per cent of the median for 
women. The greatest spread of incomes comes within the private rented sector, reflecting its 
role as a tenure of transition for some on the way to owner-occupation, but often as the only 
option for others with low incomes. As a result of these differences, half of male mortgagors 
are in the top quarter of the overall distribution, but half of all social tenants are in the 
bottom third (Table 6.6).
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Figure 6.6: Net individual incomes, by gender and housing tenure, UK, 2005-06 to 2007-08 (£)
Nation and region
Individual incomes do not vary so greatly between the four nations, although they are 
typically somewhat higher in England for men. The highest incomes for men are also 
somewhat higher than those for their equivalents in the other nations, but otherwise the 
ranges shown in Figure 6.7 are fairly similar. Similarly, at regional level, the ranges for each 
region are fairly similar, with the exception of London and the South East. In London, the 
incomes of the richest are the highest of any region, but those of the poorest are the lowest, 
for both men and women. Confirming the capital’s popular reputation for extremes, the 90:10 
ratios are 14 for men and 18 for women, showing twice the inequality of the other English 
regions.
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Figure 6.7(a): Net individual incomes, by gender and nation or region, men, UK, 2005-06 to 
2007-08 (£)
Figure 6.7(b): Net individual incomes, by gender and nation or region, women, UK, 2005-06 to 
2007-08 (£)
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Area deprivation
Bearing in mind that income levels are, indirectly, a factor in assessing the deprivation of 
areas, there are considerable differences in individual incomes between areas by level of 
deprivation. Median income for the least deprived area is 70 per cent higher than the median 
income for the most deprived area in both England and Scotland (Figure 6.8) and 56 per cent 
higher in Wales. There are even larger differences between those with the highest incomes in 
each kind of area – with 10 per cent having incomes above £700 in the least deprived English 
and Scottish areas, more than twice the highest incomes in the most deprived areas. As would 
be expected from the pattern of earnings described in Chapter 5, there is much less variation 
in the lowest individual incomes between areas, so the level of inequality ranges from 90:10 
ratios of 6-9 in the most deprived areas to 11-12 in the least deprived areas. Median incomes 
for the least deprived areas are 23-28 places higher in the overall distribution than the 
medians for the most deprived ones.
Figure 6.8(a): Net individual incomes, by Index of Multiple Deprivation, England, 2005-06 to 
2007-08, all adults (£)
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Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series 2005-06 to 2007-08.169
Chapter 6   Net individual incomes
6
Figure 6.8(b): Net individual incomes, by Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation, Scotland, 
2005-06 to 2007-08, all adults (£)
Figure 6.8(c): Net individual incomes, by Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation, Wales, 2005-06 
to 2007-08, all adults (£)
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Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series 2005-06 to 2007-08.
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Rank in the distribution
Population 
proportion
(%) 10th Median 90th
Overall 223 9.6 10 50 90 100
Men 281 7.7 15 62 93 47
Women 180 8.9 8 39 82 53
Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series, 2005-06 to 2007-08.171
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Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
40-44 369 8.5 18 76 96 4.7
45-49 368 8.6 17 76 96 4.3
35-39 366 7.8 18 75 96 4.6
30-34 346 7.3 17 73 94 3.8
50-54 344 8.7 15 72 95 4.0
55-59 311 9.0 14 67 95 4.1
25-29 288 8.4 11 63 88 3.2
60-64 259 7.3 15 58 92 3.8
65-69 229 4.1 24 51 87 3.3
70-74 219 3.6 25 48 83 2.7
75-79 203 3.5 24 44 82 2.1
80-84 201 3.2 23 44 78 1.4
85+ 200 3.4 22 44 79 0.7
20-24 199 >30 3 44 75 2.9
16-19 92 * 1 17 50 1.4
Women
30 - 34 244 12 7 54 88 4.5
35 - 39 239 10 8 53 87 5.2
40 - 44 236 9.8 8 53 90 5.3
25 - 29 232 10 7 52 83 3.9
45 - 49 228 9.6 9 51 90 4.6
50 - 54 203 19 5 44 88 4.2
20 - 24 167 17 4 36 67 3.3
55 - 59 161 >30 3 34 82 4.4
85+ 161 3.0 17 34 61 1.3
80 - 84 146 4.3 11 30 59 1.8
60 - 64 144 6.6 9 30 74 4.1
75 - 79 136 4.8 10 28 60 2.6
70 - 74 130 4.9 9 26 61 3.0
65 - 69 127 5.2 9 25 64 3.5
16 - 19 96 * 1 18 47 1.3
Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series, 2005-06 to 2007-08.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
Any other white background 292 11 12 64 96 1.7
White – British 288 7.3 16 63 94 42
Asian or Asian British – Indian 274 12 10 61 95 0.9
Mixed – White and Asian 266 * * 59 * 0.1
Any other mixed background 258 * * 57 * 0.1
Any other Black/Black British 
background
256 * * 57 * 0.0
Chinese 251 * * 56 * 0.2
Any other Asian/Asian British 
background
251 >30 5 56 92 0.3
Black or Black British – African 244 >30 3 54 90 0.4
Mixed – White and Black 
Caribbean
233 * * 52 * 0.1
Mixed – White and Black 
African
227 * * 51 * 0.0
Any other 220 >30 4 49 92 0.5
Black or Black British – 
Caribbean
220 14 6 49 90 0.4
Asian or Asian British – 
Pakistani
184 * * 40 * 0.6
Asian or Asian British – 
Bangladeshi
158 * 1 33 76 0.1173









Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Women
Black or Black British – 
Caribbean
214 8.9 9 47 86 0.5
Mixed – White and Asian 212 * * 47 * 0.1
Any other mixed background 208 * * 46 * 0.1
Black or Black British – African 205 25 4 45 86 0.5
Any other Black/Black British 
background
202 * * 44 * 0.0
Any other white background 194 23 5 42 88 2.0
White – British 181 8.0 9 39 82 47
Chinese 178 * * 38 * 0.2
Any other Asian/Asian British 
background
173 * 1 37 83 0.3
Mixed – White and Black 
African
171 * * 37 * 0.1
Any other 169 >30 1 36 82 0.6
Mixed – White and Black 
Caribbean
168 * * 36 * 0.1
Asian or Asian British – Indian 161 >30 3 34 85 0.9
Asian or Asian British – 
Bangladeshi
107 * * 20 * 0.2
Asian or Asian British – 
Pakistani
93 * 1 17 64 0.6
Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series, 2005-06 to 2007-08. An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 6.4: Net individual incomes, by gender and disability status, UK, 2005-06 to 







Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
Not disabled 316 7.6 17 68 95 36
DDA-disabled 220 3.8 23 49 84 5.8
Work-limiting disabled only 171 >30 3 36 85 1.3
DDA-disabled and work-
limiting disabled
157 6.1 10 33 75 4.1
Women
Not disabled 198 10 7 43 85 40
DDA-disabled 155 5.2 10 32 66 8.2
Work-limiting disabled only 127 >30 4 25 72 1.7
DDA-disabled and work-
limiting disabled
131 10 6 27 67 3.6
Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series, 2005-06 to 2007-08.175
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Table 6.5: Net individual incomes, by gender and occupational social class, UK, 2005-06 







Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
Higher managerial and 
professional occupations
578 64 91 98 5.4 9.4
Lower managerial and 
professional occupations
434 49 82 96 7.3 13
Intermediate occupations 314 38 68 90 2.0 3.4
Small employers and own 
account workers
270 11 60 93 3.9 7.6
Lower supervisory and 
technical occupations
334 38 71 90 4.1 5.8
Semi-routine occupations 256 17 57 81 3.6 6.8
Routine occupations 268 19 60 82 4.5
Never worked and long 
term unemployed
67 1 12 47 1.4
Not classiﬁ  ed 182 11 39 78 15 1.5
Women
Higher managerial and 
professional occupations
471 50 85 97 2.5 4.9
Lower managerial and 
professional occupations
345 34 73 91 8.8 17
Intermediate occupations 243 22 54 79 5.7 10
Small employers and own 
account size workers
182 7 39 88 1.4 3.4
Lower supervisory and 
technical occupations
227 21 50 78 1.5
Semi-routine occupations 188 14 41 69 5.9
Routine occupations 157 10 33 63 2.5 10
Never worked and long 
term unemployed
91 1 17 49 3.2 4.1
Not classiﬁ  ed 123 6 24 58 21 2.3
Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series, 2005-06 to 2007-08. An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 6.6: Net individual incomes, by gender and housing tenure, UK, 2005-06 to 







Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
Owned with mortgage 368 6.3 23 76 96 20
Owned outright 260 6.0 19 58 92 15
Private rent 243 11.1 8 54 90 4.9
Social housing – housing 
association
175 7.6 8 37 75 2.8
Social housing – council 169 6.7 8 36 70 4.4
Women
Owned with mortgage 239 11.0 8 53 88 20
Private rent 179 17.3 5 39 79 5.4
Social housing – housing 
association
152 5.7 9 32 67 4.0
Owned outright 152 7.1 8 32 77 18
Social housing – council 143 6.0 7 30 62 5.9
Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series, 2005-06 to 2007-08. 177
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Table 6.7: Net individual incomes, by gender and nation or region, UK, 2005-06 to 







Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
Men
England 290 7.8 16 64 94 34
South East 338 8.1 18 71 96 7.8
Eastern 322 7.2 19 69 95 5.4
London 319 14.1 10 69 97 5.6
South West 295 6.5 18 64 93 4.7
East Midlands 279 6.5 17 62 92 4.4
Yorkshire and the Humber 269 6.7 16 60 91 5.1
West Midlands 262 7.0 15 58 91 5.1
North West and 
Merseyside
260 7.2 15 58 91 6.6
North East 252 7.3 13 56 90 2.5
Scotland 272 7.7 15 60 93 7.4
Wales 252 7.3 14 56 90 2.1
Northern Ireland 250 7.3 14 56 90 3.3
Women
England 180 9.4 7 39 83 38
South East 196 9.9 8 43 86 8.7
London 196 17.8 5 43 90 6.5
Eastern 182 9.1 8 39 83 5.9
North West and 
Merseyside
181 8.2 8 39 80 7.4
South West 178 7.9 8 38 81 5.1
Yorkshire and the Humber 173 7.9 8 37 79 5.7
East Midlands 171 8.7 7 37 79 4.9
North East 170 7.9 8 36 79 2.9
West Midlands 170 8.6 7 36 80 5.7
Scotland 182 7.7 9 39 81 8.6
Northern Ireland 179 8.2 8 38 80 3.8
Wales 171 8.5 7 37 80 2.4
Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series, 2005-06 to 2007-08. An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 6.8: Net individual incomes, by Index of Multiple Deprivation, England, Scotland 







Rank in the distribution Population 
proportion 
(%) 10th Median 90th
England
Highest tenth 288 12.4 11 63 96 11
2nd tenth 268 10.9 11 59 94 10
3rd tenth 255 10.3 11 57 93 10
4th tenth 247 10.5 10 55 92 10
5th tenth 235 9.6 10 52 91 10
6th tenth 229 9.0 10 51 89 10
7th tenth 219 9.1 9 48 88 9.2
8th tenth 206 8.7 9 45 85 10
9th tenth 192 8.8 7 42 81 10
Lowest tenth 170 8.9 6 36 75 10
Wales
Highest tenth 281 11.1 10 62 94 11
2nd tenth 239 10.1 9 53 90 10
3rd tenth 215 7.9 11 47 87 10
4th tenth 208 9.2 9 46 87 11
5th tenth 207 10.0 8 45 87 8.7
6th tenth 199 8.5 8 44 82 9.4
8th tenth 199 7.9 10 44 84 10
7th tenth 190 7.6 8 41 76 8.3
9th tenth 179 7.8 8 38 78 10
Lowest tenth 180 7.3 8 39 73 10
Scotland
Highest tenth 288 12.2 10 63 95 10
2nd tenth 269 10.5 11 60 93 10
3rd tenth 253 9.3 12 56 92 11
5th tenth 234 9.4 10 52 90 10
4th tenth 229 8.2 11 51 88 11
6th tenth 211 7.9 10 47 85 10
7th tenth 206 7.1 11 45 82 10
8th tenth 196 6.9 10 43 80 9.3
9th tenth 184 6.6 10 40 76 10
Lowest tenth 167 6.4 8 35 72 8.9
Source: NEP, based on Individual Income Series, 2005-06 to 2007-08.179
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Chapter 7 Equivalent net income –  
      incomes on a household basis
The main official income distribution statistics in the UK are based on the income of 
the household in which an individual lives, adjusted for household size (see Box 2.5 in 
Chapter 2 for more details of how this ‘equivalent net income’ is calculated). While the 
net individual income described in the last chapter measures the resources available to 
individuals in their own right, and over which they will have strongest control, equivalent 
net income measures the resources available to people on the assumption that they 
are shared equally within the household. In this chapter we examine the equivalent net 
incomes of groups by gender, age, ethnicity, disability status, occupational social class, 
housing tenure, nation and region, and area deprivation. The source is again the Family 
Resources Survey (FRS), so we cannot present breakdowns by religious affiliation or 
sexual orientation. As the equal sharing assumption means that men and women within 
couples are allocated the same income level, we do not present the other breakdowns on 
a gender basis.
 
This ‘equal sharing’ assumption is clearly unrealistic in some cases, although a ‘no sharing’ 
assumption would be even less realistic in many others. Box 7.1 discusses some of the issues 
related to this. We present the analysis on the basis of incomes before deducting housing 
costs (but show the effects of doing so where most relevant). For most of the analysis in 
contrast to the last section, children are included as individuals (with income depending on 
that of the household in which they live). As in the previous chapter, because this information 
was not collected by the survey, we cannot present breakdowns related to religious affiliation 
or sexual orientation. The breakdowns we present by gender, age, and disability relate to 
the position of the individual concerned. For ethnicity, the analysis is by that of individual 
adults (but is not available for children). Social class is that allocated to the household as a 
whole, while tenure, nation and region, and area deprivation are the same for each household 
member.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Box 7.1: Income measurement and assumptions about sharing within the 
household
In this chapter we present information on the ‘equivalent net incomes’ of people 
calculated on the same basis as the main official income distribution statistics, 
produced by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) for its annual Households 
Below Average Income (HBAI) analysis. This measure assumes that resources are 
pooled and equally shared within households. Making an assumption about what 
happens within the household is not needed when analysing wages or earnings (as 
in Chapters 5 and 6) because there is a one-to-one relationship between the income 
earner and income recipient. However, this is no longer true when one moves to the 
household level. Some individuals may not receive any income at all in their own name, 
such as partners who are not in paid employment or dependent children, and yet the 
income of the household as a whole ensures some level of consumption or access to 
resources, through sharing within the household. The problem for analysing income 
distribution is that we do not observe what actually happens within the household, and 
what happens is likely to vary between households.
This chapter follows the practice almost universally employed in current analysis of 
income distribution, assuming that, within each household, incomes are pooled and 
the total is equally shared with each household member. Thus, each individual within 
the same household, whether adult or child, is assumed to receive the same income. 
This allocation rule is likely to be wrong when considering multi-person households. 
Qualitative research on financial management by couples has drawn attention to 
the different allocation systems that couples use and, although not specifically about 
sharing rules, the results suggest there is variation in such arrangements, including 
unequal sharing.103 Other research, based on interviews with poor families, reveals how 
parents, especially mothers, may go without items or activities in order to provide for 
their children.104 Differences in how income is used between parents and children are 
also revealed by analysis of US spending data.105 Subsequent research on economic 
models of family decision-making has continued this tradition of deriving sharing 
rules, developing theoretical models that are fitted to survey data, though focusing on 
allocations between partners to a couple rather than parents and children.106 Although 
progress has been made in this area, it has not yielded recommendations for income 
distribution analysis to employ alongside or instead of the ubiquitous equal-sharing 
rule. 
There are two relatively ad hoc approaches to examining the sensitivity of conclusions 
to this assumption.107 The first is to look, as we do in Chapter 6, at distributions of 
‘individual income’ rather than household income. This shows the income which each 
individual reports receiving from all sources, and hence is in many ways the polar 
opposite case to the equal-sharing one. It will be important, for instance, to the extent 
that actual receipt of an income source indicates control over its allocation. As can be 
103  Pahl (1983). See also the survey-based research of Vogler (1989).
104 Middleton et al. (1997).
105  Lazear and Michael (1986, 1988).
106  See, for instance, the overview by Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992).
107 Jenkins  (1991).181
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seen by comparing the results in this chapter with those in Chapter 6, this approach 
suggests much larger differences in incomes between men and women than seen in 
equivalent net income. 
The issues are not only about sharing within couples and between parents and children. 
A second type of sensitivity analysis allows for unequal sharing within households, 
by instead assuming equal sharing within families. The distinction between families 
and households is that a household also includes individuals at the same address who 
are not part of the nuclear family, such as grandparents, adult children, or unrelated 
lodgers. These are individuals who are likely to have relatively low incomes, and so this 
alternative approach tends to raise the proportion of individuals who are poor and 
increase inequality.108
If everyone lived alone, rather than in households, the discussion in the last chapter shows 
that there would be huge inequalities. But households come in different shapes and sizes, 
bringing both the ability to share where individuals have little income in their own right, 
but also greater responsibilities and needs where they are larger, for instance where there 
are children. The kind of household people live in has important effects on their potential 
standard of living, as measured by equivalent net income. This in turn affects the relative 
positions of groups with different characteristics – older people are more likely to live alone, 
for instance, and women are more likely than men to be lone parents. To provide part of the 
context for the findings in this section, Box 7.2 shows the proportions of kinds of individual 
living in different household types (which can be compared with the information on incomes 
of different types of household shown in Box 2.5 in Chapter 2).
108  See, for instance, Johnson and Webb (1989) who show that the proportion of the population with income 
below half mean income at the time was 11.1 per cent, when sharing within families was assumed, but 8.1 
per cent when equal sharing between households was assumed, even when they contained more than one 
family.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Box 7.2: Household type and other characteristics
Some of the differences in incomes shown in this chapter between people with 
different characteristics are associated with the way in which they are more likely to 
live in particular kinds of household. As we showed in Box 2.5 in Chapter 2, there are 
substantial differences between the incomes of different household types.
Table 7A shows the proportion of each group who were living in different kinds of 
households in 2007-08.
Women are more likely to be in lone parent families than men (7 per cent compared 
to 1 per cent) and more likely to be single pensioners (14 per cent compared with 
5 per cent).
By ethnicity, Asian or Asian British adults are much more likely than others to live in a 
couple, with or without children, and relatively unlikely to be in a lone parent family, as 
are those from the ‘Chinese or other’ group (only 3 per cent).
Differences by socio-economic classification are generally small. However, those 
who have never worked or are not classified are much more likely to be in pensioner 
households.
By tenure, those in social housing are more likely to be in lone parent families and less 
likely to be in a childless couple. Unsurprisingly, outright owners are more likely than 
others to be pensioners.
Table 7A: Individuals within different groups by household type, UK:

















Children * * 76 * 24 *
Men 17 5 24 25 1 28
Women 16 14 23 23 7 17
Age group (17+)
17-25 * * 15 17 7 60
26-45 * * 47 25 7 20
46-65 * * 16 41 7 20
Over 66 55 45 * * * *
Ethnicity (adults)
White British 17 10 22 25 4 22
Mixed 6 3 24 17 11 38
Asian or Asian British 6 4 41 23 3 23
Black or Black British 7 6 26 14 13 34
Chinese or other 8 5 27 28 3 30183




















Not DDA-disabled 10 4 39 20 9 18
DDA-disabled 27 23 14 14 6 17
Socio-economic class 
(adults)
Higher managerial and 
professional
5 1 37 35 2 20
Lower managerial and 
professional
5 1 32 37 4 21
Intermediate 5 2 27 34 5 27
Small employers and 
own account workers 
10 2 35 33 3 18
Lower supervisory and 
technical
5 1 30 35 3 27
Semi-routine 7 2 27 28 7 29
Routine 9 2 26 28 5 32
Never worked and long 
term unemployed 
13 12 21 10 9 34
Not classiﬁ  ed  36 25 10 10 4 17
Housing tenure
Social rented 8 13 26 9 23 21
Private rented 3 4 28 21 12 31
Owned outright 35 17 14 18 2 15
Owned with mortgage 3 1 53 23 6 15
Source: FRS 2007-08.
Note: * Less than 0.5 percent. Percentages may not sum to 100 per cent due to rounding.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Gender
Figure 7.1 and Table 7.1 show, in the same format as before, the spread of incomes on this 
basis in the single year 2007-08 of all individuals in the population, adults by gender, and for 
children.109 Median equivalent net income was £393 overall (in terms of the amount of weekly 
income that would give a couple with no children the same standard of living), with the ratio 
of 4.2 between the cut-offs for the top and bottom tenths already presented in Chapter 2. 
Given the household basis and the equal sharing assumption, gender differences only arise 
from differences between the incomes of single men and women and from the proportions 
of each that are single. They are, therefore, very much smaller than those in earnings or in 
individual incomes. Nonetheless, the median income for women is 7 per cent lower than the 
median for men, corresponding to being 6 places (out of 100) lower in the overall distribution 
than men. The difference arises from the lower incomes of women who live alone than of men 
and the greater likelihood of women to be single parents and older single pensioners. Given 
the comparatively small differences between men and women on this income definition, the 
remaining breakdowns described below are presented for all individuals, rather than split by 
gender as in the previous sections of this chapter.110 As we explore below, median income for 
children – that is, the households in which they live – is lower than for adults as a whole (some 
of whom live in households without children). The second panels of the figure and table show 
the corresponding number for income after housing costs, which are both lower and more 
unequal.
Figure 7.1(a): Equivalent net income (BHC), for men, women and children, UK, 2007-08 (£)
109  For some more detailed breakdowns below, the results are drawn from data averaged over three years. Note: 
while we pool data over three years for other analyses in Chapters 3 to 6, these DWP results are averaged 
over three years.
110  Breakdowns by gender are shown in the Statistical Appendix.





Net weekly income (£)
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.185
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Figure 7.1(b): Equivalent net income (AHC), for men, women and children, UK, 2007-08 (£)
Age
Figure 7.2 shows, for all individuals, the range of equivalent net incomes (before housing 
costs) by each individual’s age group.111 Two things are apparent. There is, as with individual 
incomes, a clear age pattern. Looking at median incomes for each age group, the lowest – 
under £350 – are clearly the medians for the under-16s (in other words, families with children 
are poorer than others) and for people aged over 65. Among those of working age, there 
are two peaks in median income – £477 for those aged 26-30, before family size reaches its 
maximum, and £474 for those in their early fifties, when many children have left home but 
the main decline in earnings with age we showed in Chapter 5 has not started. For those in 
their thirties and forties, equivalent net incomes are lower, reflecting family size, employment 
patterns and low part-time earnings for many mothers.
Second, there is a very large spread in the incomes of each group. However, only 10 per cent 
or fewer in any age group have equivalent net incomes below £200. The combination of the 
social security system and household sharing put an apparent floor to available resources, but 
one that is below the poverty line of 60 per cent of median income that is used in government 
statistics and targets (£236). It is further up the income ranges that the age-related gaps 
appear, with the incomes for those in the top tenth of the age group reaching more than 
£950 per week for those in their early thirties and early fifties. As a result, it can be seen in 
111  Note that the age categories in the available analysis are slightly different from those used in earlier 
chapters.





Net weekly income (£)
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 7.2 that inequality within age groups, as measured by the 90:10 ratio is only around 3 
for those over 70, but over 4 for those of working age, reaching its greatest extent, a ratio of 
5.3, for those in their late fifties.
The result of this pattern can be seen in Table 7.2. Half of children are in households with 
equivalent net incomes in the bottom 40 per cent of the distribution. Half of those over 70 
are in the bottom third of the distribution. To put it another way, those in their late twenties 
to early fifties are typically 25 places higher up the income distribution (before housing 
costs) than those over 70. This difference is, however, smaller for those aged over 60 when 
the comparison is made on the basis of income after housing costs, where the difference 
is reduced to around 15 places.112 Note again, however, that here we are comparing people 
of different ages at the same date; in Chapter 11 we present some analysis relating to the 
incomes of the same individuals as they age.
Figure 7.2: Equivalent net income (BHC), by age, UK, 2007-08 (£)
Ethnicity
The source for these statistics, the FRS, does not have a large enough sample size, even 
using data from the three years up to 2007-08, to make the detailed ethnic breakdowns that 
were possible using data from three years of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) when analysing 
wages and earnings, in Chapter 5 above. Nor does the FRS allocate an ethnicity to children. 
Figure 7.3 and Table 7.3 therefore present the positions for adults in seven ethnic categories, 
112 Detailed  ﬁ  gures on an After Housing Costs (AHC) basis are in the Statistical Appendix. The difference in the 
position of older people on an AHC basis results from the higher relative position of owner-occupiers who 
own outright. See section on housing tenure and Table 7.6 below.
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Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.187
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although we have seen earlier in this chapter that there will be important differences within 
these categories. All the groups have wide ranges of incomes within them, but Indian and 
White adults have the highest median incomes, £417 and £412, respectively. For Black 
Caribbean and Black non-Caribbean adults, the median is around £350, but for Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi adults (taken together), the median is only £238, 60 per cent of the median 
for White adults. 30 per cent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi adults have incomes below £190, 
and half have incomes below £238, very close to the official poverty line. Low equivalent net 
incomes reflect both the low employment rates and earnings we have shown, and for some 
groups, larger household sizes. At the other end of the scale, a tenth of Indian adults and of 
the very varied ‘Chinese and other’ group, have equivalent net incomes above £900 per week.
Income inequality within these ethnic groups is generally similar to, or greater than that 
across the population as a whole, with a 90:10 ratio of 5.4 between Indian adults and 6.4 
for the varied ‘Chinese and mixed’ group, but slightly less than others, 3.6, for Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi adults. The really striking statistic in Table 7.3 is, however, that the median 
income of Pakistani and Bangladeshi adults places them at only the 18th percentile of the 
overall distribution – 35 places (out of 100) behind median White adults.
Figure 7.3: Equivalent net income (BHC), adults by ethnicity, UK, 2005-06 to 2007-08 (£)
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000
Bangladeshi/Pakistani adult
of which: Indian adult
Asian or Asian British
Black non-Caribbean adult
of which: Black Caribbean adult




Net weekly income (£)
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.
Note: Three year average, 2005-06 to 2007-08 (at 2007-08 prices).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Disability
The analysis available to us identifies disability status according to two definitions, disability 
in the terms of the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) and whether people have a limiting 
long-standing illness (but not whether the condition was work-limiting, which we saw in earlier 
sections gives the clearest distinction between groups). The pictures shown by these are very 
similar, so Figure 7.4 shows the spread of incomes between those who are and are not DDA-
disabled, distinguishing between children, those of working age, and pensioners. Within the 
non-disabled population, the spread is as would be expected from the breakdown by age 
in Figure 7.2. All the disabled groups have a median income less than their non-disabled 
equivalents, and much lower when looking at the most affluent tenth of each group. The 
really striking difference is for those of working age: non-disabled people have a median 
equivalent net income of £457 per week, whereas the median for disabled people is £322, 30 
per cent lower. While a tenth of non-disabled working age adults have equivalent net incomes 
of £898 or more, for those who were disabled, the cut-off for the top tenth is £658.
The consequence is that children who are classed as DDA-disabled are typically four places, 
and pensioners who are DDA-disabled, typically six places further down the overall distribution 
than their non-disabled equivalents (Table 7.4).113 For people of working age, the difference 
is 25 places in the overall ranking: while non-disabled adults of working age typically have 
incomes at the 61st percentile, disabled working-age adults are typically at the 36th percentile.
Figure 7.4: Equivalent net income (BHC), by disability status, UK, 2007-08 (£)
113  A pensioner is deﬁ  ned here as a person above State Pension Age, which is currently 65 for men and 60 
for women.
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All of this is, however, looking at incomes which include ‘extra costs’ disability benefits as part 
of income. Box 7.3 presents what happens both to this breakdown and to the breakdown by 
age, if extra costs benefits are excluded from the income measure. As can be seen, disabled 
people emerge as being much further down the distribution than under the official definition 
– typically by around 5 places in the income distribution, and by 10 places for DDA-disabled 
pensioners. Excluding extra costs benefits reduces the equivalent net incomes of disabled 
people by an average of 10 per cent. Doing this implies a poverty rate for disabled people of 
more than 30 per cent, compared to the 25 per cent shown by the official statistics. 
Box 7.3: Household income and disability benefits
We describe the way in which the measure of household income used in this section 
and in the official Households Below Average Income analysis adjusts for household size 
and composition in Box 2.1.
However, there are reasons other than differences in household size and composition 
why the same amount of income may not provide the same standard of living for 
different kinds of household. Differences in disability status are one of the most 
important of these reasons. The income of a household which includes a disabled 
person has to stretch further than the income of a comparable household without a 
disabled member to meet particular needs. As a result, higher income is needed to 
reach the same standard of living in other respects.114
The social security system recognises this through the payment of ‘extra costs’ benefits 
to disabled people. However, when it comes to analysing the position of disabled people 
within the income distribution, these benefits are included within their measured 
income. This is arguably perverse: the benefits are intended to help disabled people 
deal with extra costs, but the income assessment effectively then says that they are 
better off than other people as a result.
There are different ways of dealing with this problem, but in this Box, we show the 
result of the simplest approach, which is to exclude such extra costs benefits from the 
measured incomes of those who receive them.
Figure 7A and Table 7B show what the equivalent net income distributions of various 
groups classified according to disability status look like on this basis. They can be 
compared with Figure 7.4 and Table 7.4 to gauge the scale of the change. The figures in 
brackets in the table repeat the median income and the position of the median within 
the overall distribution for each group before this adjustment was made.
Looking first at the comparison between the equivalent net income of people who are 
or are not DDA-disabled, the main effect is to reduce the median equivalent net income 
for the first group by £34 (or more than 10 per cent), but by only £3 for the second 
group. Looking at particular age groups, the decrease in household income for a DDA-
disabled working age person is from a median equivalent income of £322 (including 
extra costs benefits) to £287 per week (excluding them). Similarly, for a DDA-disabled 
pensioner, median equivalent net income is reduced from £323 to £288.
114  Burchardt and Zaidi (2003).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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The table shows that the overall effect is that people in households containing a 
disabled member are typically placed significantly further down the income distribution 
– at only the 31st percentile, compared to the 36th percentile in the conventional 
analysis. For households containing a DDA-disabled pensioner, the typical ranking is 
reduced from the 41st to the 31st percentile. 
Exclusion of the extra costs benefits also slightly increases the degree of inequality 
within each of the groups considered (as shown by the 90:10 ratios by comparison with 
those shown in Table 7.4), particularly for working age disabled people. 
One result of this is that relative poverty would be measured at a higher level for 
disabled people than in the standard statistics. In Figure 7A, it can be seen that for all 
of the groups containing disabled members, the 30th percentile (the end of the thicker 
bar) comes at or below £231 per week, which is what the poverty line would be (based 
on 60 per cent of overall median income excluding extra costs benefits). In other words, 
for all of the groups containing disabled people, the poverty rate would become over 30 
per cent, compared with 25 per cent in the official analysis.
Figure 7A: Equivalent net incomes (BHC) excluding extra costs disability benefits, by 
disability status and age group, 2007-08
Source: DWP. Estimates are for the UK.191
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Table 7B: Equivalent net income (BHC) excluding extra costs disability benefits, by 







Rank in the overall 
distribution
10th Median* 90th
DDA-disabled 288 (322) 3.7 6 31 (36) 76
not DDA-disabled 411 (414) 4.4 11 54 (53) 91
DDA-disabled child 289 (317) 3.3 7 31 (35) 73
not DDA-disabled child 344 (347) 3.9 10 42 (41) 86
DDA-disabled working-age 287 (322) 4.5 5 31 (36) 81
not DDA-disabled working-age 455 (457) 4.4 13 61 (61) 92
DDA-disabled pensioner 288 (323) 3.0 8 31 (36) 69
not DDA-disabled pensioner 334 (341) 4.1 8 40 (40) 86
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset. Estimates refer to the UK.
Note: * Numbers in parentheses show estimates including extra costs beneﬁ  ts.
Because older people are more likely to receive disability benefits than others, this 
adjustment also affects the measured position of older people. Comparing Table 7C with 
Table 7.2 at the end of the chapter, it can be seen that the largest effects are for people 
aged over 80 – a reduction of £28, or nearly 10 per cent, in their equivalent incomes. For 
all the groups aged over 65, the ranking of typical incomes for the age group is reduced 
by around 3 places (out of 100). An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Rank in the overall distribution
10th Median* 90th
5 or under 336 (339) 4.0 9 41 (40) 86
6 to 10 344 (350) 3.8 11 43 (42) 86
11 to 16 336 (340) 3.8 9 41 (40) 84
17 to 20 363 (367) 3.8 8 46 (45) 83
21 to 25 435 (438) 4.0 12 58 (57) 89
26 to 30 474 (477) 4.2 14 64 (63) 91
31 to 35 458 (460) 4.7 13 61 (61) 94
36 to 40 427 (433) 4.4 12 57 (57) 92
41 to 45 430 (433) 4.3 12 57 (57) 92
46 to 50 451 (454) 4.6 11 60 (60) 92
51 to 55 467 (474) 5.1 10 63 (63) 93
55 to 60 412 (423) 5.7 6 54 (55) 92
61 to 65 358 (372) 4.6 7 45 (46) 88
66 to 70 317 (340) 3.5 10 37 (40) 82
71 to 75 301 (321) 3.2 9 34 (36) 76
76 to 80 293 (317) 3.3 8 32 (35) 75
over 80 283 (311) 3.1 7 30 (34) 68
Source: DWP calculations for National Equality Panel (NEP). Estimates refer to the UK.
Note: * Numbers in parentheses show estimates including extra costs beneﬁ  ts.
Occupational social class
In the previous two chapters, we showed very substantial differences in earnings and 
individual incomes by household occupational social class. These can be both reinforced and 
moderated by household circumstances as well as by the tax system. Looking at all employees 
for earnings and all adults for net individual income,115 the median hourly wage of those in 
higher managerial and professional households is 2.7 times the median for those in routine 
occupation households. For weekly full-time earnings, the corresponding ratio is 2.3, and for 
individual income, 2.4. As Figure 7.5 shows, for the distribution of equivalent net income, the 
ratio is somewhat smaller, but still 1.8 times – a median of £685 per week compared to £378 
per week. The spread within each occupational social class group is substantial – more so, 
in fact, than for gross weekly earnings (partly because the population covered here includes 
those who have retired or are not currently working). The 90:10 ratio within the top group 
is 4.1, for instance, compared to 3.4 in weekly earnings for employees. The equivalent net 
115  Using the source data (shown in the Statistical Appendix) for the most recent three year periods in each 
case.193
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income of the best-off tenth within the top group exceeds £1,400 per week. Again, the widest 
spread, at 6.2, is for the group including self-employed households, with a tenth of them 
having an equivalent net income less than £138, but a tenth having above £862.
However, it is those in households who are classed as never having worked/long-term 
unemployed who are the poorest group, with half of them in the bottom fifth of the overall 
income distribution (Table 7.5). By contrast, 70 per cent of adults in the top occupational 
group are in the top 30 per cent overall; 30 per cent of them in the top 8 per cent overall.
Figure 7.5: Equivalent net income (BHC), by occupational social class, UK, 2007-08 (£)
Housing tenure
When comparing equivalent net income by housing tenure, the patterns shown for incomes 
before and after deducting housing costs (BHC and AHC) differ. For some purposes, it is 
the former which matters, as deducting one of the major elements of people’s chosen 
consumption can give a false impression of relative resources. However, looking at incomes 
before housing costs can give a misleading impression of the position of owner-occupiers 
who own their property outright, in particular – most of their housing consumption comes 
as a return ‘in kind’ from being able to live in the property which they own rent-free, but 
this ‘imputed rent’ is not included in their income as measured here.116 After housing costs 
income may be a better guide to the relative position of this group. Figures 7.6 (a) and (b) 
show the effect of this difference in definitions. Overall, income measured on an after housing 
costs basis is more unequal than that before housing costs, reflecting the way in which 
116  For discussion of the issues involved in principle, see Hills (1991). For recent calculations of this kind, see 
Mullan, Sutherland and Zantomio (2007).
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Source: DWP, based on HBAI.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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housing costs tend to vary less than people’s incomes (Table 7.1). However the comparison 
is made, social tenants have by far the lowest incomes. On a before housing costs basis, 
median equivalent income for social tenants is around £270, and for outright owners £379, 
and for mortgagors £476. On an after housing costs basis, the figures are £204, £369 and 
£388 respectively. A third of social tenants have equivalent net incomes of £230 or less 
before housing costs, that is, below the official poverty line. As with other income measures, 
the spread is widest within the private rented sector – a tenth of those living in it having 
equivalent net incomes (AHC) below around £80, but a tenth above £582.
Table 7.6 shows that, in the overall distribution, the median income for social tenants is 22-33 
places below the median for outright owners and 37-38 places below the median mortgagors, 
depending on whether before or after housing costs. Only about a fifth of social tenants are 
in top half of the overall income distribution on either definition. 
Figure 7.6(a): Equivalent net income (BHC), by housing tenure, UK, 2007-08 (£)





Net weekly income (£)
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.195
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Figure 7.6(b): Equivalent net income (AHC), by housing tenure, UK, 2007-08 (£)
Nation and region
Figure 7.7 and Table 7.7 show that of the four nations, England has the highest median 
income before housing costs, ten per cent higher than the medians for Wales and Northern 
Ireland. Note, however, that allowing for cost of living differences (of the kind shown in Box 
5.1) would remove most of those differences. Income inequality, as measured by the 90:10 
ratio, is also significantly greater in England than in the other nations. Within England, London 
is by far the most unequal region, with a 90:10 ratio of 5.6 on a before housing costs basis, 
compared to the UK ratio of 4.2. This reflects the way in which the highest incomes in London 
are much higher than in all the other regions apart from the South East, but the lowest 
incomes in London are little different from elsewhere. As a corollary, this implies that allowing 
for cost of living differences would narrow, but not eliminate, differences between those with 
the highest incomes in each region. However, those with the lowest incomes in London would 
be shown as poorer than those with low incomes in other regions.
Incomes measured after housing costs are more unequal both overall and within nations 
and regions. However, the gaps in median incomes between the nations and regions are 
somewhat smaller on the after housing costs basis.





Net weekly income (£)
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 7.7(a): Equivalent net income (BHC), by nation or region, UK, 2006-2008 (£)
Figure 7.7(b): Equivalent net income (AHC), by nation or region, UK, 2007-08 (£)
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Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.














Net weekly income (£)
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.197
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Area deprivation
Finally, Figure 7.8 and Table 7.8 show (for England only) the differences in equivalent income 
levels (before and after housing costs) between people living in areas with different levels of 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) scores and the spread of incomes within such areas. As 
with educational results, employment, earnings and individual incomes, there is a very strong 
gradient by area deprivation.117 Looking at the results before deducting housing costs, the 
median income for the most deprived tenth of areas is only £281, compared with £396 for 
England as a whole, and £533 in the least deprived tenth of areas. After allowing for housing 
costs, the gradient is, if anything, even steeper, with median incomes in the least deprived 
areas twice those in the most deprived ones.
While more than 70 per cent of those living in the least deprived areas are in the top half of 
the distribution overall, more than 70 per cent of those living in the most deprived areas are in 
the bottom half. The median income for people in the most deprived tenth of areas is 42-44 
places out of 100 lower down the income distribution than the median income for the least 
deprived areas (depending on whether measured before or after housing costs).
There are differences between areas of all kinds, not just between the most disadvantaged 
areas and others. However, there is also substantial inequality in incomes within each kind 
of area, as well as between them. In most cases, as measured by the 90:10 ratio, incomes 
are almost as unequally distributed within each kind of area as they are within England as 
a whole. In the most disadvantaged areas, there is somewhat less inequality, reflecting, in 
particular, the relatively low incomes for the best-off households within them. 
117  While acknowledging the circularity from the fact that the proportion of the local population receiving 
beneﬁ  ts such as Income Support or tax credits are part of the income domain of the IMD, the gradient is still 
very strong.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
198
Figure 7.8(a): Equivalent net income (BHC), by area deprivation, England, 2006-2008 (£)
Figure 7.8(b): Equivalent net income (AHC), by area deprivation, England, 2007-08 (£)











Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.











Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.199
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Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
Before Housing Costs 
(BHC)
Overall 393 4.2 10 50 90
Men 423 4.4 10 55 91
Women 393 4.2 9 49 90
Child 344 3.8 9 40 85
After Housing Costs 
(AHC)
Overall 332 5.2 10 50 90
Men 361 5.4 10 55 91
Women 337 5.1 10 51 90
Child 276 4.8 8 38 84
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
26 to 30 477 4.1 13 63 91
51 to 55 474 4.8 11 63 93
31 to 35 460 4.5 13 61 93
46 to 50 454 4.3 12 60 92
21 to 25 438 3.9 11 57 88
36 to 40 433 4.4 12 57 92
41 to 45 433 4.2 12 57 91
55 to 60 423 5.3 6 55 92
61 to 65 372 4.4 8 46 88
17 to 20 367 3.7 8 45 83
6 to 10 350 3.8 10 42 86
11 to 16 340 3.7 9 40 84
66 to 70 340 3.4 10 40 82
5 or under 339 3.9 8 40 86
71 to 75 321 3.1 9 36 76
76 to 80 317 3.2 9 35 77
over 80 311 3.1 7 34 71
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.201
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Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
White 412 4.1 11 53 90
Chinese or other 383 6.4 4 48 92
Mixed 374 5.0 6 46 90
Black or Black British 353 4.1 7 42 85
of which: Black Caribbean  356 4.0 7 43 84
Black non-Caribbean  349 4.1 7 42 85
Asian or Asian British 330 5.1 5 38 88
of which: Indian  417 5.4 7 54 93
Bangladeshi/Pakistani 238 3.6 4 18 65
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.
Note: Three year average, 2005-06 to 2007-08, at 2007-08 prices.








Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
Not DDA-disabled 414 4.3 10 53 91
DDA-disabled 322 3.4 7 36 78
Not DDA-disabled child
347 3.8 9 41 86
DDA-disabled child 317 3.2 8 35 76
Not DDA-disabled working-age 
adult
457 4.3 13 61 92
DDA-disabled working-age adult 322 4.1 6 36 82
Not DDA-disabled pensioner
341 4.0 8 40 86
DDA-disabled pensioner 323 2.9 9 36 72
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
Higher managerial and 
professional occupations
685 4.1 42 84 97
Lower managerial and 
professional occupations
569 3.3 33 75 94
Intermediate occupations 477 2.9 26 63 89
Small employers and own 
account workers
387 6.2 4 49 91
Lower supervisory and technical 
occupations
447 2.8 23 59 86
Semi-routine occupations 391 3.1 13 49 81
Routine occupations 378 3.2 11 47 80
Never worked and long term 
unemployed
248 3.6 4 20 63
Not classiﬁ  ed 311 3.6 7 34 78
Child 344 3.8 9 41 85
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.







Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
BHC
Owned with mortgage 476 3.8 19 63 92
Owned outright 379 4.6 7 47 89
Private rented 355 4.0 8 43 86
Social rented 270 2.7 7 25 59
AHC
Owned with mortgage 388 4.5 16 60 91
Owned outright 369 4.7 15 56 92
Private rented 250 7.3 4 33 83
Social rented 204 3.6 6 23 59
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.203
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Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
BHC
England 396 4.2 10 50 90
South East 457 4.5 13 61 91
London 441 5.6 9 58 84
Eastern 420 4.0 13 54 86
South West 396 3.8 11 50 95
East Midlands 369 3.8 9 45 83
Yorkshire and the Humber 366 3.7 9 45 88
North West and Merseyside 365 3.8 9 45 85
West Midlands 361 3.9 8 44 93
North East 352 3.6 10 42 85
Scotland 388 3.8 11 49 87
Wales 356 3.8 8 43 84
Northern Ireland 360 3.6 9 44 83
AHC
England 331 5.3 10 49 90
South East 377 5.7 11 58 93
Eastern 351 5.0 12 53 91
London 351 8.4 6 53 94
South West 332 4.7 11 50 88
East Midlands 317 4.6 10 47 86
North West and Merseyside 311 4.8 9 46 86
Yorkshire and the Humber 311 4.3 11 46 85
North East 304 4.2 11 44 84
West Midlands 304 4.6 9 44 85
Scotland 336 4.6 12 50 88
Wales 309 4.6 9 45 85
Northern Ireland 312 4.0 13 46 85
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
BHC
Lowest tenth 281 3.3 6 27 72
9th tenth 328 3.6 7 37 81
8th tenth 346 3.7 8 41 84
7th tenth 392 4.0 9 49 88
6th tenth 397 4.1 11 50 90
5th tenth 422 4.0 11 55 89
4th tenth 429 4.1 12 56 91
3rd tenth 450 4.1 14 59 92
2nd tenth 473 4.2 15 63 93
Highest tenth 533 4.5 21 71 95
AHC
Highest tenth 222 4.4 6 27 73
2nd tenth 267 4.8 7 36 80
3rd tenth 285 4.9 8 40 83
5th tenth 318 5.3 8 47 87
4th tenth 331 5.2 10 49 90
6th tenth 356 4.8 12 54 90
7th tenth 367 5.1 12 56 91
8th tenth 378 5.2 12 58 92
9th tenth 409 5.0 16 63 93
Lowest tenth 449 5.2 20 69 95
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset.205




Wealth is, as we described in Chapter 2, distributed far more unequally than the other 
outcomes we have looked at. In this chapter, we look at the distribution of wealth in 
Great Britain using information from the new Office for National Statistics (ONS) Wealth 
and Assets Survey (WAS) (using data for June 2006 to June 2008). This survey allows 
us to look at the distribution of wealth between households by age, disability status, 
occupational social class, nation and region, and by area deprivation. We can also 
compare median wealth by ethnicity and religious affiliation, but not the distribution of 
wealth within those groups. As wealth is calculated here on a household basis and there 
is no obvious way of ascribing it between individuals, we do not include a breakdown by 
gender.118
Figure 8.1 summarises the range of household wealth on three definitions, including a 
progressively wider range of assets. Under all three definitions, the least wealthy tenth of 
households have less than £9,000. Median wealth rises from £42,000 when looking at net 
financial and property wealth, to £145,000 when houses (net of mortgages) are included, and 
£205,000 when private pension rights are included. The 90th percentile rises from £177,000 
under the narrowest definition to £491,000 including houses, and £853,000 including private 
pension rights.
118  Banks and Tetlow (2009) provide parallel analysis drawing on wealth estimates for the population aged 50 
or more from the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing for 2002. As well as the breakdowns analysed here 
for the whole population, they present ﬁ  gures by family type, date left education, equivalent income, self-
reported health and type of area (urban or rural).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 8.1: Distribution of wealth between households by wealth definition, GB, 2006-08 (£)
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Source: ONS from WAS.207
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Age
One of the reasons for wealth inequality when looked at in this way is that people save and 
accumulate assets across the life cycle. Pension rights, in particular, are built up through 
people’s working lives, and then decline through retirement, as do some other forms of saving. 
However, even looking within particular age groups there are wide differences between 
households, shown for total wealth in Figure 8.2 (with detailed numbers for this and for the 
other two, narrower, definitions in Table 8.1). This confirms that there is indeed a strong 
pattern of life cycle wealth accumulation. Median total wealth for those with a ‘household 
reference person’ aged 25-34 is £66,000, rising to £416,000 for those aged 55-64, but falling 
to £172,000 for the oldest group (where pension rights, in particular, are for obvious reasons 
much smaller). We discuss in Chapter 11 the extent to which this difference of £350,000 
over an age difference of just thirty years is likely to reflect just life-cycle saving, or other 
differences, including the timing of house price increases, between more and less fortunate 
cohorts. As can be seen from the table, only 10 per cent of households aged 25-34 are in the 
top half of the distribution overall, while just under 70 per cent of those aged 55-64 are in the 
top half. However, there remains considerable inequality at every age. Among people aged 
55-64, that is, who are nearing or have reached retirement, a tenth of households still have 
wealth of less than £28,000, but a tenth have more than £1.3 million.
Figure 8.2: Total wealth, by age, GB, 2006-08 (£)
Source: ONS from WAS. Age is of ‘household reference person’.
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Ethnicity and religious afﬁ  liation
The numbers in the sample are not large enough to give a very detailed breakdown of wealth 
by ethnicity (of the household reference person) or of the spread within each ethnic group. 
However, there are considerable differences in median total wealth between ethnic groups, 
part of which will reflect differences in age structure:
  ❍ For White British households, median total wealth is £221,000.
  ❍ For Indian households it is £204,000.
  ❍ For Pakistani households it is £97,000.
  ❍ For other Asian Households it is £50,000.
  ❍ For Black Caribbean households it is £76,000.
  ❍ For Black African households it is £21,000.
  ❍ For Bangladeshi households it is £15,000
Sample numbers are also too small to give much detail of differences by religious affiliation 
of household reference person, but again there are considerable differences in median total 
wealth between groups:
  ❍ For households with a Jewish household reference person it is £422,000.
  ❍ For Sikh households it is £229,000.
  ❍ For Christian households it is £223,000.
  ❍ For Hindu households it is £206,000.
  ❍ For Muslim households it is £42,000.
  ❍ For those with any other religion it is £161,000.
  ❍ For those with no religious afﬁ  liation it is £138,000.209
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Disability
While Figure 8.3 confirms that the 38 per cent of households with a member with a disability 
or long-standing illness have lower wealth than other households, the difference is not as 
large as some of those we have seen for other outcomes. This results from the way in which 
both prevalence of disability and wealth at a household level itself tend to rise with age. 
Median total wealth for households with a disabled member is £198,000, compared to 
£210,000 for others. For each group there is again a considerable range – indeed the 90:10 
ratio for each remains close to the figure of 97 we saw for all households – and those with a 
disabled member are spread fairly evenly through the overall distribution (Table 8.2).
Figure 8.3: Total wealth, by disability status, GB, 2006-08 (£)
Source: ONS from WAS. 
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Occupational social class
The differences in wealth between occupational social classes are, however, very large indeed. 
While median total wealth for households classed as in routine occupations is £74,000, for 
those in the top two categories, it is more than £450,000 (Figure 8.4 and Table 8.3). The 
wealthiest tenth of the top two groups have total household wealth of more than £1.4 million, 
although even these groups contain some households with wealth of under £100,000. Part of 
this variation reflects age differences and life-cycle saving. In Chapter 11, we look specifically 
at wealth for those aged 55-64 by social class to shed light on wealth accumulation by the 
end of people’s working careers. 
Figure 8.4: Total wealth, by occupational social class, GB, 2006-08 (£)
Source: ONS from WAS.
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Nation and region
Figure 8.5 shows that there are considerable wealth differences between nations and regions. 
Wealth both at the median and for the top tenth are considerably higher in England and 
Wales than in Scotland. Within England, the wealthiest region is the South East, with median 
total household wealth of £288,000, 1.7 times that in the North West. The variation between 
least and most wealthy in London is particularly striking. Much of this reflects house price 
variations, of course. Table 8.4 shows the breakdown for financial and (non-housing) physical 
wealth as well as that for total wealth. For the former, there is little difference in median 
wealth between England, Scotland and Wales, while median wealth is £36,000 in the North 
West compared with £54,000 in the South East of England.
Figure 8.5: Total wealth, by nation and region, GB, 2006-08 (£)
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Source: ONS from WAS.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Housing tenure
Given the importance of housing assets within total wealth, it is hardly surprising that there 
are large variations between tenures. But Figure 8.6 and Table 8.5 show that there are equally 
large variations in other forms of wealth which reinforce this. Social tenant households 
have median financial and non-property wealth of £15,000, which is unchanged allowing 
for housing, as one would expect, and rises only to £18,000 including non-state pension 
rights. By contrast, households owning their house outright have median financial and (non-
housing) physical wealth of £75,000, rising to £285,000 including housing, and £411,000 
including private pension rights. A tenth of outright owners have total wealth of more than 
£1.23 million, while the 90th percentile for social tenants is only £105,000 (including non-state 
pension rights).
Figure 8.6: Total wealth, by housing tenure, GB, 2006-08 (£)
Source: ONS from WAS. 
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Area deprivation
Figure 8.7 shows how total wealth varies between and within areas in England classified 
by area deprivation.119 Even more starkly than for the other outcomes we have examined, 
there are very large differences between the different kinds of area. Median total wealth for 
households in the most deprived tenth of areas is £34,000; in the least deprived areas, it is 
£481,000, fourteen times as much. Half of households in the least deprived areas have total 
wealth in the top quarter overall, and a tenth of them have more than £1.4 million. In the most 
deprived tenth of areas, just under 90 per cent of households are in the bottom half within 
England (with less than £265,000). As Table 8.6 shows, this is not just because those living in 
the most deprived areas are tenants and so have no property wealth. Median financial and 
physical (non-housing) wealth for those in the most deprived areas is £15,000, compared with 
£84,000 in the least deprived ones. Private pension rights add only £10,000 to the median for 
those in the most deprived areas, but £173,000 for those in the least deprived areas.
The table shows that on all three wealth definitions, the median wealth in the least deprived 
tenth of areas is 50 or more places out of 100 higher in the overall distribution than in 
the most deprived areas. Comparing those at the 90th percentile in each kind of area, the 
differences in their places in the overall distribution is almost as large. Measured by the 90:10 
ratio, there is less wealth inequality within the least deprived areas. This is because almost all 
households in the least deprived areas have assets of some kind, whereas in deprived areas, 
the least wealthy have virtually no wealth.
Figure 8.7: Total wealth, by area deprivation, GB, 2006-08 (£)
119  Sample numbers are too small to give reliable results for this kind of breakdown in Scotland or Wales.
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Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
Total wealth
55-64 416,100 48 19 72 95
65-74 306,000 37 18 62 91
45-54 287,800 68 13 60 92
75-84 225,200 46 13 52 85
35-44 174,900 77 9 45 83
85+ 171,800 47 11 45 78
25-34 65,900 80 5 28 59
16-24 12,900 46 2 12 32
Overall 204,500 97 10 50 90
Financial, physical 
and property wealth
55-64 243,300 43 17 68 94
65-74 213,200 39 17 63 93
45-54 184,200 59 12 58 92
75-84 182,700 49 13 57 90
85+ 156,300 55 11 52 87
35-44 120,000 59 9 45 85
25-34 48,200 78 4 30 60
16-24 11,700 42 2 14 35
Overall 145,400 66 10 50 90
Financial and 
physical wealth
55-64 66,400 25 16 65 94
65-74 55,100 22 16 59 92
45-54 52,000 28 11 57 91
75-84 43,000 24 13 50 91
35-44 40,200 29 9 48 86
85+ 32,800 16 13 41 83
25-34 25,000 32 5 33 72
16-24 10,500 26 3 17 48
Overall 42,300 30 10 50 90
Source: ONS from Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) 2006-2008. Age is that of ‘household reference 
person’.215
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Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
Disability/long standing illness in 
household
198,200 104 9 49 88
No disability/long standing illness in 
household
209,900 84 10 50 90
Source: ONS from WAS 2006-2008.






Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
Large employers and higher 
managerial 
532,500 16 35 79 97
Higher professional  450,500 25 27 74 96
Lower managerial and professional 325,000 31 21 64 93
Small employers and own account 
workers
236,600 37 17 54 88
Intermediate occupations 200,400 44 14 49 85
Lower supervisory and technical 161,100 60 10 43 79
Semi-routine occupations 86,700 88 6 32 72
Routine occupations 74,000 92 5 30 68
Never worked/long-term 
unemployed
15,000 117 3 13 59
Source: ONS from WAS 2006-2008.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
Total wealth
England 210,600 96 10 50 90
South East 287,900 73 14 60 93
South West 277,700 62 12 59 90
East of England 241,300 61 13 54 91
East Midlands 213,700 60 12 51 88
West Midlands 187,700 82 10 47 87
London 173,400 273 5 45 91
Yorkshire and the Humber 172,700 73 10 45 86
North East 169,500 89 9 44 86
North West 168,200 98 9 44 87
Wales 150,600 93 8 42 86
Scotland 205,500 89 9 50 87
Financial and physical wealth
England 43,100 30 10 50 90
South East 53,600 31 13 58 93
South West 50,900 28 11 56 91
East of England 50,500 23 13 56 90
East Midlands 46,100 23 12 53 90
West Midlands 41,200 26 9 49 87
Yorkshire and the Humber 40,800 20 11 48 86
North East 37,600 29 9 46 86
North West 35,600 30 9 44 87
London 33,700 75 5 42 91
Scotland 39,100 29 9 47 87
Wales 35,900 23 9 44 85
Source: ONS from WAS 2006-2008.217
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Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
Total wealth
Own main residence outright 410,600 7 44 71 95
Buying with mortgage/loan 269,700 12 30 58 90
Privately renting 24,600 86 3 18 51
Social tenant 17,500 42 3 15 35
Financial, physical and 
property wealth
Own main residence outright 284,700 5 48 74 95
Buying with mortgage/loan 176,000 9 32 56 89
Privately renting 16,200 52 3 18 40
Social tenant 14,700 19 4 16 30
Financial and physical wealth
Own main residence outright 74,600 14 28 69 95
Buying with mortgage/loan 53,600 12 20 58 89
Privately renting 15,400 40 3 23 68
Social tenant 14,690 19 5 21 53
Source: ONS from WAS 2006-2008.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Rank in the distribution
10th Median 90th
Total wealth
Highest tenth 481,400 19 29 76 96
2nd tenth 394,800 23 26 70 94
3rd tenth 326,800 31 22 64 94
4th tenth 314,200 38 18 63 92
5th tenth 279,400 54 15 59 90
6th tenth 221,800 52 13 52 88
7th tenth 159,000 86 7 43 81
8th tenth 122,400 71 7 37 78
9th tenth 62,300 112 5 28 68
Lowest tenth 33,600 104 3 21 57
Financial, physical and property 
wealth
Highest tenth 308,500 19 28 77 95
2nd tenth 259,800 20 26 71 95
3rd tenth 232,400 32 20 67 94
4th tenth 221,200 37 17 65 92
5th tenth 192,300 41 14 59 90
6th tenth 157,900 50 12 52 88
7th tenth 113,600 72 7 43 81
8th tenth 85,000 54 8 38 76
9th tenth 42,800 78 5 29 65
Lowest tenth 23,700 69 4 21 55
Financial and physical wealth
Highest tenth 84,400 18 26 73 95
2nd tenth 71,600 17 25 68 95
3rd tenth 62,500 17 20 63 93
4th tenth 59,000 23 15 61 92
5th tenth 52,900 24 13 57 90
6th tenth 43,300 21 13 50 88
7th tenth 35,000 35 8 43 85
8th tenth 29,600 27 8 38 80
9th tenth 23,100 30 5 31 71
Lowest tenth 15,200 27 5 22 66
Source: ONS from WAS 2006-2008.219
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Chapter 9 The position of different groups –  
      a cross-cutting summary
The previous six chapters presented analyses of the position of different groups within 
the eight economic outcomes we have investigated in turn. This chapter summarises 
that information, taking a cross-cutting approach. We now focus, in turn, on each of 
the dimensions such as gender, age and so on (which were used to define the different 
groups), bringing together the findings about the various outcomes. We look at ethnicity 
and religious affiliation together, as their overlapping effect can be important in the 
labour market. The chapter also contains some more contextual information drawn from 
studies that have related the outcomes for particular groups to other characteristics and 
from other evidence submitted to us. Its final section provides a further level of summary, 
with tables bringing the findings together side-by-side.
9.1  Gender
Gender differences in outcomes run through the statistics we presented in the previous six 
chapters, and differences between other kinds of group are often distinct between men and 
women. As Katherine Rake, then from the Fawcett Society, put it to us, most inequalities need 
to be seen through a ‘gender lens’. Nor are men and women in monolithic groups. Given this, 
we highlight gender differences in each of the sections that follow rather than just in this 
section. We summarise immediately below some of these findings relating to differences by 
gender alone or by gender and age. The wealth data we are using are not broken down by 
gender.
  ❍ Girls outperform boys throughout the distribution of educational achievement at age 
16 (Key Stage 4) in each nation. Girls are typically ranked between 8 (in Scotland) and 
12 (in the other nations) places higher up the ranking (out of 100) of results at age 
16 than boys. The gender gaps are somewhat smaller between the highest and lowest 
achievers.
  ❍ Looking at the highest qualifications of the adult population as a whole, women are 
less likely than men to have A levels or higher qualifications. However, this is largely the 
result of lower levels of qualifications for older women, with little gender difference for 
those under 30. For those in their late fifties, 59 per cent of men, but only 36 per cent of 
women have A level qualifications or higher; 39 per cent of women, but only 26 per cent 
of men have no qualifications above Level 1. For those in their late twenties, 58 per cent 
of men and 59 per cent of women have A levels or higher, and fewer than 20 per cent of 
men or women have no qualifications above Level 1.
  ❍ Employment patterns differ considerably by gender. More than 85 per cent of men 
from their late twenties to early fifties are in paid work, mostly full-time. For women 
of the same ages, around 70 per cent are in paid work, but with more than 30 per 
cent in part-time employment in their late thirties. Overall, only 39 per cent of women 
compared with 59 per cent of men are employed full-time. 26 per cent of women but 
only 6 per cent of men are employed part-time. An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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  ❍ The median hourly wage for women, £8.90, is 21 per cent less than the median for 
men. Nearly three-ﬁ  fths of men are in the top half of the hourly wage distribution, while 
nearly three-ﬁ  fths of women are in the bottom half. Looking at median wages by age 
group, men’s wages are highest in their early forties (£13.40 per hour), but women’s 
are highest in their early thirties (£10.40 per hour). For those in their early ﬁ  fties, the 
median wage for women is 21 places lower down than the overall distribution than the 
median for men (at the 45th percentile of the overall distribution, compared to the 66th 
percentile for men). The minimum wage is a key determinant of the wages of the worst 
paid tenth of women in most age groups.
  ❍ Among men working full-time, median weekly earnings are £494 per week, compared 
to a median of £386 for women, 22 per cent less (with part of the difference reﬂ  ecting 
women’s shorter working hours, even if working full-time). The size of the pay gap 
between men and women varies considerably by age – 6-7 per cent in the twenties 
but as high as 28 per cent in their early forties. The gender gap in pay is accompanied 
by inequality within the distributions that is as great for men, and nearly as great for 
women, looked at separately, as it is for all full-time workers together. 
  ❍ Net individual incomes are distributed across all adults much more unequally than 
earnings are across those in employment, with considerable differences both between 
men and women and within the distribution for each gender. The median female 
individual net income, £180 per week, is less than two-thirds of the median for men, 
£281 per week.
  ❍ Gender inequalities are largely masked when incomes are measured on a household 
basis. Given the household basis and the equal sharing assumption, gender differences 
in equivalent net incomes are very much smaller than those in earnings or in individual 
incomes. Nonetheless, the median equivalent net income for women is 7 per cent lower 
than the median for men, and the median for women is 6 places (out of 100) lower in 
the overall distribution than men.
What is striking from these summaries is the extent to which younger women now have 
qualifications equal to, or higher than, those of men, but continue to be disadvantaged in 
the labour market. Box 9.3 looks at analysis of differences in the pay of men and women 
from different ethno-religious groups – ‘pay penalties’ – that persist even after allowing for 
differences in qualifications and other characteristics. One notable conclusion from this work 
is that women from nearly all ethno-religious groups are paid less than the least well paid 
group of men, controlling for other factors.
As we explained in Chapter 1, the national surveys on which the analysis in Chapters 3 to 8 
is based do not contain information on the position of the trans population. Box 9.1 gives a 
summary of some of the information available from other sources.221
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Box 9.1: Evidence on the circumstances of the trans population
There are no official estimates of the size of the trans population, as none of the 
existing household surveys or main administrative sources asks about transgender 
status. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) has recently published a position 
paper on data relating to this group, in response to a recommendation from the 2007 
Equalities Review.120 The ONS paper summarises available population estimates, 
pointing to the inconsistencies in them. For instance, the Home Office, based on 
research from the Netherlands and Scotland, estimated in 2000 that there were 
between 1,300 and 2,000 male to female and between 200 and 450 female to male 
transsexual people in the UK.121 More recently, Gender Identity Research and Education 
Society122 suggests that there are 6,200 people who have transitioned to a new 
gender role via medical intervention and approximately 2,335 full Gender Recognition 
Certificates have been issued to February 2009. However, the group, Press for Change, 
estimates that there are around 5,000 post-operative transsexual people. The figures 
are more diverse when looking at the wider ‘trans community’ in the UK.123
There are several pieces of qualitative and quantitative evidence that give indications 
of the economic status of trans people. A survey by the Scottish Transgender 
Alliance survey found that 55 per cent of survey respondents had an HND/degree 
or postgraduate degree but only 30 per cent had a gross annual income of over 
£20,000, while 48 per cent had a gross annual income of under £10,000. 37 per cent 
of respondents stated that they were disabled. There was a high unemployment rate 
among the survey respondents, with 37 per cent receiving out of work benefits. There 
was also a high reported self-employment rate, at 20 per cent.124 This may be because 
some members of the trans community avoid situations where they do not have 
control over their work environment and the people with whom they have day-to-day 
contact.125
An online survey found that the proportion of people from the trans community 
in higher occupational classes was above the UK national average. However, the 
workplace afforded a poor experience for many respondents. 42 per cent of those not 
living permanently in their preferred gender role were prevented from doing so because 
they feared it might threaten their employment status. As a consequence, one-quarter 
of trans people said they had felt obliged to change their jobs because of harassment 
and bullying. 38 per cent had experienced harassment at the time of gender transition 
and 25 per cent had experienced it at work for a period after transition. Some reported 
experiencing verbal abuse (23 per cent) and physical abuse (6 per cent).126
120 ONS  (2009b).
121 Home  Ofﬁ  ce (2000).
122 GIRES  (2008).
123  According to ONS (2009), “the term trans is an umbrella term referring to individuals whose gender identity 
or gender expression falls outside of the stereotypical gender norms”. Estimates of its size range from 65,000 
(Johnson, 2001, p.7) to 300,000 (GIRES, 2008).
124 Morton  (2008).
125  Mitchell and Howarth (2009).
126  Whittle, Turner and Al-Alami (2007).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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The group A:gender argues that members of the trans community are consistently 
found working at levels well below their capability.127 They suggest that this is unlikely 
to be explained by interruption to careers to undergo gender reassignment, as any 
consequent workplace absence is likely to have been short. Instead, they suggest that 
more plausible explanations might include changing job (voluntarily or forced), which 
may make it hard to obtaining a post at the same level, or indeed at all. 
9.2 Age
Differences by age and gender in qualifications, wages, earnings and individual incomes 
are summarised above. We look at incomes and wealth on a household basis. Key findings 
include:
  ❍ Looking at the median equivalent net income for each age group, the lowest – under 
£350 – is for the under-16s (that is, households containing children), and those over 65. 
The median incomes for those of working age have two peaks – at £477 for those aged 
26-30 and at £474 for those in their early ﬁ  fties. There are very large spreads in the 
incomes of each age group. Inequality within age groups is highest for those in their 
late ﬁ  fties.
  ❍ There is a strong life cycle pattern in total household wealth. Median total wealth is 
£66,000 for households with a ‘reference person’ aged 25-34, rising to £416,000 for 
those aged 55-64, falling to £172,000 for those over 85. However, there is considerable 
inequality at every age. By age 55-64, a tenth of households have total wealth of under 
£28,000, but a tenth have more than £1.3 million.
In Chapter 11, we look in detail at how educational outcomes develop across the life cycle, 
mostly using information from longitudinal surveys that have followed the same people as 
they become older.
9.3  Ethnicity and religion
  ❍ In terms of educational achievement at 16 in England, Indian and Chinese boys and 
girls have median rankings well above the national median. A tenth of Chinese boys are 
ranked in the top 3 per cent overall, and a tenth of Chinese girls in the top 1 per cent. 
The median rankings for each of Pakistani, Black African and Black Caribbean boys are 
well below the national median. Rankings for results of boys and girls with Irish Traveller 
or Gypsy/Romany backgrounds are exceptionally low. In Chapter 11, we look at the way 
these differences develop over the school years. Ethnic differences in achievement at 16 
appear to be smaller in Scotland and Wales than in England.
127 A:gender  (2007).223
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  ❍ There are considerable ethnic differences in highest qualiﬁ  cation for both men and 
women. More than 40 per cent of Bangladeshi and Pakistani men and women have no 
qualiﬁ  cations above Level 1. Just under a ﬁ  fth of White British men and women have 
ﬁ  rst or higher degrees, but around 30 per cent of Black African and Indian men, and 
around 40 per cent of Chinese men and women. The higher qualiﬁ  cation levels of Black 
African adults contrast with the below-average attainment of Black African children. 
These differences are linked to substantial differences by religious afﬁ  liation: more than 
a third of Buddhist and Hindu men and of Jewish men and women have ﬁ  rst or higher 
degrees; more than 40 per cent of Muslim men and women have no qualiﬁ  cation above 
Level 1.
  ❍ The largest differences in employment patterns by ethnicity and gender are that 44 
per cent of Pakistani and 49 per cent of Bangladeshi women are economically inactive, 
looking after family or home, compared to 20 per cent or fewer for most other groups. 
Only a quarter of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are in paid work, but more than 
half of other ethnic groups. Around 80 per cent of White British, other White and Indian 
men are in paid work, but between 60 and 70 per cent of other groups. 17 per cent of 
Bangladeshi men are employed part-time and 21 per cent of Pakistani men are self-
employed. By religious afﬁ  liation, only 47 per cent of Muslim men and 24 per cent of 
Muslim women are employed, and male Muslim unemployment is 9 per cent (compared 
with a national average of 5 per cent). A quarter of Jewish men and 16 per cent of 
Muslim men are self-employed. Box 9.2 explores these differences and reasons behind 
them in more detail, including the extent to which we are seeing differences between 
ﬁ  rst and second generation migrants.
  ❍ Median hourly wages range from £6.90 for Bangladeshi men and £7.70 for Pakistani 
men to £12.70 for Chinese men. Alongside these considerable differences between 
groups, inequality for men within most ethnic groups is as much as, or greater than, 
it is for all men. A tenth of Indian men are paid more than £26.30, and a tenth of 
White British men more than £24.20, but a tenth of each group less than £6 per hour. 
The median wages for Bangladeshi and Pakistani women are only £7.80 and £8.30, 
respectively, but these are more than the median wages for men of the same groups. 
The gender wage gap is also reversed for Black Caribbean and Black African women. 
Wage inequality among women is, again, as great within most ethnic groups as it is 
among all women.
  ❍ By religious afﬁ  liation, Muslim men have a median wage of £8 per hour. The median for 
Jewish men is £17.50 (within the top ﬁ  fth of all earners). There is much less difference 
between other groups of men and women by religious afﬁ  liation. Box 9.3 explores 
the extent to which hourly wage differentials between ethno-religious groups can be 
explained by differences in factors such as qualiﬁ  cations. Box 9.6 at the end of this 
section looks at the particular issue of religious afﬁ  liation and the labour market in 
Northern Ireland.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Box 9.2: Employment, ethnicity and religion 
In Chapter 9, we showed considerable differences in employment patterns for both 
men and women between both ethnic groups and between groups defined by religious 
affiliation. Two questions immediately arise from these findings. First, to what extent 
are these differences ‘explained’ by the qualifications that we reported in Chapter 3: 
are low employment rates for some groups attributable to lack of qualifications, or 
are there other factors at work? Second, are both ethnicity and religious affiliation 
each important in affecting employment status, or is the apparent effect of one 
mainly an effect of the way in which they overlap for particular groups? For instance, 
is the disadvantage of Muslims in the labour market primarily a reflection of the 
disadvantage of Pakistani and Bangladeshi people, or vice versa?
On the first of these questions, Stephen Machin, Richard Murphy and Zeenat Soobedar 
looked at the whole UK population of working age as a whole, at the extent to which 
employment is affected by qualification levels in the same ways. After allowing for 
differences related to age and gender, they found that:128
•  for any given qualification level, White British men and women are more likely to be 
employed than those of any other ethnicity covered;129
•  for those with no qualifications, Pakistani/Bangladeshi men have an employment 
rate 16 percentage points, Black men 7 percentage points, and Indian and other 
Asian men, 5 percentage points less than White British men. The differentials for 
those with higher qualification levels are smaller, but employment rates for Black and 
Pakistani/ Bangladeshi men with degrees are still 6 percentage points less than White 
British men with degrees;
•  for women the employment gaps are larger. Even comparing those with degrees, 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi women are 11 percentage points, and other groups 4-7 
percentage points less likely to be employed than White British women. For those 
with no qualifications, the gap is up to 44 percentage points.130
In this kind of analysis it is not possible to conclude that these kinds of difference are 
a straightforward effect of labour market discrimination – there may be other factors 
varying between the groups that have not been allowed for besides qualifications, 
age and occupation. In earlier work for the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) 
using data from a range of surveys between 1973 and 2004, Anthony Heath and Sin Yi 
Cheung found significant ethnic employment penalties, unexplained by qualifications, 
of the same kind.131 They found evidence that penalties were greater for the ‘first 
generation’, who were born abroad, than for those born and educated in Britain, 
however the penalties for the second generation were only a little smaller in magnitude. 
They reported that there was, “considerable evidence from the Home Office Citizenship 
Survey…and from field experiments that unequal treatment on grounds of race or 
128  Machin, Murphy and Soobedar (2009b), Section 3.3.
129  The analysis distinguished between eight broad ethnic classiﬁ  cations: White British, White Other, Black, 
Indian, Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Other Asian, Mixed, and Other groups.
130  They also found that for both men and women, disabled people were 30 percentage points less likely to be 
employed than non-disabled people, with the differential falling to 5-6 percentage points for graduates.
131  Heath and Cheung (2006).225
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colour is likely to be a major factor underlying the pattern of ethnic penalties”.132 Box 9.5 
looks at more recent direct evidence that discrimination does indeed occur when 
people applying for jobs are called for interview, with only names (linked to gender 
and presumed ethnicity) or declared disability status varying, and with experience and 
qualifications the same. 
In further work, Heath and Cheung looked in detail at unemployment differences 
between ethnic groups using Labour Force Survey (LFS) data for the period 1994 to 
2000. Unemployment gives, in some ways, the clearest indication of difficulties in the 
labour market, given the variety of other reasons (such as participation in education) for 
non-employment. After adjusting for education and age they found:133
•  significant increases in unemployment rates for Black African, Black Caribbean, 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi and (to a lesser extent) Indian men and women;
•  these effects were as great for the ‘second generation’ as for the first;
•  the differences tended to be ‘hypercyclical’, that is, worse in recessions;134
•  the effects were similar for both men and women.
Figure 9A shows the scale of these effects for first and second generation men, 
using data from 1997-2005. In each case there is a clear distinction between the 
disadvantaged position of the first three groups – Black African, Black Caribbean and 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi men – and that of the others. 
The same researchers also looked at what kind of occupation those who did get work 
were employed in, distinguishing between four broad occupational classifications.135 
In contrast to the results for unemployment, they found that the ‘second generation’ 
had made substantial progress compared with the first generation. In the second 
generation, minority men and women in employment had similar chances (after 
allowing for age and qualifications) of working in professional and managerial jobs to 
the White majority group. However, men from some minority groups – Black African, 
Black Caribbean, and Indian – had reduced chances of being in skilled manual jobs.136
We also saw in Chapter 9 that certain minority ethnic groups had high rates of 
self-employment. Investigating this, Ken Clark and Stephen Drinkwater also found 
differences between generations. First generation minorities from Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi and Chinese backgrounds were over-represented in self-employment, 
but those with Black Caribbean and Black African backgrounds under-represented. 
However, rates of self-employment fell between 1991 and 2001 for those from Chinese 
and Indian backgrounds. The authors argue that, “this is consistent with second-
generation Chinese and Indians choosing not to follow their parents into business and 
instead finding employment in the paid labour market. In contrast, Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis experienced no such decline in self-employment rates despite having 
similar demographic characteristics”.137
132  Heath and Cheung (2006), p.2.
133  Cheung and Heath (2007), table 12.A2.
134  See Section 10.5 for discussion of the early effects of the recession that started in 2008.
135  These were: ‘salariat’ (white collar); ‘petty bourgeoisie’; manual supervisor/skilled manual; and routine non-
manual.
136  Cheung and Heath (2007), tables 12.A3A and 12.A3B.
137  Clark and Drinkwater (2007), p.ix.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 9A: Predicted unemployment rates for men with similar characteristics by ethnic 
group
Source: Heath and Li (2008).
Note: BA: Black African; BC: Black Caribbean; PB: Pakistani/Bangladeshi; IN: Indian; WO: White Other 
(from Europe or Old Commonwealth); WI: White Irish; CH: Chinese; WB: White British; G1: ﬁ  rst generation; 
G2: second generation.










































































Predicted probability of being unemployed for 2nd generation men
For married men with secondary education and 10-15 years’ LM experience (1997-2005): WB=4.3%.227
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On the second question, the relative importance and interaction of ethnicity and 
religious affiliation, Nabil Khattab looked at data from the 2001 Census to examine 
the position of particular ethno-religious groups in terms of both education and 
occupational attainment. He finds that by comparison with White British Christians:
•  Jewish White British and no religion White British people, and Christian White Other 
men are advantaged in terms of both education and occupation;
•  Christian Black African and Christian Black Caribbean people are advantaged in 
terms of education, but disadvantaged in occupation;
•  Muslim Pakistanis, Muslim Bangladeshis, Muslim White people and Sikh Indians are 
disadvantaged in terms of both education and occupational attainment;
•  Hindu Indians are advantaged in terms of education, but Muslim Indians 
disadvantaged, but neither group strongly advantaged or disadvantaged in 
occupational attainment.
On the basis of his analysis he argues that, “ethnicity per se is not an important factor 
but operates as a proxy…skin colour and culture (religion) are to a greater extent 
probably the main mechanisms that operate to reinforce disadvantage among some 
groups or to facilitate social mobility amongst others”.138
In recent work, Anthony Heath, Jean Martin and Karin Bosveld have also looked at 
employment outcomes, using LFS data for working age people in Great Britain for 2005 
and 2006. They again looked at differences in employment status after allowing for 
factors such as age and highest qualification. They were able to distinguish 29 ethno-
religious groups with large enough numbers in the survey for analysis. They found that 
there were many significant differences within ethnic groups:
  “In particular there is a strong ‘Muslim penalty’ for women from all ethnic groups: 
they were particularly likely to be economically inactive or, if active, to be unemployed. 
There were also ethnic penalties which persisted despite allowing for religion, in 
particular for Black Caribbean and Black African women. For men the results were 
broadly similar. Looking just at the second generation – those born in the UK or who 
arrive before the age of 5 – indicated that Muslim disadvantage had decreased 
compared with the immigrant generation but there was no decline in the Black 
disadvantage.”139
In other words, religious affiliation and ethnicity have separate effects, and some 
of their interactions have changed between generations. This suggests that ethno-
religious group can be a more revealing way of examining labour market position than 
looking at ethnicity and religion separately. In Box 9.3, we look at analysis of pay levels 
by ethno-religious group.
138  Khattab (2009), p.319.
139  Heath, Martin and Bosveld (2009).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Box 9.3: Pay penalties, gender, ethnicity and disability
In Chapter 5, we mapped out the great differences in ranges of earnings for people 
from different backgrounds showing, amongst other things, the low levels of pay 
for women, for those from certain minority ethnic groups and for disabled people. 
These ‘pay gaps’ do not necessarily show that there is discrimination – they could, for 
instance, reflect differences in qualification levels or experience that would be expected 
to affect pay. However, it is also possible to look at pay levels for different kinds of 
people to see whether there are ‘pay penalties’ (or bonuses) for particular groups given 
what would be expected based on their qualifications, age and so on.
In recent work for the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), Simonetta 
Longhi and Lucinda Platt140 used similar data from the LFS (over three years from 
October 2004) to that used here to look at hourly pay by a wide range of characteristics 
including age, occupational classification, family circumstances and qualifications. 
They then estimated what level of pay would be predicted for someone with any 
given combination of characteristics, given what was seen in the labour market. For 
the analysis by ethno-religious group, they used data for Great Britain; for analysis 
by disability, they were able to cover the whole of the UK. Using this they could then 
look at what level of pay would be predicted for someone with exactly the same 
characteristics except for the one they were investigating. The difference from someone 
with standard characteristics gives a measure of the ‘penalty’ associated with any 
given characteristic. The existence of a penalty of this kind does not in itself show that 
there is discrimination in pay determination, although that is one possible explanation. 
There may be other factors associated with pay variation that were not captured in the 
survey data used.
Figure 9B shows some of their results. The reference category was a White British 
Christian man, who was born in the UK, non-disabled, in a couple but without children, 
aged 40-44, with Level 2 qualifications,141 and working in a skilled job. He was predicted 
to earn £10.13 per hour (at 2007 prices). The figure shows what percentage of higher 
or lower pay would be predicted for other people with exactly the same characteristics 
apart from their gender and ethno-religious group. As far as men are concerned, 
predicted pay for Indian Hindu and Sikh men and Black Caribbean Christian men was 
within the same range as the base case. White British Jewish men were predicted to 
earn 24 per cent more, even with the same other characteristics. However, Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi Muslim men and Black African Christian men were predicted to earn 
between 13 and 21 per cent less than White British Christian men with the same 
characteristics. In other words a substantial part of the pay gaps we showed for these 
groups in Figure 5.3 cannot be explained solely by factors such as qualifications and 
occupational class. Actual pay for Chinese men exceeded that of White British men by 
about 11 per cent in 2006-2008 (Table 5.3). However, once factors such as their higher 
qualification levels were taken into account, the figure shows that for Chinese men with 
no religion there was a pay penalty of 11 per cent.
140  Longhi and Platt (2008).
141  For instance, 5 GCSE A*-C or equivalent vocational qualiﬁ  cations.229
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Figure 9B: Pay penalty by gender and ethno-religious group – percentages
Looking at the results for women, it is striking that none of these groups (with the 
exception of White British Jewish women) has predicted hourly pay above that of even 
the group of men (Bangladeshi) with the lowest predicted pay. The pay penalty for 
White British Christian women compared with their men with the same characteristics 
was 26 per cent, and for the other groups was in the range 22-35 per cent (14 per cent 
for White British Jewish women). To put it another way, little or none of the gender 
hourly pay gap (21 per cent for all employees) we described in Chapter 5 is explained 
by factors such as qualification levels. This should not be a surprise given what we 
also show about women’s educational performance and the qualifications of younger 
women.
Longhi and Platt carried out similar analysis for the effect on predicted pay of disability 
(based on whether people said they had a long-standing illness that limits their 
activities). Disabled men were predicted to be paid 8 per cent less than non-disabled 
men who otherwise were the same, non-disabled women 26 per cent less, and disabled 
women 31 per cent less.142
142  Longhi and Platt (2008), table 4.2.
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Source: Longhi and Platt (2008). 
Note: The differences shown by the bars in the chart are all statistically signiﬁ  cant. Pay penalties for Indian 
Sikh men and Black Caribbean Christian men compared to White British Christian men are not statistically 
signiﬁ  cant. The ﬁ  gures show the difference in pay predicted for people from each ethno-religious group with 
the following shared characteristics: born in the UK; non-disabled; married or cohabiting; without dependent 
children; aged 40-44; level 2 qualiﬁ  cations; and in a skilled trade occupation.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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They also looked at whether the penalties they found applied to those with low and 
high qualifications, as well as for those with mid-level ones illustrated above. They 
found that pay penalties were greater for women with lower levels of qualification, 
but smaller for women with high qualifications. By contrast penalties were greater 
for disabled people with higher qualifications. Pakistani and Bangladeshi men with 
no qualifications experienced substantial pay penalties compared to White British 
Christian men with no qualifications (25 and 41 per cent respectively). Indian Hindu, 
Chinese and Black African men with higher qualifications also experienced some pay 
penalties (7-15 per cent).
The researchers extended their analysis for us to look at some of the factors associated 
with these pay penalties in more detail. This included looking at the impact of 
occupational sector in more detail (including whether full-time or part-time), at 
differences between those who were first or second generation immigrants, and at 
those with high and low pay. To do this they used LFS data pooled from Spring 2002 to 
the end of 2008. For sample size reasons their results are restricted to men.
Looking first at the larger ethno-religious groups by generation of immigration:143
•  First generation Hindu men were paid slightly more (4 per cent) than White British 
Christian men. However, given their qualifications and (particularly) their occupations, 
they would have been expected to be paid 14 per cent more – there was an 
unexplained penalty of 10 per cent.
•  Second generation Hindu men were paid 13 per cent more than White British 
Christian men, only slightly less than would be expected given their qualifications and 
occupation – an unexplained penalty of only 3 per cent.
•  First generation Pakistani Muslim men were paid 46 per cent less than White British 
Christian men. They would be predicted to earn 30 per cent less on the basis of their 
qualifications and occupation, so there was an unexplained penalty of 15 per cent.
•  Second generation Pakistani Muslim men were paid 12 per cent less than White 
British Christian men, about half of which was explained by qualifications and 
occupation, leaving an unexplained penalty of 8 per cent.
•  Which occupation people were in was most important for first generation Muslim 
men. The prevalence of part-time work was important for both generations, 
particularly at the bottom of the distribution.
•  Looking by level of pay, the researchers found that large proportions of the pay gap 
for the lowest paid were explained by education and occupation. However, the very 
highest paid (90th percentile) second generation Indian Hindu men were paid 17 
per cent and first generation Pakistani Muslim men 30 per cent less than would be 
predicted.
Two points can be noted from this. First, the ‘unexplained penalty’ – which may 
represent discrimination in some form – was much less in the second generation 
than in the first (see Box 9.2 for parallel issues on employment). The penalties for the 
second generations, in particular, were a smaller than those shown in Figure 9B above. 
143  Longhi, Nicoletti and Platt (2009), table 10. 231
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Second, the analysis – using more detailed information on occupation – shows that 
an important part of the pay gap is to do with exactly which occupations particular 
groups end up in. Given, for instance, that a quarter of second generation Pakistani 
Muslim men work as drivers or as shop assistants, lower pay would be expected than for 
those with similar qualifications in other occupations. The issue is then why there is this 
concentration – which is where the kind of discrimination in (private sector) recruitment 
shown in Box 9.5 becomes such an important mechanism. 
Looking at the pay gap for disabled people, the researchers found that an important 
factor in their pay disadvantage was concentration in part-time work and in less well-
paid occupations. For pay differences by both ethnicity and disability status, they 
concluded that, “labour market discrimination is potentially more relevant to limiting 
access to employment and to particular types of occupation than for pay within 
occupations”. This kind of occupational segregation has been identified as being crucial 
in explaining the gender wage gap.144
  ❍ The main difference in patterns of weekly earnings from those of hourly wages is that 
women are generally several places further down the distribution of full-time earnings. 
The median hourly wage for Black Caribbean women places them at the 54th percentile 
of the overall distribution, but the median weekly earnings for those working full-time 
placed them only at the 46th percentile.
  ❍ More than half of Pakistani women and nearly half of Bangladeshi women have 
individual net incomes below £100 per week, and so are in the poorest ﬁ  fth overall. 
More than a tenth of Pakistani women and of Bangladeshi men have no reported 
income in their own right at all. Comparing men and women, only for Black Caribbean 
men and women are individual incomes at similar levels across the range. For other 
ethnic groups, the median position of women is 10-20 places (out of 100) below men of 
the same ethnicity, but for White British and Indian women the difference is 24 and 27 
places.
  ❍ Within seven broad ethnic categories, Indian and White adults have the highest median 
equivalent net incomes, £417 and £412, respectively, but the median for Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi adults (taken together) is only £238, 60 per cent of that of White adults. 
Half of Pakistani and Bangladeshi adults have incomes below £238, very close to the 
ofﬁ  cial poverty line. The median income for Pakistani and Bangladeshi adults places 
them only at the 18th percentile of the overall distribution – 35 places (out of 100) 
below the median for White adults. Income inequality within these ethnic categories 
is generally similar to, or greater than, that across the population as a whole. One 
contributor to low incomes for some ethnic groups is the position of asylum seekers 
and refugees. As Appendix 3 explains, while they may come within the household 
population for survey purposes, they are not separately identiﬁ  ed. Box 9.4 reports some 
evidence from other sources on the existence of very low incomes for some asylum 
seekers and refugees.
144  See, for instance: Olsen and Walby (2004); Mumford and Smith (2007).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Box 9.4: Asylum seekers and refugees 
Although asylum seekers and refugees are not identified in the surveys on which this 
report draws, there has been a number of recent studies of the economic circumstances 
of asylum seekers which identify significant levels of hardship and even destitution. 
Two recent small-scale studies focused on the experience of destitution in two cities: 
Leeds and Leicester. The Leeds study was conducted on behalf of the Joseph Rowntree 
Charitable Trust Inquiry into Destitution among Refused Asylum Seekers.145 It used a 
range of methods and spoke to both local agencies and asylum seekers themselves. Its 
main findings include:
•  refused asylum seekers constituted the majority of those experiencing destitution;
•  destitute asylum seekers rely upon friends and charity from voluntary organisations 
and churches to try to meet their basic needs of shelter, food, health, income and 
safety. Others are forced to find undocumented work to survive. All sources of support 
are highly precarious;
•  people remain in this vulnerable position for protracted periods during which time 
they experience differing degrees of destitution that have an acute impact on their 
well-being, and can lead to self-harm and suicidal thoughts. Periods of rough sleeping 
are common for some.
Three of the asylum seekers interviewed, “stated that they felt so ignored and 
insignificant to British society that they could die in the street and no-one would notice 
or care”. One refused asylum seeker said, “In my country they hate me, they killed my 
husband, they killed my family. If I went there they would kill me. Here they are killing 
me slowly.”
The Leicester study was carried out through four voluntary organisations during one 
month in early 2008. It defined destitution as “the lack of any available statutory 
support mechanisms resulting in the need of an individual approaching charities, faith 
groups, communities and voluntary groups to get help and assistance in accessing some 
form of daily support”.146 The study found:
•  135 asylum seekers who were destitute;
•  of these, four reported sleeping rough the previous evening; 92 per cent that they 
had slept at a friend’s house; and 21 per cent were ‘sofa surfing’ between friends’ 
houses;
•  61 (45 per cent) had been destitute for more than a year and 16 (12 per cent) for five 
years or more. 
145 Lewis  (2007).
146 Malfait  (2008).233
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The author comments that, “a disturbing number of people have been trying to cope 
with destitution for considerable periods of time. In doing so there is undoubtedly a 
toll on their general health, their mental wellbeing and their feelings of inclusion in our 
society…An overwhelming feeling amongst destitute asylum seekers is that they are in a 
limbo where their lives have become meaningless and wasted”. 
A third, national, study by the Refugee Council147 focused on asylum seekers in receipt 
of ‘Section 4’ support in the form of vouchers (that is, refused asylum seekers who have 
exhausted their appeal rights and who do not have existing dependent children). The 
study surveyed organisations across England and interviewed a small number of asylum 
seekers. It concluded:
  “The research has shown that people are unable to shop around for cheaper and 
more appropriate food or other essential goods, are unable to buy sufficient food and 
toiletries to meet their needs, cannot keep in contact with friends, families and legal 
representatives, and are unable to pay for travel to essential appointments. It is clear 
that using vouchers as a means of support and subsistence is causing unnecessary 
hardship and having a detrimental effect on many asylum seekers’ physical and 
mental well-being…Some asylum seekers are being forced to survive on vouchers for 
many years.”
As well as severe material hardship, the study revealed how the vouchers system 
impacts adversely on asylum seekers’ self-esteem. A fifth of organisations reported 
that clients felt embarrassed or humiliated using vouchers and over half reported poor 
treatment in shops. Comments included:
  “People describe it as the most degrading aspect of being an asylum seeker.”
  “Repeated expression of feeling ‘less than human’.”
In face of the removal of the right to work, the majority of respondents were aware 
of asylum seekers being forced in to the informal economy “in order to obtain cash to 
meet their basic needs, potentially exposing themselves to exploitation”.
  ❍ Median total household wealth varies considerably by ethnicity, from only £15,000 for 
Bangladeshi households to around £75,000 for Black Caribbean, £97,000 for Pakistani 
households and £200,000 or more for Indian and White British households. Differences 
by religious afﬁ  liation are as great, from £42,000 for Muslim households to £229,000 
for Sikh and £422,000 for Jewish households.
It is clear that there is much diversity between minority ethnic groups: they are not all in the 
same socio-economic location. Moreover, each minority ethnic and religious group exhibits 
internal inequalities of a kind that reflect those of the country as a whole. However, socio-
economic structures or ‘objective’ class factors do not fully explain the position of non-white 
minorities, either in terms of the distinctive disadvantages or of the advantages of specific 
minority groups.
147 Doyle  (2008).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
234
As the studies reported in Boxes 9.2 and 9.3 show, educational achievement is not necessarily 
matched by labour market outcomes. The White population gets the best returns in terms 
of wages for a given level of qualifications – all minority ethnic groups suffer some form 
of ‘penalty’. Ethno-religious classification is an even better predictor of disadvantage in 
that Muslim ethnic groups suffer the largest ‘ethnic penalty’ (after controlling for the usual 
factors).
The studies also show that it is important to separate out ‘first’ and ‘second’ generations 
within minority groups. Doing so reveals, for example, that while both generations suffer 
similar degrees of ethnic penalty in relation to getting employment, the second generation 
has made considerable progress in relation to job levels and now has, if in work, similar 
chances of accessing professional and managerial jobs as the White British population. 
However, they appear to be relatively worse-placed within the broad occupational categories. 
The severity of labour market disadvantage for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi population, in 
particular, suggests that general policies aimed at reducing low incomes or unemployment 
will not, by themselves, close these gaps. An implication of all this is that the central problem 
in relation to racial equality and the labour market is now unequal levels of unemployment, 
and the employment sectors which some people are constrained to enter. In this context, 
the recent studies discussed in Box 9.5, which suggest clear evidence of discrimination in 
recruitment, are very disturbing.
Box 9.5: Evidence of discrimination in recruitment and employment
We have seen large differences between the employment rates of particular social 
groups. Some of these raw differences can be explained by factors such as age, 
qualifications and local levels of unemployment. However, even after these factors 
and characteristics are taken into consideration, some gaps still remain unexplained, 
as discussed in Box 9.2. These ‘penalties’ are not necessarily, by themselves, evidence 
of the extent of discrimination. However, other kinds of research provide more direct 
evidence, including ‘CV testing’, and interview trials. 
The National Centre for Social Research recently carried out research for the DWP 
to examine the extent to which discrimination may explain the ‘ethnic penalty’ in 
employment.148 They sent out CVs in response to actual job advertisements. As part of 
the experiment they sent identical CVs to different employers, but randomly varied the 
names on them to give an apparent indication of ethnicity and gender. 
The results show strong evidence of discrimination at the first stage of recruitment for 
formal vacancies, in terms of success rates in being called for interview. The levels of 
discrimination were similar across all the ethnic groups studied. There was much more 
evidence of discrimination in the private than in the public sector. Discrimination was 
much more likely to arise when CVs were submitted, than when employer forms were 
used (perhaps because personal details on these may be removed before selection staff 
looked at them). Findings included:
148 Wood  et al. (2009).235
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•  where more than one successful response came from an employer, 68 per cent of 
applications with an apparently White British name were successful, but only 39 per 
cent of those from apparently ethnic minority applicants, a difference of 29 per cent;
•  overall, of 987 applications with an apparently White British name, 10.7 per cent 
received a positive response;
•  of all the 1,974 applications with an apparently ethnic minority name, only 6.2 per 
cent received a positive response, a net difference of 4.6 percentage points;
•  the adverse effect was larger for those with apparently Pakistani or Bangladeshi 
names than those with Indian, Chinese or Black Caribbean names, but the 
differences between these groups were not statistically significant;
•  discrimination applied to both men and women; however
•  the level of discrimination was considerably lower for public sector than private sector 
employers (4 per cent compared to 35 per cent).
Other evidence shows how interview processes can have discriminatory consequences. 
Research on job interviews, language and ethnicity, also for DWP, looked at the 
practices of interviewers and candidates to determine whether ethnic minority 
candidates were systematically disadvantaged in interviews because of culturally-
specific practices.149 The research showed that first generation ethnic minority 
candidates fared less well in the interviews. These interviews were marked by greater 
difficulties for candidates in presenting themselves in expected ways. Proportionately, 
fewer of these candidates were successful in being selected for employment, suggesting 
that job interviews created a ‘linguistic penalty’ for this group. The research suggested 
that this was not a result of a lack of fluency in English, but from the demands on 
candidates to communicate in particular ways and from a mismatch of implicit cultural 
expectations (mutual misunderstandings and negative judgements by interviewers). 
The complex communication demands of the job interview often exceeded the stated 
requirements of the job. This study focused on interviews for low-paid, mainly manual 
work. It found, however, that second generation ethnic minority candidates fared as 
well as White British candidates. 
Another CV test experiment by the charity Leonard Cheshire assessed the extent 
of discrimination for disabled people in the private sector in Scotland.150 The results 
showed that when identical CVs were sent in response to job advertisements differing 
only in that one disclosed a disability, non-disabled people were twice as likely to receive 
a positive response as a disabled applicant (69 per cent compared to 31 per cent). There 
was also a noticeable difference by type of impairment. The applicant with cerebral 
palsy received the majority of interviews (80 per cent) compared to the applicant 
registered blind (20 per cent). This apparent discrimination against disabled applicants 
existed from all types of organisation, irrespective of size.
149  Roberts and Campbell (2006). The study is based on sixty-one real video recorded interviews.
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Box 9.6: Religion and the labour market in Northern Ireland
Looking across the UK, the clearest issues related to religious affiliation concern 
differences between different religions. However, within Northern Ireland, the largest 
issues relate to differences between communities with traditions linked to different 
Christian denominations.151 Such differences have been the subject of much political 
and academic debate. Recent analysis by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy 
First Minister (OFMDFM) in their 2008 Labour Force Survey Religion report, shows 
that the labour market differences between Roman Catholics and Protestants have 
narrowed in the years since 1992.
Figure 9C suggests that in 2008:
•  69 per cent of Roman Catholics and 75 per cent of Protestants of working age were 
economically active. In 1992 the comparable figures were 66 per cent and 77 per 
cent, so the gap has declined from 11 to 6 percentage points;
•  66 per cent of Roman Catholics and 73 per cent of Protestants of working age were 
in employment, compared to figures of 54 per cent and 70 per cent respectively in 
1992. The gap has therefore narrowed from 16 per cent to 7 per cent;
•  unemployment rates were 5 per cent for Roman Catholics but 3 per cent for 
Protestants, compared to 18 per cent and 9 per cent in 1992. The unemployment gap 
has narrowed from 9 to one percentage point.152
Figure 9C: Economic activity, employment and unemployment in Northern Ireland by 
denomination, 1992 to 2007 (percentage of working age population) 
Source: OFMDFM (2009).
Note: Unemployment rate (all economically active aged 16+); employment rate (economically active and 
inactive of working age); economic activity (working age).
151  There are related issues in Scotland between Protestants and Roman Catholics. See Paterson and Iannelli 
(2006) and McAspurren (2005).
152  The unemployment gap is based on unrounded unemployment rates.237
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Where members of the two communities are employed, there are some differences 
in sector of employment: in 2008, 12 per cent of Roman Catholics, but 9 per cent of 
Protestants worked in construction; 15 per cent of Roman Catholics, but 13 per cent 
of Protestants worked in the ‘health and social work’ sector; 10 per cent of Roman 
Catholics but 13 per cent of Protestants worked in manufacturing. Such differences 
tended to be greater amongst men than amongst women.153
The same report suggests that 33 per cent of economically active Roman Catholics 
of working age had higher level qualifications in 2008, compared to 29 per cent of 
Protestants, while there was no difference in the proportions of Roman Catholics and 
Protestants who had no qualifications.154
9.4 Disability
  ❍ Chapter 3 presented some information on educational attainment at 16 of children 
with Special Educational Needs (SEN) or Additional Support Needs (ASN) in Scotland. 
Taken as a whole, children with Special Educational Needs/Additional Support Needs 
status have much lower performance than others. However, this covers a wide variety 
of different kinds of needs. The attainment gap is particularly wide for those classiﬁ  ed 
as having Severe Learning Difﬁ  culties or profound Multiple Learning Difﬁ  culty. Box 
11.2 in Chapter 11 looks at how the positions of children with different kinds of support 
need develop through the school years. There is a strong association between living 
in a deprived area, having low levels of educational attainment and the identiﬁ  cation 
of Special Educational Needs/Additional Support Needs, particularly with regard to 
behavioural, emotional, and social difﬁ  culties. 
  ❍ For adults, nearly one-third of those of working age who are classiﬁ  ed as disabled 
both in terms of the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) and through reporting a work-
limiting condition have no qualiﬁ  cations at all, compared to 12 per cent of those who 
are not disabled.
  ❍ By employment status, only 21 per cent of men reporting that they were DDA-disabled 
and have a work-limiting disability are employed full-time, compared to two-thirds 
of men not reporting a disability. In terms of particular kinds of impairment, mental 
illness, phobia or panic, and learning difﬁ  culties are the conditions associated with 
low employment. While gendered employment patterns among disabled people are 
similar to others, only 14 per cent of DDA-disabled and work-limiting disabled women 
are employed full-time, half the rate for men. However, taking full- and part-time 
employment together, disabled women are more likely to be employed than disabled 
men – 30 per cent compared with 25 per cent.
153  OFMDFM (2009), pp.28-29.
154  OFMDFM (2009), table A7.8, p62.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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  ❍ Men who report a work-limiting disability and are DDA-disabled have a median 
hourly wage 20 per cent lower than the median for non-disabled men; for women, 
the median is 12 per cent lower. Box 9.3 summarised some evidence on the extent to 
which lower wages for disabled people are attributable to qualiﬁ  cation levels and other 
characteristics, while Box 9.5 presented evidence of discrimination in recruitment.
  ❍ The median net individual income for men who are disabled according to both DDA 
and work-limiting deﬁ  nitions is £157, half the median for non-disabled men (£316). For 
women, the corresponding ﬁ  gures are £131 and £198. A tenth of men disabled on both 
deﬁ  nitions have individual incomes below £59 per week, and a tenth of women in this 
situation have incomes below £31 per week.
  ❍ Looking at differences in equivalent net income (including ‘extra costs’ disability 
beneﬁ  ts), working age DDA-disabled people have a median income of £322, 30 per 
cent lower than the median for non-disabled people of working age. Children who are 
reported as DDA-disabled are six places and pensioners four places further down the 
distribution at the median than their non-disabled equivalents; for those of working 
age the difference is 26 places in the overall ranking. However, excluding ‘extra costs’ 
beneﬁ  ts would reduce equivalent net incomes for disabled people by 10 per cent. The 
position of their median would then be 5 places further down the income distribution, 
and their poverty rate would rise to above 30 per cent.
While these kinds of findings relate to the position of disabled people, or sometimes to the 
households in which they live, they often also have implications for the position of carers. 
Box 9.7 reports some of the evidence put to us by Carers UK on the position of carers.
Box 9.7: Evidence on the position of carers
The organisation, Carers UK, submitted a very helpful memorandum setting out the 
position of informal carers in relation to the issues raised by our terms of reference, 
making twelve key points from the evidence they had collected.155
•  Caring is relevant to all the equality ‘strands’: Carers UK suggest that half of 
women are likely to provide care by the age of 59; Bangladeshi and Pakistani men 
and women are three times more likely to provide care than their White British 
counterparts; and carers themselves are two to three times more likely to have a 
long-standing limiting illness than non-carers.
•  Carers are less likely to be in paid work than the general population: only 3 million 
of the 4.5 million carers of working age are in paid work, with one in five carers giving 
up work in order to care; many retire early in order to care.
•  Carers are more likely to be in low paid and low status professions: almost 45 per 
cent of men and 55 per cent of women who are in paid work but caring for more than 
20 hours per week are in routine occupations. 
155  The memorandum can be found on our own website:
(at http://www.equalities.gov.uk/pdf/National%20Equality%20Panel%20evidence%20Carers%20.pdf). 
Evidence which they refer to in that memorandum can be found at:
http://www.carersuk.org/Policyandpractice/Research).239
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•  Carers are more likely to suffer from ill-health and long-term conditions, which 
further reduces their chances of returning to work: Carers UK report that in 
the 2001 Census, carers providing high levels of care were twice as likely to be 
‘permanently sick or disabled’ as those not caring.
•  Young adult carers are less likely to be in further or higher education: among 
young adults aged 16-24, fewer than 16 per cent of women and fewer than 21 per 
cent of men who were caring for more than 20 hours per week were in education, 
compared to more than 25 per cent of non-carers.
•  Caring reinforces gender inequalities in the labour market and has different 
impacts on men and women: women are more likely than men to be ‘heavy end’ 
carers, for more than 50 hours per week; male carers are more likely to be in paid 
work than female carers; one in five women aged 45-59 is a carer, at what, for some, 
of them could have been the peak of their career.
•  Many carers who are currently in work are at risk of falling out of work because 
of a lack of services and a lack of support at work: only about a quarter of working 
carers report that they feel they receive adequate support to enable them to 
combine work and care.
•  Many carers who are not currently in work would like to work, but are not able to 
because of poor services, a lack of flexible working and the benefits trap: Carers 
UK report that about a quarter of carers claiming Carer’s Allowance would like to do 
more paid work, but do not want to lose their entitlement to the benefit.
•  Disability and caring are interlinked, and are a large contributor to the number of 
workless households: caring is likely to be a contributor to reduced employment rates 
amongst groups such as women, those from minority ethnic groups, older people and 
disabled people.
•  Carers are more likely to be on low incomes: carers who receive Carer’s Allowance 
are less likely to be in poverty than the population as a whole, partly reflecting their 
age, but are clustered just above the poverty line, in the second fifth of the income 
distribution; those who care for more than 20 hours per week are more likely to be in 
poverty than others.
•  Carers’ benefits do not support carers to lift themselves out of poverty or 
combine caring with paid work: Carers UK argues that the structure of Carer’s 
Allowance creates a ‘cliff-edge’, where carers receiving it cannot increase their hours 
or take a more senior position without losing the whole allowance.
•  The prevalence of caring responsibilities is likely to increase in the future: 
demographic change is likely to increase the proportion of the population needing 
formal or informal care, but this will be coupled with the increased expectation that 
people will be in paid work until later ages, as longevity increases.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
240
9.5 Sexual  orientation
Statistics on educational attainment do not provide information on the sexual orientation 
of pupils. However, a survey of more than 1,000 lesbian, gay and bisexual secondary school 
pupils conducted for Stonewall by the School Health Education Unit in 2006 gives an 
indication of the difficulties young gay pupils face. It concludes that ‘homophobic bullying is 
almost endemic in Britain’s schools’.156 According to the report:
  ❍ 65 per cent of young lesbian, gay and bisexual people experience homophobic bullying 
in Britain’s schools;
  ❍ 97 per cent hear derogatory homophobic language in school;
  ❍ of those affected, 92 per cent have been subjected to verbal homophobic bullying, 41 
per cent physical and 17 per cent have suffered death threats;
  ❍ teachers as well as pupils are responsible for homophobic bullying;
  ❍ seven out of ten of those affected believe that homophobic bullying affects their school 
work. Half say that they have skipped school because of it. Girls and black and minority 
ethnic pupils appear to be particularly adversely affected.
Most students either remain financially dependent on their parents, or receive financial 
assistance based on an assessment of their parents’ income. However, 15 per cent of lesbian, 
gay or bisexual students and 35 per cent of transgender students say they fear losing 
financial support if they come out to their parents about their sexual orientation or gender 
identity. Five per cent of these students had already been refused support by their parents.157
For the adult population some information is available on the labour market position of those 
who report that they are living in a same sex couple (or have a civil partnership):
  ❍ people with higher levels of qualiﬁ  cation are more likely than others to report that they 
are living in a same sex couple;
  ❍ the full-time employment rate for women reporting that they lived in a same sex 
couple is 67 per cent, compared to 39 per cent for other women;
  ❍ the median hourly wage for men who report that they live in a same sex couple is 19 
per cent higher than the median for all men, and the corresponding ﬁ  gure for women is 
40 per cent higher; however
  ❍ men and women reporting themselves as living in a same sex couple are somewhat 
lower down the distribution of weekly earnings than that of hourly wages. 
Such statistics are, however, potentially misleading, as this response is a very limited 
measure of sexual orientation. Only 0.4 per cent of people of working age responding to 
the LFS say that they are living in a same sex couple or in a civil partnership, a fraction of 
156  Hunt and Jensen (2007), p.2. 
157  Equality Challenge Unit (2009).241
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the likely proportion of the population who are lesbian, gay or bisexual.158 Box 9.8 reports 
analysis of the LFS which examines the extent to which differences in employment, wages 
and earnings for those in same sex couples remain after controlling for qualifications and 
other characteristics. It finds that there are now no significant pay differences for men or for 
women in same sex couples compared to men or women in other couples without children. 
For men there is no significant difference in employment rates. Women in same sex couples 
are 8 per cent more likely to be in paid employment than women in hetrosexual couples, and 
13 per cent more likely than women in same sex couples without children, but these are much 
smaller differences than the raw differential quoted above.
Information on incomes by sexual orientation is not yet available, but we would agree with 
Stonewall that there is no reason, from this kind of evidence, to expect the spread of incomes 
for lesbian, gay and bisexual people to be much different from that of the population as a 
whole.
Box 9.8: Relative pay of those reporting living in a same sex couple 
As the main text shows, LFS data suggest that those who report they are living in a 
same sex couple have higher rates of pay and employment than others. However, 
previous research based on data from 1996 to 2002, found that the pay advantage 
of men who reported living in a same sex couple disappeared or was even reversed 
once characteristics such as qualifications were taken into account, and the apparent 
advantage of women who reported living in a same sex couple was reduced.159
The same authors updated the analysis for the Panel, to the most recent time period 
available, 2006-2008.160
The LFS asks people who are not married whether they are living in a couple, and if 
so whether they are living in a same sex couple. Those reporting this are just 0.4 per 
cent of the adult working age population. Since 2006, however, civil partnerships have 
also been reported, boosting the share to 0.6 per cent of the sample. The researchers 
compare those reporting as being in same sex couples in terms of their earnings 
and employment with those of the same gender in other couples, both married and 
cohabitees, with and without children. The authors consider that these are the relevant 
comparisons for considering potential earnings discrimination.
The research finds that the statistically significant pay penalty after allowing for age 
and qualifications for men living in same-sex couples, observed in earlier studies 
(1996-99), is not statistically significant in the most recent period.
158  See Aspinall (2009) for discussion of the issues and uncertainties involved in estimating the size of the 
lesbian, gay and bisexual population. Stonewall, in evidence to the Panel, suggests that lesbian, gay and 
bisexual people make up 6 per cent or more of the UK population.
159  Arabsheibani, Marin and Wadsworth (2005).
160  Arabsheibani, Marin and Wadsworth (2009).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 9A shows the results for four time periods: 1996-99, 2000-02, 2003-05 and 
2006-2008. We show pay differentials, adjusting for age, education, region and other 
factors. The numbers in the table approximate the percentage difference between 
wages of men or women who report living in a same sex couple and the other groups 
shown (all men, men in couples, etc). So, in the first column for 1996-99, the table 
shows that – in contrast to the apparent advantage in raw data – after controlling for 
demographic and other characteristics, the pay of men in same sex couples was 1.8 
per cent less than that of all men. However, the lack of an asterisk indicates that the 
results are statistically insignificant. Compared to childless men in other couples, pay 
was significantly less than would be expected. By 2006-2008, all the differences were 
statistically insignificant.
For women in 1996-98, the pay of women who reported living in a same sex couple 
was significantly higher than other women (by 7.3 per cent). However, this was much 
smaller than the raw gap before adjusting for educational qualifications, age, and so 
on. Compared to childless women in couples, the advantage was smaller, and by 
2006-2008, this comparative advantage was statistically insignificant.
Table 9A: Estimates of pay differences (percentages) for people reporting living in same 
sex couples, allowing for qualifications and other characteristics
Comparator 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2006-08
Men
All men -1.8 0.3 -5.4* 1.2
Men in couples -5.4* -3.0 -8.4* -1.5
Childless men in couples -7.8* -5.1* -11.5* -4.4
Women
All women 7.3* 10.1* 10.0* 5.0*
Women in couples 5.7* 9.2* 9.0* 3.7
Childless women in couples 4.4 8.3* 8.8* 3.1
Source: Arabsheibani et al. (2009).
Note: * signiﬁ  cant at 5%. Other controls include dummy variables for ethnicity, 1 digit industry, 1 digit 
occupation, job tenure, ﬁ  rm size, year of sampling, private sector, temporary job and part-time working.
Table 9B reports results of employment gaps and trends over time in a similar way. 
The numbers in the table are statistics on the differential probabilities of being in 
employment, also after taking account of demographic and other characteristics, 
such as age, education, and so on. Again, in contrast to the apparent advantage seen 
in the raw data, men who reported living in a same sex couple were less likely to be 
in employment than other men in couples with similar characteristics in 1996-99. 
However, by 2006-2008, the difference was statistically insignificant.
By contrast, even after controlling for other characteristics, women who report they 
are in same sex couples remain significantly more likely to be employed than the other 
groups of women, and this difference has not changed much over time. It is, however, 
much smaller than the raw differential shown in Figure 4.5.243
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Table 9B: Employment differences (percentages) for people reporting living in same sex 
couples, allowing for qualifications and other characteristics
Comparator 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2006-08
Men
All men 0. 6 2.6 0. 4 5.2**
Men in couples -5.4** -3.2 -4.9** -0. 9
Childless men in couples -4.4** -2.8 -4.8** -1.4
Women
All women 9.5** 14.2** 9.8** 9.8**
Women in couples 7.3** 11.8** 7.7** 7.8**
Childless women in couples 13.1** 16.3** 12.7** 12.5**
Source: Arabsheibani, Marin and Wadsworth (2009).
Note: ** signiﬁ  cant at 1% level. Results control for age, education, religion and other factors, including
ethnicity and year of sampling.
9.6 Social  class
Social class differs from some of the other dimensions we examine because it is both 
an outcome of the labour market and part of the transmission mechanism that affects 
how people’s lives develop. As one would expect, there are considerable differences in 
qualifications, employment rates, earnings and incomes between those from different 
occupational social classes.
  ❍ Information on the social class of children’s parents is not available from the Annual 
School Census we have used to look at educational attainment at 16.161 Whether 
children receive Free School Meals is one indicator of parental background. The median 
attainment of boys receiving Free School Meals is 26 places out of 100, and that of girls 
receiving Free School Meals 28 places below that of other pupils in England, and the 
gap is similar in Wales. 
  ❍ More than half of those in higher managerial and professional households have degrees 
as their highest qualiﬁ  cation, compared to less than 5 per cent of those in routine or 
semi-routine occupation households. More than a third of those in the latter groups 
have no qualiﬁ  cations above Level 1.
  ❍ The most striking difference in employment status is that around two-thirds of women 
in higher or lower managerial or professional households work full-time and only about 
a ﬁ  fth part-time. By contrast, women in routine or semi-routine households are more 
likely to work part-time than full-time. Those in households classiﬁ  ed as in routine 
employment are much more likely to be economically inactive looking after family or 
home than women in higher occupational classes.
161  In Chapter 11 we look at evidence from longitudinal surveys which have followed children’s performance 
over the school years that do include such information. An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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  ❍ The median hourly wage for men in higher professional and managerial households 
is 78 per cent higher than the median for all men; the median for women in the same 
group is 153 per cent higher than the median for all women. The highest paid tenth of 
men in the top group are paid £37 per hour or more, 3.7 times overall median wages. 
Only a tenth of this group of men have wages below the overall male median. Men in 
routine or semi-routine occupation households have median wages of £7.60-7.80 per 
hour, and women £6-6.60, in the bottom third of the overall distribution for men and 
bottom fifth for women.
  ❍ For men, the gradient between household occupational groups in full-time weekly 
earnings is slightly less than that in hourly wages: median earnings for men in higher 
professional or managerial households is 2.3 times the median for men in routine 
occupation households, compared to the hourly wage differential of 2.5. However, 
median full-time earnings for women from higher professional or managerial 
households is 2.8 times as much as the median for women in routine occupation 
households, compared to a differential of 2.5 in hourly wages.
  ❍ The median net individual income for men from higher managerial or professional 
households is £578 per week, more than twice that of men from routine occupation 
households, £268 per week. For women, the differential is even larger: £471 compared 
to £157. Half of men and nearly half of women from higher professional/managerial 
households are in the top tenth of the overall distribution. Two-thirds of women from 
routine and semi-routine occupation households have individual incomes in the bottom 
half overall. Most men and women from households classed as ‘never worked or long-
term unemployed’ have incomes in the bottom ﬁ  fth of the overall distribution.
  ❍ The median equivalent net income for those in higher professional and managerial 
households is 1.8 times the median for those in routine occupation households. The 
spread within each occupational social class group is substantial (particularly for those 
who are self-employed). Income for the best-off tenth within the top group exceeds 
£1,400 per week. People in households classed as, never having worked/long-term 
unemployed, are the poorest group, with half in the bottom ﬁ  fth of the overall income 
distribution.
  ❍ Differences between occupational social classes in total household wealth are 
very large indeed. Median total net wealth for households (of all ages) in routine 
occupations is £74,000, but for those in higher professional and managerial households, 
it is more than £450,000. The most wealthy tenth of the latter groups have net wealth 
of over £1.4 million. 
In Chapter 11, we look, in particular, at how differences in outcomes between groups defined 
in terms of indicators of social advantage and disadvantage develop across the life cycle 
during childhood and adulthood, and at how the levels of wealth accumulated just before 
retirement vary by occupational social class. 245
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9.7 Housing  tenure
Housing tenure also has a dual role both as something that shapes people’s lives and as 
an outcome of their levels of advantage and disadvantage in other respects. In particular, 
access to social housing has been heavily rationed towards those in the greatest need for 
the last quarter century, and access to owner-occupation depends on capacity to borrow a 
mortgage and sometimes on inheritance or help from families. As a result, there are now very 
substantial differences in economic outcomes between those living in different tenures, and 
these often reflect other characteristics.
  ❍ Only 4 per cent of those living in social housing have degrees, compared to more than 
20 per cent of owner-occupiers. Nearly half of social tenants have no qualiﬁ  cations 
above Level 1, compared to fewer than 20 per cent of owners.
  ❍ Only half of men and 42 per cent of women living in social housing are in paid work, 
compared to 89 per cent of men and 81 per cent of women in households with a 
mortgage. Social tenants have strikingly higher rates of inactivity due to disability and 
long-term sickness than people in other tenures. Among women of working age, more 
than twice the proportion of social tenants compared to owner-occupiers are inactive 
because they are looking after family.
  ❍ Looking at hourly wages, the median for women living in social housing is in the 
bottom 20 per cent of the overall distribution. By contrast, the median for men who are 
owner-occupiers is within the top 35 per cent of the overall distribution. 
  ❍ Looking at net individual incomes, the median for male social tenants is less than half 
the median of male mortgagors. For women, the corresponding proportion is 60 per 
cent.
  ❍ On a Before Housing Costs basis, social tenants have a median equivalent net income 
of £270, and mortgagors a median of £476. On an After Housing Costs basis, the 
ﬁ  gures are around £205 and £390, respectively. A third of social tenants have incomes 
below the ofﬁ  cial poverty line. According to their median incomes, social tenants are 
typically 22-33 places below outright owners and 36-38 places below mortgagors in the 
overall distribution, depending on whether a Before or an After Housing Costs basis is 
used. The spread of incomes is widest within the private rented sector.
  ❍ Social tenant households have a median total household wealth of £18,000, 
compared to £411,000 for outright owners. A tenth of outright owners have total 
wealth of more than £1.23 million, while 90 per cent of social tenants have wealth of 
less than £105,000 (including private pension rights).
These findings confirm high levels of disadvantage in the social housing sector. They reflect 
the role of the sector in providing decent homes and secure tenancies for people on low 
incomes. We would expect a higher proportion of people who are disabled or sick to be living 
in social housing, for instance. The statistics do not show us whether social housing in itself 
contributes to better lives for some people, or limits opportunities and outcomes for others. 
Are low qualifications the product of being in social housing, perhaps partly a function of 
school quality in some social housing areas, or simply a reflection of other disadvantage? Are An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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lower employment and higher caring rates among female tenants a reflection of their weaker 
labour market position and greater caring demands, or does subsidised housing enable caring 
roles that would not be not possible with the pressures of paying a mortgage or private rents?
In Box 11.1 in Chapter 11, we report results from a recent study which looked at outcomes 
in adulthood for people who grew up in social housing.162 This found that most of the 
differences from those growing up in other tenures could be explained by factors other than 
housing tenure, but some statistical associations (especially on economic outcomes) remained 
between childhood social housing tenure and later disadvantage even after taking these 
factors into account. However, what is behind these associations is unclear, which limits the 
conclusions that can be drawn for the development of policy. What the figures do suggest, 
however, is the high level of need in social housing, and thus the need and opportunity to 
support tenants’ life chances. Addressing the disadvantage of social housing tenants is clearly 
an important component of addressing overall disadvantage, although, of course, not all 
disadvantaged individuals are in social housing.
Our findings also underline the enormous differences in wealth between those living in 
different tenure. In Chapter 11, we look in a little more detail at how these differences develop 
across the life cycle. Those who have not been able to buy their own home lag far in the 
wealth distribution. As the new figures for wealth distribution we present here show, inequality 
in housing wealth represent one of the starkest inequalities in Britain. However, social tenants 
do not only lack housing wealth – they have very low levels of other kinds of asset as well. 35 
per cent of people in the Wealth and Asset Survey with zero or negative wealth live in social 
housing. 
9.8  Nation and region
Commitments to social justice formed part of the basis of devolution. The Government of 
Wales Act 1998 has a principal equality clause, unique among devolution statutes, requiring 
government to take a proactive stance and promote equality for all persons and in respect 
of all Welsh Assembly Government functions. The Scotland Act 1998 empowers the Scottish 
Parliament to encourage equal opportunities and to impose duties on public authorities to 
ensure that functions are carried out with due regard to equal opportunity requirements. 
In Scotland equal opportunities are defined as, “the prevention, elimination or regulation 
of discrimination between persons on grounds of sex or marital status, on racial grounds, 
on grounds of disability, sexual orientation, language or social origin, or of other personal 
attributes, including beliefs or opinions, such as religious beliefs or political opinions”. In 
Chapter 10, we discuss whether trends in inequality have differed between the four nations of 
the UK over the period including devolution. In terms of several of the indicators we examine 
in this report, differences in the most recent position between them are generally smaller than 
between groups defined in other ways.
162 Lupton,  Tunstall,  et al. (2009).247
Chapter 9   The position of different groups – a cross-cutting summary
9
  ❍ As the four nations have different examination and/or assessment systems, it is hard 
to compare educational attainment at 16 between them. Gender gaps and ethnic 
differences in attainment appear to be smaller in Scotland than in England. Within 
Scotland, pupils attending schools located in larger urban areas typically do less well, 
and those attending schools located in remote rural areas better than the national 
average. Differences in the highest qualiﬁ  cations of the working age population are 
relatively small, although Scotland has the largest proportion (25 per cent) with some 
form of higher education qualiﬁ  cation, compared to less than 20 per cent elsewhere.
  ❍ Scotland has the highest levels of employment between the nations, and Northern 
Ireland the highest levels of inactivity due to disability or sickness.
  ❍ Median hourly wages for men are lowest in Northern Ireland of the four nations, but 
lowest for women in Wales.
  ❍ The distribution of net individual incomes does not vary so greatly between the four 
nations, although the median is somewhat higher in England for men than elsewhere.
  ❍ England has a median equivalent net income (Before Housing Costs) that is 10 per 
cent higher than the medians for Wales and Northern Ireland, and 2 per cent higher 
than Scotland’s median. However, the cost of living in 2004 was 4-7 per cent lower 
in Northern Ireland Scotland and Wales than in England, so that standard of living 
differences will be smaller. Income inequality is greater in England than in the other 
nations. 
  ❍ Median total household wealth is £151,000 in Scotland, £206,000 in Wales and 
£211,000 in England. 
Looking across the English regions does not suggest a simple ‘North-South divide’ in 
outcomes and their inequality, but there are often differences between London and the South 
East and other regions. Inequality in any dimension is wider in London than in any other 
region. Within England, regional differences in educational outcomes at 16 and in the highest 
qualifications of the adult population are relatively small. For other indicators there are larger 
variations, particularly between London and the South East and elsewhere:
  ❍ London has a much lower level of part-time employment, and the North East the 
highest level of inactivity due to disability or sickness.
  ❍ For men, the median male hourly wage in the North East is 73 per cent of the median 
for London; for women, the corresponding fraction is only 66 per cent.
  ❍ For men, the median net individual income in the North East is only 75 per cent of the 
median for the South East. Differentials for women are smaller: the median for the West 
Midlands is 86 per cent of the South East’s median. Inequality in individual incomes is 
twice as large in London as in the other English regions.
  ❍ Median equivalent net income in the North East is only 77 per cent of the median for 
the South East. This is a much larger difference than in cost of living, which was only 12 
per cent higher in the South East in 2004. London has by far the most unequal income 
distribution: the highest incomes in London are above those in all the other regions 
apart from the South East, but the lowest incomes in London are little different from 
elsewhere. Incomes measured After Housing Costs are more unequal than those Before 
Housing Costs overall and within nations and regions.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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  ❍ Median total household wealth is £288,000 in the South East, 1.7 times that in the 
North West. Wealth inequality is very high in all regions, but especially in London, with a 
tenth of households with little or no wealth, and a tenth having more than £934,000.
9.9 Area  deprivation
By contrast with relatively small regional differences, in all of the outcomes we examine, from 
education at 16 to equivalent net incomes, there are profound differences at neighbourhood 
level, between those with higher and lower levels of deprivation. Even allowing for the way 
in which average levels of qualifications, employment and incomes form part of the indices 
used to establish which are the most and least disadvantaged areas, the differences between 
them were some of the most striking that we showed in Chapters 3-8. The classifications of 
areas are different between England, Scotland and Wales, so we look at them separately. 
The figures for equivalent net income and wealth by area deprivation are only available for 
England.
  ❍ There are very large differences in educational attainment at 16 for both boys and 
girls between results divided by deprivation level of the neighbourhood where children 
live – of 35 places (out of 100) in typical rankings between those from the least and 
most deprived areas in England, and even larger differences in Wales. In Scotland, the 
difference is equivalent to traversing half of the overall range in performance at 16.
  ❍ Differences in highest qualiﬁ  cations between areas ranked by level of deprivation are 
considerable. In each nation nearly 30 per cent of those living in the most deprived 
areas have no qualiﬁ  cations at all, but 7 per cent or fewer in the least deprived areas.
  ❍ In the most deprived tenth of areas in England, only 55 per of adults of working age 
are employed and a quarter are economically inactive because of disability, sickness, or 
looking after family or home.
  ❍ People living in the most deprived areas of England, Scotland and Wales, have a median 
hourly wage that is 40 per cent less than the median for those living in the least 
deprived areas. The gap in median earnings between most and least deprived areas is 
equivalent to around 34 places out of 100 in England but nearly 40 places in Scotland. 
There is relatively little difference between kinds of area in low wages, but large ones for 
the best paid. As a result there is much more inequality within the least than the most 
deprived areas. 
  ❍ The median net individual income for the least deprived areas in England and 
Scotland is 70 per cent higher than the median for the most deprived areas, and 56 per 
cent higher in Wales. There are even larger differences between those with the highest 
incomes in each kind of area, but much less variation in the lowest incomes, so income 
inequality is much higher in the least deprived areas.
  ❍ There is a very strong gradient in equivalent net income by area deprivation within 
England. Median income in the most deprived tenth of areas is £281, compared with 
£396 for England as a whole, and £533 in the least deprived tenth of areas.249
Chapter 9   The position of different groups – a cross-cutting summary
9
  ❍ There is an even stronger gradient in total household wealth by area deprivation 
within England. Median total household wealth in the most deprived tenth of areas is 
£34,000. In the least deprived tenth of areas, it is £481,000.
The differences between people living in the poorest and richest areas are some of the most 
dramatic that our work reveals. For all of the outcomes, there is a steady gradient by area 
deprivation, with the median for the least deprived tenth areas being higher than for the 
next least deprived tenth and so on (so it is not the case that it is only the most deprived 
tenth of areas that lag behind the others). The differences between top and bottom are very 
pronounced, ranging from the median for hourly wages in the least deprived tenth of areas 
being 64 per cent higher than the median in the most deprived areas, to a corresponding 
ratio of 14 to 1 for total net wealth. Of course, some gradient would be expected, since the 
measures which define whether areas are advantaged and disadvantaged include indicators 
related to some of our outcomes measures. Even so, some of the differences are startling.
From such evidence one cannot conclude that it is the characteristics of low-income areas 
which cause inequalities between people.163 However, the main thing to draw from the 
findings is the very large disparity between the collective resources (both human and financial 
capital) of communities living in different kinds of area. These disparities manifest in lower 
private investment, for example, in shops and services, and less ability to support high value 
employment, as well as much greater needs for subsidised facilities and public services. A 
key policy implication is to examine whether disparities in public investment between areas 
parallel the inequalities in private resources. Schools and other education services seem a 
pressing priority, given very large gaps in the educational success rate between areas and the 
importance of education for future life chances.
9.10 Overview
Tables 9.1 to 9.3 bring together some of our findings for different outcomes in a comparable 
form across the various kinds of social group. They compare differences in median outcomes 
between groups, levels of inequality within groups, and the positions of median outcomes 
for each group within the distributions for the whole population. These allow us to see which 
patterns are common across all the outcomes, but also where they differ.
Table 9.1 brings together some of the findings for wages, earnings, incomes and wealth in a 
way that allows us to compare median outcomes between groups of the population split in 
different ways. It shows for each classification of the population, the median for each group 
as a percentage of the overall median outcome for the population as a whole. For example, 
163  There are numerous studies which have attempted to disentangle whether neighbourhood characteristics 
have any independent effect on people’s outcomes, or whether worse aggregate outcomes in poorer areas 
simply arise because the people and households who live there are more disadvantaged to start off with. 
Examples include Buck (2001), McCulloch (2001) and Bolster et al. (2007). Reviews of the evidence (e.g. 
Galster, 2007) tend to suggest that it is inconsistent and that where neighbourhood effects are found, 
they are small relative to individual and household factors. There are, however, substantial methodological 








   
median men’s hourly wages are 113 per cent of the median for all employees, while men’s 
weekly full-time earnings are 110 per cent of median earnings for all full-time employees. We 
cannot compare educational and employment outcomes in this kind of way, so the table has 
five columns. For brevity, we omit some classifications, and show the breakdowns by area 
deprivation only for England. For the non-gender breakdowns, we present results for the whole 
population; information for men and women separately in each category can be found in the 
tables in Chapters 5 to 7.














a) Overall median £9.88 £448 £223 £393 £204,500
b) Gender
Male 113 110 126 103 n/a
Female 90 86 81 97 n/a
c) Age (bottom of range)5
16 54 48 43 93
6
20 73 68 81 111
25 99 93 116 121
32
30 114 110 130 117
35 115 114 131 110
86
40 114 114 131 110
45 110 110 129 116
141
50 108 109 118 121
55 100 99 100 108
203
60 92 92 85 95
65 76 82 79 87
150
70 65 64 78 82
d) Disability
Not disabled 101 101 112 105 (107)6 103
DDA and WLD 85 85 65 82 (75)6 97
e) Ethnicity (selected)7
White British 101 101 101 105 108
Indian 103 101 97 106 99
Pakistani 80 78 59
61
47
Bangladeshi 74 75 56 7
Black Caribbean 106 98 97 91 37
Black African 98 97 98 89 10
Chinese 111 113 92 97 32251
















f) Occupational social class8
Higher managerial and 
professional
191 167 242 174 220
Lower managerial and 
professional
135 118 171 145 159
Intermediate 90 77 115 121 98
Lower supervisory/technical 90 88 137 114 79
Semi-routine 69 65 95 99 42
Routine 70 73 101 96 36
Never worked, etc 59 79 38 63 7
g) Housing tenure
Social housing 71 70 69 67 9
Private rented 87 85 93 87 12
Owned outright 95 95 90 96 201
Owned with mortgage 112 110 134 121 132
h) Area deprivation 
(England)9
Most deprived tenth 78 75 76 71 16
2nd 84 82 86 83 30
3rd 91 89 93 88 60
4th 95 95 98 100 78
5th 99 99 103 101 108
6th 105 105 106 108 137
7th 107 109 111 109 154
8th 111 114 114 114 160
9th 117 118 120 120 193
Least deprived tenth 128 132 129 136 235
Notes:
1.  Source: LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.
2.  Source: Individual Income series 2005-06/2007-08 at 2008 prices.
3.  Source: DWP from HBAI dataset.
4.  Source: ONS from Wealth and Assets Survey 2006-08.
5.  Age ranges for equivalent net income are one year higher. Wealth gives the total wealth by age of 
  the household reference person; this is only available in 10 year age bands.
6.  Equivalent net income categories are by whether DDA-disabled or not DDA-disabled. Figures in 
  brackets are for positions excluding extra costs beneﬁ  ts.
7. Deﬁ  nitions of categories vary between surveys. Net equivalent income ﬁ  gures are for adults within 
  whole population distribution.
8.  Net equivalent income ﬁ  gures are for adults within whole population distribution. 
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Looking at each panel in turn, some clear stories emerge:
  ❍ Women have a median hourly wage which is about 80 per cent of the median for men 
and a median net individual income which is only 64 per cent of men’s. Even with the 
assumption of equal sharing within the household, women’s median equivalent net 
income is 6 per cent less than that of men.
  ❍ For those in employment, median wages and earnings are highest between 35 and 44, 
and both young and older workers are typically a long way down the distributions of 
earnings and individual incomes. Allowing for household circumstances moderates this 
picture considerably for the youngest groups, and it is those in their late twenties and 
early ﬁ  fties who emerge as the best off: there is a dip in equivalent incomes over the 
age range at which most families have children. Wealth shows a different pattern, with 
an even stronger age-related pattern and highest levels for those aged 55-64.
  ❍ Among those who are disabled (in terms of both the DDA deﬁ  nition and having a work-
limiting condition), median wages and earnings are 16 per cent less than the medians 
for non-disabled people. For all disabled adults, median net individual incomes are even 
lower, only 58 per cent of that for non-disabled adults. If beneﬁ  ts paid to compensate 
for the costs of disability are excluded, disabled people (on the DDA deﬁ  nition) have a 
median equivalent net income that is 30 per cent below the median for non-disabled 
people. For household wealth, the corresponding differential is 6 per cent.
  ❍ Median wages, earnings and incomes of Bangladeshi and Pakistani adults are between 
56 and 80 per cent of the national medians. Unlike some of the other comparisons, the 
differential for median equivalent net income remains nearly 40 per cent, taking the 
two groups together. Indian and Chinese employees have median wages and earnings 
above the national median. For Indian adults median individual income is also above 
the national median, but for Chinese adults it is below it. Although the median hourly 
wage for Black Caribbean and Black African employees is close to the national median, 
the medians for other groups fall below it. Ethnic differences in wealth levels are very 
large indeed.
  ❍ Differences by occupational social class are consistently the largest of any of the 
breakdowns we have looked at. People living in higher professional and managerial 
households have median wages, earnings and incomes at least two-thirds higher 
than the national medians, and a median wealth that is twice as high. Those from 
semi-routine and routine occupation households have much lower median wages and 
earnings relative to the national median than they do incomes, but even lower relative 
wealth levels. Those in the category of ‘never worked’ or ‘not classiﬁ  ed’ have median 
wages, earnings, income and wealth that fall far below the national medians.
  ❍ Social tenants have median wages, earnings and incomes that are consistently around 
only 70 per cent of the national median, while the median for owners with a mortgage 
is 10-34 per cent above it. The wealth differences are again far larger, with social 
tenants having median wealth only 9 per cent of the national median, but the median 
for outright owners is twice the national ﬁ  gure.253
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  ❍ In all of the outcomes we have examined there are very large and consistent differences 
between areas by level of deprivation, with those in the most deprived tenth of areas 
having median wages, earnings and incomes around 25 per cent below the national 
medians, while the medians for those in the least deprived areas are more than 25 per 
cent above the national medians. Median total wealth in the most deprived areas in 
England is a sixth of the national median; in the least deprived areas, it is more than 
twice the national median.
For some groups then, the pattern of disadvantage is consistent across the outcomes – 
disabled people, Pakistani and Bangladeshi people, social tenants, and those living in the 
most deprived areas. For others – young people, women, and those in routine or semi-routine 
occupation households, disadvantage appears moderated when it comes to equivalent net 
income, based on household resources (and assuming that these are equally shared). In nearly 
all cases, the differences seen in earnings and incomes are greatly magnified when it comes 
to wealth.
Table 9.2 gives an alternative way of looking at these differences in outcomes, including 
some of those relating to education. It shows how many places out of 100 above or below 
(if the number is negative) the middle of the overall distribution the median member of each 
group would be found. Thus, in terms of hourly wages for all employees, in the third column 
of figures, the median wage for men is 8 places above the middle, but the median wage for 
women is 8 places below it. For highest qualification level, we show instead (in italics) the 
differences between the percentages of the group with higher educational qualifications 
and with no qualifications above Level 1 (28 per cent and 24 per cent of the working age 
population respectively). For reference, the top row of the table shows how much a movement 
of 10 places up or down around the median is ‘worth’ in terms of the percentage difference 
it would make to the last five outcomes. Thus, for those around the middle of the overall 
distribution, being 10 places higher up would mean wages or equivalent income would be 15 
per cent more, but that wealth would be 33 per cent greater.
The patterns for wages, earnings and incomes are, of course, closely related to those shown 
in Table 9.2. But the table also shows that many of the differences in positions in the wealth 
distribution are much more comparable to those in the other outcomes: it is the scale of 
wealth inequality that magnifies the effect of differences in position to create the much 
larger differences in actual levels of wealth seen in the previous table. Thus, for instance, 
the median people from higher professional households are ranked at only 24 places above 
the middle of the overall wealth ranking, compared to 34 places above in the equivalent 
net income distribution, but this translates into their median wealth being more than twice 
the national median, because each place in the wealth ranking corresponds to such a large 
amount in absolute terms. When looked at by area deprivation, however, the gradients in 








The other striking feature of the table is the way in which the ranking of different groups 
in terms of education and qualifications often does not translate into the differences one 
might expect in the labour market. Differences in qualifications by disability status, social 
class, housing tenure and area deprivation are in the same direction as those in wages and 
earnings. But women have better educational outcomes at 16, and qualifications that match 
those of men across the working age population, but worse outcomes in the labour market. 
The educational advantages of Indian and Chinese people are not so strongly reflected in the 
labour market. Some of this disjuncture between educational achievement and the labour 
market was discussed in Boxes 9.2 and 9.3; we explore other aspects of it in Chapter 11. 






















Value of 10 place 
change at the 
median (as % of 
median)
n/a n/a 14 15 19 15 36
a) Gender
Male -3 4 8 6 12 2 n/a
Female 3 6 -8 -11 -11 -2 n/a
b) Age (bottom of 
range)7
16 n/a -24 -42 -44 -32 -5
-38
20 n/a 6 -23 -28 -11 7
25 n/a 19 -1 -6 7 13
-22
30 n/a 19 8 6 14 11
35 n/a 12 9 9 14 7
-5
40 n/a 11 8 9 14 7
45 n/a 7 6 6 13 10
10
50 n/a 2 55 9 1 3
55 n/a -6 -1 -1 - 5
22
60 n/a -14 -6 -6 -9 -4
65 n/a -27 -20 -14 -12 -10
12
70 n/a -23 -31 -31 -14 -15
c) Disability
Not disabled n/a 10 1 - 6 +3(+4)8 0
DDA and WLD n/a -29 -12 -12 -20 -14(-19)8 -1255

























White British - 7 -- - 32
Indian 18 5 2 - -2 4 -1
Pakistani -4 -24 -16 -18 -23
-32
-17
Bangladeshi - -33 -23 -21 -25 -37
Black Caribbean -10 - 3 -2 -2 -7 -20
Black African -3 6 -2 -3 -1 n/a -34





n/a 65 35 32 40 34 24
Lower managerial 
and professional
n/a 44 18 11 27 25 14
Intermediate n/a 10 -8 -19 7 13 -1
Lower supervisory/
technical
n/a -12 -8 -9 16 9 -7
Semi-routine n/a -23 -27 -30 -4 -1 -18
Routine n/a -40 -26 -23 - -3 -20
Never worked, etc n/a -27 -37 -18 -35 -30 -37
f) Housing tenure
Social housing n/a -38 -25 -26 -17 -25 -35
Private rented n/a 1 -11 -12 -4 7 -32
Owned outright n/a 8 -4 -4 -6 -3 21
Owned with 
mortgage
n/a 17 [+7] 6 15 13 8




























-16 -30 -19 -14 -14 -23 -29
2nd -13 -18 -13 -9 -8 -13 -22
3rd -10 -7 -7 -5 -5 -9 -13
4th -4 -1 -4 -2 -2 -1 -7
5th - 3 -1 -1 1 0 2
6th 3 10 32 2 5 9
7th 7 4 44 5 61 3
8th 11 18 75 7 91 4
9th 14 21 10 8 9 13 20
Least deprived 
tenth
20 27 15 12 13 21 26
Notes:
1. Source:  DCSF.
2.  Source: LFS 2006-2008. Highest qualiﬁ  cation numbers in italics are the difference between 
  proportion of the working age population with at least higher education and proportion with no 
 qualiﬁ  cations above Level 1.
3.  Source: LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.
4.  Source: Individual Income series 2005-06/2007-08 at 2008 prices.
5.  Source: DWP from HBAI dataset.
6.  Source: ONS from Wealth and Assets Survey 2006-08.
7.  Age ranges for net equivalent income are one year higher.
8.  Net equivalent income categories are by whether DDA-disabled or not DDA-disabled. Figures in 
  brackets are for positions excluding extra costs beneﬁ  ts.
9. Deﬁ  nitions of categories vary between surveys. Net equivalent income ﬁ  gures are for adults within 
  whole population distribution.
10.  Net equivalent income ﬁ  gures are for adults within whole population distribution. 
11.  By IDACI for Key Stage 4 results, but IMD for other breakdowns.
A second main theme that emerged in Chapters 3 to 8 was the scale of variation in outcomes 
within the different groups we have defined. Table 9.3 shows in a similar format to Table 9.1 
the 90:10 ratios within each category for the five earnings, income and wealth outcomes 
we have concentrated on. In the first row of the table we show the 90:10 ratios for each 
outcome for the population as a whole. Comparing these with the numbers below shows 
whether inequality within each group is lower or higher than it is across the whole population. 
If differences between groups defined in some of these kinds of way were the main drivers 
of inequality in the population as a whole, we would expect to see lower ratios for inequality 
within each sub-group. However, this is rarely the case. As a generality, what the table brings 
out starkly is the extent to which inequality in the outcomes is usually much the same – 
sometimes even higher – within each sub-group as it is within the whole population. 257
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There are exceptions to this, such as within the Bangladeshi and Pakistani populations,164 
but particularly when the groups in themselves are part of what delineates economic 
disadvantage: lower occupational social classes, social housing, and the most deprived areas 
have somewhat less inequality within them than the national figures.165 But what the table 
makes clear is that while one aspect of inequality is the systematic differences in median 
outcomes we have shown in Table 9.1, another is that inequality within each group is usually a 
microcosm of economic inequality within the whole society.














a) All 3.9 3.7 9.6 4.2 97
b) Gender
Male 4.1 3.7 7.7 4.3 n/a
Female 3.5 3.5 8.9 4.2 n/a
c) Age (bottom of range)5
16 2.5 2.7 * 3.7
46
20 2.4 2.4 18.4 3.9
25 3 2.8 8.3 4.1
80
30 3.6 3.3 9.9 4.5
35 4 3.7 9.7 4.4
77
40 4.1 3.9 9.9 4.2
45 4 3.8 9.4 4.3
68
50 4 3.8 12.2 4.8
55 3.8 3.6 19.1 5.3
48
60 3.6 3.4 8.6 4.4
65 3.9 3.7 6.4 3.4
37
70 4 N/A 5.9 3.1
d) Disability
Not disabled 3.9 3.7 10.6 4.3 (4.4)6 84
DDA and WLD 3.3 3.4 7.2 3.4 (3.7)6 104
164  In terms of hourly wages and equivalent net incomes. Inequality in net individual income in terms of the 
90:10 ratios shown in Table 9.3 is very high – or undeﬁ  ned – for these groups because signiﬁ  cant numbers of 
adults within them have little or no income received in their own right.
165  For total net wealth, inequality as measured by the 90:10 ratio is greatest in more deprived areas, as the 
























White British 3.9 3.7 9.2 4.1 72
Indian 4.1 4.1 32 5.4 57
Pakistani 3.8 3.8 *
3.6
n/a
Bangladeshi 3.4 * 159 n/a
Black Caribbean 3.4 3 10.3 4 183
Black African 3.4 3.1 28 4.1 n/a
Chinese 4.7 4.3 320 6.4 n/a
f) Occupational social class8
Higher managerial and 
professional
3.3 3.4 4.3 4.1 25
Lower managerial and 
professional
3 2.9 3.7 3.3 31
Intermediate 2.4 2.4 3.6 2.9 44
Lower supervisory/ technical 2.7 2.8 3.5 2.8 60
Semi-routine 2.2 2.5 4.4 3.1 88
Routine 2.3 2.7 5.5 3.2 92
Never worked, etc 3.5 4 * 3.6 117
g) Housing tenure
Social housing 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.6 - 2.7 42
Private rented 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.7 - 5.0 86
Owned outright 3.9 3.9 3.8 4.6 7
Owned with mortgage 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.8 12259
















h) Area deprivation 
(England)9
Most deprived tenth 2.8 2.9 8.9 3.3 104
2nd 3.1 3.2 8.8 3.6 112
3rd 3.3 3.2 8.7 3.7 71
4th 3.5 3.4 9.1 4.0 86
5th 3.6 3.5 9 4.1 52
6th 3.8 3.6 9.6 4.0 54
7th 4 3.7 10.5 4.1 38
8th 4.1 3.8 10.3 4.1 31
9th 4.4 4.1 10.9 4.2 23
Least deprived tenth 4.6 4.2 12.4 4.5 19
Notes:
* Denotes ratios which cannot be computed because the 10th percentile is zero.
1.  Source: LFS 2006-2008 at 2008 prices.
2.  Source: Individual Income series 2005-06/2007-08 at 2008 prices.
3.  Source: DWP from HBAI dataset.
4.  Source: ONS from Wealth and Assets Survey 2006-08.
5.  Age ranges for equivalent net income are one year higher. Wealth gives the total wealth by age of  
  the household reference person; this is only available in 10 year age bands.
6.  Equivalent net income categories are by whether DDA-disabled or not DDA-disabled. Figures in 
  brackets are for positions excluding extra costs beneﬁ  ts.
7. Deﬁ  nitions of categories vary between surveys. Net equivalent income ﬁ  gures are for adults within 
  whole population distribution. Wealth gives the total wealth by age of the household reference 
  person; this is only available in 10 year age bands.
8.  Net equivalent income ﬁ  gures are for adults within whole population distribution. 
9.  By IMD for all breakdowns.261
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Part 3 
Changes over time and the life cycle
Chapter 10  Changing patterns of inequalities
In the first part of this report we looked at how overall inequalities in the outcomes 
we are interested in have changed over time, particularly in recent years. In Part 2, we 
looked in detail at the most recent available information to present a picture of how 
outcomes vary both between social groups defined in different ways and within those 
groups. In Chapter 9, we presented a cross-cutting summary, comparing inequalities in 
each outcome across those social divides. In this chapter, we look at how that picture 
has changed over time, comparing where we can between the latest picture and that a 
decade ago. We also present analysis of which factors have been the most important 
contributors to the aggregate shifts in inequality in earnings and incomes over the last 
forty years. 
One of the key factors driving up labour market inequality has been ‘skill-biased technological 
change’ (where increased demand for workers with the skills to utilise new technologies has 
come at the expense of a reduced demand for less skilled workers) in many countries. The UK 
is no exception to this. Rising wage and/or employment inequalities resulting from this have 
become a feature of contemporary labour markets which interact globally. Different groups of 
workers have faced changing patterns of demand and supply which have caused inequalities 
in their economic outcomes to change, and we focus upon the results of this in some detail in 
this chapter.166
The detail of the picture we painted in the last two chapters was only possible because of 
recent improvements in the data collected in the large-scale surveys we were able to use.  
In some cases, comparable data covering many years into the past are not available.  
In Section 10.1, we look at trends in relative GCSE outcomes, and changes in the highest 
qualification levels of different groups and in their employment patterns. For educational 
outcomes at 16, we can only show broad trends, but for the second and third of these, we 
can make a direct comparison using equivalent data for 1995-1997 to that used in earlier 
chapters for 2005-2008.167 This covers a period of continuing economic growth and, of course, 
the period since change of government in 1997. The comparisons we can make are still 
somewhat limited, however, as older surveys either did not collect information on particular 
characteristics, or collected it in a form which cannot be compared with more recent data.  
The main comparisons we can make are by gender, age, ethnicity, and nation or region, 
166  Katz and Autor (1999) Machin and Van Reenen (2008).
167  In making these comparisons, we are doing so between those with similar characteristics at the dates of 
each survey, not between the same people later in life. See Chapter 11 for evidence from surveys that have 
followed the lives of the same people over time.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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although we include others where possible. Unfortunately, we cannot compare the striking 
differences between those living in more or less disadvantaged areas that we saw in Chapters 
3 to 8 with the position in earlier years.168
In Section 10.2, we look at inequality patterns between and within groups across four further 
outcomes – hourly wages, weekly earnings, individual incomes and equivalent incomes – 
again looking back over the last eleven years using equivalent data, and taking a cross-cutting 
view as in the last chapter. (None of the sources of data has been running long enough to 
provide a comparison of wealth inequalities over time on a comparable basis.) In Section 
10.3 we look in more detail at which groups have generally been ‘winners’ or ‘losers’ over 
the period and whether the pattern was the same for the better and worse off within each 
group. We do this by looking at how the positions of those who are better or worse off within 
each group have changed in terms of their rankings within the distribution for the population 
as a whole. Have, say, those near the bottom of the group moved up or down the overall 
distribution by as much as those in the middle of the group?
In Section 10.4, we take a longer perspective, looking specifically at earnings and income 
inequality since 1968. This section examines the extent to which the changes in overall 
inequality over this period can be attributed to changing differences between groups and to 
what extent they have been associated with changes in distribution within groups.
In examining these results, readers will have different views of whether they regard one kind 
of change as being more important than the other, or see both as equally important. For 
some, differences in the outcomes for groups that reflect what should be irrelevant factors – 
such as between ethnic groups – violate the most fundamental principles of social justice. The 
key issue is then whether gaps between groups have narrowed. For other readers, even if all 
gaps of this kind between groups were eliminated, if substantial inequalities remained within 
groups, the resulting distribution would still not be regarded as fair, as society as a whole 
would remain more unequal than they thought was just. Such differences in view can affect 
interpretation of trends in different kinds of inequality, when they move in opposite directions. 
For instance, we show in Section 10.4 (Table 10.17) that one factor which acted against 
growing earnings inequality in the last forty years was a reduction in the gap in average 
earnings between groups defined by gender and marital status. This is linked to the decline in 
the gender wage gap (see Box 10.1). But at the same time, there was a considerable increase 
in inequality within each of these groups by gender and marital status. For some readers, 
the main change would be that the gaps between groups, for instance women and men, had 
closed considerably over the last forty years but, for others, this would be tempered by the 
widening differences between, say, married women for much of the same period. 
168  This is because the area markers in earlier versions of the surveys we use do not match the areas used in the 
deprivation indices on a consistent basis.263
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All of this analysis relates to the past – but so, of course, does the ‘current’ picture we 
presented in Chapters 3 to 9. In this kind of analysis we are always looking in a rear-view 
mirror, and the most recent information available to us generally relates to the three years 
ending in 2008 or the financial year 2007-08. This was, of course, immediately before the 
recession started. Since then many things have been in flux and it will be some time before it 
will be possible to see how the position reached at the end of the long period of growth has 
changed. There are, however, some indications from the experience of previous recessions 
and from early data on what has happened in the last year which suggest which groups could 
be worst affected by this one, together with some early data on its initial effects. We discuss 
these in Section 10.5.
A summary of its key points is included at the end of each section.
10.1  Recent trends in education and employment outcomes
(a)  Educational outcomes at age 16
Information on the spread of children’s exam results at 16 (GCSEs and their Scottish 
equivalents) is not available for earlier years in the form we presented in Chapter 3. However, 
there is some information of trends in a simpler indicator, the proportion of children 
(in England) achieving five or more GCSE passes at grades A*-C. Figure 10.1 shows the 
proportion of boys and girls reaching this standard from 1998 to 2008, the year we presented 
information for in Chapter 3 above. For both boys and girls, the proportion increased, but 
slightly more rapidly for boys since 2003, so the gender gap in this measure narrowed a little 
from 10 to 9 percentage points over the period. An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 10.1: GCSE and equivalent attainment, by gender, England:
Percentage achieving 5+ A*-C grades
Trends in this indicator are also available by ethnicity – for broader ethnic groups since 1997, 
as shown in Figure 10.2(a) and since 2003 for a more detailed classification, as shown in 
Figure 10.2(b). From the first figure one striking feature is the extent to which the gap in 
this measure between White and Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Black169 children narrowed 
over the period, eventually reaching the position that by 2008 the proportions reaching this 
threshold were very similar (as were their typical overall points scores shown in Figure 3.2(a)). 
By contrast, the gap in favour of Indian and Chinese children was maintained, if anything 
slightly widening. The gaps between most of the groups shown in the second panel and the 
more narrowly defined White British group narrowed over the period, including with Black 
Caribbean and Black African Children. However, the proportions of Irish Traveller and Gypsy/
Roma children reaching the standard declined remarkably over this short period – from over 
40 per cent to under 20 per cent for the former group. Whilst the numbers of children involved 
are relatively small170, it is impossible not to find this disturbing: not only are these groups of 
children reaching a level that is so far behind other groups, but this position appears to have 
worsened considerably in the recent past.171
169  Data for the period up to 2002 come from the Youth Cohort Study, which uses these classiﬁ  cations, which 
are not broken down more ﬁ  nely.
170  In 2008, there were 438 Gypsy/Romany and 109 Travellers of Irish heritage pupils at Key Stage 4 according 
to the Annual School Census.
171  As we discuss in Chapter 11, Burgess, Wilson and Worth (2009) also show the way in which the most recent 
cohort of Traveller and Gypsy children reaching 16 had average assessments that fell further behind the 


































Source: DCSF from NPD.265
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Figure 10.2(a): GCSE and equivalent attainment, by ethnic group, England, 1997 to 2008:
Percentage achieving 5+ A*-C grades
Figure 10.2(b): GCSE and equivalent attainment, by ethnic group, England, 2003 to 2008:
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Using a different source, Figure 10.3 shows trends in this level of achievement by parental 
occupational social class for children in England and Wales, between 1989 and 1998 using 
one classification, and from 2000 to 2006 using the classification we used in the last six 
chapters (National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC)). In the first period, 
the gap between children with unskilled manual and with managerial/professional parents 
widened from 40 to 49 percentage points, but in the second the gap between children with 
parents in routine and in higher professional occupations narrowed from 48 to 39 percentage 
points. So while this gap remains very wide (and we discuss in Chapter 6 how it develops over 
the school years), there are signs that it has narrowed a little in recent years.172
Figure 10.3: GCSE and equivalent attainment, by parental occupation, England, 1989 to 2006:
Percentage achieving 5+ A*-C grades
While large, the achievement gap between children receiving and not receiving Free School 
Meals has also narrowed a little in the last few years. Figure 10.4(a) shows that looking at 
individual children, the gap fell from 31 percentage points in 2002 to 27 percentage points 
in 2008. Figure 10.4(b) shows the proportion of children achieving five or more A*-C grades 
by the proportion of children receiving free meals within the school. The most notable 
feature of this is that the gap between the groups of schools with the largest proportions 
of poor children – more than 20 per cent receiving free meals – and other schools narrowed 
substantially between 2002 and 2008. 
172  These data need to be treated with some caution because of the change in socio-economic classiﬁ  cation 
and the fact that parental occupational data are reported by young people rather than parents. There is 
year-on-year ﬂ  uctuation and it is impossible to know whether the narrowing of the gap in 2006 represents 
‘noise’ in the data or a longer-term trend. Nevertheless, the data show a modest improvement over the 













































Source: Lupton, Heath and Salter (2009) and DCSF.267
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Figure 10.4(a): GCSE and equivalent attainment, by Free School Meals (FSM) receipt, England, 
2002 to 2008:
Percentage achieving 5+ A*-C grades
Figure 10.4(b): GCSE and equivalent attainment by proportion of FSM pupils in the school, 
England, 1999 to 2008:
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Source: DCSF, Statistical First Release 32/2008.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Of course, there is considerable controversy about the extent to which the overall trends in 
this measure are the result of rising standards, ‘grade inflation’ or of more efficient ‘teaching 
to the test’. One factor which affects comparisons over time is the inclusion of a wider range 
of ‘GCSE-equivalent’ qualifications in recent years. However, so far as monitoring differences 
or gaps between groups, rather than levels, are concerned, these issues are generally less of 
a potential problem. Here there is some positive news: while we have already seen in Chapter 
3 that gaps in children’s attainment remain wide in terms of social class or of receipt of Free 
School Meals, those gaps are a little narrower than they were a few years ago. At the same 
time, some of the main ethnic gaps in attainment have narrowed, although the very poor and 
apparently deteriorating position of Traveller and Gypsy children is very disturbing.
(b)  Qualiﬁ  cations of the adult population
Using data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), we can look at how the proportions of the 
UK adult population with different levels of qualification changed between 1995-1997 and 
2006-2008. Table 10.1 shows for all men and women of working age and then for men 
and women in different age bands, the proportions with degrees or other higher education 
qualifications, and with no qualifications higher than Level 1.173 In general, what the table 
shows is a cohort effect – the higher qualification levels of those born more recently. There 
are some very large changes indeed, even over this comparatively short period, particularly for 
women. Women in their forties and fifties in 2006-2008 were up to 20 percentage points less 
likely to have only low or no qualifications than their predecessors just eleven years before. 
The proportion of women aged 25-34 with higher education qualifications was 15 percentage 
points higher. As a result, while in 1995-1997, more men than women had higher education 
qualifications in every age group above 25, by 2006-2008, more women than men had higher 
education qualifications in all the age groups up to age 44, and fewer had no or only low 
qualifications.
173  Figure 3.9 shows more detail for 2006-08.269
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Table 10.1: Highest qualifications, by gender and age, 1995-1997 and 2006-2008, 
percentage of the adult population

























21 28 27 24 6 -4
20-24 19 22 20 18 1 -3
25-29 25 24 34 20 9 -3
30-34 25 24 35 19 10 -5
35-39 24 23 31 22 7 -2
40-44 26 25 31 22 5 -3
45-49 25 27 30 22 5 -5
50-54 22 30 30 25 8 -6
55-59 17 35 27 26 10 -9
60-64 16 41 23 32 8 -9
65-69 25 34 22 37 -3 3




19 35 29 23 10 -12
20-24 19 20 24 17 5 -3
25-29 22 25 38 17 16 -9
30-34 23 27 38 18 15 -10
35-39 22 31 33 20 10 -11
40-44 23 38 32 21 9 -17
45-49 21 43 29 25 8 -19
50-54 17 50 29 31 13 -19
55-59 15 59 25 39 10 -20
60-64 16 56 21 45 5 -11
65-69 20 57 17 57 -3 0
70+ 19 60 21 52 2 -7
Source: LFS, UK. Reductions in proportions over time shown in bold.
Note: 1995-97: 12 quarters of LFS data, from beginning of 1995 to end of 1997. 
2006-08: 12 quarters of LFS data, from beginning of 2006 to end of 2008.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 10.2 shows a similar breakdown by ethnicity. We show the results separately for each 
period, as there have been some changes in the categories available between them. Care 
also needs to be taken with comparisons between the periods due to small sample numbers 
for some groups, especially in 1995-1997. There appear to have been large reductions in the 
proportion of Bangladeshi and Pakistani adults with low or no qualifications, albeit to levels 
which are still twice as high as for the population as a whole. With the exception of the Black 
Caribbean population, all the other groups show faster increases in the proportion with higher 
education than the White British population. By 2006-2008, greater proportions of the Indian, 
Other Asian, Black African, and Other Black, and Chinese populations had higher education 
than the White British population. However, fewer of the White British population had no or 
only low qualifications than any of the other groups shown (see Figure 3.9 for more detail).
Corresponding comparisons between the four nations of the UK and the English regions show 
very similar changes to the overall national picture over this period. In terms of nations, the 
most notable feature is that Scotland, already with the highest proportion of the population 
with higher education qualifications in 1995-1997, had the largest increase, by 10 percentage 
points, to 32 per cent. Within the English regions the North East and West Midlands had the 
fastest, and London the slowest fall in the proportion without qualifications. However, London 
also had the fastest rise in the proportion with higher education qualifications, from 26 per 
cent to 36 per cent.271
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Table 10.2: Highest qualifications, by ethnicity, 1995-1997 and 2006-2008, percentage of 
the working age population
Higher education 
and above
Level 1 or below/




White British 28 21 84.0
Other White 28 32 5.7
White and Black Caribbean 17 24 0.3
White and Black African 20 30 0.1
White and Asian 33 16 0.2
Other Mixed 37 20 0.2
Indian 34 29 2.2
Pakistani 18 43 1.5
Bangladeshi 14 48 0.5
Other Asian 30 36 0.8
Black Caribbean 25 25 1.0
Black African 35 29 1.2
Other Black 36 23 0.1
Chinese 45 28 0.5
Other 29 38 1.5
1995-97
White 20 30 94.2
Black – Caribbean 19 33 0.9
Black – African 26 33 0.6
Black – Other (non-mixed) 17 24 0.2
Black – Mixed 13 30 0.2
Indian 20 38 1.6
Pakistani 10 54 1.0
Bangladeshi 3 64 0.3
Chinese 29 34 0.3
Other – Asian (non-mixed) 19 41 0.3
Other – Other (non-mixed) 26 35 0.2
Other – Mixed 23 27 0.2
Source: LFS, UK.
Note: 1995-97: 12 quarters of LFS data, from beginning of 1995 to end of 1997. 
2006-08: 12 quarters of LFS data, from beginning of 2006 to end of 2008.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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(c) Employment
Table 10.3 compares the broad employment status of men and women in different age 
groups in 1995-1997 and 2006-2008. Over this period of more or less continuous economic 
growth, the main change was the rise of 2 percentage points in the proportion of the working 
age population employed or self-employed full-time, and a 2 percentage point decline in the 
proportion unemployed. The proportion inactive was unchanged. The rise in full-time paid 
work was greater for women, where it tended to replace inactivity, than it was for men, where 
it tended to replace unemployment (while men’s inactivity actually rose). By age, economic 
inactivity grew for 16-19 year-old men and women. Most of this was accounted for by rising 
numbers in education (and so not implying a rise in the numbers not in unemployment, 
education or training). It fell most for men aged 55-69 and women aged 50-64. The fastest 
rise in full-time paid work was for women aged 45-59 and for men aged 55-64. Part-time work 
rose slightly for men of most ages, but fell slightly for women aged 25-54. However, this did 
little to change the overall gender difference in part-time work, as we saw in Figure 4.1.
Table 10.4 shows a similar comparison by ethnicity. Again, we cannot make a precise 
comparison between the two periods, as the definitions of the different groups changed, and 
sample sizes were small for some of them in the earlier period. However, it appears that nearly 
all the gaps compared to the White British population narrowed over the period, although 
differences remain considerable for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations.
At a national and regional level most changes followed the UK average. However, full-time 
employment or self-employment rose by 4 percentage points in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland (to overtake England in the former case) and by 5 percentage points in the North East 
(but leaving it still with the lowest rate of any English region).
Looking back over a longer period, Richard Berthoud analyses the employment rates of 
disabled and non-disabled people with different levels of qualifications between 1974-76 and 
2001-03 (using limiting long-standing illness reported to the LFS as the measure of disability). 
The results of this are shown in Figure 10.5. The first panel shows that employment rates 
for non-disabled men fell between 1974-76 and 1988-90, particularly for those with low 
qualification levels. However, there was little further fall after 1988-90. For disabled men, 
the falls in employment rates were much larger, and continued after 1988-90. They were 
particularly marked for disabled men with no qualifications, whose employment rate halved 
between 1974-76 and 2001-03. 273
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72 4 8 16 73 6 5 17
16-19 29 22 13 36 21 20 12 47
20-24 65 7 13 15 61 11 10 18
25-29 82 2 9 7 82 4 5 8
30-34 85 2 7 6 87 3 4 7
35-39 85 2 7 6 86 3 3 7
40-44 84 2 6 8 87 2 3 8
45-49 84 2 5 9 85 3 3 9
50-54 78 2 6 14 81 3 3 13
55-59 64 4 7 26 70 5 3 21
60-64 41 5 4 50 48 8 2 42
65-69 8 5 1 86 13 8 1 79





40 27 5 29 44 26 4 26
16-19 20 30 10 39 14 30 9 47
20-24 50 14 7 29 47 18 6 29
25-29 50 18 5 27 56 17 4 24
30-34 39 27 5 29 47 25 4 25
35-39 38 32 4 26 43 30 3 24
40-44 43 31 4 22 46 31 3 20
45-49 45 30 3 22 50 29 2 19
50-54 38 30 3 29 48 27 2 23
55-59 26 26 2 46 37 26 2 35
60-64 9 15 0 75 14 19 1 67
65-69 2 5 0 93 4 8 0 88
70+ 1 1 0 98 1 1 0 98
Source: LFS, UK.
Note: 1995-97: 12 quarters of LFS data, from beginning of 1995 to end of 1997. 
2006-08: 12 quarters of LFS data, from beginning of 2006 to end of 2008.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Other White 64 12 4 20 5.7
White and Black Caribbean 42 17 10 31 0.3
White and Black African 47 18 7 29 0.1
White and Asian 50 14 7 29 0.2
Other Mixed 53 14 7 26 0.2
Indian 57 12 6 25 2.2
Pakistani 36 10 7 47 1.5
Bangladeshi 29 13 8 50 0.5
Other Asian 49 14 6 31 0.8
Black Caribbean 54 13 9 23 1.0
Black African 48 14 9 29 1.2
Other Black 52 13 13 23 0.1
Chinese 48 13 4 34 0.5
Other 47 12 7 34 1.5
1995-97
White 57 16 6 21 94.0
Black – Caribbean 50 13 13 24 0.9
Black – African 37 12 18 33 0.5
Black – Other
(non-mixed)
45 12 16 27 0.2
Black – Mixed 39 17 13 31 0.2
Indian 51 11 8 30 1.6
Pakistani 30 7 11 52 0.9
Bangladeshi 23 9 12 56 0.3
Chinese 48 10 6 36 0.3
Other–- Asian
(non-mixed)
44 11 7 39 0.3
Other – Other
(non-mixed)
42 10 11 38 0.2
Other – Mixed 45 15 11 30 0.2
Source: LFS, UK.
Note: 1995-97: 12 quarters of LFS data, from beginning of 1995 to end of 1997. 
2006-08: 12 quarters of LFS data, from beginning of 2006 to end of 2008.275
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Figure 10.5(a): Proportion of men without limiting long standing illness who are in work, by 
highest educational qualifications (percentages)
Figure 10.5(b): Proportion of men with limiting long standing illness who are in work, by 

























Source: Berthoud (2007). Disability is based on reported limiting long-standing illness.
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Summary
•  Gaps in children’s attainment in terms of social class or of receipt of Free School 
Meals are narrower than they were at the start of the decade. Some of the main 
ethnic gaps in attainment also narrowed, but the poor and apparently deteriorating 
position of Traveller and Gypsy children since 2003 is disturbing.
•  Women have made large gains in qualification levels, both absolutely and relative 
to men. Women in their forties and fifties in 2006-2008 were up to 20 percentage 
points less likely to have only low or no qualifications than their predecessors in 1995-
1997. The proportion of women aged 25-34 with higher education qualifications was 
15 percentage points higher.
•  There appear to have been large reductions in the proportions of Bangladeshi and 
Pakistani adults with no qualifications over the eleven years, albeit to levels which 
are still twice as high as for the population as a whole, so that a considerable gap 
remains. Apart from the Black Caribbean population, all the ethnic groups analysed 
had faster increases in the proportion with higher education than the White British 
population.
•  By age, economic inactivity grew for 16-19 year-old men and women (reflecting rising 
numbers in full-time education), while it fell most for men aged 55-69 and women 
aged 50-64. The fastest rise in full-time paid work was for women aged 45-59 and for 
men aged 55-64.
•  Employment rates for disabled men with low or no qualifications have fallen 
considerably in the last 25 years.
10.2  Changing patterns of earnings and income inequalities 
in the last decade
It would not make sense simply to repeat here the analysis of the last two chapters for a 
previous year.174 Instead, in this section we concentrate on what the data tell us about how 
things had changed to produce the most recent picture. We compare here outcomes between 
the three-year periods using pooled data for 1995-1997 and 2006-2008.175 From Chapter 2, it 
will be recalled that this was a period – taking it as a whole – when there were much smaller 
changes in overall inequality in earnings or incomes than there had been in the 1980s and 
174  For enthusiasts, the Statistical Appendix to this report contains equivalent tables, where the data are 
available, for 1995-1997, which can be compared with those for 2006-2008.
175  Figures for net individual incomes are for ﬁ  nancial years covering similar periods. Equivalent net incomes 
are for 1997-98 and 2007-08 (apart from statistics for ethnicity which are a three year average at 2008 
prices for the later period but not available for the earlier one). As the results shown here compare two 
sample surveys, the question of the statistical signiﬁ  cance of any differences between them arises. Given the 
very large sample sizes (more than 70,000 in all) any differences of the kind shown in Table 10.5 in 90:10 
ratios for large proportions of the population (such as all men and all women), for instance, are likely to be 
signiﬁ  cant. However, when small population groups are involved, as, for instance with changes for many 
of the minority ethnic groups shown in Table 10.8, differences would have to be large to be statistically 
signiﬁ  cant, so caution should be used in interpreting those ﬁ  gures.277
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early 1990s. So far as weekly earnings are concerned, the rapid growth in inequality according 
to the 90:10 ratio slowed after the early 1990s (Figure 2.6). Inequality in equivalent net 
income as measured using the Gini coefficient was slightly higher in 2007-08 than it had been 
in 1996-97, but was unchanged using the 90:10 ratio, which captures differences across the 
bulk of the population but not the very top or bottom (Figure 2.13).
According to the 90:10 ratio inequality measure, and for the four distributions we have 
focussed on, between 1995-1997 and 2006-2008: 
  ❍ Inequality in gross hourly wages (across all employees) fell from 4.2 to 3.9.
  ❍ Inequality in gross weekly earnings (for full-time employees) fell slightly from 
3.8 to 3.7.
  ❍ Inequality in net individual incomes (for all adults) fell slightly from 9.8 to 9.6.
  ❍ Inequality in equivalent net incomes (for all individuals, Before Housing Costs) was 
unchanged at 4.2.
In the sub-sections below, we examine the extent to which these overall changes were 
associated with changes in inequality between and within different groups when the 
population is classified in different ways.
(a) Gender
The first two columns of Table 10.5 show median outcomes for men and women in each of 
these measures expressed as a percentage of the overall median in each three-year period. 
In each case the pattern is the same: women’s earnings or incomes were below those of men 
at both dates, but the gap narrowed over the period: inequalities between men and women 
declined – most notably for net individual income, where women’s median incomes rose 
from 74 to 81 per cent of the overall median, and from 53 to 64 per cent of that for men. For 
equivalent net income, the assumption of equal sharing within the household meant that the 
gender difference was relatively small to start with, and it narrowed only slightly.
The third and fourth columns show how inequality changed within the distributions for men 
and women.176 To highlight the changes, in this table and the ones that follow, the higher of 
each pair of years is in bold.
  ❍ For hourly wages, inequality fell slightly looking within men and within women as 
groups: the overall reduction in inequality came from narrowing inequalities both 
between and within genders.
  ❍ For weekly earnings, inequality for each gender was unchanged. The slight overall fall in 
inequality reﬂ  ected narrowing of the gender gap.
176  We also looked at whether trends within the top and bottom halves of the distributions (as measured by the 
’90:50’ and ’50:10’ ratios) were appreciably different from those in the 90:10 ratio, but they were not, so we 
do not report them here. The only substantial difference was that the 50:10 ratio for net individual income 
for women declined rather faster than the 90:50 ratio.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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  ❍ For individual incomes, the pattern was more complicated: there was a fall in inequality 
between women, as well as between men and women, but a rise in inequality between 
men, which meant that the overall fall in inequality was limited.
  ❍ For equivalent net incomes, inequality for each gender rose slightly, offsetting the slight 
narrowing in inequality between them, leaving overall inequality unchanged.
Box 10.1 below looks at other evidence on recent trends in the gender pay gap.
Table 10.5: Inequality in earnings and incomes by gender, 1995-1997 and 2006-2008
Group median as 
percentage of 
overall median
Inequality within groups 
(90:10 ratio)
1995-97 2006-08 1995-97 2006-08
(a) Hourly wages
Men 118 113 4.2 4.1
Women 86 90 3.7 3.5
(b) Weekly earnings
Men 112 110 3.7 3.7
Women 82 86 3.5 3.5
(c) Net individual incomes
Men 139 126 7.1 7.7
Women 74 81 11.4 8.9
(d) Equivalent net income (BHC)
Men 104 103 4.2 4.3
Women 96 97 4.1 4.2
Source: LFS (UK 1995 to 1997; 2006 to 2008), National Equality Panel (NEP) from Individual Income 
Series (GB 1996-97 to 1998-99; UK 2005-06 to 2007-08), Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), 
based on Households Below Average Income (HBAI) (GB 1997-98; UK 2007-08).
Note: The time frame is 1996-97 to 1998-99 and 2005-06 to 2007-08 for net individual incomes; 1997-98 
and 2007-08 for equivalent net income. Higher ﬁ  gures of each pair shown in bold.279
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Box 10.1: Trends in the gender pay gap
The gender pay gap – the difference in pay between men and women – can be 
calculated in several different ways:
•  By looking at hourly wages or weekly earnings. Looking at hourly wages gives the 
clearest comparison between the rates of pay that men and women receive for the 
same amount of work, but of course excludes the differences that arise from men 
and women working different hours.
•  Looking at all employees, whether working full-time or part-time, or looking at full-
time and part-time employees separately (but both by comparison with full-time 
workers). Looking at all employees together captures the effect on women as a whole 
of the way in which part-time pay is much lower than full-time. However, looking at 
full-time or part-time pay separately shows more clearly the impact of lower part-
time pay for women.
•  By looking at the gap between median pay of men and women or in mean (average) 
pay. The median is less affected by relatively small numbers of high earners than the 
mean and can give a better guide to the position of the population as a whole.
In earlier chapters we have shown these differences in a number of ways, but in 
Chapter 5, we concentrated on two – the median pay gap in hourly wages for all 
employees and the median pay gap in weekly earnings for full-time earners. We base 
our analysis on the LFS, showing for instance in 2006-2008 women employees had 
hourly wages 21 per cent below those of men, while weekly full-time earnings were 22 
per cent lower. Eleven years before these gaps had both been 27 per cent (Table 10.5).
To set these results in the context of alternative measures, Figure 10A shows trends 
as measured by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in six measures of the gender 
pay gap in hourly wages. Three of these show the median gap and three the mean 
gap. The three pairs of lines show the gaps for all employees and then for full-time 
and part-time employees only. The comparisons are all of women’s pay compared with 
that of men working full-time (whereas our LFS comparisons are with all men). These 
are derived from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), which gives slightly 
different levels of pay from the LFS, but gives a similar picture of overall inequalities 
(see Appendix 12). The gender pay gap in hourly wages for all employees in this series 
between 2006 and 2008 is slightly higher (24 per cent) than the LFS-based results we 
have presented earlier in this report (as it is by comparison with men working full-time, 
rather than with all men as in our calculations). The trends in the two series are similar, 
however, with the ASHE based series falling by 4 percentage points over the slightly 
shorter period from 1997 to 2006-2008.
The pay gaps shown for all employees are greater than for full-time employees only, 
while the pay gap for part-timers is much larger – remaining at almost 40 per cent 
even at the end of the period. On all the measures, the gender pay gap decreased by 
between 4 and 6 percentage points over the period as a whole, but increased slightly 
between 2007 and 2008.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 10A: Trends in alternative measures of the gender pay gap (hourly wages) 
Source: ASHE 1997-2009. Note there were methodological changes in 2004 and 2007 causing breaks in 
the full-time series at those points. The gaps are measured against men working full-time in each case.
Using different measures and comparators produces different measures of the gender 
pay gap. Table 10A compares the gaps shown in the series based on ASHE for hourly 
pay in 2008 with those we derive from the LFS for 2006-08 for both hourly wages and 
weekly earnings. The two figures derived from our main comparisons are shown in bold: 
21 per cent in hourly earnings for all employees, and 22 per cent in weekly earnings for 
those working full-time. The other figures show the consistency of other measures of 
the hourly pay gap between the two sources.
Table 10A: Alternative measures of gender pay gap (percentages)
ASHE 2008 LFS 2006-2008
Hourly wages Hourly wages Weekly earnings
a) All women versus all men 22 21 39
(b) All women versus full-time 
men
26 24 43
(c) Part-time women versus 
full-time men
40 37 71
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(b)  Gender and age
These patterns are the product, however, of the rather more complex changes in the position 
of different groups defined by age as well as by sex shown in Table 10.6. Looking at the first 
two columns in each panel, there is a similar pattern for hourly and weekly earnings and for 
individual incomes:
  ❍ In most cases, there was a narrowing in inequality between age/gender groups – those 
that were below the overall median in 1995-1997 tended to make relative gains, and 
those that had been above it to fall back. This meant an improving position for nearly 
all age groups of women, but men aged 25-54 fell back. Older men also made relative 
gains.
  ❍ An exception to this overall pattern was that the position of younger men and women 
(aged 16-24), already below the overall median, fell back further or barely improved 
(part of which, with regard to incomes, at least, reﬂ  ects the rising numbers in full-time 
education).
  ❍ Some age groups of women moved from having median earnings or incomes below the 
overall median to above it, which would not necessarily contribute to overall inequality 
reductions.
The general pattern is therefore that the relative position of all but the youngest groups of 
women improved, as did that of older men, and middle-aged men fell back in relative terms.
The third and fourth columns of each panel show the changes in inequality in the three 
outcomes within each age/gender group. Here the pattern for each gender is the opposite:
  ❍ For men aged up to 64, inequality within each age group generally increased, while it 
fell for men aged over 64.
  ❍ For women aged up to 64, inequality within each age group generally decreased, while 
it rose for women aged over 64.
  ❍ This division is clearest for individual incomes. For hourly and weekly earnings, 
inequality also decreased within age groups of men aged 16-29, as it did (slightly) for 
the weekly earnings of women aged 16-24 (and the individual incomes of women aged 
20-24).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 10.6: Inequality in earnings and individual incomes by gender and age, 1995-1997 
and 2006-2008
Group median as a percentage 
of overall median
Inequality within groups 
(90:10 ratio)
1995-97 2006-08 1995-97 2006-08
(a) Hourly wages
Men
16-19 53 54 2.9 2.5
20-24 79 75 2.8 2.4
25-29 109 102 3.1 2.9
30-34 130 123 3.4 3.5
35-39 140 131 3.6 3.8
40-44 145 136 3.7 4.0
45-49 147 134 3.9 4.0
50-54 131 129 4.0 4.1
55-59 113 116 4.0 3.9
60-64 99 101 3.7 3.6
65-69 81 84 6.3 4.2
70+ 65 68 6.3 4.5
Women
16-19 53 54 2.9 2.5
20-24 73 72 2.6 2.4
25-29 96 97 3.1 3.0
30-34 101 105 3.7 3.5
35-39 93 101 3.9 3.7
40-44 92 97 3.9 3.6
45-49 90 94 3.8 3.5
50-54 86 94 3.6 3.6
55-59 79 87 3.4 3.4
60-64 75 81 3.4 3.3
65-69 65 69 4.6 3.3
70+ 64 62 * 3.3283
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Table 10.6: (Continued)
Group median as a percentage 
of overall median
Inequality within groups 
(90:10 ratio)
1995-97 2006-08 1995-97 2006-08
(b) Weekly earnings
Men
16-19 46 48 3.0 2.7
20-24 72 70 2.7 2.4
25-29 101 96 2.9 2.8
30-34 121 114 3.1 3.2
35-39 129 124 3.3 3.5
40-44 133 128 3.4 3.7
45-49 134 126 3.5 3.6
50-54 122 121 3.5 3.7
55-59 105 110 3.6 3.5
60-64 92 96 3.1 3.4
65-69 83 86 * 3.7
70+ 84 69 * *
Women
16-19 45 48 3.0 2.8
20-24 64 66 2.4 2.3
25-29 86 89 2.7 2.7
30-34 99 102 3.2 3.3
35-39 92 98 3.6 3.7
40-44 88 93 3.5 3.7
45-49 85 87 3.4 3.5
50-54 82 90 3.4 3.5
55-59 77 83 3.4 3.5
60-64 71 79 3.3 3.4
65-69 59 67 **
7 0 + ****An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 10.6: (Continued)
Group median as a percentage 
of overall median
Inequality within groups 
(90:10 ratio)
1995-97 2006-08 1995-97 2006-08
(c) Net individual 
incomes
Men
16-19 51 41 * *
20-24 97 89 7.4 >30
25-29 147 129 7.3 8.4
30-34 174 155 6.7 7.3
35-39 185 164 7.4 7.8
40-44 188 166 7.2 8.5
45-49 185 165 8.0 8.6
50-54 177 154 7.6 8.7
55-59 146 139 7.4 9.0
60-64 122 116 6.0 7.3
65-69 109 103 4.2 4.1
70-74 94 98 3.9 3.6
75-79 84 91 3.5 3.5
80-84 80 90 3.8 3.2
85+ 80 90 3.5 3.4
Women
16-19 46 43 * *
20-24 76 75 10.7 16.7
25-29 94 104 13.5 10.2
30-34 91 109 15.7 11.9
35-39 92 107 11.7 10.2
40-44 96 106 11.8 9.8
45-49 93 102 16.8 9.6
50-54 79 91 89.5 18.7
55-59 63 72 >30 >30
60-64 57 65 10.8 6.6
65-69 54 57 5.0 5.2
70-74 53 58 4.5 4.9
75-79 55 61 4.3 4.8
80-84 59 65 4.0 4.3
85+ 66 72 2.6 3.0
Source: LFS (UK 1995 to 1997; 2006 to 2008), NEP from Individual Income Series (GB 1996-97 to 
1998-99; UK 2005-06 to 2007-08).
Note: The time frame is 1996-97 to 1998-99 and 2005-06 to 2007-08 for net individual incomes; 1997-98 
and 2007-08 for equivalent net income. Higher of each pair of ﬁ  gures shown in bold.285
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Given the equal sharing assumption, differences between groups defined by gender as well as 
age are less revealing, so Table 10.7 shows the changing inequality in equivalent net incomes 
between and within each age group. As far as inequality between age groups is concerned:
  ❍ the relative position of those with a ‘household reference person’ (see Glossary) aged 
over 55 improved. As most of these started behind the overall median, this tended to 
reduce inequality overall;
  ❍ the relative position of the originally best-off groups aged 41 to 55 fell back, also 
tending to reduce inequality, as did the improvement in the position of children aged 
up to 10; however
  ❍ the improvement of the already favourable position of those aged 26-40 and the 
further deterioration of the position of 17-20 year-olds both tended to increase 
inequality.
These diverse changes in inequality between age groups were combined with increases in 
inequality within most age groups, especially those aged 51-65. The result, as we have seen, is 
that overall inequality was unchanged.
Table 10.7: Inequality in equivalent net income by age, 1997-98 and 2007-08
Group median as a percentage 
of overall median
Inequality within groups 
(90:10 ratio)
1995-97 2006-08 1995-97 2006-08
0-5 85 86 3.8 3.9
6-10 84 89 3.7 3.8
11-16 87 87 3.6 3.7
17-20 101 93 3.9 3.7
21-25 117 111 3.9 3.9
26-30 119 121 4.2 4.1
31-35 112 117 4.4 4.5
36-40 108 110 4.3 4.4
41-45 116 110 4.1 4.2
46-50 128 116 4.2 4.3
51-55 124 121 4.3 4.8
55-60 106 108 4.4 5.3
61-65 95 95 3.9 4.4
66-70 82 87 3.2 3.4
71-75 74 82 3.0 3.1
76-80 72 81 3.2 3.2
80+ 73 79 3.2 3.1
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset (GB 1997-98; UK 2007-08).
Note: Higher of each pair of ﬁ  gures shown in bold.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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(c) Ethnicity 
Table 10.8 shows a similar breakdown for hourly wages, weekly earnings and individual 
income by broad ethnic groups (sample sizes are too small to provide a clear picture by 
gender and ethnicity). As before the classifications within the surveys changed between the 
two periods and so are not directly comparable. The first panel shows the comparison for 
hourly wages and weekly full-time earnings. The second panel shows the comparison for net 
individual incomes. Comparisons are not available for equivalent net income. The picture for 
changes within and between ethnic groups differs from that for age:
  ❍ Inequality within each ethnic group appears to have narrowed for hourly wages and 
weekly earnings (apart from a slight increase for Black Caribbean employees). For 
individual income, there was also an increase for three of the groups shown, but a 
decline for the White British group, and a small decline for the Black or Black British 
African group.
  ❍ Looking between ethnic groups, the clearest equalising change appears to have been 
an improving relative position for Bangladeshi employees: from 50 to 73 per cent of the 
overall median for hourly wages; from 35 to 62 per cent for weekly full-time earnings. 
However, there was no apparent improvement in the median individual incomes of 
Bangladeshi adults, which remained at only 56 per cent of the overall median. The 
difference partly reflects the continuing very low employment rates of this group, so the 
median adult is not in employment (Table 10.4), but small sample sizes mean that we 
should take care with this comparison.
  ❍ The patterns of change differed across ethnic groups. The position of the Black African 
group improved towards the overall median in weekly earnings and individual incomes, 
but slipped back slightly for hourly wages.
  ❍ The improvement in weekly earnings and individual incomes for Indian adults also had 
an equalising effect, but the improvement in their median hourly wages took them 
further above the overall median, with the opposite effect. Similarly, the improved 
position of Chinese adults had an equalising effect for individual incomes, where they 
started below the overall median, but a disequalising effect for hourly and weekly 
earnings, where they started already above the median. 
  ❍ Improving relative hourly wages for Black Caribbean workers took them further above 
the overall median, with a disequalising effect, but as they started with below-overall 
median individual incomes, in that case the improvement was equalising.
To summarise this complex picture, there appear to have been reductions in wage and 
earnings inequality within most ethnic groups, and some of the groups that were furthest 
below the overall median appear to have caught up to some extent. However, some groups 
that were already above the overall median improved their positions further, offsetting some 
of the other trends towards reduced inequality overall.287
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Table 10.8(a): Inequality in wages and earnings by ethnicity, 1995-1997 and 2006-2008












White British 100 100 3.9 7.8 88.0
Other White 97 101 4.3 6.9 5.6
White and Black Caribbean 87 84 3.2 8.6 0.2
White and Black African 89 88 * * 0.1
White and Asian 114 104 4.7 10.6 0.1
Other Mixed 113 110 4.1 7.0 0.2
Indian 103 105 4.1 7.4 1.7
Pakistani 80 76 3.8 7.3 0.6
Bangladeshi 73 62 3.4 6.6 0.2
Other Asian 93 94 4.0 7.9 0.6
Black Caribbean 106 107 3.4 6.0 0.8
Black African 98 101 3.4 6.3 0.9
Other Black 97 93 * * 0.1
Chinese 111 107 4.7 10.5 0.3
Other 92 92 3.8 7.3 1.0
1995-97
White 101 100 4.2 9.5 96.0
Black – Caribbean 104 106 3.3 6.4 0.7
Black – African 100 96 3.6 6.7 0.3
Black – Other (non-mixed) 112 111 * 7.1 0.1
Black – Mixed 94 90 * 9.1 0.1
Indian 101 101 4.3 7.9 1.2
Pakistani 81 81 4.2 10.6 0.4
Bangladeshi 50 35 * 9.5 0.1
Chinese 106 106 5.2 10.0 0.2
Other – Asian (non-mixed) 107 108 4.9 9.5 0.2
Other – Other (non-mixed) 110 110 * 9.5 0.1
Other – Mixed 112 109 4.4 9.3 0.2
Source: LFS (UK 1995 to 1997; 2006 to 2008).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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White – British 101 9.2 88.0
Any other white background 106 18.4 3.7
Mixed – White and Black Caribbean 82 * 0.2
Mixed – White and Black African 95 * 0.1
Mixed – White and Asian 111 >30 0.3
Any other mixed background 106 * 0.1
Asian or Asian British – Indian 97 >30 1.8
Asian or Asian British – Pakistani 59 * 1.2
Asian or Asian British – Bangladeshi 56 >30 0.3
Any other Asian/Asian British background 98 >30 0.6
Black or Black British – Caribbean 97 10.3 0.9
Black or Black British – African 98 27.8 0.9
Any other Black/Black British background 95 * 0.1
Chinese 92 >30 0.4
Any other 87 >30 1.1
1996-97 to 1998-99
White 101 9.7 95.0
Black – Caribbean 87 7.1 0.9
Black – African 80 28.3 0.5
Black – neither Caribbean nor African 80 * 0.1
Indian 95 30.3 1.5
Pakistani 63 >30 0.8
Bangladeshi 56 18.3 0.3
Chinese 82 * 0.2
None of these 82 >30 1.0
Source: NEP from Individual Income Series (GB 1996-97 to 1998-99; UK 2005-06 to 2007-08).289
Chapter 10   Changing patterns of inequalities
10
(d) Disability
We can examine trends broken down by disability status only for equivalent net incomes. 
Table 10.9 suggests that the biggest change over the period was the deteriorating relative 
position of working-age adults with long-standing limiting health conditions, whose median 
income fell from 90 per cent to 80 per cent of the overall median – even when extra costs 
disability benefits are included in their income.177 On the other hand, the position of children 
and pensioners improved towards the overall median, whether or not they had long-standing 
limiting health conditions. Inequality increased within the groups of disabled people of 
working age and non-disabled pensioners. These factors acted in different directions, leaving 
overall inequality in equivalent income unchanged.
Table 10.9: Inequality in equivalent net income by long-standing limiting illness, 1997-98 
and 2007-08
Group median as % 
overall median
Inequality within groups 
(90:10 ratio)
1997-98 2007-08 1997-98 2007-08
No long-standing limiting illness
All 104 105 4.2 4.3
Children 87 88 3.8 3.8
Working-age 119 116 4.3 4.3
Pensioners 80 86 3.7 4.0
Long-standing limiting illness
All 82 82 3.4 3.4
Children 73 81 3.1 3.1
Working-age 90 80 3.7 4.0
Pensioners 77 83 3.0 2.9
Source: DWP, based on HBAI dataset (GB 1997-98; UK 2007-08).
Note: Higher of each pair of ﬁ  gures shown in bold.
(e) Housing  tenure
We can also compare the position of different housing tenure groups for individual incomes 
and for equivalent incomes. Table 10.10 shows that the inequalities between tenures which we 
discussed in Chapter 9 were actually slightly smaller in 2006-08 than they had been eleven 
years before. However, inequalities within tenure groups were wider (with the exception of 
declining individual income inequality among owners with mortgages).
177  The employment changes illustrated in Figure 10.5 will have contributed to this decline. See Box 7.3 in 
Chapter 7 for discussion of the effects of excluding extra costs disability beneﬁ  ts from the measured incomes 
of disabled people. An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 10.10: Inequality in individual and equivalent net income by housing tenure, 
1995-1997 and 2006-2008
Group median as a 
percentage of 
overall median










(a) Net individual incomes
Social housing – council 67 68 5.7 6.3
Social housing – housing 
association
69 72 5.7 6.5
Private rent 87 93 10.9 15.0
Owned outright 89 90 8.5 8.7
Owned with mortgage 139 134 11.3 9.6
1997-98 2007-08 1997-98 2007-08
(b) Equivalent net income (BHC)
Rented from council 65 67 2.5 2.6
Rented from housing association 68 71 2.5 2.7
Rented privately unfurnished 85 87 3.8 3.7
Rented privately furnished 93 97 4.7 5.0
Owned outright 96 96 4.6 4.6
Owned with mortgage 123 121 3.8 3.8
Source: NEP from Individual Income Series (GB 1996-97 to 1998-99; UK 2005-06 to 2007-08), DWP, 
based on HBAI dataset (GB 1997-98; UK 2007-08).
Note: Higher of each pair of ﬁ  gures shown in bold.
(f)  Nation and region
Table 10.11 shows that the differences between the four nations of the UK in earnings and 
between the three nations of Great Britain in incomes tended to narrow slightly over the 
period, particularly as relative earnings in Northern Ireland rose.178 However, relative hourly 
and weekly earnings and equivalent incomes in Wales fell slightly further back compared to 
the overall median.
Given the differences between the countries in some of their policies and in particular, the 
strong constitutional commitments of the Scottish and Welsh devolved administrations 
towards equality (see Section 9.8), the third and fourth columns of the table are of great 
interest as they show whether inequality was declining any faster in those nations:
178  As Northern Ireland is included in the 2006-08 income ﬁ  gures, the other three nations all rose in the UK 
rankings for net individual incomes. As discussed in Box 5.1 in Chapter 5, cost of living differences affect 
how one interprets these differences, but we do not have any measures of how differential changes in them 
affected each nation or region over the period.291
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  ❍ For hourly wages, inequality reduced at a similar rate in all four nations, but somewhat 
faster in Northern Ireland.
  ❍ Inequality in weekly earnings was unchanged in England, so the overall decline in the 
UK reﬂ  ected reduced inequality in the other three, again with the largest reduction in 
Northern Ireland.
  ❍ Inequality in net individual incomes increased in Wales and very slightly in England, but 
fell in Scotland.
  ❍ Inequality in equivalent net incomes was unchanged in England, rose slightly in Wales, 
but fell in Scotland.
  ❍ In all cases, inequality in the three other nations started and ended a little below that in 
England (although not always below the levels in the English regions shown in 
Table 10.12).
The overall picture is one where the changes were broadly similar across the four nations, 
but it is notable that inequality declined slightly on all four measures only in Scotland, and 
inequality in earnings most rapidly in Northern Ireland. That there has been comparatively 
little difference between the devolved nations and England over the period may come 
as a disappointment to some, given the priority given to equality issues by the devolved 
governments in Scotland and Wales. Tania Burchardt and Holly Holder, in a more detailed 
study of comparative trends since 1997, also point to the small scale of differences, but point 
out that some of the major factors that affect inequalities in economic outcomes, such as the 
structure of the tax and benefit systems have been common across the UK.179
In the previous two chapters we noted the much higher level of inequality in London than 
elsewhere for most outcomes. This is confirmed in Table 10.12, which presents the picture 
across the English regions. The most consistent feature is that relative median incomes in 
London, already well above the English median, increased further for all four outcomes, 
although individual and equivalent incomes in the South East remain higher. London also 
started as the most unequal region and became even more unequal through the period in all 
four respects. The relative positions of the other regions were more mixed, with movements 
both towards and away from the overall median. In contrast to London, inequality within 
most regions generally declined slightly.
179  Burchardt and Holder (2009).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
292
Table 10.11: Inequality in earnings and income by nation, 1995-1997 and 2006-2008
Group median as a 
percentage of 
overall median
Inequality within groups 
(90:10 ratio)
1995-97 2006-08 1995-97 2006-08
(a) Hourly wages
England 102 101 4.2 3.9
Northern Ireland 84 90 3.9 3.3
Scotland 96 98 4.0 3.7
Wales 93 92 3.8 3.4
(b) Weekly earnings
England 102 102 3.8 3.8
Northern Ireland 81 86 3.6 3.3
Scotland 94 96 3.6 3.5
Wales 92 91 3.5 3.3
(c) Net individual incomes
England 101 102 9.9 10.0
Scotland 96 98 8.9 8.6
Wales 89 93 8.6 8.9
(d) Equivalent net income (BHC)
England 101 101 4.2 4.2
Scotland 98 99 3.9 3.8
Wales 92 91 3.7 3.8
Source: LFS (UK 1995 to 1997; 2006 to 2008), NEP from Individual Income Series (GB 1996-97 to 
1998-99; UK 2005-06 to 2007-08), DWP based on HBAI dataset (GB 1997-98; UK 2007-08).
Note: The time frame is 1996-97 to 1998-99 and 2005-06 to 2007-08 for net individual incomes; 1997-98 
and 2007-08 for equivalent net income. Higher of each pair of ﬁ  gures shown in bold.293
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Table 10.12: Inequality in earnings and income by region (England), 1995-1997 and 
2006-2008
Group median as a 
percentage of 
overall median
Inequality within groups 
(90:10 ratio)
1995-97 2006-08 1995-97 2006-08
(a) Hourly wages
North East 93 91 3.9 3.4
Yorkshire and the Humber 93 92 3.9 3.5
South West 94 97 3.9 3.7
West Midlands 96 96 3.9 3.6
East Midlands 94 93 4.0 3.7
North West 97 94 3.9 3.6
East of England 104 105 4.3 4.1
South East 109 110 4.5 4.3
London 129 132 4.4 4.5
(b) Weekly earnings
North East 93 88 3.6 3.4
Yorkshire and the Humber 93 91 3.6 3.5
West Midlands 95 95 3.6 3.5
East Midlands 95 95 3.6 3.5
North West 95 92 3.6 3.5
South West 96 99 3.7 3.6
East of England 107 108 3.8 3.8
South East 110 112 4.0 4.1
London 120 124 3.8 4.1
(c) Net individual incomes
North East 89 92 9.2 8.4
Yorkshire and the Humber 91 96 8.8 8.7
East Midlands 96 98 9.1 9.1
North West 96 98 9.0 8.7
West Midlands 98 94 8.9 8.9
South West 99 102 9.1 8.9
East of England 108 108 10.9 10.5
London 110 111 14.2 16.6
South East 115 114 11.6 11.1An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 10.12: (Continued)
Group median as a 
percentage of 
overall median
Inequality within groups 
(90:10 ratio)
1995-97 2006-08 1995-97 2006-08
(d) Equivalent net income (BHC)
North East 86 90 3.7 3.6
Yorkshire and the Humber 91 93 3.9 3.7
North West 93 93 3.9 3.8
East Midlands 96 94 3.8 3.8
West Midlands 97 92 3.8 3.9
South West 98 101 3.9 3.8
London 108 112 5.0 5.6
East of England 109 107 4.3 4.0
South East 118 116 4.5 4.5
Source: LFS (UK 1995 to 1997; 2006 to 2008), NEP from Individual Income Series (GB 1996-97 to 
1998-99; UK 2005-06 to 2007-08), DWP based on HBAI dataset (GB 1997-98; UK 2007-08).
Note: The time frame is 1996-97 to 1998-99 and 2005-06 to 2007-08 for net individual incomes; 1997-98 
and 2007-08 for equivalent net income. Higher of each pair of ﬁ  gures shown in bold.
Summary
Taken as a whole, inequality (as measured by the 90:10 ratio) declined slightly between 
the two three year periods 1995-1997 and 2006-2008, so far as hourly and weekly 
earnings and individual incomes were concerned. However inequality in equivalent 
incomes was the same at the end of the period as at the start. These fairly small 
changes disguise much more complex (and often offsetting) underlying changes in 
inequality between and within different population groups. 
•  Inequalities between men and women reduced over the period, particularly for the 
individual incomes of adults, where those of women rose from 53 per cent to 64 per 
cent of those of men. For hourly wages, inequality for each gender narrowed, but for 
equivalent net incomes inequality increased for each gender.
•  Looking between groups defined by age as well as gender, the relative positions of 
all but the youngest women improved in terms of earnings and individual incomes, 
while middle-aged men fell back. Within age groups, inequality fell for older men and 
women up to 64, but rose for working age men and older women.
•  Considering adult men, women, and children, the improving position of younger 
children and older adults tended to reduce overall inequality in equivalent net 
incomes. However, inequalities increased within most age groups, offsetting this.295
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•  There appear to have been reductions in wage and earnings inequalities within most 
ethnic groups over this period, and some of the groups that were furthest below the 
overall median appear to have caught up to some extent. However, some groups that 
were already above the overall median improved their positions further, offsetting 
some of the other trends towards reduced inequality.
•  The equivalent net incomes of adults of working age with limiting long-standing 
conditions fell further below the overall median, tending to increase inequality, but 
the positions of children and pensioners improved towards the median whether or 
not they were disabled, with the opposite effect.
•  Income inequalities between housing tenure groups reduced slightly over the period, 
but this was offset by widening inequalities within most tenures.
•  Differences between the nations narrowed slightly over the period, although Wales 
tended to fall further behind. Changes in inequality within the nations were generally 
similar, although only in Scotland was there a (slight) narrowing in all four outcomes.
•  Median earnings and incomes in London increased further in relative terms, although 
incomes remain higher in the South East. London started as the most unequal 
English region and became even more unequal over the period.
Section 10.4 looks at changes in within-group and between-group inequalities over a 
longer period in earnings and in equivalent net incomes.
10.3  The changing positions of different groups
The patterns shown in the previous section imply that the positions of particular groups, 
and within those groups those who are more or less advantaged, changed over the eleven 
years we can compare. This section looks at which kinds of people emerged as ‘gainers’ or 
‘losers’ from the process. This section looks at earnings and incomes as in the last section, 
concentrating on differences by gender and age, but also looking at those who were better 
and worse off within each group. Changes in definitions between the surveys make it hard to 
do this on an accurate basis for ethnicity.
(a) Hourly  wages
Table 10.13 adds to the information discussed in Section 10.2 by presenting changes in the 
position of the 10th through to 90th percentiles of each group in terms of the changes in their 
rank within the population as a whole. As before, rankings in the overall distribution range 
from zero (for the poorest) to 100 (for the richest). The table entries show where within each 
group’s distribution there are the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. ‘Losers’ are percentiles with a fall in 
relative rank – shown as a negative number and in bold. An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Thus, for example, it can be seen from the first row of the table that median hourly wages for 
men fell by three places (out of 100) down the distribution for all employees, while the median 
for women rose by three places. However, for 30-34 year-old men with low wages (at the 10th 
percentile for that age group), the fall was much greater, 7 places.
The five columns of Table 10.13 make clear that the changes were not simply a matter of 
younger and middle-aged men losing, while middle-aged women gained. The biggest losers, 
in terms of their ranking in the wage distribution, were the bottom half of men in each age 
group from 25-49, and better-paid men and women aged under 25. The biggest gainers were 
women in their thirties and fifties with middle incomes for their group. The relative position of 
both the least and best-paid women in each age group changed much less. More simply, those 
moving down were young, or were less well-paid middle-aged men, while those moving up 
were more women in their thirties to fifties with middle wages.
Table 10.13: Change of rank in overall distribution of gross hourly wages (all employees) 
between 1995-1997 and 2006-2008, by gender and age
Percentile of group
10 30 Median 70 90
Men
All working age -2 -3 -3 -1 0
16-19 -1 -1 -2 -3 -5
20-24 -2 -4 -5 -6 -6
25-29 -4 -5 -5 -4 -3
30-34 -7 -6 -4 -2 0
35-39 -5 -6 -4 -1 0
40-44 -6 -4 -3 -2 0
45-49 -6 -5 -5 -3 -1
50-54 -4 -2 -1 00
55-59 -2 0120
60-64 0 -1 131
65-69 0 0 1 -2 -6
70+ 1 3 2 -1 -3297




10 30 Median 70 90
Women
All working age 0 2 3 3 2
16-19 -1 -1 -2 -4 -7
20-24 -2 -2 -3 -3 -2
25-29 0 -1 001
30-34 0 4 3 2 1
35-39 0 4 5 5 1
40-44 0 2 3 3 0
45-49 0 1 2 2 -1
50-54 2 5 6 9 3
55-59 0 3 6 7 4
60-64 0 2 4 6 5
65-69 1 1 2 0 -5
70+ * -1 -3 -4 *
Source: LFS (UK).
Note: 1995-97: 12 quarters of LFS data, from beginning of 1995 to end of 1997, at 2008 prices. 2006-08: 
12 quarters of LFS data, from beginning of 2006 to end of 2008, at 2008 prices. Falls in rank shown in 
bold.
Changes in the position of those within each nation or region were small, with the possible 
exception that typical workers in Northern Ireland moved 5 places (out of 100) up the overall 
ranking, although they remained well below the typical level of hourly wages in the UK as a 
whole. 
(b) Weekly  earnings
Table 10.14 shows the same kind of information, but for the weekly earnings of full-time 
employees. In terms of rankings within the overall distribution, the picture is not so different 
from that for hourly wages. However, it is more clearly men that were moving down the 
distribution (apart from those in their late fifties and sixties), with those in their twenties and 
thirties most affected. Nearly all age groups of women improved their position, and across the 
distributions within each age, but particularly better-paid women in their fifties and sixties. So 
while the weekly pay of men aged 35-54 remains well ahead of any other group (Figure 5.12), 
older women have caught up to some extent, while younger men have fallen behind.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 10.14: Change of rank in overall distribution of gross weekly full-time earnings 
between 1995-1997 and 2006-2008, by gender and age
Percentile of group
10 30 Median 70 90
Men
All working age -1 -2 -2 -1 0
16-19 0 -1 -1 -1 -1
20-24 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5
25-29 -4 -5 -4 -3 -4
30-34 -6 -6 -5 -3 -1
35-39 -5 -5 -3 -2 0
40-44 -5 -4 -3 -2 0
45-49 -5 -5 -4 -2 -1
50-54 -3 0 -1 10
55-59 -2 242 -1
60-64 03353
65-69 * 3 2 0 *
70+ * * -14 **
Women
All working-age -1 1453
16-19 0 0 0 1 2
20-24 -1 -1 012
25-29 -1 1332
30-34 -1 0221
35-39 0 2 4 3 3
40-44 -1 2314
45-49 -1 -2 103
50-54 1 5 7 9 5
55-59 1 4 5 10 7
60-64 0 5 8 11 9
65-69 * * 5 * *
7 0 + *****
Source: LFS (UK).
Note: 1995-97: 12 quarters of LFS data, from beginning of 1995 to end of 1997, at 2008 prices. 
2006-08: 12 quarters of LFS data, from beginning of 2006 to end of 2008, at 2008 prices. Falls in rank 
shown in bold.299
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(c)  Net individual income
Given the importance of employment earnings within net individual income, it is not 
surprising that the pattern shown in Table 10.15 is similar to that for weekly earnings. 
However, the changes were even more pronounced by gender. While we saw in Table 10.5 that 
median women’s individual incomes in 2006-2008 were only 64 per cent of those of men, this 
was considerably higher than eleven years before, when they were only 53 per cent of them. 
Not only had employment and the earnings of women in employment risen compared with 
men over the period, but so had other sources of individual income, including tax credits and 
pensions. 
As the highlighting in Table 10.15 makes plain, there were very clear patterns by age, by 
gender and across different parts of the range within each group. Men and women – with 
rising numbers in full-time education – aged 16-24 slipped down the distribution of individual 
income, as did all but the highest income men aged 25-69. The position of poorer middle-
aged men slipped fastest. By contrast, women aged 25-64 gained across the distribution, 
particularly those with middle and above-average incomes in their thirties. The relative 
position of the oldest men also improved. Again, we have already seen in Chapter 7 that there 
was a great disparity between the individual incomes of men and women in 2006-08, but 
this came after a decade in which all but the youngest women had generally improved their 
position from an even lower starting point. 
Looking at other breakdowns where we can make this kind of comparison, there were few 
notable changes in terms of other characteristics. While it is not possible to compare the 
position of disabled people between the two dates using consistent definitions, it was notable 
that people with ‘health problems’ slipped two places further down the distribution over the 
period. In Chapter 11, we look at other evidence on the deteriorating labour market position 
of disabled people.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 10.15: Change of rank in overall distribution of net individual incomes, between 
1996-1998 (GB) to 2006-2008 (UK), by gender and age
Percentile of group
10 30 Median 70 90
Men
All working age -4 -4 -3 -2 -1
16-19 -1 -5 -6 -5 -4
20-24 -5 -8 -4 -4 -1
25-29 -4 -7 -5 -4 -2
30-34 -5 -3 -2 -2 -1
35-39 -5 -5 -3 -2 0
40-44 -7 -4 -3 -1 0
45-49 -5 -5 -2 -2 0
50-54 -8 -7 -4 -2 -1
55-59 -5 -4 011
60-64 -5 -4 -1 -1 1




8 5 + 05464
Women
All working-age 11333
16-19 -1 -4 -1 -3 -2








60-64 3 4 323
65-69 0 1 0 -1 2
70-74 -1 -1 123
75-79 -1 -1 223
80-84 -1 -1 233
85+ -1 1234
Source: NEP, from Individual Income Series (GB 1996-97 to 1998-99; UK 2005-06 to 2007-08).
Note: Falls in rank shown in bold.301
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(d)  Equivalent net income
Finally in this section, we can look at changes in equivalent net incomes, based on those of 
the household in which people live, adjusted for household size.180 Given the way in which the 
‘equal sharing’ assumption made in calculating this measure works, gender differences – and 
changes in them – are much less pronounced than those in individual incomes or earnings. 
Table 10.16 shows that the most striking changes in ranking are by age (with relatively little 
variation within age groups by income level). First, the position of 6-10 year-olds (that is, of 
households containing them) improved notably, as did that of the over-70s – both trends 
associated with the falls in child and pensioner poverty over the period. By contrast, the 
position of young people aged 17-25 deteriorated (except for the poorest 17-20 year-olds) as 
did that of those aged 41-55. Within the oldest groups there was tendency for the greatest 
gains in position to be for those with the highest incomes. People in their early fifties used 
to be clearly the most affluent group – as we saw in Table 7.2, they generally remain higher 
up the distribution than those of other ages apart from those in their late twenties, but the 
margin over other age groups reduced over the period (as we saw in Table 10.7).
Second, we can compare people according to a narrow definition of disability in this series. 
Table 10.16 confirms that it was working age people with long-standing limiting illness who 
had the greatest decline in their position (especially those with middle incomes) – the kinds of 
difference we saw for 2006-08 in Table 7.4 between disabled and non-disabled people were 
much greater than they had been eleven years earlier. There were few changes in relative 
rankings by housing tenure, although the rather small group of private furnished tenants with 
middle incomes improved their ranking. Because of definitional differences and sample sizes, 
we cannot make this kind of comparison by ethnicity.
180  For more detailed analysis of who has gained, and who has lost, from recent economic growth, see Jenkins 
and Van Kerm (2008).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 10.16: Change of rank in overall distribution of equivalent net income (BHC) 
between 1997-98 and 2007-08, by gender, age and limiting long-standing illness
Percentile of group
10 30 Median 70 90
(a) Gender
Male 0 -1 0 -1 0
Female 01110
(b) Age
5 or under 01122
6  t o  1 0 25463
1 1  t o  1 6 10012
17 to 20 0 -4 -5 -5 -3
21 to 25 -2 -3 -3 -2 -2
2 6  t o  3 0 0011 -1
3 1  t o  3 5 02420
3 6  t o  4 0 21221
41 to 45 -1 -4 -3 -3 -1
46 to 50 -3 -5 -6 -4 -1
51 to 55 -5 -4 -1 -1 -1
55 to 60 -3 -2 121
61 to 65 -2 -2 010
66 to 70 -2 1331
7 1  t o  7 5 12663
7 6  t o  8 0 33666
o v e r  8 0 21442
(c) Limiting long-standing 
illness
Not long-standing, limiting 
illness
A l l 00000
Children 12122




All -1 -2 -1 -2 -3
Children 25531
Working-age -3 -7 -8 -7 -3
Pensioners 32431
Source: DWP, from HBAI (GB 1997-98; UK 2007-08).
Note: Falls in rank shown in bold.303
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Summary
•  Looking at the changing positions of the better and worse off within each age/
gender group by hourly wages, the biggest losers were the lowest paid half of men 
aged 25-49, and better-paid men and women aged under 25. The biggest gainers 
were women in their thirties and fifties with middle incomes.
•  Men generally moved down the distribution of full-time weekly earnings (apart from 
those in their late fifties and sixties), with those in their twenties and thirties most 
affected. Nearly all age groups of women improved their position, and across the 
earnings distributions within each age, but better-paid women in their fifties and 
sixties had the largest gains.
•  Men and women aged 16-24 slipped down the distribution of net individual income 
(for some because of longer periods in education), as did all but the highest income 
men aged 25-69. The position of poorer middle-aged men slipped the most. Women 
aged 25-64 gained across the distribution, particularly those with middle and higher 
incomes in their thirties. The relative position of the oldest men also improved. 
•  The most striking changes in ranking by equivalent net income were by age. The 
position of 6-10 year-olds improved notably, as did that of the over 70s. By contrast, 
the position of young people aged 17-25 deteriorated (except for the poorest 17-20 
year-olds) as did that of those aged 41-55.
10.4  Which factors are most important in accounting for 
changing earnings and income inequality?
In Section 10.2, we looked back over the last eleven years to see how the relative positions 
of different groups had changed, indicating changes in between-group inequality, and at 
changes in inequality within each of these groups. While enlightening, this description did not 
show which of these was most important, or the relative importance of changes associated 
with one particular group classification rather than another. Can what has been happening 
be attributed to changes within age groups or to changes between age groups? And are 
breakdowns of changes in inequality based on groupings by nation or employment status 
(say) more informative than breakdowns by age? The period we looked at, over which we 
could use data broken down in the same way as in earlier chapters, was also a comparatively 
short one.
An approach which addresses the questions posed in the previous paragraph was used in 
work undertaken for us by Mike Brewer, Alastair Muriel and Liam Wren-Lewis.181 They use a 
technique known as ‘decomposition analysis’, first to look at whether changes in within-group 
or between-group inequalities have had most impact on overall inequality, and then to look at 
181  Brewer, Muriel and Wren-Lewis (2009).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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the relative importance of different factors when they are looked at together.182 They look at 
changes in both weekly earnings inequality (across all employees) and equivalent net income 
inequality, using data for the last forty years, from 1968 to 2006-07.183 For technical reasons 
this exercise can only be carried out using inequality measures that differ from those used in 
other parts of this report – indices known as the ‘Mean Logarithmic Deviation’ (MLD) for the 
first decomposition exercise and the ‘variance of logs’ for the second. These measures, like 
the Gini coefficient, but unlike the 90:10 ratio, have the advantage that they take account 
of earnings and income differences across the whole of the range, from the top through to 
the bottom. The two measures are more sensitive to income differences towards the bottom 
of the distribution rather than differences at the top; the Gini coefficient is most sensitive to 
income differences around the point at which incomes are most concentrated.
(a) Earnings  inequality
Table 10.17 summarises some of the decomposition results for earnings. It shows how much 
of the change in earnings inequality over the period as a whole – shown in the first column 
of figures – can be attributed to changes in inequality within groups (the second column of 
figures), how much to changes in the relative sizes of each group (the third column) and how 
much to changes in the mean earnings of each group (the fourth column).184 Each row of the 
table shows the results obtained when the population is classified in different ways. Thus, 
the first row shows, for instance, that when the population is classified by age group, three-
quarters of the overall increase (45) in the inequality index was accounted for by the increase 
in within group inequality (32), and less than a quarter by changes in the relative mean 
incomes of each age group (9). The fraction of the change attributable to changes in the 
relative sizes of the groups was much smaller (2). The other rows show what happens when 
the population is classified in other ways, such as by household type in the second row.
182  In any year, and for a particular deﬁ  nition of groups (e.g. individuals classiﬁ  ed by age), overall inequality can 
be expressed as the sum of inequality within groups and inequality between groups. Within-group inequality 
is the weighted sum of inequality within each of the groups. Between-group inequality is the inequality that 
would arise were each person to receive the mean income of the group to which they belong (in which case, 
within-group inequality would be zero). Overall inequality, therefore, depends on: inequality within each of 
the sub-groups; the average income of each group; and the relative size of each group. Changes over time in 
overall inequality can thus arise from three sources: (a) changes in within-group inequalities; (b) changes in 
the relative sizes of each group, and (c) changes in group mean incomes. In the tables that follow, we relate 
changes in overall inequality over the period to each of terms (a), (b) and (c), repeating the calculations 
for each of a variety of subgroup classiﬁ  cations. Later in subsection (c), instead of looking at factors such 
as age, gender, region, and so on, one at a time, we show a multivariate regression version of the earlier 
decomposition analysis in which the impact of a factor is assessed taking into account the impact of the 
other factors at the same time.
183  These are both drawn from the same sources, the Family Expenditure Survey up to 1993, and the FRS since 
1994-95. The income data are thus from the same source as we have used to measure income inequality in 
earlier parts of the report, but the earnings data sources differ, and so may show somewhat different levels 
and trends over time from those used in other parts of the report.
184  The full report breaks these each down between seven sub-periods.305
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In nearly every case, the pattern is the same: however the population is classified, it is 
changes in inequality within groups that has been the dominant effect in explaining overall 
inequality changes. When people are grouped by gender and marital status, the increase in 
within-group inequality was more than enough to account for the overall change, with the 
narrowing of average earnings differences between the groups tending to reduce inequality 
considerably. This reflects a substantial improvement in the position of married/cohabiting 
women over the period. As a consistent occupational classification is not available over the 
whole period, the results by occupation are divided between three sub-periods, but within 
each of these it was still the within-group changes that dominated. It should be noted that 
the qualification variable available in the data is only a very crude one – the age at which the 
head of the household left full-time education. 

















Age group (table 5) 45 32 2 9
Household type (table 8) 45 49 -6 4
Gender and marital status (table 6) 45 79 21 -56
Region (table 13) 45 37 3 6
Age left education (table 15) 51 42 5 5
Occupation 1968–1986 (table 16) 34 30 -9 11
Occupation 1987–2001 (table 16) 3 2 3 -1
Occupation 2001–2007 (table 16) -9 -9 2 -2
Source: Brewer, Muriel and Wren-Lewis (2009). Table number in brackets refers to the table in Brewer, 
Muriel and Wren-Lewis (2009) from which estimates are taken.
Notes: Gross weekly earnings for all employees at the individual level. Occupations A-C are between 8 and 
12 categories of occupation, depending on the period (such as ‘professional and technical workers’, or 
‘skilled manual workers’ in Occupation A). 
‘Change in overall inequality’ refers to change in the MLD inequality index (see text).
Given the dominance of changes in within-group inequalities, the panels of Figure 10.6 
concentrate on illustrating which groups had the greatest inequality, and the greatest 
changes in it, when different breakdowns are used. 
  ❍ Figure 10.6(a) shows that earnings inequality grew within each of the age groups 
during the 1980s, but continued to grow and did not fall back within the under-25 age 
group.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
306
  ❍ Figure 10.6(b) shows more instability over time in inequality for particular household 
types (though this may simply represent the effects of sampling variability for relatively 
small groups). There were particularly large increases in inequality within the two 
lone parent groups in the late 1980s and among single pensioners in the early 1990s. 
Despite some falls in the last ten years, inequality in 2006-07 was greater within every 
household type group than in 1968, except among lone parent households with young 
children (possibly reﬂ  ecting higher employment rates and more generous treatment by 
the tax and beneﬁ  t system).
  ❍ Figure 10.6(c) shows the breakdown by gender and marital status. Inequality grew 
within both male groups from the early 1980s onwards until the start of this decade. For 
married/cohabiting women, earnings inequality started much higher than within other 
groups, but has been falling since the early 1990s. For single women, it started above 
both groups of males and below married/cohabiting women and rose until the mid-
1990s. It has been steady since then.
  ❍ Figures 10.6(d) and (e) show the breakdown of inequality within each English region, 
Scotland and Wales. Overall, the patterns of growth and subsequent decline are very 
similar – with the exception that the growth in earnings inequality in London was 
fastest and continued longest (although starting from the lowest base).









































Below 25 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
Source: Brewer, Muriel and Wren-Lewis (2009).307
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Figure 10.6(b): Within-household type earnings inequality, 1968 to 2006-07
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Figure 10.6(d): Within-region earnings inequality, 1968 to 2006-07 (1)
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(b) Income  inequality
Table 10.18 gives a similar breakdown of the extent to which the growth of income inequality 
over the period can be ascribed to within-group inequality changes and to changes in the 
relative incomes between different groups, with the population again divided in different 
ways. Again, within-group inequality changes are dominant, accounting for all of the 
aggregate change in inequality or more in the age breakdowns, and nearly all of it in the 
others. A breakdown by ethnicity is only available for the period 1994 to 2006-07. For this 
period, in common with other breakdowns of the population, the overall inequality growth 
was mainly accounted for by growing inequality within ethnic groups. Only changes in relative 
incomes by employment status substantially added to rising inequality.
















Age group (table 4) 74 76 -1 -3
Household type (table 7) 74 70 11 -8
Employment status (table 9) 74 47 11 14
Household employment structure 
(table 10)
74 59 13 -1
Region (table 12) 73 69 1 3
Education (table 14) 78 60 13 2
Ethnicity (since 1994) (table 17) 12 10 2 -1
Source: Brewer, Muriel and Wren-Lewis (2009). Table number in brackets refers to the table in Brewer, 
Muriel and Wren-Lewis (2009) from which estimates are taken.
Notes: Equivalised net household incomes, all households. Occupations A-C are between 8 and 12 
categories of occupation, depending on the period (such as ‘professional and technical workers’, or ‘skilled 
manual workers’ in Occupation A). 
‘Change in overall inequality’ refers to change in the MLD inequality index (see text).
Given the overwhelming importance of changing inequality within groups, the panels of 
Figure 10.7 again illustrate the contributions coming from particular groups within each 
breakdown. 
  ❍ Figure 10.7(a) shows both similar levels of income inequality within each age group, 
and fairly similar patterns of increase, although with more instability in inequality 
within the oldest group in particular.
  ❍ Figure 10.7(b) shows different levels of, but similar growth in income inequality within 
different groups by household types. Again, lone parents with young children were the 
only group to end up with lower within-group inequality than at the start.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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  ❍ By employment status (of ‘household head’), Figure 10.7(c) shows that inequality 
within the self-employed remained highest, but that within households with 
unemployed heads grew most rapidly, particularly since 2000-01.
  ❍ As with earnings inequality broken down by nation or English region, Figure 10.7(d) 
shows that inequality started at similar levels in each of them and changed over time 
in the same way, with the exception that the growth in London was much more rapid, 
leaving incomes in London far more unequal than in the others by the end of the 
period. 
Figure 10.7(a): Within-age group income inequality, 1968 to 2006-07
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Figure 10.7(b): Within-household type income inequality, 1968 to 2006-07
Figure 10.7(c): Within-employment status of head of household group income inequality, 
1968 to 2006-07
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Figure 10.7(d): Within-region income inequality, 1968 to 2006-07
(c)  The importance of different factors
A second kind of decomposition analysis investigates the relative contributions of each 
factor to overall inequality, and the extent to which there are other unexplained reasons for 
inequality growing, even after we have allowed for each of these factors. The unexplained 
fraction is the ‘residual’ in the figures. The results of doing this type of decomposition exercise 
are shown in Figure 10.8(a) for earnings inequality and Figure 10.8(b) for income inequality. 
In these figures, the more that a particular factor contributes to overall inequality (shown by 
the height of the chart as a whole), the wider is the band representing it. If the importance 
of a particular factor declines – for instance, because the gap in earnings between genders 
narrows – the band becomes narrower over time. Conversely, if a factor becomes more 
important, the band associated with it becomes wider. 185
So far as earnings are concerned, Figure 10.8(a) shows that taken together, the factors 
included accounted for more than half of overall inequality at the start, but much less of it 
by then end. Even allowing for all these personal characteristics simultaneously, unexplained 
inequality grew – consistent with the patterns we have shown throughout this section of 
rising within-group inequality however the population is split. Two of the factors examined 
tended to reduce inequality over the period – falling gender earnings inequality and, also 
linked to gender, the declining importance of whether someone was a household head or a 
185  The band representing occupational category changes shading in the ﬁ  gures reﬂ  ecting the changes in the 
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second earner. On the other hand, earnings differences between occupational groups had 
an increasing effect over the period (although definitional changes make this element less 
precise). The contribution of earnings differences by education grew, but do not appear to be 
very large (partly because the measure is only the age someone left education).
If anything, Figure 10.8(b) shows even more strongly that in the case of income, the identified 
factors, and income differences between groups identified by them, were not the explanation 
of the rise in inequality over the period. Growing differences in income by employment status 
(especially between employed and non-employed people in the 1980s) and occupation did 
play a part in overall income inequality growth, as did differences by the age of leaving 
education. However, most of the growth in inequality is not related to the factors shown. 
Again, this is consistent with the patterns shown earlier in this chapter, that much of the story 
of changing income inequality is about changing income differences within groups, however 
they are defined.

































Residual Region Household type Age
Education Ethnic group Health Gender
Household head Occupation A Occupation B Occupation C
Source: Brewer, Muriel and Wren-Lewis (2009).
Notes: Gross weekly earnings for all employees at the individual level. Occupations A-C are between 8 and 12 categories 
of occupation, depending on the period (such as ‘professional and technical workers’, or ‘skilled manual workers’ in 
Occupation A).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 10.8(b): Income inequality decomposed by factor and year, 1968-2006
Summary
•  Looking at the relationship between overall earnings inequality since 1968 for each 
of a number of different group definitions taken separately in turn, it is changes in 
inequality within groups that dominates in explaining overall changes, not changes in 
the relative earnings of different groups or the relative sizes of the groups.
•  Changes in overall equivalent net income inequality are even more dominated by 
changing inequality within groups, rather than by changes in the mean incomes 
of each group. The exception to this is that differences in mean income when the 
population is classified by gender and marital status narrowed (but inequalities 
within these groups increased substantially). 
•  With only very few exceptions (such as lone parents with young children), both 
earnings and income inequality within any of the many sub-groups of the population 
we have looked at was greater in 2006-07 than it had been in 1968.
•  While changes in the relationship between each personal characteristic and people’s 
earnings or income might contribute only a little separately, when they are all 
looked at simultaneously, they might, together ,explain a larger share of the overall 
inequality changes. However, even together they account for little of the change. This 
confirms that most of the increase in earnings and income inequality over the last 







































Health Employment status and occupation A
Employment status and occupation B Employment status and occupation C
Source: Brewer, Muriel and Wren-Lewis (2009).
Notes: Equivalised net household incomes, all households. Occupations A-C are between 8 and 12 categories of 
occupation, depending on the period (such as ‘professional and technical workers’, or ‘skilled manual workers’ in 
Occupation A).315
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10.5  Inequalities and the recession
Inevitably, the data on which we have based this report relate to a period in the past, usually 
up to 2008 or the financial year 2007-08. In some ways, this is an advantage – it means 
that we are covering a period before the instability following the world financial crisis in the 
autumn of 2008 and before the economic recession had gathered pace. Whatever the path of 
recovery, it will be some time before the effects of the crisis on different groups will be clear. 
By the same token, some groups will have been more affected than others, and so the picture 
we have presented will already be, in some respects, out of date. Repeating the analysis we 
have carried out in a few years’ time would reveal which respects these were. However, in the 
meantime, there is evidence that gives clues about what might be happening.
First, it is possible to look at other recessions to see if the patterns of change in inequality 
associated with them were consistent. Alastair Muriel and Luke Sibieta186 conclude that, as 
far as overall income inequality was concerned, there was no consistent pattern. Income 
inequality fell slightly during the recession in the mid-1970s, rose during the early 1980s, but 
was flat in the early 1990s (see Figure 2.13). In each of these recessions, the real incomes of 
those in the middle of the income distribution (roughly speaking, the 30th to 70th percentiles) 
fell by the same proportion, but patterns at the top were more varied, sometimes related to 
income tax changes that happened at the same time as the recession. How different groups 
are affected depends, in part, on their relationship to the labour market – pensioners and 
groups such as lone parents whose incomes are more dependent on social security benefits 
may be less affected by changes in real wages and employment. The real living standards of 
those whose incomes have a large proportion of benefits within them will also be affected 
by fluctuations in inflation, particularly as they are adjusted with a lag, depending on past, 
rather than current, inflation rates.
Looking at employment, a study by Lynn Gambin and colleagues at Warwick University for 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC)187 suggests that in previous recessions:
  ❍ women were employed in less cyclically sensitive occupations, so men’s unemployment 
rose faster; however
  ❍ where women were employed in traditionally male-dominated sectors, they were the 
ﬁ  rst to lose their jobs. Lone mothers, older women, and those with lower skills were 
worst affected;
  ❍ in the most recent recessions there was some evidence of more lower-qualiﬁ  ed women 
entering the labour market, possibly to ﬁ  ll the gap in falling family incomes;
  ❍ younger and older people had been more affected than middle-aged people, as labour 
market entry became difﬁ  cult, and as older people were encouraged to take early 
retirement.
186  Muriel and Sibieta (2009).
187 Gambin,  et al. (2009).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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  ❍ recessions have coincided with higher levels of work-related disability, especially related 
to mental health problems;
  ❍ in the 1970s and 1980s, unemployment rates of minority ethnic groups – particularly 
Caribbean and African188 men rose faster than the rest of the population during the 
recession, but then fell faster in the recovery. However, in the recovery of the 1990s they 
did not fall faster than others.
Using data from General Household Survey covering a thirty-year period and looking back at 
previous recessions, Richard Berthoud189 identifies the characteristics of those most and least 
likely to be affected by a recession. He concludes that the groups most adversely affected 
in terms of employment are men, younger adults, non-disabled people,190 those with poor 
educational records, members of ethnic minorities, and those living in the West Midlands. 
Those least adversely affected are women without children, in older age groups, disabled, 
with good qualifications, white people and those living in the North East of England. However, 
it is far from easy to generalise from these patterns.
Recent work by Rebecca Tunstall and Alex Fenton for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (based 
on analysis of Jobseeker‘s Allowance claims at a neighbourhood level since 1983) shows that 
recessions tend, disproportionately, to affect neighbourhoods with high proportions employed 
in manufacturing and with high proportions of private and social renting. Areas with high 
public sector employment have been more resilient.191
The second kind of evidence is from early statistics on the initial impact of the current 
recession on the labour market.192 Comparing data for the second quarter of 2009 with the 
position a year before, overall employment in the UK had fallen by 2.2 percentage points, 
unemployment had risen by 2.5 percentage points, but economic inactivity had increased by 
0.2 percentage points. Within this:
  ❍ young people, aged 18-24, were worst hit, with an employment rate down 4.4 points, 
unemployment up 4.8 points, and inactivity up 1.1 points. By contrast, the employment 
rate for those aged 50-69 had barely fallen; their unemployment had risen by 1.6 
percentage points, less than the national average;
  ❍ women had been less affected, with their employment rates down by 1.3 percentage 
points compared to 2.8 percentage points for men. The employment rate for lone 
parents with children increased by 0.6 percentage points, but their unemployment rate 
rose by 1.6 percentage points, although their inactivity fell by 1.8 points;
188  The study is based on the LFS categorisation at that time. These were African and West Indian or Guyanese.
189 Berthoud  (2009).
190  The study found that if disabled people followed a similar trajectory in the current recession as they did in 
the 1983 and 1993 recessions, they would experience a 2.1 percentage point rise in their non-employment 
rate. This would be rather lower than that faced by non-disabled people and represent only a proportionate 
increase compared with the high rate of non-employment already faced by disabled people (Berthoud, 2009, 
p. 17).
191 Tunstall  (2009).
192  Based on our analysis of the LFS Q2 2008 to Q2 2009, seasonally unadjusted, age 16 to 59-64, except for 
breakdown by age.317
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  ❍ for those from minority ethnic groups taken as a whole, employment rates had fallen 
(by 1.6 points), and inactivity had increased by just 0.3 points, with unemployment 
up 1.9 percentage points. Given the initial gaps (see Chapter 4), this still left minority 
employment rates much lower, and unemployment and inactivity much higher than the 
national average;
  ❍ disabled people also had smaller changes than the national average in all three 
respects;
  ❍ employment fell faster than the UK average in Northern Ireland and Wales, and the 
unemployment rate had risen at similar levels in the UK countries. Inactivity rates rose 
faster in Northern Ireland than in the UK average and the other countries. 
Summary
Past recessions have not affected all groups equally, but have varied in their effects 
on inequality. From recent recessions, one might expect those worst affected to be 
younger adults, men, those with low qualifications, members of minority ethnic groups, 
and non-disabled people. However, early evidence suggests that the current recession 
may have some different impacts from other recent recessions, particularly so far 
as older people are concerned. In certain respects, the patterns continue what we 
described in earlier sections of this chapter for the previous decade – young people 
in particular falling behind, but gaps compared with the national average narrowing 
somewhat for women and older people.319
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Chapter 11  How do inequalities develop  
  across the life cycle?
In Part 2, we showed the great extent to which economic outcomes vary not just between 
various social groups, but also within them. In Chapter 10, we looked at changes over 
time, and showed a complex picture over the last decade, with the differences between 
some groups narrowing a little, but that at the same time inequalities within some 
of them widening. We presented research showing that most of the overall growth 
in inequality in earnings and in incomes over the last forty years can be attributed 
to growing inequalities within groups defined in terms of characteristics, such as age, 
ethnicity, gender, region, and household type (although some growth in earnings 
inequality was also attributable to growing inequality between those in different 
occupational groupings).
In this chapter, we look at a different aspect of time: how do the differences we have 
charted develop as people age, from birth through to retirement and later life? In 
Chapters 5 to 8, we showed how incomes and other outcomes show an age-related 
pattern, comparing across a cross-section of people born in different years at a single 
date. In this chapter, where possible we use information on how the lives of people born 
in the same year (the same cohort) have developed as they have got older – longitudinal 
data. We also use information on the ways in which inequalities are affected by 
transitions between particular life stages. 
In Section 11.1, we look at what, in some ways, is the start of this process, but in other ways 
the result of it – links between the economic circumstances of individuals and their parents. 
Unlike subsequent sections, it does not represent a single stage in the life cycle. Rather, it 
represents both the starting point for and the result of processes that occur at each life stage. 
In Section 11.2, we look at the pre-school years and assessments of children as they arrive in 
school. Section 11.3 looks at developments through the school years, particularly in terms of 
ethnicity and of indicators of the economic and social position of parents. Section 11.4 looks 
at higher education and entry into the labour market. Section 11.5 looks at particular issues 
connected with the way gender differences develop across people’s working lives. In Section 
11.6, we look at resources in retirement and their links with people’s previous circumstances.  
A summary is given at the end of each section.
11.1  Overall intergenerational links
The circumstance over which people have least choice is that of who their parents are. How 
much the outcomes of children depend on the circumstances of their parents – whether there 
is high or low ‘social mobility’ – is controversial and difficult to measure. One reason for the 
difficulty is that we often lack detailed information on family and parental circumstances 
when individuals were growing up. A second is that these links refer to a long time – a whole 
generation. By the time we know, for instance, what the links look like between parental An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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income in childhood and how someone’s earnings then evolve in early middle age, twenty 
or more years will have passed. For this reason, it is seldom possible to talk about what 
is happening to ‘social mobility’ in the present tense – we usually know what has been 
happening to social mobility as a result of processes in childhood or in school that may 
already have changed.
In principle, intergenerational links could be examined between any of the outcomes we 
looked at in Chapters 3 to 8 – educational qualifications, employment status, earnings, 
incomes or wealth. Confusion can arise when links in those different dimensions have varying 
strengths or change in different directions. The links can also be looked at in two different 
ways. On the one hand, we can examine the relationship between absolute outcomes for 
children and those of their parents: are the children better off in real terms than their parents, 
or do they have ‘better jobs’ or better qualifications than their parents according to a fixed 
standard? On the other, we can look at the relationship in relative terms: each generation may 
be improving their situation compared to the previous one, but are they all doing so at the 
same rate? To put it another way, how does the children’s ranking in the income distribution 
compare with that of their families when they were growing up, or what is their ranking in an 
educational hierarchy by comparison with the ranking of their parents? With a measure of 
absolute mobility, everyone in the younger generation can do better than their parents. But 
with relative mobility, it is a zero-sum game: if someone is rising in the ranking, someone else 
must be falling.
In practice, the main evidence that is currently available for the UK about social mobility 
relates to only three of these possible measures: absolute and relative mobility in terms of 
occupational social class; and relative income mobility. This evidence rules out the extreme 
possibilities: outcomes for children are not random or independent of family background; 
but nor are we looking at a deterministic process, in which life chances are set in stone at 
birth. How we judge links whose strength is between these two extremes is difficult, and is 
sometimes a matter of choosing to describe whether a glass is half full or half empty. What 
we can sometimes say is whether links have been getting stronger over time, and whether 
they are stronger or weaker than in other countries. This is important because declining 
mobility, or mobility that is lower than in other countries, is seen as undesirable by people 
who have different political philosophies. For those who are concerned with inequality in 
outcomes in itself, strong intergenerational links would be seen as an exacerbating factor – 
not only are outcomes unfairly unequal, but they may have been reached through routes that 
appear less fair than in the past or than apply in other countries. But others who see ‘equality 
of opportunity’ as being the main yardstick for judging fairness, rather than inequality in 
outcomes per se, would also see intergenerational links that have strengthened over time or 
which are stronger than elsewhere as a problem, as they suggest less equal opportunities. 
However, the evidence on intergenerational income and on occupational mobility tell different 
stories. This does not mean that they contradict one another. As we saw in Chapter 9, the 
relationship between occupational social class and income has changed over time, both 
in terms of income differences between classes and those within classes, so we would not 321
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necessarily expect intergenerational links in one to move in the same direction as those in 
the other. We present some of the key pieces of recent evidence, some of it the result of 
research by members of the Panel and their colleagues. A more detailed review of some of the 
evidence can be found in a recent Cabinet Office discussion paper, which acted as background 
to the January 2009 White Paper, New Opportunities: Fair Chances for the Future.193
(a)  Absolute mobility in occupational social class
The first piece of evidence is associated with the work of John Goldthorpe and colleagues who 
have looked at the occupational social class of people of working age by comparison with 
what they report was that of their parents. The results presented in Figure 11.1(a) for men 
and 11.1(b) for women who were aged 25-59 at different dates between 1972 and 2005 show 
rates of upward and downward mobility between three levels of occupational status.194 It is 
important to remember that over time the proportion of the workforce in the top category,195 
two-fifths in recent years for men, was only roughly a quarter in the early 1970s, and even 
less in earlier decades. There has, thus, been more ‘room at the top’ for people to have 
‘better jobs’ in this absolute sense than their parents – for instance, white collar rather than 
manual jobs. The figures therefore show higher rates of upward absolute mobility (marked 
with green circles in the figures) than downward mobility (marked with orange squares) for 
men throughout the period and rates of upward mobility for women that have overtaken 
their rates of downward mobility. A complication in the figures comes from the definitional 
change, and hence non-comparability, between data from the General Household Survey 
(most observations) and two more recent surveys (the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) 
and the EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions). Allowing for this break in the series, the 
conclusion that the researchers reach is that there has been no change in absolute social class 
mobility for men over the thirty years shown while, for women, there is evidence that upward 
mobility grew between those working in the early 1970s and those working in the early 1990s, 
and appears to have grown again (to match that of men) by 2005.
Other countries have also experienced the ‘room at the top’ phenomenon and also have 
higher rates of upward than downward absolute occupational mobility. Figures 11.2(a) and (b) 
suggest that upward mobility rates in the UK have been steady, but somewhat below typical 
rates elsewhere in Europe for men, and although they have risen for women, they were still 
below all of the other countries shown in the 1990s.196
193 Cabinet  Ofﬁ  ce (2008, 2009a).
194  See Goldthorpe and Mills (2008) for the way in which these are constructed from the occupational class 
measures available in different surveys.
195  Corresponding to higher and lower managerial and professional posts, in terms of the National Statistics 
Socio-Economic Classiﬁ  cation (NS-SEC) social class measure used in Chapters 3 to 8.
196  See Iannelli and Paterson (2007) for more speciﬁ  c investigation of occupational social mobility in Scotland.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 11.1(a): Absolute mobility in occupational social class, men 25-29





















Source: Goldthorpe and Mills (2008).
Note: Circles and squares show estimates of mobility rates. Each vertical line shows the 95% confidence 





















Source: Goldthorpe and Mills (2008).
Note: Circles and squares show estimates of mobility rates. Each vertical line shows the 95% confidence 
interval for the corresponding estimates.323
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Figure 11.2(a): Absolute social mobility in different countries, men:
Proportion of men getting better jobs than their parents (percentages)
Figure 11.2(b): Absolute social mobility in different countries, women:
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Source: Cabinet Office (2008), based on Breen (2004).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Apart from breakdown by gender of the kind shown, there is relatively little information 
on how social mobility varies between the kinds of population group we examine in 
this report. However, Lucinda Platt has used data from the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) Longitudinal Study (based on linked Census records) to look at patterns in absolute 
occupational mobility by ethnicity, comparing class origins and destinations for White non-
migrants, and those with Indian and Caribbean backgrounds. Examining the occupations in 
1991 of those who had been children aged 8-15 in 1971, she found that patterns of mobility 
varied between the three groups. In particular, she found that Caribbean children had much 
lower chances of ending up in 1991 in the ‘service class’ (white collar) than White and Indian 
children. White children whose parents were in the service class had more than three times 
the chance of ending up in that class themselves than those whose parents were ‘working 
class’. The relative chance for Indian children with service class parents was about twice 
that of those with working class parents. But for Caribbean children, having service class 
parents gave no statistically significant advantage.197 By 2001, however, when the cohort 
was ten years older, Caribbean disadvantage in this respect had lessened, and indeed had 
become statistically insignificant once levels of educational achievement were allowed for. 
As she puts it, “In so far as Caribbeans remain disadvantaged it is through area of residence, 
more limited access to parental resources, and an educational system in which they either do 
less well or achieve comparable levels of qualifications later”.198 In other words, the different 
groups appear to be following trajectories with different timing in their careers. However, the 
Caribbean cohort still faced higher risks of unemployment regardless of class background.199
(b)  Relative mobility in occupational social class
As the discussion above indicates, some ‘social mobility’ in terms of the absolute occupational 
class of children compared with their parents is inevitable between generations, given 
the changing structure of jobs – the increasing proportion of white collar and decreasing 
proportion of manual jobs. The trends in occupational structure have varied over time, 
affecting the rate at which absolute mobility could occur. The index shown in Figures 11.3(a) 
(for men) and 11.3(b) (for women) adjusts for changes in occupational structure to compare 
relative social mobility over time – were people’s chances of changing occupational level 
from those of their parents faster or slower than one would expect on the basis of the earliest 
comparison, after allowing for the changing labour market? The index is set at one for the 
earliest observation. The bars around later observations show the range consistent with there 
having been no statistically significant change. The conclusion reached by the authors is that 
there is no evidence that rates of relative occupational mobility have changed at all since the 
early 1970s (disregarding one apparent outlier in the index for women).
197  Platt (2005a), tables 4 and 5. In her research ‘Caribbeans’ are taken as those who deﬁ  ned themselves as 
‘Black Caribbean’ or ‘Black Other’ in the 1991 Census, and had at least one parent born outside Britain. 
‘Indians’ are those who deﬁ  ned themselves as ‘Indian’ and had at least one parent born outside Britain.
198  Platt (2005b), p.715.
199  See Box 9.2. See also Platt (2005c).325
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Figure 11.3(a): Index of relative occupational mobility, 1972-2005, men aged 25-29







































































Source: Goldthorpe and Mills (2008).
Note: Each vertical line shows the 95% confidence interval for the corresponding estimate.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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(c)  Relative intergenerational income mobility
The third kind of comparison we can make is between the earnings (or incomes) of adults and 
those of their families when they were growing up. Information of this kind is very limited, 
but Jo Blanden and Stephen Machin have used the results of the ‘birth cohort studies’ that 
have followed two groups of children born in 1958 and 1970, respectively, from birth into their 
thirties. Table 11.1 shows some of their findings. This compares where children came in the 
ranking of their earnings in their early thirties with their parents’ income group when they had 
been teenagers. So in the upper panel, it can be seen that 30 per cent of men born in 1958, 
whose parents were in the bottom quarter of incomes when they were teenagers, ended up 
in the bottom quarter of earnings themselves; only 18 per cent of them ended up in the top 
quarter of earnings. For their equivalents born twelve years later, more (37 per cent) ended up 
at the bottom, and fewer (13 per cent) at the top. The stickiness of high income strengthened 
even more – 45 per cent of those born in 1970 with the most affluent parents ended up high 
paid themselves, compared with 35 per cent for the earlier cohort. The lower panel shows a 
similar strengthening of the links between daughters’ earnings and parental income.
Table 11.1: Intergenerational income mobility, Great Britain
Parents’ income group
Bottom 25% Top 25%
(a) Sons’ earnings at 33-34 (%)
In bottom 25%:
Born 1958 (at 33) 30 18
Born 1970 (at 34) 37 13
In top 25%:
Born 1958 (at 33) 18 35
Born 1970 (at 34) 13 45
(b) Daughters’ earnings at 33-34 (%)
In bottom 25%:
Born 1958 (at 33) 27 18
Born 1970 (at 34) 32 16
In top 25%:
Born 1958 (at 33) 18 37
Born 1970 (at 34) 14 41
Source: Blanden and Machin (2007), tables 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b (and calculations by authors for National 
Equality Panel).327
Chapter 11   How do inequalities develop across the life cycle?
11
This comparison, suggesting – in contrast to the evidence on occupational class – that 
intergenerational income mobility declined significantly, relates to generations who are now 
in their late thirties and fifties.200 The 1970 cohort completed the bulk of its education by the 
mid-1990s. We do not have corresponding evidence for those born more recently. However, 
looking at a variety of other sources, Blanden and Machin suggest that there is no evidence 
that there has been any reversal of that decline, although it may have flattened out for those 
born more recently. For instance, Table 11.2 shows the proportions of people born in different 
years who had achieved a first degree by the time they were 23, depending on the income 
group their parents had been in. There is a huge difference between those whose parents had 
high and low incomes, and this difference grew between the 1958 and 1970 cohorts – the 
expansion of higher education barely affecting those who had low income parents. For those 
born later in the 1970s, the absolute gap has widened again, but much less rapidly than over 
the previous period.
Table 11.2: Proportion achieving a degree by age 23 by parental income group 
(percentages)
Parents’ income group




1975 (average) 11 40
1979 (average) 10 44
Source: Blanden and Machin (2007), tables 3 and 6.
As before, it is helpful to compare the UK experience with that of other countries to judge 
whether the rates of income mobility in the UK are ‘high’ or ‘low’. Using data for those born in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, Figure 11.4 shows how closely the earnings of sons are related 
to the earnings of their parents201 – the higher the index, the more closely they are related 
and the lower intergenerational mobility. This suggests that Brazil, the USA, and Great Britain 
had the least mobility for this generation (since when the study quoted above suggests it has 
fallen further in Great Britain). It is notable that the highest rates of mobility appear to have 
been in the countries whose income distributions were more equal in the mid-1980s, when 
200  Ermisch and Nicoletti (2007) suggest that one cannot reach conclusions on trends in intergenerational 
mobility comparing only two points in time. Therefore, they compare intergenerational earnings mobility 
across successive cohorts for sons born between 1952 and 1972 in Britain, using the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) (which contains information on people born at different times, but smaller sample numbers 
for those born at each time than are available from the birth cohort studies). By contrast with the birth 
cohort comparisons, their results suggest that intergenerational earnings mobility did not change much 
over that period. There is some indication of a stronger association between children’s and fathers’ average 
earnings for those born towards the end of the period, but the differences from earlier cohorts are not 
statistically signiﬁ  cant.
201  The UK data, as above, use the income of parents, rather than their earnings.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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these generations reached the labour market (see Figures 2.8 and 2.14). Equally, the apparent 
fall in income mobility between the 1958 and 1970 cohorts in Britain coincides with the rise 
in income inequality between the periods when they each reached the labour market. This 
is suggestive evidence that intergenerational mobility is slower in societies which are more 
unequal – moving up a ladder is harder if its rungs are further apart.
Figure 11.4: International comparisons of income mobility
The Panel on Fair Access to the Professions, chaired by the Rt. Hon. Alan Milburn looked in 
detail at some of the mechanisms by which social mobility has slowed down in terms of the 
backgrounds of those ending up in particular professions, at the very top of the occupational 
hierarchy. Figure 11.5 shows that members of the professions covered by that Panel typically 
had grown up in families with above average income. For most of the professions202, the 
difference between their families’ income and the average grew substantially between those 
born in 1958 and those born in 1970. For instance, those born in 1958 who became journalists 
came from families with incomes 5 per cent above the average; those born in 1958 who 
became journalists came from families with incomes more than 40 per cent above average.















































Note: Each vertical line shows the 95% confidence interval for the corresponding estimate.329
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Figure 11.5: Family income background of professionals, born 1958 and 1970:
Percentage difference between the average family’s income and that of the family that the 
typical professional grew up with
Summary
Whether intergenerational mobility is greater or smaller for today’s adults than it was in 
the past depends on which outcomes are examined. The level of job that people end up 
in appears to be no more or less dependent on that of their parents than it was thirty 
years ago, allowing for changing occupational structure. In this sense, ‘social mobility’ 
has not changed. On the other hand, the earnings in their early thirties of those born in 
1970 are more closely associated with the income level of their parents when they were 
growing up than was the case for those born in the late 1950s. In this sense, ‘social 
mobility’ has declined.
However, whatever the differences between particular studies that are measuring 
different outcomes, two features of the evidence are clear. We do not live in a 
perfectly mobile society: people’s occupational and economic destinations depend 
to an important degree on their origins. Moreover, rates of intergenerational mobility 
in terms of incomes are low in international terms, and in terms of occupation 
are below the international average for men and at the bottom of the range for 
women. Intergenerational mobility is slower in societies which are more unequal – 
moving up a ladder is harder if its rungs are further apart. Equally, the apparent fall 
in intergenerational income mobility between those born in 1958 and in 1970 in 
Britain coincides with the rise in income inequality between the periods when they 
each reached the labour market. It matters more in Britain who your parents are 








Scientists and other medicine





BCS (Born 1970) NCDS (Born 1958)
Source: Panel on Fair Access to the Professions (2009).
Note: The red line separates those professions where entry became less related to family income (above it) from those 
which have become more related to it (below).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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than in many other countries. When the stakes are so high given our historically and 
internationally high levels of inequality in economic outcomes, this observation is a 
cause for concern for those from a wide range of political philosophies.
In the following sections of this chapter we look at the ways in which some of these 
links between generations play out in the early stages in people’s lives, and then how 
their later lives depend in turn on these. Given the links with parental background 
we show at each of those stages, it should be borne in mind that we may still not 
have seen the full effect of the increases in earnings and income inequality that took 
place across the 1980s: those who were the beneficiaries of this have had greater 
opportunities than others to support their children, but have still only had half their 
careers in this less equal environment.
11.2  Inequalities in the early years
It is, of course, very hard to tell when children are young how they and their abilities may 
develop later on, and any attempt to measure different types of ‘ability’ (in terms of a score 
on some kind of assessment or test) will be subject to wide margins of error (particularly if 
there are language differences between the child and that of the assessment). Nonetheless, 
clear differences emerge and widen very early on between children with different 
backgrounds. Figure 11.6 gives some examples of data drawn from the Millennium Cohort 
Study (MCS), a cohort study that has been following a group of children born in 2000-01. In 
this case, assessments are shown for children aged 3 (the left two clusters) and at 5 (the other 
three clusters). In each case, the average results are shown for children whose families were in 
each of five income groups. The results are shown in terms of how high up the range, out of 
100 children, the average ranking would come. If there were no differences between poorer 
and better off children, all the bars would have a height of 50 – the average ranking for each 
group would match the overall average. In fact, there were substantial differences. In terms 
of ‘school readiness’ at age 3,203 there was a difference of 31 places between the children 
from the poorest group of families and those from the richest – a third of the measured ability 
range. The gradient in vocabulary ranking at age 3 with income is almost as great. By the 
age of 5, the difference in ranking of vocabulary scores is even greater. For assessments of 
conduct and hyperactivity at 5, the poorest fifth of children having an average ranking 26-27 
places higher – that is, with more problems – than the richest fifth of children.
203  School readiness is measured in terms of the Bracken School Readiness Assessment, which is the sum of 
correct responses on six sub-scales: colours, letters, numbers/counting, sizes, comparisons and shapes.331
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Figure 11.6: Indicators of school readiness by parental income group, UK
There are, of course, many reasons why child development and the economic position 
of parents should be linked like this. As well as the resources available to them, parental 
behaviour and parenting style may differ both because of the different pressures on and 
opportunities open to parents with different incomes, or because more educated parents may 
both earn more and interact with their children in different ways. On the latter, the panels 
of Figure 11.7, also drawn from the MCS, show strong links between parental income and 
resources and factors known to affect child development. The children of poorer mothers had 
lower average birth weight, which affects later development, and their mothers were far more 
likely to suffer post-natal depression than the children of richer parents, both of which have 
direct links to relative resources. In terms of behaviour, there were strong gradients by income 
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Source: Goodman and Gregg (forthcoming).
Note: SES is a composite index encompassing income, social class, housing tenure and other factors.
Figure 11.7: (Continued)
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Figure 11.8 shows that where children start from, in terms of measured ‘ability’ at very young 
ages, does not determine what happens through the rest of their childhoods. The first of 
these is drawn from the research of Leon Feinstein, looking at the 1970 birth cohort. The 
second is drawn from the work of Jo Blanden and Stephen Machin using data from the MCS 
children born thirty years later. The diagrams trace the average performance in later tests 
at different ages of children initially assessed with high or low ‘ability’, at 22 months in the 
1970 case, and at three years for the MCS children.204 Of course, how a child performs on 
a particular day at such young ages is not likely to be a very precise measure of underlying 
‘ability’. The imprecision of such assessments is shown in the way in which average later 
assessments of the ‘high’ ability children move downwards towards the mean, while those for 
‘low’ ability children move upwards towards it. But the researchers also divided each of these 
‘ability’ groups by social class, and then looked at the average performance later on within 
each group.
By the age of 10, the higher social class children born in 1970 who were initially assessed in 
the top quarter of ability had ended up 29 places higher, on average, than the lower social 
class children from the same initial group. The higher social class children initially assessed 
as having low ability also ended up 31 places out of 100 higher than the lower social class 
children with the same initial assessment. Indeed, by the age of 10, and probably by age 7, 
the higher social class children with initial low assessments had overtaken the lower social 
class children with initial high assessments. The second panel shows the results of a similar 
exercise using results from the MCS, with assessments initially made at age 3, compared with 
those then made when the children were 5. Exactly the same process appears to be at work, 
with a gap growing between children from families with higher or lower occupational social 
class, but similar ability assessments.
These are not the patterns one would expect to see if differences in child development were, 
for instance, simply a matter of genetic endowment. Instead, what we see is that differential 
experiences of children from different social class backgrounds are leading to expanding gaps 
in outcomes. Such experiences may include differences in the parenting they receive, kinds of 
childcare or pre-school education, quality of schooling, and the resources available to parents 
and their children.
204  The children’s general cognitive development was assessed with age appropriate tests. At twenty-two and 
forty-two months, health visitors asked them to complete a range of tasks, such as pointing to their eyes, 
stacking cubes, counting and speaking. The ﬁ  ve year-old children were given drawing and basic vocabulary 
tests. Scores for maths and reading at age ten years were also used. The analysis was based on where the 
children’s attainment featured within the overall range of results.335
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Figure 11.8: Cognitive test scores by age and social class, children born in 1958 and 1990
Source: Cabinet Ofﬁ  ce (2008), from Feinstein (2003) and Blanden and Machin (2007). The scores show the average rank 
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When the MCS children reached school, aged 5, they were assessed by teachers for their 
Foundation Stage Profile (FSP) in England and Devolved Administration Teacher Survey 
(DATS) for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Some of the results of this are shown in 
Table 11.3, showing mean scores for children in different groups. First, the way in which 
these assessments are made means that children are different ages when they are assessed. 
This gives a helpful benchmark for understanding the variations between other groups. For 
instance, in the English results, children aged 67-69 months had average scores of 93.8, while 
those nine months younger had average scores of 82.2. Each month older a child was made 
a difference of about 1.3 to the average score. The gap in assessment for English children 
depending on mother’s highest qualification was more than 20 points – equivalent to 
15 months of typical development – between those whose mothers had no qualifications 
and those with the highest qualifications (degree and equivalent vocational qualifications). 
There were similar gradients by qualification in the other nations (which appear to correspond 
to even larger numbers of months of development, but the sample sizes in the study make 
comparisons of that kind less precise).
Dividing the children into groups by other characteristics also shows very large gaps. In the 
English results, these are equivalent to: a year’s development between those with no parent 
in paid work and those with two parents working; eight months between those whose parents 
are in poverty and those who are not; six months between those in lone parent and two 
parent families; and, remembering that there may be language issues involved, ten months 
between those with White and with a Pakistani or Bangladeshi mother.337
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Table 11.3: Teachers’ assessment of children on primary school entry (born 2000-01)







All respondents 87.7 95.6 103.3 97.4
Age group at assessment
57 months or younger 80.1 - - -
58 to 60 months 82.2 - - -
61 to 63 months 86.7 89.6 103.9 96.5
64 to 66 months 90.7 89 100 97.7
67 to 69 months 93.8 96 104.6 98.4
70 months or older - 99.4 104.2 97.4
Ethnicity
White 88.5 - - -
Mixed 86.4 - - -
Indian 86.1 - - -
Pakistani or Bangladeshi 75.8 - - -
Black 82.1 - - -
Other 83 - - -
Family structure
Two parents 89.1 97.2 104.3 99.1
Lone parent 81.2 88.2 99 88.4
Source: Hansen and Joshi (2008), table 7.2.
Of course, each of these factors is related – those with low qualifications are more likely to 
have low incomes, for instance. The differences between groups defined in one way may be 
the result of variations between them in other, more important, factors. Figure 11.9 shows the 
results of analysis by Andy Cullis and Kirstine Hansen, which looks at the relationship between 
scores and various child, family and parental choice factors, after controlling for the effect of 
the others.205 It shows, from a wide range of factors, which ones remained most statistically 
significant after carrying out this exercise.206 In this assessment, note that a child may be 
affected by more than one factor at once, so the effects are cumulative:
  ❍ girls had an assessment equivalent to over 3 months of development more than boys; 
  ❍ Bangladeshi and Pakistani children had assessments the equivalent of 4 months behind 
White children;207
205  Cullis and Hansen (2008). Data are for England only.
206 The  ﬁ  gure shows the factors that were signiﬁ  cant at the 1 per cent level in the researchers’ ‘full model’ 
(Cullis and Hansen, (2008, table 5).
207  Note that the reference category used in the study was ‘White’.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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  ❍ children whose mothers had degrees were assessed 6 months ahead of those whose 
mothers had no qualiﬁ  cations above grade D at GCSE;
  ❍ every extra £100 per month in family income when the child was ﬁ  rst surveyed (2001-
02) was associated with a difference equivalent to a month’s development;
  ❍ where mothers had ever been a lone parent, the difference from others was equivalent 
to more than two months; and 
  ❍ if children were in social housing at age 3, the difference was more than three months.
On the other hand, a child read to regularly at three, had assessed development, controlling 
for other factors, which was the equivalent of two months extra development.
These kinds of results show associations rather than causality. It is not necessarily social 
housing in itself that leads to the lower assessment for children living in it, for instance, but 
may be other factors (beyond those allowed for in the analysis) that lead both to people 
qualifying for social housing as a result of their high needs and to children developing less 
rapidly. Box 11.1 discusses evidence that looks in much more detail at links between childhood 
housing tenure and later outcomes.
Figure 11.9: Impact of child and family characteristics (allowing for all factors together), 
England
Difference in score
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Child read to every day at age 3









Source: Cullis and Hansen (2008).339
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Box 11.1: Childhood housing tenure and outcomes in adult life
Recent research suggests that housing tenure in childhood may be associated with 
economic outcomes in adulthood.
Ruth Lupton and colleagues208 examined the relationship between childhood housing 
tenure and a range of adult outcomes including educational qualifications and whether 
or not in paid employment, for people born in 1946, 1958 and 1970, drawing on the 
British birth cohort studies. They found that, on average, those who experienced social 
housing as children were worse off as adults in terms of health, well-being, education 
and employment than their peers who did not experience social housing during 
childhood. For example, at age 34 in 2004, 79 per cent of those born in 1970 who had 
ever been in social housing in childhood were in paid employment, while 86 per cent of 
others were.
Table 11A: Average outcomes for adults at 33-34 comparing those ever in social housing 
in childhood with those never in social housing
Born 1958 at 33 (1981) Born 1970 at 34 (2004)
Ever in SH Never in SH Ever in SH Never in SH
Self-rated health (out of 4) 3.11 3.27 2.92 3.13
Malaise (out of 24) 2.84 2.11 1.88 1.56
Cigarettes smoked per day 6.9 4.2 5.5 3.0
Taking regular exercise (%) 76 80 76 81
Life satisfaction (out of 10) 7.37 7.52 7.23 7.52
In paid employment (%) 76 82 79 86
Literacy/numeracy problems 0.14 0.09 0.20 0.13
Source: Lupton, Tunstall et al. (2009), table 7.
For people born in 1946, these raw differences were explained by differences in family 
background and childhood characteristics. This implies that social housing has no 
inherent negative consequences. However, for people born in 1958 and more so in 
1970, living in social housing as a child was still associated with some worse adult 
outcomes, even after accounting for these factors. About half of the gap shown above 
on measures of self-assessed health, cigarettes smoked and paid employment between 
those in social housing as children and their peers remained after controlling for 
background factors. Notably, there were no situations where the ‘ever in social housing’ 
group had more positive scores than others, after controls. Thus, there was no evidence 
of social housing appearing to counteract earlier disadvantage with positive, ‘value 
added’ effects on adult outcomes. The sizes of the associations were typically larger for 
the 1970 cohort than for the 1958 cohort, indicating a widening gap over time.
208  Lupton, Tunstall et al. (2009).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
340
The researchers found different associations for men and women. For all cohorts, 
there were more and stronger statistically significant associations between 
childhood social housing and experiences in adulthood for women than for men. One 
explanation for this may lie in the different pathways followed in young adulthood 
by men and women who have grown up in social housing. For the 1958 and 1970 
cohorts, they examined the ages at which young people first moved into independent 
living, formed their first partnership, and had their first child. They found tenure 
differences, even after controlling for level of parental advantage. Young people from 
social housing formed partnerships and became parents earlier than their similarly 
advantaged counterparts in other tenures, and this was particularly the case for 
women. These patterns became more marked over time. This suggests that there 
may be an important role for interventions to support people’s transitions into early 
adulthood, and a need for further research on how tenure may affect transitions.
They found that negative associations with social housing were greater for people 
who moved into social housing in childhood than those who were in social housing 
but moved out. This indicates that the circumstances in which people enter social 
housing, not just the tenure itself, may be driving later outcomes.
Whatever the reasons that explain these associations, the research provides stark 
evidence of the widening gap between the socio-economic circumstances of children 
in social housing and their peers. Mothers of those born in 1958 were more likely to 
work when their children were of pre-school age if they were social tenants than if 
they were homeowners. For the 1970 cohort there was little difference by tenure, 
but by the time the 2000 cohort were aged 5, the home-owner mothers were twice 
as likely to be working as the social tenant mothers. As inequality has increased, 
and the social housing sector becomes more targeted on the most disadvantaged, 
a wide tenure gap has opened up. This is particularly important given that it seems 
likely to be reflected in worse outcomes as today’s generation of children move into 
adulthood.
Similarly, the way in which children whose mothers experienced lone parenthood had 
lower assessments than others may not reflect the fact of lone parenthood itself, but other 
circumstances it leads to – for instance – much higher rates of maternal depression. Kathleen 
Kiernan and Fiona Mensah found from analysis of the development of children aged 3 in 
the MCS that when they allowed for factors such as maternal depression, there were still 
strong associations between poverty and young children’s intellectual and behavioural 
development.209 Maternal depression was more weakly related to cognitive development 
but strongly related to behaviour problems. However, after allowing for other factors, 
especially poverty, family structure (one or two parent) was only weakly related with children’s 
development.
209  Kiernan and Mensah (2009).341
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Summary
Recent analysis of the ways in which children born at the start of this decade have been 
developing suggests that there were typically large differences between them in their 
assessed readiness for school by the time they entered school, depending on family 
background. These included differences by mother’s education, ethnicity, income and 
the child’s gender: Bangladeshi and Pakistani children were assessed 4 months behind 
White children; children whose mothers had degrees were assessed the equivalent of 6 
months ahead of those whose mothers had no qualifications above grade D at GCSE; 
and every extra £100 per month in family income when the child was first surveyed 
(2001-02) was associated with a difference equivalent to a month’s development.
Differences associated with social class appear to have widened for these children 
between ages 3 and 5, in the same way that they did through early childhood for those 
born in 1970, suggesting that these differences in early outcomes are not a simple 
result of differences in genetic inheritance. In the next section we look at the extent to 
which such differences widen or narrow during the school years, a process which leads 
up to the variations at age 16 that we described in Chapter 3.
11.3  Inequalities in the school years
We know from Chapter 3 that some of these inequalities between groups in assessments 
of children in their early years and as they enter school persist, at least until Key Stage 4 
assessments at 16. But others narrow. This section looks at different kinds of evidence on how 
they change over the school years.
(a)  Differences by Free School Meal status
The gap between income groups already seen in the early years appears to widen over the 
school years, particularly between ages 7 and 14. Figure 11.10 presents the Department for 
Children, Schools and Families’ (DCSF) summary of evidence on the comparative performance 
of children who are and are not receiving Free School Meals at each age in England through 
the school years.210 The results are cross-sectional, rather than for the same cohort of children. 
As we have just seen in Figure 11.9, low income is associated with lower assessments in the 
‘Foundation Stage Profile’ on school entry. Here the difference is shown as a 22 percentage 
point lower proportion of children receiving Free School Meals reaching the ‘expected level’ 
than others. In these terms, the gap was the same at Key Stage 1 (age 7), but wider for older 
children – 24 percentage points at Key Stage 2 (age 11), 29 percentage points at Key Stage 3 
(age 14), and 28 percentage points at Key Stage 4 (age 16).211 On leaving school, 32 per cent 
of those not receiving Free School Meals go on to higher education, but only 13 per cent of 
those receiving them.
210  As we discussed in Chapter 3, this is an imperfect measure of low income as not all children from low-income 
families are entitled to Free School Meals, and not all those entitled actually claim or receive them.
211  The ‘expected level’ at Key Stage 4 is 5 or more GCSE passes at grade C or above, including English and 
Maths.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 11.10: Free School Meal attainment gap at different stages
Figure 11.11 shows some more specific DCSF analysis of factors associated with GCSE 
performance in England, showing the effects of each factor while allowing for the others, as 
in Figure 11.9. This analysis looked at the factors that affect performance between 11 and 
16. None of these was as important as prior performance at Key Stage 2 (age 11) – in other 
words no other factor outweighed pupils’ starting point as they had left primary school (itself, 
of course, already associated with many features of their social background). However, there 
were further negative associations with gender (for boys), receiving Free School Meals, being 
in care, living in a deprived neighbourhood, having Special Educational Needs (see Box 11.2 
below) and recent mobility between schools.212 Having English as a second language was 
associated with improving performance at secondary school –the negative effect it had on 
earlier attainment wore off.213
212  See Strand and Damie (2007) for discussion of the effects of frequent mobility.




























































Source: DCSF (2009), figure 4.1.343
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Figure 11.11: Factors that affect performance between 11 and 16
(b)  Ethnicity and Free School Meals (FSM) status
Using detailed data for a cohort of children who have now been assessed at ages 7 to 16, 
Simon Burgess, Deborah Wilson and Jack Worth investigated how differences developed 
between those from different ethnic groups depending on whether they were receiving 
Free School Meals or not as they moved through school.214 The data they use are for all 
children who were aged 16 in 2007, and so were born in 1991. This means that findings 
for small population groups are not affected by sampling errors. The different panels of 
Figure 11.12 show the relative performance of boys and girls not on Free School Meals 
from different ethnic groups as they moved through school.215 The upper panel compares 
the results of White British boys and boys from different Asian backgrounds. Figure 11.2(b) 
shows the equivalent picture for girls. While White British, Indian and Chinese children had 
similar average assessments at age 7 (boys below the overall average, girls above it), by 16, 
the Indian and Chinese children had much higher assessments – as we saw in Chapter 3. 
It also shows that Pakistani and Bangladeshi girls and Bangladeshi boys had much lower 
assessments at age 7 – reflecting some of what we already saw in terms of their position at 
214  Burgess, Wilson and Worth (2009). See Burgess, Briggs and Wilson (2005) for full details of their 
methodology.
215  For comparability between ages, this is shown as the difference between the average score for each group 
and the overall average expressed as a proportion of the standard deviation of results at that age. As a 
rough benchmark, at Key Stage 4, one would expect around 44 per cent of pupils to be within 0.5 standard 
deviations of the mean. As the distribution is skewed, a group that is 0.5 points above the average is typically 
16 places (out of 100) higher up the distribution than in the middle score.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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school entry (Figure 11.9). However, their gap behind the White British group narrowed from 
then on – throughout for boys and particularly after 14 for girls. By GCSE it had effectively 
disappeared (for this group not on FSM). In other words, this ethnicity gap now disappears 
over the school years. 
The lower panels compare White British children with Black Caribbean, Black African and 
Black Other backgrounds (not on FSM). In both cases Black Caribbean and Black Other 
Black children, and Black African girls tended to fall behind between ages 7 and 14, but the 
gap narrowed again by age 16, particularly for girls – indeed, disappeared for Black African 
children.216
Figure 11.13 shows results for the same ethnic group breakdowns, but this time for those 
receiving Free School Meals. The first panel shows that, in contrast to those not on Free 
School Meals, White British boys receiving Free School Meals were already assessed well 
behind the national average at age 7, and this position deteriorates further between 11 and 
16. For White British girls on Free School Meals there was a slight improvement by 16, but they 
too remained well below the overall average for all children. Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani 
children on Free School Meals were also well below the national average at age 7, but 
improved their position as they moved through school, especially between 14 and 16. Indeed, 
by age 16 Indian and Bangladeshi children on Free School Meals had average performances 
approaching the national average for boys, and exceeding it for girls. Chinese children on free 
meals were assessed around the national average at age 7, but improved their performance 
through the school years, eventually reaching a point at age 16 where their GCSE results were 
better than those of any other ethnic group, even those not on free meals. 
The various Black groups shown in the lower panels had, like White British children, worse 
assessments at age 7 if they received Free School Meals, and ones that also deteriorated by 
age 14. However, in contrast to the White British children, their position improved sharply 
between 14 and 16 for girls and for Black African boys.217 Looking at the detailed results, 
by 16 the positions of White British and Black Caribbean boys receiving Free School Meals 
(alongside boys from mixed White and Black Caribbean backgrounds) were below that of any 
of the groups identified in this way, with the exception of Gypsy and Traveller children. As the 
figures show, Traveller and Gypsy boys and girls start a long way behind the overall average 
and then fall further behind, even for those not receiving Free School Meals.
216  The research report (Burgess, Wilson and Worth, 2009) shows results for other groups.
217  The detailed results show that Traveller and Gypsy children receiving Free School Meals have average 
assessments that remain the lowest of any of these groups that the researchers differentiate throughout the 
school years.345
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White British Black Caribbean Black African Black Other Traveller/Gypsy
Source: Burgess, Wilson and Worth (2009), ﬁ  gures 7a and 7b. The vertical scale shows the difference 
between the average score for a group and the overall average at that age, expressed as a proportion of the 
standard deviation of scores at that age. 347
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White British Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese
Source: Burgess, Wilson and Worth (2009), ﬁ  gures 6a and 6b. The vertical scale shows the difference 
between the average score for a group and the overall average at that age, expressed as a proportion of the 
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Figure 11.14 shows the researchers’ analysis of the effects of ethnicity on the age 16 results, 
controlling some other pupil characteristics (but not prior performance) in a similar way to 
the analysis in Figure 11.11. The figures given for each ethnic classification give a comparison 
with the results of White British children. Most of the other ethnic groups have positive 
coefficients – by age 16 they had better results on average, when controlling for gender, 
Special Educational Needs and Free School Meals status. The groups with worse performance 
are Black Caribbean, Black Other, mixed White and Black Caribbean, and – to a very large 
degree – Traveller and Gypsy children. In the first three cases the effect was smaller than the 
average difference between boys and girls, but in the latter it was far larger. The figure also 
shows that the ‘Free School Meal effect’ was larger than any of the other associations shown, 
with the exception of the higher performance of Chinese pupils and lower performance of 
Traveller and Gypsy children.218
Figure 11.14: The effect of ethnicity, gender and Free School Meals receipt on GCSE 
performance controlled by other factors
(c)  Social factors as a whole
In a further analysis of assessment of children from age 3 to age 16, Alissa Goodman, Luke 
Sibieta and Elizabeth Washbrook combined results from three samples of children from three 
different studies that have each followed their sample children as they get older: the MCS, 
born in 2000-01 at ages 3 and 5 (see (a) above); the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and 
Children (ALSPAC), born in 1991-92 at ages 7 and 11; and the Longitudinal Survey of Young 
People in England (LSYPE), born in 1989-90; at ages 11, 14 and 16.219 The advantage of 
218  Burgess, Wilson and Worth (2009) also present results investigating interaction of FSM-eligibility with gender 
and ethnicity, but these do not change the ﬁ  ndings presented here.
219  The surveys differ in their coverage – they use data for the UK from MCS; the ALSPAC data are for all children 
in the Bristol area; and the LSYPE is for England (Goodman, Sibieta and Washbrook, 2009).
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Source: Burgess, Wilson and Worth (2009). The horizontal scale shows the impact on a pupil's score, expressed as a 
proportion of the standard deviation of scores at 16, controlling for other factors.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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these surveys is that they contain much more information about parental circumstances and 
income than the school records used above. The panels of Figure 11.15 show the patterns over 
time for six of the factors they investigated, with the scale of differences between the least 
and most advantaged groups summarised in Figure 11.16.220 In each case, the differences 
shown are ‘raw’ effects, that is, not controlling for others. As the factors are strongly 
associated with one another, the differences shown are not cumulative. 
What is really striking is that the socio-economic differences tended to widen between ages 3 
and 14, while the ethnic differences narrowed (as we saw in the last subsection).
The first panel shows the gaps between children by family income group (fifths). These 
widened between 3 and 5 and again (in the Bristol area study) between 7 and 11, and in 
the national sample between 11 and 14. There was, however, a narrowing of the difference 
between those with family incomes in the poorest and richest fifths between 14 and 16 (on 
average, and so consistent with the improvement at that age for all groups on Free School 
Meals except White boys shown in the last subsection). The second panel also shows a 
widening in the gaps by father’s occupation (close to the occupational social class definitions 
used in Chapters 3 to 8) between 3 and 5 and between 11 and 14 (but with no widening 
in the Bristol sample between 7 and 11). Again, there was some narrowing between top 
and bottom groups by 16. The panels showing the results by mother’s education and area 
deprivation show a similar pattern to those by income.
The pictures in the fifth and sixth panels contrast with these, however. Looking at changes 
by family marital status, children living with married parents did better throughout, but that 
advantage became widest through secondary school. As with pre-school children, family 
marital status is, of course, highly associated with the other factors (including income), so 
this picture looking at family marital status by itself does not show which is the dominant 
causal factor. The final panel shows the position by ethnicity. As would be expected from the 
last subsection, this is very different. There were wide ethnic gaps at 3 and 5, but these were 
smaller at age 11 and – apart from the better performance of Indian children – the groups 
shown clustered together at age 16.
220  The detailed report, Goodman, Sibieta and Washbrook (2009), also shows differences by mother’s age at 
child’s birth, gender, housing tenure, region, SEN status, and quarter of birth.351
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Figure 11.15: Assessments of children aged 3-16 by social group
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Figure 11.15: (Continued)
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Source: Goodman, Sibieta and Washbrook (2009). The vertical scale shows the difference between the 
average score for a group and the overall average at that age, expressed as a proportion of the standard 
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The differences between lowest and highest assessed groups at each stage are summarised in 
Figure 11.16 (including differences by tenure and gender).221 It is striking that those reflecting 
socio-economic differences – income, father’s occupation, mother’s education, housing tenure 
and area deprivation – started already large and widened further up to age 14, when they 
narrowed a little. The difference between family types followed a more uneven pattern, but 
widens between 7 and 16. The pattern by ethnic group was completely different, however. 
The difference at age 3 between lowest and highest assessed groups was larger than that 
between income groups, but by 16 the gap had effectively disappeared. In these results, the 
gender gap narrowed between 3 and 5,222 but widened for older children. It remained far 
smaller, however, than the gaps based on income or social class.
Figure 11.16: Overview of differences in assessments by category, age 3-16
221  For ethnicity, the comparison is between the average standard deviation gap between White and ethnic 
minority children. The relative progress of ethnic minority children through the school years, combined with 
the rising relative position of Indian children in particular, means that the average attainment at 16 of the 
minority children taken together is above that of White children.
222  Note that this study uses a different assessment of children in the MCS at age 5 from the study used in 
Section 11.2, and so the results vary slightly, in particular not showing a gender gap at 5, unlike Figure 11.9.
Source: Goodman, Sibieta and Washbrook (2009).
Note: The differences shown are those between ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ groups where categories are clearly 
ordered (i.e. income, parental social class, education, tenure and area deprivation). They are differences 
between married and not-married (family type), girls and boys (gender), and White children compared to 
the other group with lowest average assessment at each age (ethnicity).
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(d)  Special Educational Needs
Box 11.2 reports research carried out for us on the impact of different kinds of Special 
Educational Needs (SEN) on children’s attainment at age 16 (in England). It shows how 
varied the categories covered by ‘SEN’ are, and how much variation there is in attainment 
between the different categories. For most groups, such as children with sensory impairments 
or physical needs, average attainment at 16 is closely related to attainment at the end of 
primary school. However, this is not the case for pupils with Behavioural, Emotional and 
Social Difficulty: their attainment at 16 is lower than would be expected given their average 
attainment levels at 11.
Box 11.2: The educational performance of pupils with special educational 
needs in England
About one-fifth of school children in England are identified by their schools or local 
authorities as having some form of Special Educational Needs. Official statistics show 
their educational performance at Key Stages (see Figure 3.3). However, much less is 
known about the performance of pupils with different types of Special Educational 
Needs. Francois Keslair and Sandra McNally carried out research to fill this gap and 
assess the performance of children with various types of Special Educational Needs as 
they progress through the education system.223
School data include information on eleven categories of Special Educational Needs, 
which are grouped into four main areas. Table 11B below shows these as well as the 
corresponding percentage of pupils with Special Educational Needs.
The Special Educational Needs population, 20 per cent of the total school population, 
is very varied. The research reveals that boys are more likely to be classified in all of 
the Special Educational Needs types than girls. In particular, they are over-represented 
among those classified as having Communication and Interaction Needs and as having 
Behaviour, Emotional and Social Difficulty. 
Pupils from economically disadvantaged families, as measured by eligibility to receive 
Free School Meals, are over-represented in every type of Special Educational Needs.
Black students are over-represented and Chinese pupils are under-represented 
among most Special Educational Needs types, except for Speech, Language and 
Communication needs, where Chinese pupils are greatly over-represented. Asian 
students are under-represented in many Special Educational Needs categories. They are 
overrepresented among students with Moderate Learning difficulties.
223  Keslair and McNally (2009).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 11B: Categories of Special Educational Needs and percentage of pupils 
Special Educational Needs type
% of Special 
Educational Needs 
pupils
Cognition and Learning Needs
Special Learning Difﬁ  culty (SpLD)
Modern Learning Difﬁ  culty (MLD)
Severe Learning Difﬁ  culty (SLD)
Profound and Multiple Learning Difﬁ  culty (PMLD) 46
Behaviour, Emotional and Social Development Needs
Behaviour, Emotional and Social Difﬁ  culty (BESD) 16
Communication and Interaction Needs
Speech, Language and Communication Needs (SLCN)
Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 11
Sensory and/or Physical Needs
Visual Impairment (VI) 
Hearing Impairment (HI)
Multiple-Sensory Impairment (MSI)
Physical Disability (PD)  4
Source: Keslair and McNally (2009) from National Pupil Database, 2006
Figure 11A: Percentage of pupils on any type of Special Educational Needs programme in 
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The figure shows that 17 per cent of children are put on a Special Educational Needs 
programme in the first year of primary school. This increases gradually to 24 per cent 
by Year 4 and stays the same until Year 6, the final year of primary school. In secondary 
school, the percentage of children on Special Educational Needs programmes declines, 
to reach just above 18 per cent at the end of compulsory schooling in Year 11. However, 
there are differences by type of Special Educational Needs. Some, for instance 
Physical Disability, show no clear profile, but others, such as Speech, Language and 
Communication Needs being more common among younger children and Behaviour, 
Emotional and Social Difficulty more common among teenagers.
The research finds that there are large gaps in the exam performance of students with 
all types of special needs compared to other pupils, both in primary and secondary 
school. The gap is particularly wide for those classified as having Severe Learning 
Difficulty or Profound Multiple Learning Difficulty.
Wide gaps remain also when pupils are compared on a like-with-like basis (at least, 
according to observable characteristics). The negative association between Special 
Educational Needs type and school outcome does not reflect a potential association 
between Special Educational Needs type and characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, 
Free School Meal eligibility, region etc: pupils of each Special Educational Needs type 
have a high probability of doing worse than other pupils with the same demographic 
characteristics, who attend the same school and have the same attainment at Key 
Stage 1.
More specifically, Table 11C shows the association between Special Educational Needs 
type and GCSE points score, starting with a raw correlation (Column 1) and then with 
the correlation after controlling for demographic factors, such as gender and ethnicity, 
and whether on Free School Meals and English as an additional language (Column 2). 
Attainment at the end of primary school is controlled for in Column 3, while Column 4 
presents results for those pupils who attended the same primary school. The numbers in 
the cells show how far away (above or below) pupils with a specific Special Educational 
Needs type are from the mean of the overall population. All this allows us to examine 
how the raw association between Special Educational Needs type and GCSE points 
score presented in Column 1 is mediated by demographics, prior attainment and school 
attended.
Clearly, there is a negative association between all Special Educational Needs types 
and GCSE points score, this being more pronounced for pupils with Profound and 
Multiple, and Severe, Learning Difficulties, and less for pupils with Visual Impairment 
and Hearing Impairment. Controlling for gender, ethnicity, having English as an 
additional language and receiving Free School Meals (Column 2) reduces the extent of 
this association only marginally. However, the association is much reduced after prior 
attainment at primary school is taken into account (Column 3), and actually becomes 
positive for pupils with profound and multiple learning difficulties. A further but very 
marginal reduction in the association results when considering pupils who attended the 
same primary school (Column 4).
However, results for pupils with Behavioural, Emotional and Social Difficulty depart 
from the general picture presented above. After taking account of all the factors, the 
extent of the association between Special Educational Needs type and GCSE outcome 
is much larger than that of other Special Educational Needs types.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 11C: Association between Special Educational Needs type and GCSE points score 
(end of secondary school, age 16)
Association (see text):
1234
A. Cognition and Learning Needs
Special Learning Difﬁ  culty (SpLD) -19.54 -18.72 -2.49 -1.89
Modern Learning Difﬁ  culty (MLD) -29.26 -27.43 -3.65 -2.45
Severe Learning Difﬁ  culty (SLD) -44.76 -41.95 2.75 0.46
Profound and Multiple Learning Difﬁ  culty (PMLD) -47.47 -45.35 2.01 -2.07
B. Behaviour, Emotional and Social Development 
Needs
Behaviour, Emotional and Social Difﬁ  culty (BESD) -29.44 -27.06 -14.98 -13.71
C. Communication and Interaction Needs
Speech , Language and Communication Needs 
(SLCN)
-22.31 -22.07 -1.16 -0.04
Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) -25.30 -22.61 -2.65 -3.18
D. Sensory and/or Physical Needs
Visual Impairment (VI) -12.38 -10.39 -1.92 -1.71
Hearing Impairment (HI) -12.92 -12.00 -0.62 -0.05
Multiple-Sensory Impairment (MSI) -21.46 -19.60 -2.56 -3.09
Physical Disability (PD) -17.80 -15.82 -1.40 -1.48
Source: Keslair and McNally (2009).
Note: Mean in overall population is 43.07, and standard deviation is 22.94. Therefore the -19.54 in the 
ﬁ  rst cell of the ﬁ  rst column means that pupils with SpLD have a score that is 0.85 (19.54/22.94) standard 
deviations below the average.359
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Summary
Overall data for assessments in English schools show that the gap between income 
groups already seen in the early years appears to widen over the school years, 
particularly between ages 7 and 14 (as measured by the difference between children 
receiving Free School Meals and others). Analysing changes in progression between 
11 and 16, while the most important factor is prior attainment at 11, there are further 
negative associations with being a boy, receiving Free School Meals, being in care, living 
in a deprived neighbourhood, having Special Educational Needs, and recent mobility 
between schools.
Looking at assessments of all English school-children born in 1991 from age 7 to age 
16, differentiated by gender, ethnicity and Free School Meals status, positive features 
include the ways in which Pakistani and Bangladeshi children caught up during 
compulsory schooling (even if receiving Free School Meals), and in which many of the 
groups with lower assessments at 14 had reduced the gap with the national average by 
16. To set against this, for all ethnic groups the position of those receiving Free School 
Meals (apart from Chinese children) was already well below the national average at age 
7, and remained below it at age 16 (apart from Indian and Bangladeshi children). The 
position of White British children on Free School Meals deteriorated between 7 and 14, 
and for White British and Black Caribbean boys deteriorated further by 16. Indeed, by 
16 the position of White British boys receiving free meals (alongside boys from mixed 
White and Black Caribbean backgrounds on free meals) was below that of any of the 
groups identified in this way, with the exception of Gypsy and Traveller children.
Looking at survey data including more detail on family background, it is striking that 
those reflecting socio-economic differences – income, father’s occupation, mother’s 
education, housing tenure and area deprivation – started at already large levels before 
school and widened further up to age 14, when they narrowed a little by 16. The 
pattern by ethnic group was completely different: the gap at age three between lowest 
and highest assessed groups was larger than between income groups, but by 16 it had 
effectively disappeared. In these results, the gender gap narrowed between 3 and 5, 
but widened for older children. It remained far smaller, however, than those based on 
income or social class.
For children with sensory impairments or physical needs, differential attainment at 
the end of secondary school is largely predicted by attainment levels at the end of 
primary school. By contrast, those with Behavioural and Emotional Support Needs have 
attainment levels which fall further behind during secondary school.
11.4  Higher education and labour market entry
Box 11.3 shows analysis by the (then) Department of Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) 
which shows how closely linked participation in higher education by young people is to their 
GCSE results: more than three-quarters of young men and women who achieved the best 
results (more than 49 points in the GCSE scores used) in 2002-03 were in higher education by 
2006-07. Of pupils with the lowest attainment at 16 (under 33 points), fewer than a fifth went An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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on to university. The pattern was identical for men and women. Looked at by ethnicity, those 
from minority ethnic groups with GCSE results around or below the national median are much 
more likely to go on to higher education than White British pupils with similar results. Those 
with higher levels of attainment are likely to go on to higher education regardless of ethnic 
background. However, young people who had been receiving Free School Meals at 16 and 
had results at the top of the range were less likely to go on to higher education than others – 
despite it having been less likely that they would get those results. 
Box 11.3: Higher education participation by prior attainment, gender, 
ethnicity and Free School Meals status
This box presents result of analysis by the (then) DIUS based on pupils aged 15/16 in 
maintained schools in England in 2002-03 and who have entered higher education (in 
any UK higher education institution or English further education college) either at age 
18 in 2005-06 or at age 19 in 2006-07. The pupils have been ranked according their 
GCSE capped points scores.224
In Figure 11B, the two lines show the percentage of men (green) and women (blue) 
in higher education in 2006-07 for any level of GCSE attained in 2002-03. The figure 
shows that the two lines are almost identical: once GCSE attainment is taken into 
account, there is not a significant difference between boys and girls subsequent 
participation in higher education. 
Figure 11B: Participation in higher education by age 19 by gender and prior attainment
224  The calculations are based on the pre-2004 system of points scores, where A*=8 points. The total score is the 
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By contrast, students from ethnic minorities are more likely to be in higher education 
by the age of 19 than White students with the same GCSE attainment, for most levels 
of attainment (up to 49 points). Figure 11C shows that the gap is widest for levels 
of attainment around 33-37 points. At median attainment levels – 37 capped GCSE 
points – only about a fifth of White British students went on to higher education by 19, 
compared to more than twice as many of the other groups with similar scores. Only for 
the highest achievers do White British children go on to higher education at a similar 
rate to the other groups. Within the other groups, participation is highest at any level 
of attainment for Indian students and lowest for Black Caribbean and Bangladeshi 
students. It is important to note that, as we showed in Chapter 3, students from each 
ethnic background tend to be found in different positions of the range of attainment 
shown in the chart. For instance, the median score for White British is 37 points, equal 
the overall median (using this scoring system). However, half of Indian students have 
scores above 42, but half of Black Caribbean students have scores lower than 31 points. 
Figure 11C: Participation in higher education at 19 by prior attainment and ethnicity
Finally, Figure 11D shows participation in higher education by Free School Meals status 
at age 15.225 In this case, the two lines cross just above the middle of the attainment 
distribution. Free School Meals students are less likely to be in higher education than 
non-Free School Meals students with the same attainment if this was above average 
– by more than 10 percentage points for the highest achievers. The opposite is true for 
lower than average attainment. 
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Figure 11D: Participation in higher education at 19 by prior attainment and Free School 
Meals receipt
In summary, the results show that ethnic minority students are more likely to 
participate in Higher Education by the age of 19, after taking into account their GCSE 
attainment, than White British students. Higher achieving students who are recorded 
as eligible for Free School Meals at the age of 15 are less likely to go on to higher 
education than non-Free School Meals students with similar results. There are no 
significant differences by gender. 
What happens to people once they enter the labour market is heavily dominated by their 
qualification levels, especially whether they have higher education qualifications. But not all 
forms of higher education or results have the same value in the labour market. What kind 
of university people attend and their degree class – not to mention whether they complete 
the degree at all – have large effects.226 The three panels of Figure 11.17 show analysis 
carried out for us by Stephen Machin, Richard Murphy and Zeenat Soobedar of the kind of 
university attended by those who completed higher education in 2002-03 with different 
backgrounds. First, somewhat more men who had completed higher education had gone 
to more prestigious ‘Russell group’ universities,227 and fewer had gone to ‘higher education 
establishments’. More dramatically, more than half of completing students who had attended 
226  Connor, Tyers, Modood and Hillage (2004) found that, overall, ethnic minorities are more likely to drop out of 
university than white students, but when allowance is made for differences between students (e.g. in entry 
qualiﬁ  cations, age and subject), this gap disappears.
227  The Russell Group is an association of 20 major research-intensive universities of the United Kingdom, 
including the universities of Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, 
Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Oxford, Shefﬁ  eld, Southampton, Warwick, and Imperial College 
London, King’s College London, London School of Economics and Political Science, Queen’s University 
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private schools, but only a quarter of those from state schools, went to Russell group 
universities. The third panel shows an equally strong gradient by parental social class – more 
than 40 per cent of those with professional parents went to Russell group universities, but less 
than a quarter of those with manual, semi-skilled or unskilled parents. The picture by ethnicity 
was less straightforward. Black and Pakistani/Bangladeshi students were the least likely to 
have gone to Russell group universities and most likely to have gone to new universities. More 
than a fifth of Indian students had gone to Russell group universities, but over two-fifths to 
new universities.228
Figure 11.17: University attended by background, UK-born students, UK universities
Degree classes follow an equally strong pattern. The top panel of Figure 11.18 shows that 
women (who were 56 per cent of completing students) were slightly less likely to get first class 
degrees than men, but much more likely to get upper seconds. Those who had been to private 
schools were rather more likely to get first or upper seconds than those from state schools, 
and there was a strong gradient by class: two-thirds of those with professional parents had 
firsts or upper seconds, but only half of those with unskilled parents. Remembering that they 
were less likely to have gone on to higher education in the first place, White students were the 
most likely to get firsts or upper seconds, and Black and Pakistani/Bangladeshi students the 
least likely.
228  The researchers used amalgamated ethnic categories, as the raw data were not available. For detailed 
groupings, see Machin, Murphy and Soobedar (2009b).
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Figure 11.18: Class of degree achieved by background, UK-born students, UK universities
These breakdowns do not, however, identify which factors are driving the associations. 
Analysing probabilities of men and women achieving a first or upper second class degree in a 
way that controls for the effects of other factors, including subject taken and the individual 
university attended,229 the researchers show that:
  ❍ non-White ethnic groups were less likely to get good degrees (ﬁ  rst or upper second 
class);
  ❍ those who had been to private schools were less likely to get a good degree (in contrast 
to the raw results in Figure 11.18); 
  ❍ women from higher social class backgrounds were more likely to get a good degree 
than other women (but for men the differences were not signiﬁ  cant).
  ❍ when both men and women are considered together in the same sample, men were 10 
per cent less likely than females to achieve a good degree. 
The dataset used in this analysis allowed the researchers to look at what then happened to 
this cohort of graduates in the labour market. Figure 11.19 shows what earnings levels looked 
like three and a half years after graduation.230 First, despite their lower degree classes, 22 
per cent of male graduates in full-time employment were earning more than £30,000 (that 
is, already within the top 30 per cent of full-time earners), compared to only 12 per cent of 
women. There was an even greater difference by schooling: a third of those who had gone to 
private schools earned over £30,000, but only 14 per cent of those who went to state schools. 
229  Machin, Murphy and Soobedar (2009b), table 4 (using results from Model 2a, with full controls).
230  The full research report also looks at employment status and at outcomes six months after graduation.
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A quarter of graduates who had professional parents had high earnings, but less than 15 per 
cent of the other groups. By ethnicity, Indian graduates had the greatest proportion with high 
earnings, and White graduates the lowest (despite their greater proportion of good degrees).
Figure 11.19: Gross earnings (£) 3.5 years after graduation by background, UK-born students, 
UK universities
Again the researchers were able to look at which factors were most important in determining 
wages, controlling for other factors, including the class and subject of degree, the region the 
university was in,231 and the sector and region of employment. Doing this separately for men 
and women suggested that:
  ❍ male Indian students earned 4 per cent more, but male ‘other Asian’ students 8 per 
cent less than White students;
  ❍ female Pakistani/Bangladeshi students earned 5 per cent less and ‘mixed/other’ female 
students 4 per cent less than White students;
  ❍ men who went to private schools earned 8 per cent more and women 6 per cent more 
than men who went to state schools.
That is, on top of their greater chances of high performance at GCSE, and greater chances of 
going on to higher education, men who had gone to private school were already earning 8 per 
cent more within four years of graduation than one would have expected given their gender, 
ethnicity, degree class, subject taken and occupation. 
231  But not the individual university attended. When they could allow for this as well in looking at earnings just 
six months after graduation, the effects of higher social class and of attendance at private schools were 
reduced somewhat, but remained signiﬁ  cant apart from the effect of having professional parents for men 
(Machin, Murphy and Soobedar, 2009b, table 7).
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Summary
•  Whether students enter higher education is very closely related to attainment at 
16, with very similar patterns for boys and girls. In the middle of and lower down 
the attainment range, White British children are less likely than those from minority 
ethnic groups to go on to higher education. At the top of the attainment range, those 
receiving Free School Meals are less likely than others to go on to higher education.
•  More than half of students who had attended private schools and more than 40 per 
cent of those with professional parents went to the more prestigious Russell group 
universities, but a quarter or less of those from state schools or with manual, semi-
skilled or unskilled parents. Black, and Pakistani/Bangladeshi students were the least 
likely to go to Russell group universities.
•  Two-thirds of those with professional parents received firsts or upper seconds, but 
only half of those with unskilled parents. White students were the most likely to get 
firsts or upper seconds, and Black and Pakistani/Bangladeshi students the least likely. 
Allowing for the effects of other factors, including subject taken and the university 
attended, non-White ethnic groups were less likely to get good degrees, as were those 
who had been to private schools. Women from higher social class backgrounds were 
more likely to get a good degree.
•  Three and a half years after graduation, despite lower degree classes than women, 
22 per cent of male graduates in full-time employment were earning more than 
£30,000, but only 12 per cent of women. A third of those who went to private schools 
had high earnings, but only 14 per cent of those from state schools. A quarter of 
graduates with professional parents had high earnings, but less than 15 per cent of 
the others.
•  Allowing for factors affecting wages, including class and subject of degree, the 
impact of ethnicity on subsequent earnings was smaller than class-related factors. 
Men who went to private schools earned 8 per cent more and women 6 per cent 
more than expected, given their gender, ethnicity, degree class, subject taken and 
occupation.
11.5  Earnings, employment and incomes across working lives
The earlier parts of this chapter have looked at particular links between aspects of people’s 
backgrounds and what happens to them through the education system in particular. Chapters 
4 and 5 contain extensive material on differences between people in their employment 
patterns, wages and earnings when they are of working age. In Chapter 9 (particularly in 
Boxes 9.2 and 9.3), we presented evidence which shows that employment and wage levels 
of men and women from different ethno-religious groups differ, even after allowing for 
qualifications and other factors. In particular, women from most ethno-religious groups are 
affected by a ‘pay penalty’ compared with White British Christian men. In this section, we 
look in more detail at gender differences in the way employment, ages and incomes develop 
through working life. 367
Chapter 11   How do inequalities develop across the life cycle?
11
In Chapter 5, we showed the major differences between men and women in the relationship 
between wages and age using cross-sectional data on people of different ages today (Figures 
5.2 and 5.12). In particular, we showed that hourly wages are highest for women in their 
early thirties, but for men in their early forties. Figure 11.20 looks at these differences in more 
detail, showing age-wage profiles for men and women divided into six groups – by three levels 
of qualification, and by whether working in the public or private sector, using data on wages 
between 1994 and 2006. It shows that the stereotype that wages tend to rise throughout 
people’s careers, reaching a maximum shortly before retirement is one that applies only to 
a limited group – men and women with high qualifications working in the public sector. For 
men with middle or low level qualifications, hourly wages are highest for those in their forties, 
but lower for those in their fifties. Wages are at their highest for highly qualified men in the 
private sector aged 40, and then lower for older groups. For women with middle or low level 
qualifications, there is little increase even through their twenties, but then a slow decline with 
age. For highly qualified women working in the private sector, highest wages are for those in 
their early thirties, and then there is a more rapid reduction with age.
These kinds of earnings-age profile are taken from cross-sectional data at a single time. 
But the way the earnings of cohorts born at different times change as they grow older 
has not stayed the same. Figures 11.21(a) and (b) show the results of analysis by Stephen 
Jenkins of data from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), which follows the same 
people over time, giving average hourly wage and equivalent net income trajectories for two 
cohorts, those born before 1955 and those born in 1955 or afterwards.232 The trajectories 
are shown separately for men and women with each further classified by qualification 
level, between those with no qualifications, with some qualifications, and with A levels or 
higher qualifications. The trajectories shown are from models which summarise the average 
relationship between age and wages or income for the people followed by the survey. The 
estimates are shown at January 2008 prices. Income levels are shown using a logarithmic 
scale on the vertical axis, which means that the same distance between any two points on the 
vertical scale corresponds to the same ratio of real values. The distance between a wage of 
£4 per hour and £8 per hour is thus shown as the same as that between £8 per hour and £16 
per hour, and so on. For a group whose incomes grew at a constant percentage rate each year, 
the income-age trajectory would be a straight line sloping upwards.
232 Jenkins  (2009).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Looking at the first panels of Figure 11.21, a first point is that if one looks at wage levels as 
a cohort ages, then, by contrast with the cross-sectional wage-age profiles shown in Chapter 
5 (see Figure 5.2), real wage growth is greater at the start of the working life (the curve is 
steeper), and continues until older ages (the ‘peak’ is later). Even if people fall back relative to 
the national average, overall growth means that their real wages can still be growing. Second, 
wages for the younger cohort were higher on average at every age than for their older cohort 
counterparts for nearly all the groups shown, except perhaps for the younger generation of 
men with no qualifications when they reached their fifties. Third, educational qualifications 
make a big difference on average. Within each cohort for both men and women, the 
trajectory for those with A level or higher qualifications lies above that for those with fewer 
qualifications and this, in turn, lies above the trajectory for those with no qualifications. 
Fourth, women earned less than men at any given wage within every group, but the gap was 
greatest for women with no qualifications and in the older generation. For the younger cohort 
of women with high qualifications, the wage gap was fairly small when they were aged 25. 
Their earnings then fell behind, but did tend to catch up in their forties. For better-qualified 
women in the older cohort, the gap with better qualified men had tended to narrow at the 
oldest ages, but partly as a result of the real pay of the men falling (and also as a result, 
presumably, of the women still in employment in their late fifties being an atypical group). 
These results are a reminder of the need to be cautious in interpreting cross-sectional patterns 
of wage progression with age as showing what will happen to any particular cohort as it ages.
The second pair of panels shown in Figure 11.21(b) – for equivalent net income – shows a 
number of interesting contrasts. First, most of the group trajectories are flatter than the 
corresponding trajectory for hourly wages, particularly for the younger cohort, and the middle 
and high qualification groups. The benefits of hourly wages that grew as the cohort aged 
were partly offset by changing family composition. For those with no qualifications, however, 
real incomes started at a much lower level, grew quite rapidly until they were in their late 
forties, but then turned down – rapidly in the case of the younger cohort.
It should be stressed that these are pictures of average trajectories, and the average 
masks substantial variation in trajectory shapes at the individual level, even within groups 
characterised in terms of sex, qualifications and birth cohort. This individual-level variation 
is hard to summarise succinctly, as it has several sources. Within each group, there are 
differences in wages (and income) at the beginning of the working life – some start lower and 
some higher – and there is then also variation in subsequent growth rates with age. Moreover, 
this is combined with additional fluctuation from one year to the next at the individual 
level. The substantial variations in individuals’ income-age trajectories, even within relatively 
narrowly defined groups, are consistent with one of the recurring findings of our report, 
namely the importance of within-group inequalities. 
A recurring theme of this chapter is that advantage and disadvantage tend to compound 
themselves over the life cycle. That is generally true when comparing between qualification 
groups, as in Figure 11.21. However, one of the features the detailed analysis reveals is that 
there is a tendency for those within a particular qualification group who start lower to have 
trajectories that grow more rapidly, that is to catch up with and even overtake their peers.233
233  See Jenkins (2009) for more detailed analysis and discussion.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 11.21(a): Estimated average wage-age trajectories, by group, for employees of working 
age (logarithmic scale)
Figure 11.21(b): Estimated average income-age trajectories, by group, for individuals aged 
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A major factor associated with these differences is motherhood, and the lasting impact it 
has on women’s employment patterns and earnings levels, particularly where women do 
not return to the same employer after a standard period of maternity leave.234 Quite how 
profound these impacts are can be seen in Figures 11.22 and 11.23. These show the results 
of analysis by Mike Brewer and Gillian Paull of paid work participation rates and of earnings 
before and after women and men in the BHPS (surveyed between 1991 and 2003) had their 
first child.235 The first of these shows that paid work rates for the men were a little lower 
before the first birth, then rose to around 90 per cent in paid work, eventually declining only 
20 years later (as many of them moved into their fifties). For women, however, employment 
rates dipped in the year before the birth, and fell to 40 per cent in the year of birth itself. 
After a rebound the next year (at the end of maternity leave for some) to above 50 per cent, 
employment rates grew slowly over the next twenty years, but never reached as high as 80 
per cent, before declining (again as many mothers reached their fifties). The overall gap does 
not disappear, even when the children are no longer in the household. The authors argue 
that the patterns shown support the hypothesis that children are crucial in explaining gender 
differentials in work participation, and that the impact is persistent and long-term.236
Figure 11.23 shows how the gender wage gap is affected by a first birth.237 In the years before 
the first birth, women were earning between 80 and 90 per cent of men’s earnings, regardless 
of whether one looks at all employees, or just those working full-time. For full-time workers the 
gender wage gap grew slowly, but remained below 20 per cent until ten years after the first 
birth, reaching a maximum of around 30 per cent shortly afterwards. But given the lower pay 
of part-time workers, looking at all employed women, the gender wage gap grew more rapidly, 
reaching nearly 40 per cent ten years after the first birth, and never falling much below 30 
per cent. What this figure makes clear is that the impact of motherhood on women’s relative 
pay is not a matter of a one-off shock from which there is gradual recovery (which is what 
happens with employment), but is a picture of continuing decline through most of the first 
childhood.
234  Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel (2007).
235 The  ﬁ  gures include information drawn from fertility history data collected by the survey, so the births 
involved happened throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
236  See Brewer and Paull (2006), section 5.1.
237  The wage gap is calculated by comparison with men the same distance in years from the birth.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Figure 11.22: Paid employment rates by year, before and since birth of first child, 
(percentages)
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Summary 
•  Looking at cross-sectional data, only for men and women with high qualifications 
working in the public sector are earnings highest in the years close to retirement. For 
others, earnings are highest for younger age groups. For women with low or mid-level 
qualifications, they are lower for all age groups above 30.
•  However, looking at longitudinal data, overall economic growth can mean that 
individuals’ real wages can grow over time, even if they fall back relative to those who 
are now younger. However, real wages for women with no qualifications have fallen 
for recent cohorts after they were in their forties even after the effects of growth.
•  Equivalent incomes have grown more slowly than wages as recent cohorts have aged 
as a result of changes in people’s family circumstances.
•  Average trajectories can mask considerable variation in the underlying trajectories for 
individuals within any particular group by age and gender.
•  For women, birth of a first child is associated with a rapid decline in paid work 
participation, which does not entirely recover, even when children have left home. 
The gap in wages between mothers and fathers continues to grow until ten years 
after the birth of a first child to stay at nearly 40 per cent until the child is 20, after 
which it still declines only slowly.
11.6  Resources in retirement
Finally, in this chapter we examine the links between working life and the resources available 
to people in retirement. In this we concentrate on four issues: gender, ethnicity, disability, 
and social class. In earlier chapters we have set out the ways in which many women, those 
from particular minority ethnic groups, and disabled people are disadvantaged in the 
labour market. As pension entitlements are closely related to labour market position, these 
disadvantages in working life are transmitted into retirement.238 Similarly, we have shown how 
employment and income levels in working life are closely related to occupational social class. 
These differences affect not only pension rights but also other components of the wealth and 
assets that people can accumulate by the time they reach retirement.
(a)  Gender and resources in retirement
Both the Pensions Commission and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) looked 
in particular at the position of women in the pension system before the recent reforms 
embodied in the 2007 and 2008 Pensions Acts.239 The Pensions Commission identified several 
factors that particularly affect the position of women in retirement:
238  For a description of the UK pensions system and recent changes in pensions policy, see Evandrou and 
Falkingham (2009). 
239  Pensions Commission (2004), chapter 8, and DWP (2005).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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  ❍ Current single female pensioners, particularly older women, are poorer than single 
male pensioners, In 2007-08, the average gross income of single female pensioners 
was £247, but that of single male pensioners £288 per week. The main reason for the 
difference was that occupational and personal pensions for women averaged only £54 
per week, compared to £87 for men.240
  ❍ These differences reﬂ  ect women’s lower levels than men of paid employment, earnings, 
and membership of pension schemes in the past. However, as shown extensively 
in Chapters 4-6 (and summarised in Section 9.1), women still have lower levels of 
paid employment and earnings than men, so differences in their non-state pension 
entitlements will continue. This is particularly important for part-time workers, given 
what we have shown about levels of part-time pay.
  ❍ However, since 2000, women in full-time employment have been more likely to be 
members of their current employer’s pension scheme than men, partly reﬂ  ecting the 
larger proportion of women who work in the public sector, where provision is more 
extensive. By 2007, 58 per cent of women in full-time employment were members of 
their employer’s scheme, compared to 53 per cent of men in full-time employment, but 
only 38 per cent of women in part-time employment.241
  ❍ Where pension rights take the form of an accumulating pension pot, through the 
deﬁ  ned contribution schemes that are now most common in the private sector, the 
annual pension that can be purchased depends on life expectancy at the time an 
annuity is purchased. As women tend to retire earlier than men, this will tend to be 
lower for women.242
  ❍ State pension rights are also related to people’s labour market experience, together 
with ‘credits’ for periods of time spent unemployed or in various forms of caring for 
children or others. The recent reforms, particularly the new ‘30 year rule’ from April 
2010, will make it much more common for women to accrue a full basic pension in their 
own right. The way in which the state second pension will become more ﬂ  at rate and 
less earnings-related will also beneﬁ  t many women. However, those who do not have 
paid work, or have low levels of part-time earnings, will not qualify for a full state second 
pension, even when the reforms have fully worked their way through the system.
  ❍ The assumption that women’s income in retirement will effectively be provided by their 
husbands is increasingly outmoded. The Government Actuary’s Department forecast 
in 2004 that by 2021, 38 per cent of women aged 55-64 will not be part of an ongoing 
marriage, largely because they never married or because of divorce.243
  ❍ Although widows inherit parts of their husbands’ state pension rights and those from 
some occupational schemes, many of the more recent kind of ‘deﬁ  ned contribution’ 
pension are used to purchase a ‘single life’ annuity that does not survive the husband.
240 DWP  (2009b).
241  ONS (2009c), ﬁ  gure 7.3. Figures for the UK.
242  Even if the annuity at any given age is provided on a ‘unisex’ basis.
243  Pensions Commission (2004), p.268.375
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We have already seen how women’s median individual net incomes are currently substantially 
lower than those of men for those over State Pension Age (Figure 6.2). Some of the labour 
market differences that have led to this for the current generation of pensioners have 
narrowed but they remain substantial for those who will form the next generation in 
retirement. Reforms to the state system will go, as Maria Evandrou and Jane Falkingham 
conclude, “a long way toward closing the gap between men and women’s state pension 
entitlement. However, fundamental differences remain between men and women – and rich 
and poor – in third-tier provision”.244
(b)  Ethnicity and resources in retirement
Because of their age structure, the proportion of the minority ethnic population who are 
already retired is relatively small. Looking ahead, however, the factors associated with 
relatively weak labour market positions for particular groups during their working lives will be 
transmitted into lower incomes in retirement.
The first panel of Table 11.4 brings together some of the data we have examined in Chapter 4 
on employment rates, and on hourly wages as in Chapter 5, but focussed on those at the ages 
when pension rights are most likely to be accrued (so we can only look at broad ethnic groups 
for this analysis). This emphasises the low levels of employment of Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
adults, with only 35 per cent of men and 13 per cent of women of working age employed full-
time. 19 per cent of Bangladeshi and Pakistani men are self-employed, but self-employment 
is associated with much lower rates of accrual of both private and state pension rights. Wage 
levels are also much lower than for other groups for Pakistani and Bangladeshi men and 
women, so that any rights that are accrued will usually be smaller in proportion.
The second panel of the table shows earlier analysis by the Pensions Commission of 
membership of non-state pensions for those aged 20-59. This uses broader ethnic groups, 
but shows a strong contrast. While half of White men and 40 per cent of White women are 
accruing some form of non-state pension rights, the figure falls to 31 per cent for Asian/Asian 
British men, 30 per cent for Black/Black British men and 21 per cent for Asian/Asian British 
women. The final panel shows the results of recent analysis by the Pensions Policy Institute 
for the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC). Looking very broadly at members of 
all ethnic minority groups together, they suggest that lower accrual of state pension rights 
will compound their disadvantage in occupational pension rights. In any year, 26 per cent of 
those of working age from minority ethnic groups are not accruing rights to the basic pension 
and 35 per cent are not accruing rights to the state second pension, even after allowing for 
the recent pension reforms.
244  Evandrou and Falkingham (2009), p.176.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table 11.4: Factors affecting pension levels and arrangements by ethnicity














White 60 5 14 13.49 13.21
Mixed 45 9 9 13.50 12.53
Indian 58 7 13 12.55 11.30
Pakistani or Bangladeshi 35 12 19 7.88 8.94
Black or Black British 51 9 9 10.79 10.76
Other ethnic group (inc. Chinese 
and Other Asian)
48 9 12 10.43 10.06
Women
White 40 27 5 9.70 9.27
Mixed 37 21 4 11.71 11.43
Indian 39 18 4 10.55 8.59
Pakistani or Bangladeshi 13 10 2 9.25 8.27
Black or Black British 41 17 3 10.86 10.32
Other ethnic group (inc. Chinese 
and Other Asian)
33 16 5 9.86 9.02
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2006-2008.








Asian/Asian British 23 8




Asian/Asian British 17 4
Black/Black British  29 4
Chinese/Other 17 3
Source: Pensions Commission, (2004), ﬁ  gure 3.14 (based on Family Resources Study (FRS) 2001-02 and 
2002-03).377
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Table 11.4: (Continued)




through credits Not qualifying
Basic State Pension
White 70 15 15
Ethnic minorities 56 19 26
State Second Pension
White 64 13 24
Ethnic minorities 51 14 35
Source: Stevenson and Sanchez (2008), chart 18 (based on FRS 2005-06). 
While the state pension system, through means-testing and the flat rate nature of the basic 
pension, tends to equalise resources in retirement, the factors described above suggest that 
the current labour market disadvantage of particular minority ethnic groups, particularly the 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani population, will be transmitted and even amplified into income 
differences in retirement.
(c)  Disability and resources in retirement
In the same way, the combination of lower employment rates and lower hourly wages, leads 
to both lower membership of private pension schemes and higher rates of non-qualification 
for both the basic and second state pensions by disabled people. The first panel of Table 11.5 
contrasts the positions of working age adults identified as not disabled or disabled in different 
ways, again looking at employment and hourly wages between ages 35 and 54. Only 21 per 
cent of men and 14 per cent of women who are reported as both disabled under the terms of 
the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) and as having a work-limiting condition are in full-time 
employment. When they are employed, their hourly wages are substantially less than those of 
other men and women.
Disabled people have an older age profile than others. Other things being equal this would 
mean a greater likelihood of being a member of a private (occupational or personal) pension 
scheme. However, the second panel of the table shows that at any given age, disabled people 
are up to 9 percentage points less likely to be members. The final panel shows that, even with 
the reformed state pension system, more disabled people fail to qualify for full state pensions 
than others. The Pensions Policy Institute calculates that even though 40 per cent of disabled 
adults are credited into the basic state pension without having earnings, and 36 per cent into 
the state second pension, in any given year a quarter do not accrue rights to the basic pension 
and a third do not accrue rights to the state second pension.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Again, a comparatively weak labour market position during working life will continue to be 
transmitted into lower income through retirement for many disabled people. For some, this 
will be compounded if another family member stops or reduces paid work to care for them, or 
indeed if they are caring for another (see Box 9.7 in Chapter 9).
Table 11.5: Factors affecting pension levels and arrangements by disability status














Not disabled 65 6 14 13.50 13.36
DDA-disabled 66 6 15 12.44 12.71
Work-limiting disabled only 49 7 14 11.17 10.98
DDA-disabled and work-limiting 
disabled
21 5 8 10.12 10.09
Black or Black British 51 9 9 10.79 10.76
Women
Not disabled 42 28 5 9.90 9.38
DDA-disabled 44 28 5 9.36 9.34
Work-limiting disabled only 31 27 5 9.37 8.96
DDA-disabled and work-limiting 
disabled
14 16 3 8.15 8.25
Other ethnic group (inc. Chinese 
and Other Asian)
33 16 5 9.86 9.02
Source: LFS, 2006-2008 (wages at 2008 prices).
(b) Accrual of private pension rights by age and disability status (employed and self-
employed, percentages)
16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64
All ages 
(16-64)
Not disabled 16 48 61 64 60 48 52
Disabled 13 44 55 55 54 41 50
Source: Stevenson and Sanchez (2008), chart 8 (based on FRS 2005-06).
Note: Disabled people are those registered with their local authority, or with a limiting, long-standing 
illness or disability.379
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Table 11.5: (Continued)




through credits Not qualifying
Basic state pension
Not disabled 74 11 15
Disabled 35 40 25
State second pension
Not disabled 67 9 24
Disabled 31 36 33
Source: Stevenson and Sanchez (2008), chart 7.
(d)  Income at work, occupational social class and resources in 
retirement
In Chapter 8, we looked at the distribution of wealth by age and by occupational social class. 
As we showed, some wealth inequality across the population as a whole is the result of its life 
cycle pattern – building up in the years before retirement, and then running down, at least in 
part, through retirement. Nonetheless, there are considerable inequalities, even looking at the 
restricted age group approaching retirement. For households with a ‘reference person’ aged 
55-64, median household wealth (including non-state pension rights) is £416,000, but a tenth 
have less than £28,000, and a tenth more than £1.3 million (Figure 8.2). This variation is the 
product of differences in the trajectories people have followed through their working lives, but 
then become the basis for their position through retirement. 
A first observation, however, is the sheer scale of the difference – in these cross-sectional 
data at a particular moment – between those aged 55-64 and those aged 25-34, whose 
median wealth is only £66,000. The older group are £350,000 wealthier – equivalent to nearly 
£12,000 of extra wealth for each year of age. This in itself is remarkable, when one recalls that 
equivalent net income for those in their thirties, forties and fifties is around £450 per week, or 
£23,500 per year (Figure 7.2). If the wealth seen for the older group was simply the result of 
saving, this would have required them to have saved (including through house purchase and 
accrual of pension rights) amounts equivalent to around half of their net incomes. However, 
this is not the only factor in wealth accumulation. For this cohort, house price inflation will 
have made a major contribution – with, for instance, real house prices more than doubling in 
all English regions between 1996 and 2005 (after which they rose further, but then fell back 
again).245
245  Hills (2007), ﬁ  gure 8.1.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Second, transfers from and inheritance from parents and grandparents make an important 
contribution both to people’s ability to get on the housing ladder and to their other resources. 
These reinforce the differences in the ability to save that come with higher incomes in working 
lives, themselves sometimes the product of the links between children’s and parents’ position 
described earlier in this chapter. For instance, by 2005, nearly half of young first-time buyers 
benefited from assistance from family or friends with their deposit for house purchase. Those 
receiving such assistance were able to pay deposits of £34,000, compared to only £7,000 for 
others.246 The likelihood of receiving such help is clearly related to the resources of parents 
and grandparents.
Similarly, the chances of receiving an inheritance are highly correlated with people’s existing 
wealth – the already wealthiest are most likely to receive more. Analysis of the English 
Longitudinal Survey of Ageing of those aged 54-75 in 2006 shows that the wealthiest quarter 
thought they had, on average, a 24 per cent chance of receiving an inheritance in the next 
ten years. For the least wealthy quarter, the chance was only 12 per cent. For more significant 
inheritances of over £10,000, the chances were 22 per cent for the already wealthiest quarter, 
but 9 per cent for the least wealthy quarter.247
These factors compound the differences that follow from working life differences in earnings 
and incomes. Pension scheme membership has a similar effect, with those with higher 
earnings more likely to be members of employer pension schemes. In 2008, 76 per cent of 
men and 82 per cent of women in full-time employment earning more than £600 per week 
were members of their employer’s pension scheme; for those earning less than £300 per 
week, only 21 per cent of men and 32 per cent of women were members.248
We do not have information on wealth just before retirement classified by the incomes people 
have had through their working lives. However, these are closely related to their occupational 
social class. Table 11.6 shows the end results of the processes described above and earlier in 
this chapter in terms of wealth differentials by household social class for those aged 55-64. 
As can be seen, they are considerable, even abstracting, as this does, from life cycle savings 
effects. The median total wealth of the top two groups is more than £900,000. For the 
bottom three groups it is less than £220,000. For the top two groups, private pension rights 
add £548,000 and £461,000 to the median respectively. For the bottom three groups they 
contribute £63,000 or less (just £16,000 for the bottom group). Looking just at financial and 
property wealth (excluding houses and mortgages), the top two groups have median assets of 
around £150,000, while the bottom two groups have less than £30,000. 
246  Hills (2007), ﬁ  gure 12.6, based on data from Council of Mortgage Lenders.
247 Ross  et al. (2008). Figures are for England.
248  ONS (2009c), ﬁ  gure 7.10. Figures for the UK.381
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Table 11.6: Household wealth for 55-64 year olds by occupational social class, GB, 
2006-08 (£000s)1
Median 






















156 444 369 992 2431 (7)
Higher professional  142 448 290 909 2172 (10)
Lower managerial/
professional
99 334 189 667 1721 (26)
Intermediate 63 230 84 397 1068 (9)
Small employers/own 
account work
61 275 37 357 1056 (11)
Lower supervisory/
technical
50 177 20 302 815 (9)
Semi-routine 37 156 13 219 637 (13)
Routine 29 100 8 146 521 (12)
Never worked/long-term 
unemployed
28 43 * 59 * (1.4)
All 66 243 28 416 1342 (100)
Source: ONS, based on the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS), July 2006-June 2008.
Note: 1. Households where ‘household reference person’ is aged 55-64. Proportions of households in age 
group are from unweighted sample numbers. * Sample size too small for accurate reporting.
There are also considerable differences in total wealth within the social class groupings. A 
tenth of those in the top two groups have household wealth of more than £2.1 million at this 
age, but a tenth of higher professionals have less than £290,000. A tenth of those in routine 
or semi-routine occupations have wealth of over £637,000, but a tenth approach retirement 
with less than £13,000.
As housing assets are so important within total wealth, part of the difference in wealth relates 
to tenure, as we saw in Chapter 8. Table 11.7 shows that tenure differences are even more 
acute when we focus on those aged 55-64. Median total wealth for those who have already 
become outright house-owners is over £572,000. For social tenants, it is only £26,000. The 
table also confirms the observation in Chapter 8 that tenure differences are not only about 
housing assets: social tenants just before retirement have median financial assets and other 
physical wealth of only £15,000, and private pension rights only add £10,000 to this.249
249  In related analysis of the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA) for wealth in 2002-03 looking at 
those aged 50 or more (so including those aged over 64), Banks and Tetlow (2009) ﬁ  nd a similar picture. For 
this older group they ﬁ  nd all tenants (social and private together) to have had median ﬁ  nancial and physical 
wealth of only £1,200, and total wealth including private pension rights of £8,200. Adding in state pension 
rights would only increase median wealth for tenant households by £52,000 compared to £73,000 for owner-
occupiers.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
382
Table 11.7: Household wealth for 55-64 year olds by housing tenure, GB, 2006-08 
(£000s)1
Median 















Outright owners 95 334 199 572 1612
Mortgagors 68 245 148 474 1262
Private tenants 25 25 * 62 *
Social tenants 15 15 3 26 186
All 66 243 28 416 1342
Source: ONS, based on the WAS, July 2006-June 2008.
Note: 1. Households where ‘household reference person’ is aged 55-64. * Sample size too small for 
accurate reporting.
Such differences in wealth obviously determine the living standards people can enjoy in 
later life. They are also closely related to the length of that later life. It is well-known that 
life expectancy at older ages varies considerably between those from different occupational 
classes. However, recent analysis of the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA) suggests 
that differences in mortality rates are in fact more closely related to wealth than they are to 
social class.250 Our final figure, Figure 11.24, shows what proportion of members of the ELSA 
cohort (initially aged 50 or more) survived over a six-year period, depending on gender and 
where they came within the distribution of wealth. The survival rates are age-adjusted, so 
they represent the position of the cohort as a whole. More than 90 per cent of the men and 
95 per cent of the women who were in the wealthiest fifth survived the six years. Only 81 per 
cent of the women and only 75 per cent of the men from the least wealthy fifth had survived. 
More than twice as many men, and nearly four times as many women with low wealth died 
within the six years as did those with high wealth.251
250  Nazroo, Zaninotto and Gjonca (2008), p.267.
251  See the forthcoming report of the Strategic Review of Health Inequalities in England, chaired by Sir Michael 
Marmot for further discussion of this kind of relationship and policies to address it.383
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Figure 11.24: Survival rates (age adjusted) by wealth group (fifths) and months from initial 
interview, over 50s, England, 2001-2006
We started this chapter by looking at the ways in which people’s attainments in childhood 
and positions in entering the labour market are related to their social background and to 
the incomes and occupations of their parents. We described in this section how wealth and 
resources in later life are related to their labour market position in their working lives. The end 
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Summary 
•  Differences in employment and earnings during working life lead to women having 
lower pension rights than men. It can no longer be assumed that women’s income 
in retirement will effectively be provided by their husbands. Some of the past labour 
market differences affecting the current generation of women pensioners have 
narrowed, but they, nevertheless, remain substantial for those who will form the next 
generation in retirement.
•  The current labour market disadvantage of particular minority ethnic groups, 
particularly the Bangladeshi and Pakistani population, will be transmitted and even 
amplified into income differences in retirement.
•  Low employment rates and low hourly wages for disabled people also lead to lower 
membership of private pension schemes and lower rates of qualifying for state 
pensions. For some this will be compounded if another family member stops or 
reduces paid work to care for them, or if they care for another.
•  Wealth inequalities build up across people’s working lives not just because of 
differences in incomes, pension scheme membership and the ability to save in other 
ways, but also because of differences in assistance and inheritances from parents 
and grandparents. Looking at those aged 55-64, higher managerial and professional 
households have median total wealth of over £900,000. Households with routine or 
semi-routine occupations have median total wealth of under £220,000.
•  Mortality rates in later life are even more closely related to wealth levels than they 
are to occupational social class. For those aged over 50, more than twice as many 
men, and nearly four times as many women with low wealth die within a six year 
period as do those with high wealth.385




Chapter 12  Key findings and policy  
  implications
Overview
The National Equality Panel (NEP) was set up to document the relationships between 
inequalities in people’s economic outcomes – such as earnings, incomes and wealth – 
and their characteristics and circumstances – such as gender, age or ethnicity. How does 
who you are affect the resources and opportunities available to you?
We have mapped out in detail what these relationships look like in a way never done 
before. In this summary we bring together the key findings from our main report, and 
the challenges they create for the development of policy. There are several over-arching 
themes.
•	 Inequalities	in	earnings	and	incomes	are	high	in	Britain,	both	compared	with	other	
industrialised countries, and compared with thirty years ago. Over the most recent 
decade according to some measures, earnings inequality has narrowed a little and 
income inequality has stabilised, but the large inequality growth between the late 
1970s and early 1990s has not been reversed.
•	 Some	of	the	widest	gaps	in	outcomes	between	social	groups	have	narrowed	in	
the last decade, particularly between the earnings of women and men, and in the 
educational qualifications of different ethnic groups.
•	 However,	there	remain	deep-seated	and	systematic	differences	in	economic	
outcomes between social groups across all of the dimensions we have examined – 
including between men and women, between different ethnic groups, between social 
class groups, between those living in disadvantaged and other areas, and between 
London and other parts of the country.
•	 Despite	the	elimination	and	even	reversal	of	the	differences	in	educational	
qualifications that often explain employment rates and relative pay, significant 
differences remain between men and women and between ethnic groups.
•	 Importantly,	however,	differences	in	outcomes	between	the	more	and	less	
advantaged within each social group, however the population is classified, are 
usually only a little narrower than those across the population as a whole. They are 
much greater than differences between groups. Even if all differences between such 
groups were removed, overall economic inequalities would remain wide.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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•  The inequality growth of the last forty years is mostly attributable to growing gaps 
within social groups, however those groups are defined. The pattern of the last 
decade has been more mixed, with the effects of growing inequality within some 
groups offset by narrowing gaps between them.
•  Many of the differences we examine cumulate across the life cycle, especially those 
related to people’s socio-economic background. We see this before children enter 
school, through the school years, through entry into the labour market, and on to 
retirement, wealth and resources for retirement, and mortality rates in later life. 
Economic advantage and disadvantage reinforce themselves across the life cycle, and 
often on to the next generation. By implication, policy interventions to counter this 
are needed at each life cycle stage.
•  A fundamental aim of people with widely differing political perspectives is to 
achieve ‘equality of opportunity’, but doing so is very hard when there are such wide 
differences between the resources which people and their families have to help them 
fulfil their diverse potentials.
Key ﬁ  ndings
We set out at the start of this report why we believe that inequality in economic outcomes 
matters. There are many other aspects of people’s lives that are more important than those 
that simply relate to money, but in our society, income and wealth are closely related to 
whether people can achieve many of those other more fundamental outcomes. For some, the 
most fundamental social justice issues relate to the pervasive differences between the kinds 
of groups we examine in this report, such as by gender or ethnicity. For others, even if all such 
differences were eliminated on average, the degree of inequality within groups – and hence, 
within society as a whole – would remain their concern. For many readers, the sheer scale 
of the inequalities we have presented may have been shocking. Whatever the reasons for 
people’s positions in the rankings of different outcomes, the sheer degree of inequality makes 
it impossible to create as cohesive a society as they would like. Others would point to the 
associations between large inequalities in economic outcomes and lower levels of happiness 
or well-being in other respects. For people across a wide political spectrum, a crucial test is 
whether outcomes reflect choices made against a background of equality of opportunity. 
The systematic nature of many of the differences we present, and the ways in which those 
advantages and disadvantages are reinforced across the life cycle make it hard, however, to 
suggest that there is such a background of equality of opportunity, however defined. 
Whatever degree of inequality people find acceptable or unacceptable, the overall picture 
we have described is one of considerable differences, even if one ignores those with the very 
highest earnings or incomes, such as the banking bonuses or Chief Executives’ pay that often 
attract most attention.252 The measure of inequality we have concentrate on most in this 
report is the ‘90:10’ ratio between the cut-offs for those in the top tenth (the 90th percentile) 
252  See Box 2.2 for discussion of the highest earnings and incomes.387
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and bottom tenth (the 10th percentile) of each distribution. This gives a measure of the 
differences between those near the top and near the bottom of each distribution – between 
the quite well-off and those who are poor, but not between the extremes.
  ❍ Those at the cut-off for the top tenth have gross hourly wages 3.9 times the cut-off for 
the bottom tenth.
  ❍ For the gross weekly earnings of those employed full-time, the ratio is 3.7.
  ❍ For the net individual incomes received by adults in their own right, including those not 
employed, it is 9.6.
  ❍ For the whole population, the ratio for equivalent net income253 is 4.2. 
  ❍ Households in the top tenth have total wealth (including private pension rights) almost 
100 times those at the cut-off for the bottom tenth. Even looking more narrowly at the 
top half of the wealth distribution, those in the top tenth have more than 4.2 times 
as much wealth as those in the middle, twice the corresponding ratios for earnings or 
household income.
For earnings and equivalent net income, these represent high levels of inequality by 
comparison with those in the UK a generation ago, when, for instance, the ratio for equivalent 
net income was just over 3 to 1 (Figure 2.13). Most of this increase occurred during the 1980s. 
Over the last decade, trends have been complex. On some measures, including the 90:10 ratio 
described above, earnings inequality has narrowed, and income inequality stabilised. On other 
measures, particularly those for income inequality which look across the whole distribution, 
inequality has widened. 
Looking at the top of the income distribution, using data from tax records, the share of the 
top 1 per cent in after tax income fell from 12.6 per cent of the total in 1937 to 4.7 per cent 
by 1979, but rose again to 8 per cent in 1990 and 10 per cent in 2000. The share of the top 
0.05 per cent fell from 2.4 per cent of the total in 1937 to under 0.5 per cent in 1969. By 
2000, their share had risen back to 2.5 per cent. A similar gain in the shares of those with the 
highest incomes occurred in other English-speaking countries in the 1980s and 1990s, but this 
did not occur in continental Europe (Box 2.2). Earnings and income inequality are also high 
in international terms, compared with other industrialised countries (Figures 2.8 and 2.14(a)), 
although wealth inequality does not appear to be exceptional (Table 2.1).
Some, but as we have shown, by no means all, of these inequalities have their origins in 
variations in skill levels and qualifications. Despite recent improvements in results at age 16, 
there is a ‘long tail’ of low achievement amongst 16 year-olds (Figure 2.1). The UK has lagged 
behind other countries in the proportion of the working age population with upper level 
secondary qualifications,254 especially amongst the generation now aged 25-34 
(Appendix 10).
253  Using the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP’s) ‘Households Below Average Income’ (HBAI) 
deﬁ  nition, and so adjusted for household size, assuming equal sharing within households, and before 
deducting housing costs (see Box 2.5).
254  GCSE passes at A*-C or above.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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In Chapters 3 to 8 we looked in turn at how inequalities in each of eight outcomes related to 
people’s characteristics and circumstances, and at the considerable variations within social 
groups when the population is divided in different ways. In Chapter 9, we looked at common 
patterns for particular groups across different outcomes, in Chapter 10 at how they have 
converged or widened over time, and in Chapter 11 at how inequalities develop across the life 
cycle. Below we pick out some of the features of all of this material, looking at each of the 
dimensions we have examined in turn.
(a) Gender
Girls have better educational outcomes than boys at 16. Out of every 100 pupils, girls have 
median255 achievement ranked between 8 and 12 places higher than the median achievement 
for boys (depending on which nation is examined) (Figure 3.1). Reflecting these results, 
women are more likely to go on to tertiary education than men, and are more likely to achieve 
good (first or upper second class) degrees (Figure 11.18). More women now have higher 
education qualifications than men in every age group up to age 44, and fewer have no or only 
low qualifications, reversing the pattern in older generations (Figure 3.8).
However, women are paid less than men – 21 per cent less in terms of median hourly pay 
for all employees (and 13 per cent less than men for those employed full-time). Allowing for 
shorter working hours, weekly earnings of women in full-time employment are 22 per cent 
less than men (Figures 5.1 and 5.11).256 For women in their twenties, the gender gap is much 
smaller (6-7 per cent in weekly full-time earnings at the median), but within four years of 
graduation, nearly twice as many men have earnings over £30,000 as women (Figure 11.19). 
It is sometimes assumed that wages tend to grow with age and experience. However, hourly 
wages for women are highest for those in their early thirties, and lower for each subsequent 
age group (Figure 5.2(b)). It is only for women with high qualifications and working in the 
public sector that one sees ‘career progression’ in wages (Figure 11.20). While it is not the 
only factor, women’s pay, relative to men’s, declines not just at the moment of first becoming 
a mother, but through most of the first child’s childhood (Figure 11.23). There is, however, 
almost as much inequality between well-paid and low-paid women as there is between the 
well-paid and the low-paid overall (Table 10.5).
A crucial factor in all of this – and also in the earnings of disabled people and those from 
certain minority ethnic groups – is the low level of part-time pay. Half of those working part-
time earn less than £7.20 per hour. Few part-timers have hourly wages above the median of 
£9.90 for all employees (Figure 2.4(c)).
The current position of women is, nonetheless, an improvement on what it was in the late 
1990s. Looking at net individual income received by adults in their own right (from all sources 
including benefits and tax credits as well as wages), the median for women rose from 53 per 
cent of the men’s median in 1995-1998 to 64 per cent in 2005-2008 (Table 10.5).
255  Within any group, half have outcomes below its median, and half above it.
256  The gender pay gaps quoted here are taken based on data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and therefore 
vary slightly from those based on the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) which are usually 
published. See Box 10.1 for discussion of this and Appendix 12 for discussion of the differences between the 
two surveys.389
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Given the size of the ‘trans population’, national sample survey evidence of the kind used in 
this report is unable to shed light on their economic position. However, evidence of other kinds 
suggests substantial difficulties in employment for some members of that population 
(Box 9.1).
(b) Age
The position of young people (aged under 25) in the labour market and in equivalent net 
income has declined both over the longer-term257 and in the last decade, for some because 
of longer periods in education, but not for others (Tables 10.6 and 10.7). Those who have 
most improved their relative positions in the last decade have been women of all ages over 
25 (particularly those with middle and higher incomes in their thirties) and older men. Men 
aged 25-69 (especially poorer middle-aged men) slipped back. Equivalent net incomes – in 
many ways the best summary of differences in relative living standards among the measures 
we examine – now have a ‘crown’ shape with age, with the highest levels for those both in 
their early thirties and in their early fifties when looked at any one time (Figure 7.2). Those 
in their thirties and forties tend to have lower equivalent incomes as family sizes are then at 
their largest. However, other surveys that follow the same people over time show that rising 
general living standards mean that those in their forties tend actually to experience this as a 
flattening, rather than dip, in their own incomes (Figure 11.21).
As one would expect, wealth is highest for those in their late fifties and early sixties, when 
people are close to retirement. Including private pension rights, median wealth is £66,000 for 
those aged 25-34, but £416,000 for those aged 55-64. However, there are very considerable 
differences in wealth within each age group, with a range from £28,000 to £1.3 million 
between the 10th and 90th percentiles of those aged 55-64 (Figure 8.2).
(c)  Ethnicity and religious afﬁ  liation
Our detailed results in Chapters 3 to 8 show the complexity of differences between ethnic 
groups when they are defined quite narrowly and, by implication, the dangers in conflating 
ethnic categories (although the data available to us are sometimes only for broad categories). 
It is often valuable to look at differences by ethno-religious group, rather than by ethnicity by 
itself, and to look at the interaction between gender and ethnicity.
Looking at particular groups as they move through compulsory schooling, some of the 
minority ethnic groups that start with test scores well below the national average improve 
their relative position between 7 and 16 (Figures 11.12 and 11.13). At 16, however, Pakistani, 
Black African and Black Caribbean boys in England have median results well below the 
national figure for all pupils (Figure 3.2(a)). Other groups have results well above the national 
average. A tenth of Chinese girls have results in the top 1 per cent overall. Children with 
257  Brewer, Muriel and Wren-Lewis (2009), ﬁ  gure A1.4.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Traveller or Gypsy backgrounds have assessments that fall further behind during the school 
years, resulting in much worse results at 16 than others.258 This gap appears to have widened 
rapidly in recent years (Figures 11.12, 11.13 and 10.2(b)).
Those from minority ethnic groups with GCSE results around or below the national median 
are much more likely to go on to higher education than White British pupils with similar 
results (Box 11.3). However, Black and Pakistani/Bangladeshi students are less likely to go to 
more prestigious universities or to get higher class degrees (Figures 11.17 and 11.18). A larger 
proportion of those of working age from several minority ethnic groups, including those with 
Chinese, Indian and Black African backgrounds259, have higher education qualifications than 
the White British population (Figure 3.10).
Despite this, nearly all minority ethnic groups are less likely to be in paid employment than 
White British men and women (Figure 4.2). 44 per cent of Pakistani and 49 per cent of 
Bangladeshi women are economically inactive, because they are looking after family or home, 
compared to 20 per cent or fewer of other groups. Around 80 per cent of White British, Other 
White, and Indian men are in paid work, but between 60 and 70 per cent of other groups. 
17 per cent of Bangladeshi men are employed part-time and 21 per cent of Pakistani men 
are self-employed. For some groups differences in unemployment rates are as great for the 
‘second generation’, as for those who were born outside the UK (Box 9.2). 
When employed, nearly all other groups have hourly pay less than White British men, 
although several groups (including Black Caribbean women) have higher pay than White 
British women. In Box 9.3 we report research which shows what wage levels would be 
predicted for people who have the same age, occupation, and qualifications (given the 
actual wages seen across each group). Controlling for differences in age, occupation, and 
qualifications in this way, Indian Hindu and Sikh men, and Black Caribbean Christian men 
have similar hourly wages to White British Christian men. White Jewish men are paid 24 per 
cent more. However, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim men and Black African Christian men 
have a ‘pay penalty’, earning 13-21 per cent less than White British Christian men (see Box 
9.3). Although Chinese men are one of the highest paid groups, they are paid 11 per cent 
less than would be expected allowing for their qualifications. Women from nearly all ethno-
religious backgrounds have pay between a quarter and a third less than a White British 
Christian man with the same qualifications, age and occupation.
These differences are smaller for the children of migrants (the ‘second generation’) than for 
first generation migrants, and some of the largest differences in pay by ethnicity appear 
smaller than they were only a decade ago (Table 10.8). However, as with the position of 
women in general, improving or high qualifications for people from several minority ethnic 
groups do not appear to be translating into the labour market position one would expect. A 
major factor in this is not just somewhat lower pay, allowing for qualifications and type 
258  There are only 141 pupils recorded as having Traveller or Gypsy backgrounds in the data for the cohort 
examined.
259  This contrasts with the below-median attainment of Black African children at 16 (Figure 3.2).391
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of employment, but whether people are employed at all, and if they are, in which sector. 
Recent experiments show clear evidence of discrimination in whether people are offered job 
interviews depending on the apparent ethnicity in their CVs (Box 9.5).
The end result of all this is that some minority ethnic groups still have equivalent net incomes 
that are well below those of the rest of the population (Figure 7.3). Those from Bangladeshi 
and Pakistani households have a median equivalent net income of only £238 per week, 
compared to the national median of £393. Nearly half are below the official poverty line. As 
with the other outcomes we examine, however, there is generally as wide – or even wider – 
variation in the equivalent net incomes within ethnic groups as within the population as a 
whole (Table 7.3).
(d) Disability  status
There are several ways to measure disability status, and the data available to us vary in 
the definitions used. For those at school the categories of ‘Special Educational Needs’ and 
‘Additional Support Needs’ are very broad, and there are substantial differences between 
the children covered by them and in their attainments. For instance, for pupils with sensory 
impairments or physical needs, differential attainment at the end of secondary school is 
largely predicted by their attainment levels at the end of primary school. By contrast, those 
with Behavioural and Emotional Support Needs have attainment levels which fall further 
behind in secondary school (Box 11.2).
In terms of both employment and wages, there are large differences between those reporting 
a ‘work-limiting disability’ and others. Differences for others who would be classed as disabled 
under the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) definition are much smaller. Nearly half of those 
reporting both ‘work-limiting’ and ‘DDA’ disability have no or only low qualifications, twice the 
proportion of those who are not disabled (Figure 3.12). Their paid employment rates are less 
than half those of people who are not disabled (Figure 4.4). When employed, disabled people 
have median hourly earnings 20 per cent lower for men and 12 per cent lower for women 
(Figure 5.5). The disability employment ‘penalty’ has grown steadily over the last quarter 
century.260 Disabled people with low or no qualifications have been particularly strongly 
affected, and more so than non-disabled people (Figure 10.5). Again, recent experiments 
suggest that those disclosing a disability are less likely to be called for interview than those 
with otherwise identical CVs (Box 9.5).
According to official definitions, working age adults who are DDA-disabled have a median 
equivalent net income that is 30 per cent lower than that for other working age adults (Figure 
7.4). This is a considerable fall relative to the national median since the late 1990s (Table 
10.9). However, even this understates the relative disadvantage of disabled people. As we 
explain in Box 7.3, this income measure includes social security benefits, including those paid 
to disabled people on the grounds that they face extra costs in achieving a given standard 
of living compared to non-disabled people. It seems perverse to include such benefits in an 
260  Berthoud and Blekesaune (2007).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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income measure that attempts to give a guide to relative living standards, without adjusting 
for the extra needs they reflect (as the measure does for household size). If extra costs 
benefits are excluded from net income, the net income of disabled people is reduced by more 
than 10 per cent, and their poverty rate would be more than 30 per cent (compared to 25 per 
cent under the usual definition). Box 9.7 discusses the related issue of the position of carers, 
and the parts of the population they come from.
(e) Sexual  orientation
There is very little information on the economic position of people in terms of their sexual 
orientation (although information by sexual orientation is now being collected by the Office 
for National Statistics (ONS) in its regular household surveys, so this will change in the near 
future). The limited information that is available is potentially misleading because it relates 
to the position of the small proportion of the population who report to the LFS that they 
live in a same sex couple. People reporting this status have higher qualification levels, higher 
rates of employment and higher earnings than others (Figures 3.13, 4.5 and 5.6). However, 
these differences appear to reflect who is most likely to have the self-confidence to live 
and to report their status in this way. In Box 9.8, we present evidence on trends in relative 
employment and earnings for people reporting they live in same sex couples allowing for their 
qualification levels and other characteristics. This shows that men in same sex couples were 
less likely to be employed and paid significantly less than would have been expected given 
their other characteristics in the late 1990s, but that this penalty has now disappeared. For 
women in same sex couples, pay remains higher than for other women, but this difference 
has also narrowed. By implication, there is no reason from this kind of evidence to expect the 
spread of earnings or incomes for lesbian, gay or bisexual people to be much different from 
that of the population as a whole.
(f)  Occupational social class
Social class is different from some of the other dimensions we examine in that it is both 
an outcome of the labour market and part of the transmission mechanism that affects 
how people’s lives develop. As one would expect, there are considerable differences in 
qualifications, employment rates, earnings and incomes between those from different 
occupational social classes. The median hourly wage for men from higher professional and 
managerial households is 2.5 times higher than men in routine occupations. For women the 
corresponding figure is 2.9 times higher (Figure 5.7). The median equivalent net income of 
those in higher professional and managerial households is 80 per cent higher than that for 
those with routine occupations, putting half of them in the top sixth of the population overall 
(Figure 7.5). Occupational social class is the only breakdown where within-group variation is 
generally substantially less than that within the population as a whole, although it remains 
large (Table 5.7). Growing inequality between broad occupational classes was one of the 
important contributors to the growth in earnings inequality over the 1980s (Figure 5.8(a)).393
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(g)  The impact of social background
The evidence we examine confirms that social background really matters. There are 
significant differences in school readiness before and when children reach school by parental 
income and mother’s education (Figures 11.6 and 11.9). Children entering primary school 
in 2005-06 whose mothers had degrees were assessed 6 months ahead of those who 
had no qualifications above Grade D at GCSE. In addition, every extra £100 per month in 
income when children were small was associated with a difference equivalent to a month’s 
development. Rather than being fixed at birth, these differences widen through childhood. For 
recently born children a similar process seems at work to that already observed in the 1970s. 
Children with a higher social class background who start with a low assessment of relative 
cognitive ability when young eventually overtake those with a lower social class background 
who were initially assessed as having high ability (Figure 11.8). Looking from age 3 to age 
14, differences in assessment related to family income, father’s occupation and mother’s 
education widen at each stage (although they then narrow slightly between 14 and 16), in 
contrast to differences related to ethnicity, which narrow or even reverse during childhood 
(Figures 11.15 and 11.16).
In the main data available on performance at school, the best available indicator of socio-
economic background is whether children receive Free School Meals. By age 16, half of boys 
receiving Free School Meals have results in the bottom quarter in England (and in the bottom 
fifth in Wales). However, it is boys on Free School Meals from certain ethnic backgrounds 
that slip back through secondary school. By age 16 White British, Black Caribbean and 
mixed White and Black Caribbean boys receiving Free School Meals have the lowest average 
assessment of any group identified by gender, ethnicity and Free School Meals status, apart 
from Gypsy and Traveller children (Figure 11.13). The social class and Free School Meals gaps 
in GCSE attainment are, however, both a little smaller than they were a few years ago 
(Figures 10.3 and 10.4).
Low income acts as a barrier to post-compulsory education. Young people with GCSE results 
above the national median who have been on Free School Meals are less likely to go on to 
higher education than others with the same results (Box 11.3). Those with manual worker 
parents who do go to university are less likely than others to go to prestigious universities or 
to get higher class degrees (Figure 11.18). Within four years of graduation, men who went 
to private schools earn more than 8 per cent more than one would expect after allowing 
for their gender, ethnicity, social class, degree class, subject taken, occupation, industry and 
region of employment.261 As the Panel on Fair Access to the Professions recently observed, 
those entering the professions who had been born in 1970 came from families whose relative 
incomes were substantially higher than those for their predecessors born in 1958 (Figure 11.5).
However one looks at the evidence on social mobility, it is clear that we live in a far from 
perfectly mobile society. People’s occupational and economic destinations in early adulthood 
depend to an important degree on their origins. Moreover, rates of intergenerational mobility 
261  Machin, Murphy and Soobedar (2009b), table 10.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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in terms of incomes are low in international terms, and in terms of occupation are below the 
international average for men and at the bottom of the range for women (Figures 11.2 and 
11.4). 
Parental help can also make a large difference to access to owner-occupation – nearly half of 
young first-time buyers had received help from family and friends with their deposit in 2005. 
Someone’s chance of receiving an inheritance – particularly a substantial one – is higher, 
the greater the wealth they already have. Membership of an occupational pension scheme 
increases rapidly with income (Section 6.6(d)). As a result of such processes, combined with 
the ability to save more out of higher incomes, for those aged 55-64, the median wealth 
(including pension rights) of higher professional and managerial households is more than 
twice the median for all households, and around four times that of semi-routine or routine 
households (Table 11.6).
In turn, differences in wealth are highly correlated with mortality rates after age 50. More 
than twice as many men, and nearly four times as many women, from least wealthy fifth of 
over-fifties die within a six-year period as of those from the wealthiest fifth (Figure 11.24).
(h) Housing  tenure
Housing tenure also has a dual role, being something that both shapes people’s lives and 
an outcome of their levels of advantage and disadvantage in other respects. In particular, 
access to social housing has been heavily rationed towards those in the greatest need for the 
last quarter century, and access to owner-occupation depends on the capacity to borrow on 
a mortgage and sometimes on inheritance or help from families. As a result, there are now 
very substantial differences in economic outcomes between those living in different tenures, 
and these often reflect other characteristics. Only 4 per cent of those of working age living 
in social housing have degrees, and nearly half have no or only low qualifications (Figure 
3.14). Only half of men and 42 per cent of women of working age living in social housing are 
in paid work, compared with 89 per cent of men and 81 per cent of women in households 
with a mortgage (Figure 4.7). The median hourly wage of women in social housing is in the 
bottom fifth of wages overall, while the median wage for male owners with a mortgage is in 
the top 35 per cent (Figure 5.8). A third of social tenants have equivalent net incomes (before 
housing costs) below the official poverty line, and only a fifth of social tenants are in the top 
half of the income distribution (before or after housing costs) (Figure 7.6). However, income 
differences between tenures are slightly smaller than they were a decade ago (Table 10.10).
It is not surprising that social tenants have much lower total household wealth, including 
housing, than owner-occupiers – a median of £18,000 compared to £270,000 for mortgagors 
and £411,000 for outright owners (Figure 8.6). But they have little wealth in other forms too. 
Median financial and physical wealth is only £15,000 for social tenants, compared to £54,000 
for mortgagors and £75,000 for outright owners. Private pension rights only raise the median 
wealth of social tenants by £3,000, but add £126,000 to the median for outright owners.395
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Growing up in social housing has become more strongly associated with poorer economic 
outcomes in adulthood than it was for previous generations (Box 11.1). This reflects, in large 
part, the increasing levels of relative disadvantage found in the sector compared with a 
quarter of a century ago.
(i)  Nation and region
Levels of inequality are slightly higher within England than within the devolved nations. 
However, recent trends are similar, whichever outcome one examines, despite the 
constitutional commitments to equality in the legislation establishing the Scottish 
Government and Welsh Assembly Government. This partly reflects the way in which some 
of the policies which most affect distributional outcomes are in fact UK-wide. There have 
been some, relatively small, differences in the last decade, and it is notable that Scotland is 
the only one of the four nations where inequalities in all four of the aspects of earnings and 
income on which we focus have fallen a little over that period (Table 10.11). While differences 
in median incomes are not very great between the nations, those in median total wealth are 
considerable, between £151,000 in Scotland, £206,000 in Wales and £211,000 in England 
(Figure 8.5).
Looking across the English regions does not show a simple ‘North-South divide’ in outcomes 
and their inequality. However, inequality in any dimension is wider in London than in any 
other region, and inequality in earnings and incomes has increased faster in London over the 
last decade than anywhere else (Table 10.12) 
(j) Area  deprivation
By contrast, in all of the outcomes we examine, from education at 16 to total wealth, there 
are profound differences at neighbourhood level, between areas with higher and lower levels 
of deprivation. There is some circularity here – deprived areas are judged as such because 
many of the people living in them have low levels of qualifications, employment, or incomes. 
None the less we found the differences startling. In Scotland, for instance, the difference in 
educational performance at 16 between median outcomes for those in the most and least 
deprived tenths of areas is equivalent to crossing half of the overall range in attainment 
(Figure 3.6(b)). Only 55 per cent of adults in the most deprived tenth of areas in England 
are employed (Figure 4.9). The median equivalent net income in the poorest tenth of areas 
in England is 30 per cent below that for the rest of the country. Median total wealth in the 
poorest tenth of areas is only 16 per cent of the national median. In the least deprived tenth 
of areas total wealth is more than twice the national median (Figure 8.7).
It is also striking that inequality in earnings and incomes is greater, the more prosperous 
an area. The earnings and incomes of those in the poorest tenth within all areas, whatever 
the level of area deprivation, are similar – it is the middle and high incomes within the less 
deprived areas that are much higher than elsewhere, and so the range within them is greater.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Box 12.1: Data issues
The analysis we have been able to present in this report is considerably richer than 
would have been possible, just a few years ago (as is evident from the limited nature 
of some of the comparisons we can make over time, which we discuss in Chapter 10). 
That we have been able to do this is a tribute to the advances that have been made by 
ONS and the DWP in the surveys that they run. The material we have been able to use 
from the new ONS HAS is of particular importance, and we would strongly urge that the 
survey continues into the future, having proved both its value and its feasibility.
We also hope that some of the innovations we have made in this report will be 
included within more regular analysis by government in the future, in particular the 
use of already available data to look at differences in outcomes both between and 
within groups of the kind we were asked to examine. As we explain, the latest material 
available to us relates to periods that end in 2008, largely predating the world financial 
crisis and subsequent recession. It is not yet clear how different groups will emerge from 
this turmoil (see Section 10.5), and repeating many of the breakdowns we have used 
when the economy has stabilised would be instructive.
There are also kinds of analysis which we have updated for this report and which 
we have found illuminating. This particularly includes the analysis of net individual 
incomes, where we have been able to supplement the analysis contained in the main 
DWP series of equivalent net income, based on household income. This is a series which 
has not been updated in recent years, but which shows important distinctions in trends 
over time, particularly so far as gender differences are concerned. We suggest that 
analysis on this basis is again carried out periodically.
We also found it useful to look at the whole distribution of children’s educational 
achievement at 16, rather than just to focus on whether they have passed a single 
threshold, and suggest that more use is made of this kind of information, already 
available within government and to researchers.
We have also found analysis which looks at outcomes related to the deprivation level 
of the area in which people live very revealing. There are obvious data protection issues 
which make disclosure of actual areas of residence impossible. However, the wider use 
of data on the deprivation level or other characteristics of an area is not ruled out by 
data protection concerns and can be of great importance. There is potential for more 
analysis of this kind than is currently undertaken.
Having said that, it will have been clear that there have been data limitations in some 
of the areas which we would like to have examined further, although some of these 
will be improved through new questions which are already included in surveys that are 
already under way, for instance, with regard to sexual orientation.
The research reported in Chapter 11 shows the importance of having longitudinal as 
well as cross-sectional data. We strongly support current initiatives to maintain existing 
sources and new developments such as the new large household panel survey and 
plans for a new birth cohort study. At the same time, we believe that administrative 
record data of various kinds are an under-utilised resource, whether used by themselves 397
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or linked to survey data. Many of our findings about inequalities in children’s progress 
through the educational system would not have been possible without access to 
longitudinal data from the Annual School Census, for instance. But there are also very 
rich data about earnings and incomes held by the DWP, and by HM Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC) that could play an equally valuable role. We support initiatives to improve 
access to these sources for research purposes (while acknowledging that there would be 
important issues to resolve to safeguard data security and privacy).
Another issue which we would highlight is the way in which there are sometimes 
important differences between narrowly defined ethnic groups that are sometimes 
put together. This underlines the importance of both the way questions are asked in 
surveys, and the size of the samples taken (with over-sampling of particular groups 
often justified as a way of dealing with this). We would also draw attention to the 
sensitivity of the labels that result from such exercises. We have only been able to use 
the material from surveys in the way they were originally conducted, but are aware that 
this can create labels which some find inappropriate in terms of the cultural loadings 
they carry. We would urge ONS and DWP to keep this kind of issue under review and 
to consult widely to make sure that categories generated by data become and remain 
appropriate.
We have found the material available on the position of the Gypsy and Traveller 
community very striking and of great concern. Within the surveys we have looked at, it 
is only from the National Pupil Database (NPD) that a comprehensive (and disturbing) 
picture emerges. This suggests the need for better data collection on other aspects 
of the lives of this community. We also found few sources of quantitative information 
on the position of asylum-seekers or refugees, as this is not a status which the regular 
surveys ask about. This is also a gap to which we would also urge attention is paid.
Finally, in our analysis of the position of disabled people we were struck by two issues. 
First, it is often the difference between those who report a work-limiting disability and 
other that is more revealing than whether they have a disability as defined by the DDA. 
Second, the inclusion of social security benefits designed to offset the extra costs that 
they face gives a misleading impression of relative living standards. We would suggest 
that when DWP presents analysis of the relative positions of disabled and non-disabled 
people, these benefits are excluded from the income definition used.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Challenges for policy
We have written this report against a back-drop of widespread public ignorance of the scale 
of inequality in the dimensions we have examined. Most people are unaware, for instance, 
either of their own position in the income distribution or of the true scale of differences 
between the high paid and the low paid.262 This lack of awareness runs through society, 
from rich to poor, and acts as a constraint on any policies designed to contribute to reducing 
inequality. We hope that one result of the Panel’s work is to provide a source of information 
that improves that knowledge. By the same token, public awareness would be improved by 
measures that increase the transparency of relative rewards for people across businesses and 
public organisations – not just for a few at the very top, but also across the whole range of 
wages and salaries.
A second conclusion is that averages can be misleading. Differences in outcomes within each 
social group, however the population is classified, are usually only a little narrower than those 
across the population as a whole, and are much greater than those between groups. The 
inequality growth of the last forty years is mostly attributable to growing gaps within groups 
rather than between them. By implication, achieving a more equal society than we have now 
would require not only narrowing gaps between the average outcomes for particular groups, 
as defined for instance in equalities legislation. It would also require gaps to be narrowed 
between the more and less advantaged within each social group.
Nonetheless, there remain deep-seated and systematic differences in economic outcomes 
between social groups across all of the dimensions we have examined – including between 
men and women, between different ethnic groups, between social class groups, and between 
those living in disadvantaged and other areas. Some of the widest gaps in outcomes between 
groups narrowed in the last decade, particularly between women and men and, although 
the data are not completely robust, the same seems true of those between the most 
disadvantaged ethnic groups and others. But, despite the elimination and even reversal of the 
qualification differences that often explain relative levels of employment and pay, significant 
unexplained differences in labour market outcomes remain. Such differences suggest that 
people are not receiving equal treatment in some way, and that the opportunities open to 
some are constrained in a way that they are not for others.
Fourth, economic advantage reinforces itself across the life cycle. While there is nothing 
deterministic in what we have described, the evidence we have looked at shows the long arm 
of people’s origins in shaping their life chances, stretching through life stages, literally from 
cradle to grave. Differences in wealth in particular are associated with opportunities such 
as the ability to buy houses in the catchment areas of the best schools, or to afford private 
education, with advantages for children that continue through and beyond education. At the 
other end of life, wealth levels are associated with stark differences in life expectancy after 
50. By implication, policy responses aimed at equalising life chances are needed across the 
full range of life stages and transitions between them. This is not just about differences in 
opportunities between the very top and bottom of society, but also between those who are 
quite well-off and those who are below the average, but not at the bottom.
262  Hills (2004), chapter 2, section 2.5; Sefton (2005); Toynbee and Walker (2008), chapter 2.399
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We were asked to comment on the implications of our findings for the direction of policy, 
rather than to make specific recommendations. Below, we highlight particular challenges for 
policy. In doing so, we reject the idea that public policies cannot make a difference. Recent 
reviews of the impact of policies towards inequality with which some of us have been involved 
suggest that they can and have made a difference, although their scale has sometimes been 
small by comparison with the challenges.
A recent assessment of the overall impact of tax and benefit reforms since 1979 finds that 
policy over the 1979 to 1997 period was equivalent to increasing benefits in line with price 
inflation, while policy since then has been equivalent to increasing benefits in line with the 
growth of national income.263 Reforms since 1997 have tended to reduce income inequality, 
while those in the earlier period tended to increase it. Another assessment of the reforms 
in tax and benefit policies between 1996-97 and 2008-09 suggests that, compared with 
what would have happened if the 1996-97 structures had been maintained, adjusted for 
only price inflation, those who would have been in the poorest tenth were up to 25 per cent 
better off (see Box 2.4).264 However, compared to a benchmark in which the 1996-97 system 
was adjusted in line with earnings growth, gains at the bottom were still positive, but much 
smaller, for instance 8 per cent for the poorest tenth. This redistribution was selective, with the 
biggest beneficiaries being pensioners and families with children. 
Many of the issues we point to emphasise the importance of policy interventions, often aimed 
at having long-run effects on people’s life chances. The closing of the gender gaps in pay and 
individual incomes – albeit slowly and from high levels – show that the kinds of difference we 
describe are not immutable (Table 10.5).
Equally, public policy can ensure that access to important aspects of life – from health care 
to safe parks and public spaces – does not depend on income, and so is not affected by the 
inequalities we have described.
Schooling and education
(1)  Differences in school readiness by parental resources and social class are apparent 
in the early years and widen before school entry. But they are not set in concrete. 
This underscores both the importance of early years policies and the scale of the 
challenges they continue to face.
(2)  In the school years:
  ❍ Differences by family parental resources widen through the years of compulsory 
schooling, resulting in what remain – despite some recent progress – wide gaps 
between, for instance those receiving Free School Meals and others by 16. This evidence 
supports both the need to reduce child poverty and to improve the educational 
attainment of poor children in general, and substantially to improve staying-on rates 
after 16 of low-income children in particular.
263  Adam and Browne (2009).
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  ❍ Britain has a long tail of low achievement among school-leavers, especially those with 
low literacy, numeracy and information technology skills. The deteriorating position 
through secondary school of low-income boys from White British and Black 
Caribbean backgrounds is a particular concern within this.
  ❍ The overall economic position of the Gypsy and Traveller community is clearly very poor 
in other respects (although the main data sources available to us do not allow precise 
assessment), but the low – and apparently deteriorating – educational achievement of 
children from Gypsy or Traveller families is very troubling.
  ❍ The position of those with particular forms of Special Educational/Additional 
Support Needs is of concern, particularly those with Behavioural and Emotional 
Support Needs in secondary school.
(3)  Considerable differences remain, even after allowing for attainment at 16, in entry into 
higher education, and the kind of institution attended by social class and ethnicity, 
and experience of private education.
The labour market
(4)  In several respects the economic position of young people has deteriorated in recent 
years. For some, low incomes are temporary, reflecting longer periods in education. 
But for other young people it reflects their very weak position in – or in attempting to 
enter – the labour market. The recession appears to have exacerbated these trends, 
raising the acute challenge of avoiding longer-term ‘scarring’ effects from early 
unemployment.
(5)  Pay levels for women and for those from most minority ethnic groups do not reflect 
their qualification levels or improvements in them in recent years. Differences in pay 
by gender and ethnicity remain that are unrelated to qualifications and occupation. 
The transition from education to the labour market is failing to make the best 
use of people’s talents. There are many reasons for this, but we would highlight the 
processes that affect or constrain the sectors and types of employment that people 
end up in – or find difficult to access. There still appears to be straightforward 
discrimination in recruitment, affecting both minority ethnic groups and disabled 
people, particularly in the private sector. 
(6)  The particularly disadvantaged position of the Bangladeshi and Pakistani working age 
populations, cross-cutting with Muslim religious affiliation, was evident across each of 
the labour market outcomes we examined.
(7)  The low level of hourly pay for part-time work reflects both the low value accorded 
to it and a failure of the way we organise work, including the lack of opportunities for 
training and promotion. We need to open up part-time opportunities beyond routine 
and low-paid occupations, and to open up career progression for part-time workers. For 
some, part-time work is their preferred option, but for others, working part-time is the 
result of constrained choices reflecting limited childcare options and assumptions about 
gender roles. 401
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(8)  We were struck across all of the breakdowns of hourly wage levels within different social 
groups by the way in which the National Minimum Wage has created a floor, protecting 
the bottom tenth of earners. Improving the level of the minimum wage relative to 
other wages is a potentially powerful weapon in reducing labour market inequality.
(9)  While a gender pay gap emerges soon after labour market entry, it widens steadily 
through people’s thirties and forties. This is partly a result of lack of career progression 
for most women, underlining the potential importance of a whole series of policies 
related to parental leave and flexible employment as well as childcare provision, 
availability and cost.
(10)  The way in which the disability employment penalty has risen in recent years, in contrast 
to those related to gender and ethnicity, suggests the need for a stronger focus on 
policies affecting the employment of disabled people, particularly those with mental 
health conditions. As with other disadvantaged groups in the labour market, the 
problem is most intense for those with low and with no qualifications, in turn a greater 
issue for older generations. This again suggests the importance of policies that support 
lifelong learning and training that extends beyond the already well-qualified.
(11)  Differential rates of disability and ill-health towards the end of people’s working lives, 
and in life-expectancy after them, have many earlier roots, underscoring policies to 
reduce health inequalities earlier throughout adulthood being addressed by the 
Strategic Review of Health Inequalities in England, chaired by Sir Michael Marmot.
Resources in later life
(12)  Inequalities affecting different groups in the labour market are magnified in the 
resources people reaching retirement have through pensions, housing and savings. 
The end result is huge differences in the resources, including pension rights, with 
which people enter retirement. Recent pension reforms, designed to provide a more 
generous and more secure base on which people with average and low incomes 
can more easily build their own retirement savings, are essential. However, they will 
still leave gaps, affecting the self-employed in particular (affecting some ethnic groups 
more than others), and they cannot compensate for large-scale inequalities in people’s 
working lives.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Low income neighbourhoods
(13)  In 2001, the Government set out a vision that, “within 10 to 20 years, no-one should 
be seriously disadvantaged by where they live”.265 The evidence we have presented 
on the profound differences in all economic outcomes between more and less 
disadvantaged areas suggests we are still a very long way from achieving this goal. 
Whatever the source of these differences, they imply huge disparities in the collective 
resources available from one area to the next, and the need for investments that 
counter their effects. The ‘neighbourhood renewal’ agenda itself needs renewal, 
especially as the impact of recession becomes clear.
(14)  Related to this is the very high level of disadvantage in the labour market which we have 
described for tenants of social housing, related to the way in which access to it is now 
heavily based on showing high levels of need. We need to be more successful in using 
the advantages of security and work incentives that social housing can offer to support 
tenants in moving towards and into employment. Most social tenants have very low 
levels of assets of any kind, not just of housing equity. Measures to support saving and 
asset-building by tenants are needed to address this. 
Devolution 
(15)  Differences in outcomes between the four nations of England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland open up the possibility of learning from one another’s experiences, 
an opportunity which so far is under-exploited. As yet, however, few of those differences 
have been large enough to show in terms of the inequalities we have examined at 
national scale. This in itself presents a challenge to administrations that have set strong 
objectives of greater equality or social justice.
The distributional effect of taxes and spending 
(16)  Through the structure of taxes and benefits, the Government narrows the range of 
incomes that would otherwise result from the market, although less in the UK than 
in many other European countries. Who benefits and tax credits are paid to also 
affects distribution within the household, where resources are not shared equally. The 
progressivity of the tax system and the level of social security benefits and tax 
credits in relation to other incomes are central to this, and to the levels of inequality 
within social groups of the kind that we have observed throughout our work. In the 
wake of the financial crisis and the recession, Government faces the challenge of 
rebalancing the public finances. How this is done will probably be the most important 
influence on how the inequalities both within and between groups evolve from those 
we have described in this report. A fundamental question is now whether the costs of 
recovery will be borne by those who gained least in the period before the crisis, or by 
those who gained most, and are in the strongest position to bear them.
265  Social Exclusion Unit (2001).403
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Britain has moved from being a society where those near the top had three times the incomes 
of those near the bottom in the 1960s and 1970s to one where, since the start of the 1990s, 
they have four times as much. We have still not seen the full results of this shift, as the gainers 
and losers from this process have still only had half their careers within this more unequal 
world.
Much of what we have described in this report shows the way economic advantage and 
disadvantage reinforce themselves across the life cycle, and often on to the next generation. 
It matters more in Britain who your parents are than in many other countries. More generally, 
intergenerational mobility appears lower in societies such as ours which are more unequal 
– moving up a ladder is harder if its rungs are further apart, and those who start higher up 
the ladder will, unsurprisingly, fight harder to make sure their children do not slip down it. A 
fundamental aim of those people with differing political perspectives is to achieve ‘equality of 
opportunity’, but doing so is very hard when there are such wide differences in the resources 




Appendix 1: Members of the National 
Equality Panel
  ❍ Chair: John Hills, Director of the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion and Professor of 
Social Policy at the London School of Economics.
  ❍ Mike Brewer, Director of the Direct Tax and Welfare Programme at the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies.
  ❍ Stephen Jenkins, Professor of Economics at the Institute for Social and Economic 
Research, University of Essex.
  ❍ Ruth Lister, Professor of Social Policy at Loughborough University.
  ❍ Ruth Lupton, Senior Research Fellow in the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion at the 
London School of Economics.
  ❍ Stephen Machin, Professor of Economics at University College London and Research 
Director of the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics.
  ❍ Colin Mills, Reader, in the Sociology Department, University of Oxford.
  ❍ Tariq Modood, Professor in the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, at the 
Bristol Institute for Public Affairs, University of Bristol.
  ❍ Teresa Rees, Professor in the School of Social Sciences and Pro Vice Chancellor 
(Research) at Cardiff University.
  ❍ Sheila Riddell, Professor of Inclusion and Diversity and Director of the Centre for 
Research in Education Inclusion and Diversity, University of Edinburgh.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Appendix 2: Terms of reference for the 
National Equality Panel
The UK Government is committed to promoting a more equal society.
The Equalities Review, which reported in 2007, was a fundamental review of equalities in the 
UK. It focused on the major ‘equality strands’ that are subject to formal anti-discrimination 
measures (gender, race, disability, age, sexual orientation and religion or belief). New 
legislation addressing inequalities in these areas will be set out in the forthcoming Equalities 
Bill. The Minister for Women and Equality now wishes to consider the relationship between 
these ‘equality strands’ and other key dimensions of equality.
Specific questions to be asked:
  ❍ What does the best available evidence reveal about the relationships between the 
‘equality strands’, other dimensions of equality such as class, tenure and geography, 
and employment, income and wealth?
  ❍ What does the evidence reveal about how these have changed over time?
  ❍ What are the gaps in the evidence relating to these questions and how should they be 
addressed?
These questions need to be considered in the context of the Public Service Agreements’ focus 
on narrowing gaps, including:
  ❍ PSA 15: “To address the disadvantage that people experience because of their gender, 
race, disability, age, sexual orientation, and religion or belief.”
  ❍ PSA 8: “Narrowing the gap between the employment rates of the following 
disadvantaged groups and the overall rate: disabled people, lone parents, ethnic 
minorities, people aged 50 and over, those with no qualiﬁ  cations, those living in the 
most deprived local authority wards.”
  ❍ PSA 11: “Narrow the gap in educational achievement between children from low 
income and disadvantaged backgrounds and their peers.”
  ❍ PSA 18: “Reduce health inequalities by 10% by 2010.”407
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Remit
The National Equality Panel will:
1.  assemble the best available evidence relating to the questions set out above;
2.  commission new research as delegated authority allows;
3.  engage with key stakeholders identified in conjunction with the Government Equalities 
Office (GEO);
4.  provide an independent analysis of the evidence;
5.  provide advice to Government on the implications for the direction of policy; and
6.  report to the Minister for Women and Equality by the end of 2009.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Appendix 3: The non-household population
For statistical purposes, a household is defined as ‘one person or a group of people who 
have the accommodation as their only main residence and, for a group, either share at least 
one meal a day or share the living accommodation, that is living room or sitting room’. Non-
household groups are those not living in a house, flat, mobile home or separate quarters. 
They are therefore excluded from the household surveys on which much of the analysis in this 
reports is based.
In this appendix, we present evidence from different sources on the size and the situations of 
some particular non-household groups.
Estimates for the population size of these groups are limited, if available at all. The Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) has recognised the need for a better measurement of their size.266 
The consequence of this is that we are not able to present the kind of detailed analysis for 
these groups that we can present for the rest of the population. However, although it is scant 
and patchy, some quantitative and qualitative research is available. In what follows we draw 
on this limited evidence to give an overview of both the numbers of people resident in the UK 
who are not part of the household population and the economic inequalities/disadvantage 
they experience. 
The ONS mid-2008 estimate of the total population for England and Wales was 54,439,700, 
including those within and outside households. The estimate for the household population 
was 53,422,900. An estimate of the non-household population can be derived as the 
difference between the two numbers, suggesting that the non-household population was 
just over 1 million, or 1.9 per cent of the total resident population. This is similar to Evans’s 
estimate of between 1.7% and 2.1% of the UK population in the early 1990s.267
ONS identifies five categories: health and care establishments; access restricted 
establishments (such as prisons, detention centres, military camps and bases, or royal 
households); educational establishments; managed residential establishments; other 
miscellaneous establishments. This categorisation helps to identify the following groups, on 
which we focus in this appendix, together with their approximate sizes:
  ❍ residential care home residents (around 450,000);
  ❍ looked-after children (around 22,000 not in foster homes);
  ❍ people detained in prison, police cells and detention centres (around 85,000);
  ❍ people in armed forces accommodation (around 220,000);
  ❍ nomadic Gypsies and Travellers (around 100,000); and
  ❍ street homeless people, who are sleeping rough (several hundred or more).
266 ONS  (2009a).
267 Evans  (1995).409
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(a)  People in residential care 
The Department of Health estimates that there are around 400,000 residents in care and 
nursing homes in England and Wales at any one time. This is made up of council-supported 
residents (roughly 230,000); residents who pay for their own care (roughly 100,000) and 
those receiving NHS funded nursing care and continuing healthcare.268 The Welsh Assembly 
Government estimates there are nearly 15,000 people receiving in residential care homes in 
Wales.269 The Scottish Government estimates there are around 31,000 long-stay residents, 
aged over 65, in care homes in Scotland in 2009. 
This substantial group, making up nearly half of the non- household population is 
overwhelmingly drawn from the older population, and so would be expected to have lower 
economic resources on average than the population as a whole. However, there will be a 
substantial range of resources within it, including those who incomes and savings are paying 
for their own care and accommodation.
(b)  Children in care
There are about 60,000 looked-after children in England at any one time.270 This figure 
is increased to about 72,500 when Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are included 
(although there are some legal differences in the definitions, especially between England and 
Scotland). Of those children, around 70 per cent are in foster families in England, Scotland and 
Wales, and 60 per cent in Northern Ireland. If fostered, the children would come within the 
household population, so around 22,000 children may be outside the household population 
for this reason.
Children leaving care are known to face particular disadvantages in education (CRAE, 2007). 
Research commissioned by the Department for Education and Skills found that over half the 
young care leavers sampled (54 per cent) had left school with no qualifications in 2003271, and 
over 29 per cent were not in employment, education or training in 2007272. 
(c)  People in prison
The population in English and Welsh prisons on 20 June 2009 was 83,500, of which 79,200 
were male and 4,300 female. The foreign national prison population was 11,400 (including 
those held under the Immigration Act 1971).
In 2008, 22,400 prisoners were from a non-white ethnic group, 27 per cent of the total prison 
population (mixed 4.4 percent, Asian/Asian British 7 percent, Black/Black British 15 percent, 
Chinese/Other 1.6 percent). Between 2007 and 2008 there was a 7 per cent increase in the 
268  The numbers can vary quite widely over quite a short period.
269  The Welsh Assembly Government (http://dissemination.dataunitwales.gov.uk/webview/index.jsp).
270  The Fostering Network (http://www.fostering.net/media_centre/statistics.php).
271 Dixon  et al. (2006).
272 Cabinet  Ofﬁ  ce (2009b).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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number of prisoners from black and minority ethnic background compared to a 3 per cent 
increase in White prisoners.273
Prison inmates usually have very low levels of current income. While their past circumstances 
are varied, prisoners have backgrounds that disproportionately involve low levels of literacy 
and numeracy, high levels of unemployment and low wages. On leaving custody, former 
prisoners face substantial labour market and financial problems, and often have high rates of 
mental health problems.274
(d) Armed forces
There are nearly 50,000 Service Family Accommodation properties in the UK in 2009, but 
8,400 were vacant. At April 2009, there were around 142,000 people (service personnel and 
their dependants) in these properties in Great Britain. 
In addition, there were 77,000 people living in ‘Single Living Accommodation’ (what would be 
popularly be known as barracks or their equivalent). 
This group will by definition almost all have income from employment, with a wide range 
of earnings. For instance, in 2009-10, the salary for a private is £16,681; for a corporal it is 
£32,532. Others vary from £45,836 for a warrant officer I to £98,984 for a brigadier. The 
highest paid people in the army, generals, have a salary of £172,130.
(e) Gypsies and Travellers 
The precise number of nomadic Gypsies and Travellers is difficult to estimate as their numbers 
are not recorded at present in census records.275 The Council of Europe has estimated the 
number at around 300,000 - 200,000 housed, and 100,000 in caravans.276 Around 100,000 
Gypsies and Travellers in England and Wales are therefore likely to be outside the household 
population.
We are able to analyse the often very low educational achievement of Gypsy and Traveller 
pupils, as they are recorded in the Pupil Level Annual Schools Census (PLASC) (see Chapters 3 
and 11).
As Box 3.2 in Chapter 3 describes in more detail, Gypsy and Traveller communities in 
Britain experience wide-ranging problems associated with economic inclusion and access 
to employment; relationships with and experiences of accessing healthcare, social care, 
education and other public services; experiences of the legal and criminal justice systems; 
racism and discrimination; housing; political participation; literacy; and life expectancy.277
273  Ministry of Justice (2009).
274  Social Exclusion Unit (2002).
275  The Traveller Law Reform Project (2009). The 2011 Census in England and Wales will include Gypsies and 
Travellers as an ethnic group.
276  Friends, Families and Travellers (2008).
277 Cemlyn  et al. (2009).411
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(f) Homeless people sleeping rough
Communities and Local Government, from counts carried out from January 2007 to June 
2008, estimates that there were 483 people sleeping rough in England on any one night, 
although there are many reasons why the actual numbers and their composition are hard 
to establish. Nearly a quarter of those were in the London Borough of Westminster alone. 
The Combined Homeless Action and Information Network (CHAIN) estimates around 3,000 
individuals sleep rough at different times over the year in London.278 The CHAIN database 
also showed that roughly 87 per cent of people sleeping rough were male.
There are many reasons why people become homeless, and some of these are related to the 
extreme ends of the economic inequalities that form the focus of this report. People may 
be sleeping rough because of poverty, debt, unemployment, lack of affordable housing, but 
also because of health issues; patterns of migration; leaving care, prison or hospital. Clearly 
virtually all of this group have very low resources indeed. More specifically, the reasons for 
sleeping rough were problems relating to alcohol (49 per cent), drugs (41 per cent), and mental 
health (35 per cent), which are likely to be associated with other labour market problems both 
before and after periods of street homelessness.
Some asylum-seekers may be street-homeless or ‘sofa-surfing’ in circumstances that would 
mean they were missed by surveys covering the household with which they were staying 
temporarily. Household surveys do not ask about whether people are asylum-seekers or 
refugees, so we have no information on their numbers in the resident population or their 
position within the distributions we examine. Box 9.4 reports other kinds of evidence on the 
circumstances of some of them.
Summary
Approximately 1.9 per cent of the UK population, or more than one million people, are part 
of the non-household population. Some of those who have the very lowest levels of economic 
resources are outside the household population, and therefore many of the data sources 
we are able to use will not include them. However, some of those who are excluded are not 
necessarily poor. The largest groups that are omitted – those in residential care homes for 
the elderly and those living in armed forces accommodation – have a range of resources that 
are not so different from others of similar ages. As a corollary, the data we can use on the 
household population, while incomplete, can still present a fair picture of the circumstances of 
the population as a whole. 
278  Communities and Local Government (2008).412
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Appendix 4: List of evidence gathering visits
  ❍ Institute for Economic and Social Research at the University of Essex
  ❍ Equality and Human Rights Commission
  ❍ Centre for Longitudinal Studies, Institute of Education
  ❍ Ofﬁ  ce for Disability Issues
  ❍ Department for Children, Schools and Families
  ❍ Department for Work and Pensions
  ❍ Institute for Fiscal Studies
  ❍ Cabinet Ofﬁ  ce
  ❍ Centre for Market and Public Organisation at the University of Bristol
  ❍ Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at the University of Bristol
  ❍ Townsend Centre for International Poverty Research at the University of Bristol
  ❍ Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) at the London School of Economics
  ❍ Centre for the Economics of Education (CEE) at the London School of Economics
  ❍ Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion at the London School of Economics
  ❍ Joseph Rowntree Foundation
  ❍ Communities and Local Government
  ❍ Scottish Government
  ❍ Welsh Assembly Government
  ❍ HM Treasury
  ❍ Sutton Trust
  ❍ Department for Innovation, University and Skills (now part of the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills)
  ❍ Department of Social Policy and Social Work at the University of Oxford
  ❍ Department of Sociology, University of Oxford
  ❍ Ofﬁ  ce of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland413
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Appendix 5: Call for Evidence
The National Equality Panel issued a Call for Evidence in November 2008 and received 25 
formal submissions from a range of organisations and academics. These formed an essential 
part of the Panel’s gathering of its evidence.
The following organisations submitted evidence to the Panel:
  ❍ Age Concern and Help the Aged
  ❍ British Humanist Society
  ❍ British Naturism
  ❍ Carers UK
  ❍ Catholic Bishops Conference of England & Wales
  ❍ Centre for British African Caribbean Studies (CBACS)
  ❍ Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
  ❍ Centre for Research on Families and Relationships (CRFR)
  ❍ Centre for Research on Ageing and Gender
  ❍ Children’s Rights Alliance England
  ❍ The Equality and Diversity Forum
  ❍ Fawcett Society
  ❍ Institute for Employment Studies
  ❍ Institute for Public Policy Research
  ❍ Learning and Skills Improvement Service
  ❍ Leonard Cheshire Disability
  ❍ The Lesbian and Gay Foundation
  ❍ National Housing Association
  ❍ Nemton Research Foundation
  ❍ Royal National Institute of Blind People
  ❍ Runnymede Trust
  ❍ Stonewall
All the submissions are available on our website.
Individuals submitting evidence included:
  ❍ Dr Jonathan Bradshaw (University of York)
  ❍ Professor Ian Plewis (University of Manchester)
  ❍ Professor Ludi Simpson (University of Manchester)An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Appendix 6: Stakeholder events
To inform its work, the Panel held two events for organisations and individuals with interests 
and expertise in some of the issues covered by our remit. Summaries of the main points made 
in discussion at these events are available on our website.
First Stakeholder Seminar – March 2009
As part of our evidence-gathering, we held a seminar at the beginning of March 2009 to 
draw on the expertise of different stakeholders on issues around inequality in the UK. The day 
included presentations around different equality strands including gender, sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, religion/belief, age and disability. Presenters included:
  ❍ Katherine Rake from the Fawcett Society
  ❍ Derek Munn from Stonewall
  ❍ Karen Chouhan from 1990 Trust
  ❍ Zamila Bungawala from the Young Foundation
  ❍ Andrew Harrop from Age Concern
  ❍ Carla Garnelas from the Children’s Rights Alliance England
  ❍ Sarah Veale from the TUC
  ❍ Rowen Jade from Equality 2025
Second Stakeholder Seminar – June 2009
We held a second seminar at the end of June to update stakeholders with some of the 
evidence the Panel had been drawing on during the first part of its work. The event also 
allowed for feedback from those who attended. The day was structured around four 
presentations looking at how inequalities develop across the life-course, followed by responses 
from experts in the field, and then general discussions. Presenters and respondents included:
  ❍ Intergenerational links and pre-school years:
–  Presentation by Professor John Hills, chair of the National Equality Panel
–  Response from Professor Jane Waldfogel, Columbia University, New York
  ❍ School years:
–  Presentation by Dr Ruth Lupton, Panel member
–  Response from Professor Geoff Whitty, Institute of Education415
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  ❍ Working age:
–  Presentation by Mike Brewer, Panel member
–  Response from Professor Richard Berthoud, Institute for Social and Economic, 
Research, University of Essex
  ❍ Older age and retirement:
–  Presentation by Professor Stephen Jenkins, Panel member
–  Response from Chris Curry from the Pensions Policy InstituteAn anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Appendix 7: List of research projects 
commissioned by the Panel
1.  Passing through school: the evolution of attainment of England’s ethnic minorities. 
Simon Burgess, Deborah Wilson and Jack Worth, Centre for Market and Public 
Organisation (CMPO), University of Bristol
2.  Decomposing pay gaps across the wage distribution: Investigating inequalities of 
ethno- religious groups and disabled people. Simonetta Longhi, Cheti Nicoletti and 
Lucinda Platt, the Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex
3.  Inequalities in educational outcomes among children aged 3 to 16. Alissa Goodman, 
Luke Sibieta and Elizabeth Washbrook, Institute for Fiscal Studies
4.  Spaghetti unravelled: A model-based description of income-age trajectories. 
Stephen Jenkins, Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex
5.  Special Educational Needs in England. Francois Keslair and Sandra McNally, Centre for 
Economic Performance, London School of Economics
6.  Gay pay in the UK update. Reza Arabsheibani, Alan Marin and Jonathan Wadsworth, 
Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics
7.  Differences in the labour market gains from Higher Education participation. 
Stephen Machin, Richard Murphy and Zeenat Soobedar, Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics
8.  Differences in the labour market gains from qualifications. Stephen Machin, 
Richard Murphy and Zeenat Soobedar, Centre for Economic Performance, London 
School of Economics
9.  An investigation of educational outcomes by ethnicity and religion. Simon Burgess, 
Ellen Greaves and Deborah Wilson, CMPO, University of Bristol
10.  Accounting for changes in inequality since 1968: Decomposition analysis for Great 
Britain. Mike Brewer, Liam Wren-Lewis and Alistair Muriel, Institute for Fiscal Studies
The final reports from all of these pieces of research are available on our website and those of 
the institutions which carried it out.417
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Appendix 8: Relationship between outcomes 
The following four tables each show the ways in which outcomes in one of the dimensions we 
examine are related to those in another:
  ❍ Highest qualiﬁ  cation with employment status
  ❍ Highest qualiﬁ  cation with hourly wages
  ❍ Hourly wages and employment status with net individual income
  ❍ Net individual income with equivalent net income
The tables show what percentage of those in each category listed vertically are found within 
each category listed across the table (so each row totals 100). The first two tables are drawn 
from the Labour Force Survey, 2006-2008, and the second two from the Individual Income 
Series, based on the Family Resources Survey, 2005-06 to 2007-08. 
Table A1: Relationship between outcomes







































Higher degree 65 12 11 2 1 3 1 3 2
Degree 62 13 12 3 2 3 1 3 2
Higher 
education
54 19 9 2 2 3 3 5 2
GCE A Level or 
equiv.




43 21 7 5 7 7 4 3 3
Level 1 40 20 7 8 4 9 7 3 3
Other 
qualiﬁ  cations
47 14 11 4 2 7 6 5 3
No 
qualiﬁ  cation
24 15 8 5 5 12 17 10 4
Don't know 56 10 12 4 4 4 5 3 3
Source: LFS, 2006-2008.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Table A1: (Continued)
(b) Hourly wages by highest qualification, all employees, UK





ﬁ  fth 
(%)
3rd 
ﬁ  fth 
(%)
4th 
ﬁ  fth 
(%)
Highest 
ﬁ  fth 
(%)
Highest qualiﬁ  cation
Higher degree 3 4 8 26 58
Degree 6 9 15 27 44
Higher education 9 13 20 31 27
GCE A level or equivalent 19 22 25 21 13
GCSE grades A-C or equivalent 27 27 23 15 8
Level 1 33 29 22 12 4
Other qualiﬁ  cations 29 27 21 14 9
No qualiﬁ  cation 43 29 17 8 3
Don't know 25 27 23 17 8
Source: LFS 2006-2008 (at 2008 prices).






ﬁ  fth 
(%)
3rd 
ﬁ  fth 
(%)
4th 
ﬁ  fth 
(%)
Highest 
ﬁ  fth 
(%)
Hourly wages, all employees
Lowest ﬁ  fth 33 31 18 10 7
2nd ﬁ  f t h 01 1 7 1 1 44
3rd ﬁ  fth 0 0 22 73 6
4th ﬁ  fth 0 0 0 52 49
Highest ﬁ  fth 0 0 0 0 100
Employment status
Full-time employee 2 6 21 33 39
Part-time employee 16 31 25 19 9
Self-employed 19 15 17 19 31
Unemployed 80 14 4 2 0
Retired 23 35 23 13 6
Student 73 16 7 3 2
Looking after family/home 57 28 10 3 1
Permanently sick/disabled 39 34 19 7 1
Temporarily sick/injured 67 23 8 3 0
Other inactive 67 17 9 5 3
Source: Individual Income series 2005-06 to 2007-08 (at 2008 prices).419
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Table A1: (Continued)
(d) Equivalent net income by net individual income, all adults, UK





ﬁ  fth 
(%)
3rd 
ﬁ  fth 
(%)
4th 
ﬁ  fth 
(%)
Highest 
ﬁ  fth 
(%)
Net individual income (£)
Lowest ﬁ  fth 37 26 18 11 8
2nd ﬁ  fth 17 40 25 12 6
3rd ﬁ  f t h 3 2 13 92 61 2
4th ﬁ  fth 1 7 21 44 27
Highest ﬁ  fth 1 1 6 19 75
Source: Individual Income Series 2005-06 to 2007-08 (at 2008 prices).An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Appendix 9: International comparisons of 
teenage attainment
International comparisons of teenage attainment have become possible thanks to 
studies that administer standardised tests in various subjects to a sample of children from 
participating countries. The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
by the OECD and the Third International Maths and Science Study (TIMMS) are two of 
the international studies that assess and compare achievements across countries. In this 
appendix, we present some of their findings.
PISA results
PISA assessed reading, mathematics and science among 15 to 16 year-olds in the UK in 2000, 
2003 and 2006. 62 countries have signed up to the fourth assessment in 2009, for which 
results are not yet available. The test is administered to between 4,500 and 10,000 students 
in each country.
In 2006, the mean score on the reading scale in the UK was 495, just above the average 
OECD score of 492. The inequality of the UK distribution was also very similar to the average 
OECD range, with scores very close to the OECD average for the 5th, 10th, 25th and 75th 
percentiles. It is at the very top, the 90th and 95th percentiles, that the UK score was slightly 
higher than that for the OECD average, resulting in a slightly higher 95:5 ratio. 
The UK score of 351 on the mathematics scale was slightly above the OECD average of 346. 
Scores were also very similar across the whole of the distribution, resulting in a 95:5 ratio of 
1.83 for the UK and 1.87 for the OECD average.
TIMSS results
TIMSS provides data on trends in science and mathematics achievements over time. It is 
carried out every four years, with the latest results available for 2007. England and Scotland 
participated separately in this study; Wales and Northern Ireland were not part of it.
Mathematics achievement for English 14-year-olds, at 513, was above the TIMSS average of 
500, while that of Scottish pupils, at 487, was below the TIMSS average. England was ranked 
seventh, and Scotland seventeenth, out of 49 countries.
The range of achievements for England and Scotland were no wider than those in many 
of the other countries, with the distance between the bottom 5th and the top 5th of the 
distributions smaller, particularly in Scotland, than in some others. However, England had 
lower scores at the bottom of the achievement range than the other countries that had 
average achievement above the overall series average. 421
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Table A2: PISA 2006 – Mean and percentile scores on the reading and mathematics 




5th 10th 25th 75th 90th 95th
Reading
Korea 556 399 440 503 617 663 688
Finland 547 410 441 494 603 649 675
Canada 527 357 402 468 593 644 674
New Zealand 521 339 381 453 595 651 683
Ireland 517 358 395 457 582 633 661
Australia 513 349 388 453 579 628 656
Poland 508 335 374 441 579 633 663
Sweden 507 335 378 445 575 629 658
Netherlands 507 332 379 446 578 622 649
Belgium 501 297 347 433 581 631 657
Switzerland 499 331 373 440 566 615 642
Japan 498 317 361 433 569 623 654
United Kingdom 495 318 359 431 566 621 653
Germany 495 299 350 429 573 625 657
Denmark 494 339 378 437 557 604 633
Austria 490 298 348 421 568 621 651
France 488 298 346 421 564 614 639
Iceland 484 314 356 423 552 603 633
Norway 484 301 346 416 558 613 643
Czech Republic 483 290 335 408 564 621 653
Hungary 482 318 359 422 549 595 623
Luxembourg 479 302 344 415 552 602 630
Portugal 472 299 339 408 543 594 622
Italy 469 276 325 402 546 599 627
Slovak Republic 466 281 326 398 542 597 628
Spain 461 304 343 405 523 569 594
Greece 460 272 321 398 531 583 613
Turkey 447 291 330 388 510 564 594
Mexico 410 247 285 348 478 530 559






5th 10th 25th 75th 90th 95th
Mathematics
Finland 548 411 444 494 605 652 678
Korea 547 392 426 485 612 664 694
Netherlands 531 382 412 467 596 645 672
Switzerland 530 362 401 464 600 652 682
Canada 527 383 416 470 587 635 664
Japan 523 370 404 463 587 638 668
New Zealand 522 368 401 458 587 643 674
Belgium 520 337 381 451 598 650 678
Australia 520 375 406 460 581 633 663
Denmark 513 371 404 456 572 621 649
Czech Republic 510 340 376 441 582 644 677
Iceland 506 357 391 446 567 618 646
Austria 505 338 373 438 577 630 657
Germany 504 339 375 437 574 632 664
Sweden 502 354 387 442 565 617 649
Ireland 501 366 396 445 559 608 634
France 496 334 369 429 565 617 646
United Kingdom 495 351 381 434 557 612 643
Poland 495 353 384 435 557 610 638
Slovak Republic 492 333 370 433 558 611 640
Hungary 491 343 377 431 551 609 643
Luxembourg 490 332 368 426 555 610 641
Norway 490 339 373 428 552 609 638
Spain 480 332 366 421 542 593 622
United States 474 328 358 411 537 593 625
Portugal 466 315 348 404 530 583 612
Italy 462 305 341 398 527 584 616
Greece 459 304 341 399 522 575 607
Turkey 424 287 316 360 477 550 595
Mexico 406 268 299 349 463 514 546
OECD average 498 346 379 436 561 615 645
Source: OECD (2007).423
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Table A3: TIMSS 2007 – Distribution of mathematics achievement after 8 years of 





5th 10th 25th 75th 90th 95th
Chinese Taipei 598 403 448 535 672 721 748
Korea, Rep. of 597 435 475 537 662 711 738
Singapore 593 422 463 533 661 706 731
Hong Kong SAR 572 394 438 518 638 681 706
Japan 570 424 460 515 628 677 704
Hungary 517 375 405 459 576 624 652
England 513 366 400 459 574 618 642
Russian Federation 512 372 402 455 569 617 644
United States 508 379 408 456 563 607 633
Lithuania 506 371 402 453 561 609 635
Czech Republic 504 382 408 455 552 599 629
Slovenia 501 384 409 454 550 594 619
TIMSS  Scale  Average 500       
Armenia 499 351 390 448 554 601 629
Australia 496 365 394 443 548 600 630
Sweden 491 371 399 446 539 582 604
Malta 488 315 359 431 553 597 622
Scotland 486 355 381 432 544 590 616
Serbia 486 333 368 427 548 597 624
Italy 480 349 381 430 532 574 600
Malaysia 474 342 372 421 529 578 603
Norway 469 356 382 425 517 552 571
Cyprus 465 310 347 409 528 575 603
Bulgaria 464 280 324 398 536 586 617
Israel 463 287 328 400 533 584 615
Ukraine 462 310 346 404 523 572 603
Romania 461 289 328 395 533 587 616
Bosnia and Herzegovina 456 322 352 405 509 552 578
Lebanon 449 329 354 397 502 549 574
Thailand 441 297 327 378 501 562 600
Turkey 432 263 297 354 503 581 624
Jordan 427 253 290 356 503 556 584
Tunisia 420 313 336 375 466 508 532







5th 10th 25th 75th 90th 95th
Iran, Islamic Republic of 403 266 295 344 459 516 551
Bahrain 398 259 289 340 457 505 533
Indonesia 397 254 286 338 456 509 541
Syrian Arab Republic 395 259 290 339 452 502 530
Egypt 391 222 258 321 462 521 553
Algeria 387 291 311 346 427 465 485
Colombia 380 250 281 329 431 477 507
Oman 372 207 245 309 440 492 521
Palestinian National 
Authority
367 195 233 297 439 498 530
Botswana 364 236 264 312 415 460 489
Kuwait 354 221 252 301 408 455 481
El Salvador 340 222 248 291 389 433 462
Saudi Arabia 329 202 231 278 382 429 457
Ghana 309 162 192 246 372 428 461
Qatar 307 152 186 243 370 427 461
Morocco 381 251 278 323 438 486 511
Source: Horne et al. (2008). 425
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Appendix 10: International comparison of 
highest qualiﬁ  cations of the working age 
population
‘On average in OECD countries, university-level graduation rates have risen by 15 percentage 
points over the last 11 years and virtually every country saw some increase. In contrast to 
patterns in the early 1990s, in almost every OECD country university graduation rates among 
females are higher than among males’.279
Table A4 shows the distribution of educational attainment of the 25-to-64-year-old 
population in OECD countries, according to the International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED). 
Tertiary education, according to the ISCED classification, corresponds roughly to the top three 
categories used in Figure 2.2 (Higher Education, Degree and Higher Degree). In 2006, 30 per 
cent of the United Kingdom adult population (25-64) had achieved tertiary education, which 
was a higher proportion than the OECD average of 27 per cent. This was a similar fraction to 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden, but higher than that for Germany and lower than for 
Denmark and Finland. 
The ‘upper secondary’ category includes GCSE grades A*-C, A levels and equivalent 
qualifications. 68 per cent of the UK population had at least upper secondary education, 
just below the OECD average of 69 per cent. This was a lower proportion than Germany, 
Finland, or the Netherlands, but higher than in Spain or Greece. It was in the proportion of the 
working population with below upper secondary qualifications where the UK (at 31 per cent) 
compared most unfavourably with countries such as Germany (with only 17 per cent).
Figure A1 shows that it was the younger cohort of people between 25 and 34 years of age 
that were most likely to have an upper secondary education than the cohort of 55 to 64 year 
olds, in all countries. However, the UK’s young cohort was less likely to attain at least upper 
secondary education than their peers in most other European countries. 75 per cent of the 
25-34 year olds in the UK had attained at least upper secondary education in 2006, 
compared to an OECD average of 78 per cent. This comparison is more favourable for the 
older cohort: 61 per cent of 55-64 year olds in the UK had attained at least upper secondary 
education, compared to an OECD average of 55 per cent.
279  Education at a Glance 2008: OECD indicators’ webpage, accessed on 13 August 2009.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Tertiary level of 
education
Canada 14 39 47
Japan 0 60 40
United States 12 48 39
New Zealand 31 31 38
Finland 20 44 35
Denmark 18 47 35
Australia 33 34 33
Korea 23 44 33
Norway 21 46 33
Belgium 33 35 32
Sweden 16 54 31
Ireland 34 35 30
Netherlands 28 42 30
United Kingdom 31 38 30
Switzerland 15 55 30
Iceland 37 34 30
Spain 50 21 28
France 33 41 26
Luxembourg 34 42 24
Germany 17 59 24
Greece 41 37 22
Poland 47 35 18
Austria 20 63 18
Hungary 22 60 17
Mexico 78 7 15
Slovak Republic 13 72 14
Czech Republic 10 77 14
Portugal 72 14 13
Italy 49 38 13
Turkey 72 18 10
OECD average 31 42 27
Source: OECD (2009). 427
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Figure A1: Population that has attained at least upper secondary education (2007) 
(percentages) 
Source: OECD (2009), table A1.2a.
Notes: 1. Year of reference 2002, 2. Year of reference 2004.
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Appendix 11: International comparison of 
employment patterns
Data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EULFS) provide comparable statistics on 
the labour markets of EU countries.
The UK had a relatively high rate of employment in 2008 compared to other European 
countries: 71.5 per cent overall compared to an average in the Euro area of 66 per cent. The 
employment rate for women was also higher (66 per cent) in the UK than in most other EU 
countries except for the North European and Scandinavian ones. It was 7 percentage points 
higher than the Euro area average of 59 per cent. However, the UK had a higher percentage 
of women working part-time (42 per cent) than the average for the Euro area (35 per cent). 
The ILO unemployment rate at 5.6 per cent was relatively low, almost 2 percentage points 
lower than the Euro area average of 7.5 per cent. 
The UK economic inactivity rate was nearly 6 percentage points lower than the Euro area 
average. Within this, the inactivity rate for women, at 44 per cent, was lower than the rate for 
the Euro area average, at 50 per cent. 429
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Total Men Women Men Women Total Total
Iceland 83.6 87.3 79.6 9.5 33.7 18.1
Switzerland 79.5 85.4 73.5 13.5 59 31.8
Denmark 78.1 81.9 74.3 14.2 36.5 3.3 34
Norway 78 80.5 75.4 14.4 43.6 2.5 26.2
Netherlands 77.2 83.2 71.1 23.9 75.3 2.8 33.4
Sweden 74.3 76.7 71.8 13.3 41.4 6.2 28.7
Austria 72.1 78.5 65.8 8.1 41.5 3.8 38.8
United Kingdom 71.5 77.3 65.8 11.3 41.8 5.6 37.2
Finland 71.1 73.1 69 8.9 18.2 6.4 38.5
Cyprus 70.9 79.2 62.9 4.8 11.4 3.7 35.8
Germany 70.7 75.9 65.4 9.4 45.4 7.3 40.3
Estonia 69.8 73.6 66.3 4.1 10.4 5.5 38.9
Ireland 67.6 74.9 60.2 .. .. 6 36.6
Czech Republic 66.6 75.4 57.6 2.2 8.5 4.4 41.5
Euro area1 66.1 73.4 58.8 7.7 35 7.5 42.8
France 65.2 69.8 60.7 5.8 29.4 7.8 43.1
Spain 64.3 73.5 54.9 4.2 22.7 11.3 40.9
Lithuania 64.3 67.1 61.8 4.9 8.6 5.8 43.3
Bulgaria 64 68.5 59.5 2 2.7 5.6 46.2
Luxembourg 63.4 71.5 55.1 2.7 38.3 4.9 44
Belgium 62.4 68.6 56.2 7.9 40.9 7 46.3
Slovakia 62.3 70 54.6 1.4 4.2 9.5 40.7
Greece 61.9 75 48.7 2.8 9.9 7.7 46.5
Poland 59.2 66.3 52.4 5.9 11.7 7.1 45.8
Romania 59 65.7 52.5 9.1 10.8 5.8 45.5
Italy 58.7 70.3 47.2 5.3 27.9 6.8 50.7
Croatia 57.8 64.9 50.7 6.7 11.5 8.4 51.5
Hungary 56.7 63 50.6 3.3 6.2 7.8 49.9
Malta 55.2 72.5 37.4 4.5 25.5 6 50.6
Turkey 45.9 67.7 24.3 5.6 20.8 9.8 52.4
Source: EUROSTAT (accessed 14 August 2009).
Note: 1. Euro Area: 15 member states of the European Union, which use the Euro as their currency.An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Appendix 12: Earnings in ASHE and LFS
280
There are two main data sources for earnings in the UK: the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and 
the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), formerly known as the New Earnings Survey 
(NES).
ASHE and LFS collect similar information on earnings and hours worked, but their purpose 
and the methodologies adopted are different. ASHE provides accurate information on 
earnings, hours and the characteristics of the employer, but little personal information on the 
employee. The LFS has detailed personal information but less accurate earnings information.
ASHE is an annual 1 per cent sample of employees, resulting in around 140,000 records per 
year. It was first carried out in 2004, replacing and extending the NES sample to improve 
coverage of the low paid. Employers are asked to provide detailed information on the hours 
and earnings of their employees and on the workplace characteristics. The only additional 
information about employees reported in ASHE is gender and age. This information is derived 
from employers’ pay records.
In contrast, the LFS is a quarterly sample survey of about 60,000 households living in private 
addresses in the UK, resulting in 150,000 individuals being covered in each quarter. The 
survey collects information on respondents’ personal circumstances, including personal 
characteristics such ethnicity, disability, age, gender, religion, during a specific reference 
period, normally a period of one week or four weeks (depending on the topic) immediately 
prior to the interview. The earnings of the self-employed are not recorded in the LFS. 
Information on all individuals in the household is provided by the respondent, sometimes 
without any reference to documentary evidence such as pay slips. These ‘proxy’ responses 
mean that earnings data are less likely to be accurate. The measures of hours worked is also 
likely to differ between the two surveys. While employers report paid hours, respondents tend 
to report the hours they actually work, though few people keep a record of the numbers of 
hours they work in a week.
Table A6 compares the hourly and weekly earnings for all employees of the two surveys at 
different points of the distribution, the 10th, median and 90th percentile. For both hourly 
and weekly earnings, at all the three points of the distributions, the figures are lower (by up 
to 10 per cent) in the LFS than in the ASHE. This difference is slightly more pronounced for 
weekly pay at the bottom end of the distribution and for hourly rates at the top end of the 
distribution. The extent of inequality (the 90:10 ratio) is, however, very similar for the two 
surveys: around 3.9 for hourly pay and 7.5 for weekly pay.
280  See Ormerod and Ritchie (2007) for a technical exposition of the characteristics of the two datasets and how 
to link them.431
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Table A6: Gross pay in the LFS and ASHE, 2008 (£)
P10 P50 P90
LFS
Hourly 5.53 9.87 21.33
Weekly 107 363 813
ASHE
Hourly 6.00 10.61 23.62
Weekly 117.2 388.4 852.8An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Appendix 13: Coverage and gaps in the data 
sets used
The following table presents the datasets that have informed the analysis and the findings 
presented in this report. The first eight are those which we make most use of in Chapters 2-8. 
Dataset Coverage Organisation (Sponsor)
National Pupil Database and 
Pupil Level Annual School 
Census (PLASC), England, 
Wales 
Gender; Ethnicity by narrow 
categories (including Gypsies 
and Travellers); Free school 
meals; Special Educational 
Needs; Region.
Department for Children, 
Schools and Families
Welsh Assembly Government
Northern Ireland School 
Census, Northern Ireland
Gender; Religion; Ethnicity; 
English as second language; 
Special educational needs; 
Free school meals; Looked 
after children.
Department of Education, 
Northern Ireland
Pupil Census, Scotland Gender; Ethnicity; Additional 
Support Needs; Urban/Rural.
Scottish Government
Labour Force Survey Age; Gender; Ethnicity; 
Religious affiliation; 
Disability; Whether living as 
part of a same sex couple; 
Housing tenure; Household 
social class/NS SEC (National 
Statistics Socio-economic 
Classification); Region.
Office for National Statistics
National Survey of Adults 
Basic Skills in Wales
Gender; Age; Self-reported 
health; Highest qualification; 
Occupational category; 
Welsh language use; Welsh 
region; Social Class. 
Welsh Assembly Government
Skills for Life Survey  Gender; Age; First Language; 
Region; Urban/Rural, 
Household NS-SEC 
(5 groups); Household 
Social Class (I to V); Health; 
Learning disabilities; Highest 
qualification; Occupational 
category.
Department for Children, 
Schools and Families433
Appendices
Annual Survey of Hourly 
Earnings
Age; Gender. Office for National Statistics
Family Resources Survey Age, Gender, Ethnicity; 
Disability; NS-SEC; Region; 
Housing tenure; Deprivation.
Office for National Statistics
Wealth and Assets Survey Gender; Age; Ethnicity; 
Disability; Same-sex 
cohabitation, NS-SEC; Region; 
Housing tenure.
Office for National Statistics
Avon Longitudinal Study of 
Parents and Children
Gender; Deprivation; Parental 
Occupation and Social Class; 
Housing tenure; Special 
Educational Needs.
University of Bristol
British Household Panel 
Study
Age; Gender; Educational 
qualification. 
University of Essex
Destination of Leavers from 
Higher Education Short 
Survey
Age; Gender; Subject of 
study; University attended; 
Standard Industrial 
Classification of employer; 
Standard Occupational 




Higher Education Statistics 
Authority
Destination of Leavers 
from Higher Education 
Longitudinal Survey
Age; Gender; Subject of 
study; University attended; 
Standard Industrial 
Classification of Employer; 
Standard Occupational 




Higher Education Statistics 
Authority
English Longitudinal Study of 
Ageing
Age; Gender; Family type; 
Ethnicity; Housing tenure; 
Social class; Region; 
Deprivation; Limiting illness 
and work disability; Urban/
rural; Self-reported health.
Institute for Fiscal StudiesAn anatomy of economic inequality in the UK
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Longitudinal Study of Young 
People in England 
Gender; Family NS-SEC; 
Special Educational Needs; 
Ethnicity; Free school meals; 
Parental highest educational 
qualifications; Home 
ownership; Deprivation; First 
Language; Month of birth.
Department for Children, 
Schools and Families
Millennium Cohort Study Age; Gender; NS-SEC; 
Ethnicity; Religion; Housing 
tenure; Region; Language 
spoken; Parental occupation 
and social class. 
Institute of Education, 
University of London
Chapter 15 of the EHRC Research Report 31, Developing the Equality Measurement 
Framework: selecting the indicators, by Sabine Alkire et al. (2009) contains a full assessment 
of equality data, including coverage of equality characteristics and gaps, as well as 
developments underway or planned to fill the main gaps, such as those for sexual orientation. 
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) sexual identity project, aimed to develop questioning 
to be used on social surveys and for equality monitoring purposes, resulted in the inclusion of 
a question on sexual orientation in the Integrated Household Survey (IHS) in January 2009. 
The first data will become available for analysis in 2010. Data collected in the first year will be 
used to produce the first baseline estimates of the size and characteristics of the lesbian, gay 
and bisexual (LGB) populations.435
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